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Trust and security

Anton Aliev edited this page Oct 24, 2026 · 2 revisions

Trust, privacy and signing

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Layer Current boundary
Local inference The broker uses the configured backend; a caller may forward returned data
Package integrity ECDSA-signed manifest and package hashes
Release-asset attestation Records published bytes; does not by itself prove a build from the declared source
Windows publisher identity SignPath onboarding remains planned in #210; no publisher certificate is confirmed here
---
config:
  theme: base
  themeVariables:
    primaryColor: "#CCE4F7"
    primaryTextColor: "#1A1A1A"
    primaryBorderColor: "#2D7FD3"
    lineColor: "#0067C0"
    secondaryColor: "#FAFAFA"
    tertiaryColor: "#F3F3F3"
---
flowchart LR
  source["Reviewed source"] --> build["Trusted CI build"]
  build --> approval["Human signing approval"]
  approval --> own["Sign own PE binaries"]
  own --> package["Final ZIP"]
  package --> manifest["Hash and sign manifest"]
  manifest --> verify["Verify and publish"]
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This is the target signing route, not proof that a signed release already exists. Do not sign upstream DLLs as project-owned code. Do not modify a package after its hash and manifest signature are computed.

Code signing policy · Privacy · Publication checklist · Report a vulnerability privately.


Source: dedd223a9af7. Changes via pull request.

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