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Trust and security
Anton Aliev edited this page Oct 24, 2026
·
2 revisions
| Layer | Current boundary |
|---|---|
| Local inference | The broker uses the configured backend; a caller may forward returned data |
| Package integrity | ECDSA-signed manifest and package hashes |
| Release-asset attestation | Records published bytes; does not by itself prove a build from the declared source |
| Windows publisher identity | SignPath onboarding remains planned in #210; no publisher certificate is confirmed here |
---
config:
theme: base
themeVariables:
primaryColor: "#CCE4F7"
primaryTextColor: "#1A1A1A"
primaryBorderColor: "#2D7FD3"
lineColor: "#0067C0"
secondaryColor: "#FAFAFA"
tertiaryColor: "#F3F3F3"
---
flowchart LR
source["Reviewed source"] --> build["Trusted CI build"]
build --> approval["Human signing approval"]
approval --> own["Sign own PE binaries"]
own --> package["Final ZIP"]
package --> manifest["Hash and sign manifest"]
manifest --> verify["Verify and publish"]
This is the target signing route, not proof that a signed release already exists. Do not sign upstream DLLs as project-owned code. Do not modify a package after its hash and manifest signature are computed.
Code signing policy · Privacy · Publication checklist · Report a vulnerability privately.
Source: dedd223a9af7. Changes via pull request.
MIT · Source · Privacy · Code signing policy