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Capture With Least Privilege
A live capture needs raw-socket rights for one moment: opening the interface. Everything after that, the parsing of untrusted packets included, needs none. This page takes the rights away as early as sipnab allows, and narrows what the process can reach after that.
| Step | What it takes away | Needs |
|---|---|---|
| Grant capture rights to the binary | Running as root at all | Linux, setcap
|
| Let sipnab drop root | Root after the interface opens | Started as root |
| Read capture files only root can read | Root while it reads the files | Started as root, one open file per input |
| Confine it to a directory | The rest of the file system | Started as root |
| Bound the files it can open | Files outside the paths the run names | A kernel with Landlock |
| Bound the system calls it makes | System calls outside a derived list | A kernel with seccomp, a list derived on that host |
Reading a capture file needs none of this: it is reading a file.
What ran: every command and output on this page ran on 2026-11-03 with sipnab 0.5.232 built from source, on Ubuntu 24.04 with Linux 6.8 (aarch64). That kernel has seccomp and no Landlock, so Bound the files it can open shows the refusal and not a confined run.
- Linux. File capabilities, Landlock and seccomp are Linux features. Every command on this page ran on Linux only.
- sipnab on the capture host, as Installing sipnab says.
-
Root, or
sudo, for the step you take. The table above names the steps that start as root. -
setcapandgetcap, for the first step. On Debian and Ubuntu thelibcap2-binpackage has them. -
An interface that carries the traffic.
ip -brief linklists the interfaces. The examples useeth0. - Nothing on any other system. Every step changes the capture host only: the capabilities of one binary, the user and root directory of one process, and the paths and system calls that process may use. No SIP server, relay or network device changes.
sipnab --setup-capsIt sets cap_net_raw,cap_net_admin+ep on the binary with setcap,
re-running itself through sudo when it is not root, and exits. It prints
nothing. Check the result:
getcap "$(command -v sipnab)"It prints the binary's path followed by cap_net_admin,cap_net_raw=ep.
Then capture as your own user:
sipnab -N -d eth0 --duration 3 --no-cli-printOn a lab bridge, hepx, that printed:
INFO sipnab::capture::live: Capturing on 'hepx' (link_type=1, snaplen=65535)
INFO sipnab::capture::live: Live capture on 'hepx' finished: 0 packets, no drops
- Replacing the binary clears its capabilities: an upgrade, a rebuild, a
package update. Run
--setup-capsagain after each. - A file system mounted
nosuidignores file capabilities. - macOS and other systems without file capabilities run live capture under
sudo. - Under systemd,
AmbientCapabilities=CAP_NET_RAW CAP_NET_ADMINgrants the same to a unit that runs as an ordinary user (Run sipnab as a service).
Started as root, sipnab opens the interface, then switches to an unprivileged
user: nobody unless you name another with --user or [privilege] user.
sudo sipnab -N -d eth0 --duration 3 --no-cli-printThe log says which user it became. On the lab bridge:
INFO sipnab::privilege: Dropped privileges to user 'nobody' (uid=65534, gid=65534)
- sipnab opens what the run reads by path before the drop: the capture device, a keylog file or FIFO, the config. A file the dropped user cannot reach is unreachable after that.
- It creates
-Oand--splitfiles after the drop, as the dropped user, so that user must be able to write their directory (An output file sipnab cannot create). - The dropped user usually cannot read your home directory, so the TUI's file
browser (
O) shows nothing there. Capture with capabilities instead. -
--no-priv-drop(or[privilege] no_priv_drop = true) keeps root for the whole run, and the log saysPrivilege drop disabled (--no-priv-drop).--priv-dropturns the drop back on for one run when the file turns it off. The scanner-kill worker does not need either: sipnab opens its raw socket before the drop.
Some commands open no capture and end before a capture would start. Since 0.5.256 the ones that listen or connect drop root too. A command that is not started as root changes in nothing.
| Command | Started as root |
|---|---|
sipnab fleet serve |
Reads its key files and binds as root, then runs as --user, else nobody, before it opens the store or accepts |
sipnab fleet inventory |
Reads the hosts file and every token file as root, then asks each instance as --user, else nobody
|
sipnab fleet verify |
Reads its key files as root, then lists and reads the history files as --user, else nobody
|
--vcon-forward, --vcon-fetch, --vcon-audio-fetch
|
Reads its credential, key and CA files as root, then runs as --user, else [privilege] user, else nobody, before it creates a directory or connects |
--relay-holdings, --relay-sessions
|
Runs as --user, else [privilege] user, else nobody, before it asks the relay |
--show-frame, --strip-secrets, --write-annotated, --find-in-files, --compare-captures
|
Since 0.5.257: names and opens its capture files (and the notes file) as root, then runs as --user, else [privilege] user, else nobody, before it unpacks or parses any of them |
--vcon-validate, --vcon-resign
|
Since 0.5.257: reads the container's bytes (and the signing key and certificate) as root, then runs as --user, else [privilege] user, else nobody, before it parses them |
-
A file the command reads once, such as a key, a token or a CA, can stay readable by root only.
-
What the command writes must belong to the user it runs as: the center's store and its directory, the forwarder's spool, and the directory that holds
--vcon-fetch-out,--vcon-audio-fetch-out,--vcon-resign-out, or the copy--strip-secretsor--write-annotatedwrites. -
When that user cannot write it, the command refuses to start, exits 2 and creates nothing. The message names the path and three ways out:
--vcon-fetch: started as root, this command runs as user 'nobody', and 'nobody' cannot write in '/home/alice/vcons' (--vcon-fetch-out). Nothing was created. Choose one: chown nobody '/home/alice/vcons'; run it with --user alice, who can; or pass --no-priv-drop to keep root -
The
sipnab fleetcommands read no configuration file.[privilege] userdoes not name their user: it is--user, elsenobody. -
sipnab fleet verifywrites nothing. The user it runs as must read the history directory, every directory in it and every file in them. When that user cannot, the command refuses before it reads a history file, exits 2, and the message sayscannot readwith the path (Verify the history store). -
Under
sudo, the message names the calling user in--userwhen that user can write the path. Otherwise it prints--user USER. -
--no-priv-dropkeeps root, as before 0.5.256, and the command logs one warning line that says so. -
On macOS a command started as root with no
--userkeeps root, as a capture does there, and logs one warning line. -
--vcon-audio-fetch-localmakes no connection, so it keeps the caller's user.
sipnab g729 install started as root downloads, checks and unpacks the
package as --user, the config user or nobody, and root only checks the
table file that user sends and writes it in place. That user must be able to
write in TMPDIR and read the CA bundle. --from PATH and --no-priv-drop
keep the caller's user (Install as root).
These commands still run as the user that started them, root included:
- Commands that read no input from outside, or need root:
--setup-caps,--uprobe-list,--mint-token,--dump-config,--vcon-spool-status,--journal-show,--revert-actions,--completions,--print-yang-module,sipnab fleet keygenandsipnab g729 status.
Purpose: run --show-frame, --strip-secrets, --write-annotated,
--find-in-files, --compare-captures, --vcon-validate or --vcon-resign
on a file only root can read, without parsing that file as root. Since
0.5.257 sipnab opens the file as root and parses it as another user.
Prerequisites:
- sipnab 0.5.257 or later, started as root (with
sudo, for example). - For a command that writes a file (
--strip-secrets,--write-annotated,--vcon-resign-out): a directory for the output that the user the run drops to can write. No other system needs a change.
Steps:
-
Choose the user the command runs as:
--user USER, else[privilege] userin the config file, elsenobody.--show-frame,--write-annotatedand--vcon-validateread the config file for[privilege]only; if it does not load, they use--user, elsenobody. -
Run the command and name the output in a directory that user can write. Here
call.pcapngis a capture only root can read, in a directory you own:sudo sipnab --strip-secrets clean.pcapng -I call.pcapng --user "$SUDO_USER" -
A command that prints its answer needs no output directory:
sudo sipnab --show-frame 'call.pcapng#12'
Verify: the output file belongs to the user the run dropped to
(ls -l clean.pcapng). With --no-tui (-N), the log holds
Dropped privileges to user 'nobody' before the command's result.
Troubleshoot:
- The run exits 2 with a message that starts
--strip-secrets: started as root: it stopped before it parsed or created anything. Use one of the three ways the message lists. - A gzip capture or an archive fails with
Permission denied: sipnab unpacks it after the drop, into the temporary directory. PointTMPDIRat a directory the user the run drops to can write. -
--find-in-filesexits 2 and names the open-file limit: as root it opens every file before the drop. Raise the limit (ulimit -n), or sweep fewer files in one run. -
--write-annotatedsays a note names another capture: after the drop, sipnab cannot compare two spellings of a path inside a directory the user cannot enter. Spell-Ias the notes file spells the capture. -
--no-priv-dropkeeps root for the whole command, and the command prints one line that says so.
Purpose: read a set of captures, or an archive of them, that only root may
open (mode 0600, owner root), while the run still drops to nobody or
chroots before it parses a packet.
Prerequisites: started as root, as in the previous section. The open-file limit must hold one descriptor per input file plus 64 for the run itself.
Steps: name the files, a directory or an archive with -I, as an ordinary run
does.
sudo sipnab -N -I /var/lib/captures/ring/ --user nobodyA root run that drops privileges or chroots opens every file of the set
before it does either, and reads each one through the descriptor it opened
then. A run that keeps its credentials (not root, or --no-priv-drop without
--chroot) opens each file when it reaches it, as before.
Since 0.5.259 a root run that drops privileges reads none of those bytes as
root: it opens the files, drops, and then unpacks, probes and reads them as
the user it dropped to. The line Reading N capture files comes after
Dropped privileges in the log.
- The run raises its open-file soft limit as far as the hard limit when the
set needs it. Above the hard limit the run stops before it reads anything, with
exit
2. - The run unpacks an archive (
.tar.gz,.zip, a.pcap.gz) after the drop, as the drop user, into a directory only its owner may enter (0700) holding files only its owner may read (0600), underTMPDIR. That user must be able to writeTMPDIR: root's per-user temporary folder on macOS (under/var/folders, mode0700) is not one it can reach, so setTMPDIR=/tmpthere. - A
--chrootrun changes root and drops first too, and unpacks inside the new root, as the drop user, underTMPDIRas seen there (normallyDIR/tmpon the host). Confine it to a directory says whatDIRthen needs. - The run reads the TLS secrets a pcapng carries in a Decryption Secrets Block through the descriptor it opened as root, so a root-only capture still decrypts.
Verify: with SIPNAB_LOG=info, the closing line counts every file as read in
full, and no line says Skipping. On 2026-11-08 with sipnab built from source after
0.5.237, three root-only copies of one capture under a soft limit of 66:
INFO sipnab::app::bootstrap: Raised the open-file limit from 66 to 67: the 3 input file(s) are opened before the run confines itself
INFO sipnab::privilege: Dropped privileges to user 'nobody' (uid=65534, gid=65534)
INFO sipnab::capture::file: Read 21 packets: 3 of 3 file(s) read in full
Troubleshooting: under a hard limit of 66 the same run stopped with exit 2:
sipnab opens all 3 input file(s) before it drops root privileges or chroots, beside 64 descriptors of its own, and this process may hold at most 66 open files. Raise the limit (ulimit -n), read fewer files per run, or run as an ordinary user, which opens each file when it is read.
Raise the hard limit (ulimit -Hn, or LimitNOFILE= in a systemd unit), or
split the set across runs. 0.5.239 and earlier opened every file after the
first by path after the drop, and skipped a root-only one with
Permission denied (No such file or directory under --chroot), the run
ending with exit 1 and a line such as Read 2 packets: 1 of 2 file(s) read in full, 1 skipped.
When the drop user cannot write TMPDIR, the run stops with exit 1 at the
first archive or .pcap.gz, before it unpacks anything:
-I/--input: cannot unpack '/var/lib/captures/a.pcap.gz': user 'nobody' cannot create files in the temporary directory '/var/folders/xy/T', where sipnab unpacks an archive or a compressed capture after it drops root. Set TMPDIR to a directory that user can write (TMPDIR=/tmp), or pass --user with a user who can write it
Run with TMPDIR=/tmp before the rest of the command
(sudo TMPDIR=/tmp sipnab -N -I a.pcap.gz), or with --user naming a user
that can write the directory. A capture that needs no
unpacking reads whatever TMPDIR is.
--chroot DIR (or [privilege] chroot) changes the root directory to DIR
after the interface opens and before the drop.
sipnab looks the user up before it changes root, so DIR needs no
etc/passwd: an empty directory works. 0.5.233 and earlier looked the user
up inside DIR and stopped with Failed to drop privileges: User 'nobody' not found unless DIR held an etc/passwd naming the user.
A file run (-I) opens its files before it changes root and reads them
through those descriptors, so DIR needs no copy of them. Since 0.5.259 an
archive or a .pcap.gz unpacks after the chroot, as the drop user, into the
temporary directory inside DIR: create it, writable by that user.
sudo mkdir -m 1777 /var/lib/sipnab/jail/tmpWithout it the run stops with exit 1 at the first such file, before it
unpacks anything:
-I/--input: cannot unpack '/var/lib/captures/a.tgz': user 'nobody' cannot create files in the temporary directory '/tmp' inside --chroot '/var/lib/sipnab/jail', where sipnab unpacks an archive or a compressed capture after it drops root. Create '/var/lib/sipnab/jail/tmp' writable by that user (mode 1777), or set TMPDIR to such a directory inside '/var/lib/sipnab/jail'
The run removes what it unpacked from DIR/tmp when it ends. A capture that
needs no unpacking reads with an empty DIR.
A TLS client that names no CA file of its own (a --hep-send-transport tls
sender without --hep-tls-ca, an HTTPS [vcon_fetch] store without ca)
trusts the host's CA bundle. A run with --chroot finds and reads that bundle
before it changes root, so DIR needs no copy of it. 0.5.238 and earlier
looked for it inside DIR and stopped with exit 2: Failed to create HEP sender: no system CA bundle found; name the collector's issuer with --hep-tls-ca. If no bundle exists outside DIR, sipnab still looks inside it.
A directory that does not exist stops the run with exit 1: Failed to chroot: chroot(/var/empty) failed: No such file or directory (os error 2).
Debian and Ubuntu have no /var/empty. Make an empty directory for it:
sudo mkdir -p /var/lib/sipnab/jailsudo sipnab -N -d eth0 --user nobody --chroot /var/lib/sipnab/jail --duration 3 --no-cli-printINFO sipnab::privilege: Chrooted to /var/lib/sipnab/jail
INFO sipnab::privilege: Dropped privileges to user 'nobody' (uid=65534, gid=65534)
Any file the run writes after this, -O included, is a path inside DIR.
--sandbox uses Linux's Landlock to limit which paths the process can open
once startup is over, to the ones the run names: its inputs, outputs, key
files and configuration.
-
--sandbox best-effortconfines the run where the kernel has Landlock, and warns and runs unconfined where it does not. -
--sandbox requiredrefuses to capture without it, with exit1.
On a kernel built without Landlock:
sipnab -N -I sample-call.pcap --sandbox required --report --no-cli-printWARN sipnab::app::bootstrap: path sandbox NOT active: this kernel (6.8.12-rt-tegra) has no Landlock: it was built without Landlock support (CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK). The capture is running unsandboxed; `--sandbox required` refuses instead of continuing.
`--sandbox required` was given and no path sandbox is in force: this kernel (6.8.12-rt-tegra) has no Landlock: it was built without Landlock support (CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK). Refusing to capture. Use `--sandbox best-effort` to capture without one.
Rerun on 2026-11-08 on the same host (Linux 6.8.12-rt-tegra). The reason
depends on the running kernel's release, from uname:
| The version query returns | Release | The reason says |
|---|---|---|
ENOSYS |
older than 5.13 | this kernel (<release>) has no Landlock (needs 5.13 or newer) |
ENOSYS |
5.13 or newer |
this kernel (<release>) has no Landlock: it was built without Landlock support (CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK): a kernel upgrade does not help; a kernel built with that option does |
ENOSYS |
unreadable | both causes, and that sipnab could not read the release |
EOPNOTSUPP |
any | Landlock is compiled in but disabled; add it to the kernel's lsm= list to enable it |
Before that change the text said needs 5.13 or newer for every ENOSYS,
which on this 6.8 kernel was wrong. Check yours:
cat /sys/kernel/security/lsmlandlock must be in the list. Not run for this page: a run with Landlock in
force.
--seccomp installs a seccomp filter. Its two modes are two steps:
-
--seccomp logallows every system call and records each one. It protects nothing. It exists to find out which calls your runs make. -
--seccomp enforcekills the process on a call outside an allowlist, which you derive on the host that runs the capture and name withSIPNAB_SECCOMP_ALLOWLIST: a file of syscall numbers, one per line,#comments allowed.
Without a list, enforce refuses to start, with exit 1:
`--seccomp enforce` was given and no syscall filter is in force: enforcement needs an allowlist derived ON THIS HOST, named by SIPNAB_SECCOMP_ALLOWLIST. The list that ships in this binary settled across sixteen shapes on one machine and killed the process on another of the same architecture, so it is a worked example rather than a list to enforce. Produce yours with scripts/derive-seccomp-allowlist.sh. Refusing to capture. Use `--seccomp off` to capture without one.
scripts/derive-seccomp-allowlist.sh <sipnab> <interface>, run as root, runs
sipnab in sixteen shapes under --seccomp log, streams the log the records go
to, and says whether the set of calls stopped growing.
Where the records go depends on the host, and the script finds out the same way you would:
sudo auditctl -s- A non-zero
pidmeans an audit daemon holds the audit socket. The kernel hands it the records, and they land in its log (log_filein/etc/audit/auditd.conf,/var/log/audit/audit.logby default) astype=SECCOMPlines. The script follows that file withtail -Fand printsRecords go to the audit daemon; following /var/log/audit/audit.log. - A
pidof 0, or noauditctl, means no daemon. The records are in the kernel log asaudit: type=1326lines, and the script followsdmesg --follow, withkernel.printk_ratelimitset to 0 for the run and restored after it.
Set SIPNAB_DERIVE_AUDIT_LOG to read another file on the audit path.
To look at the records yourself on a host with a daemon:
sudo ausearch -m SECCOMP -ts recentA single --report run over the sample capture on 2026-11-03 left 5,896
records there, naming 13 distinct system calls. Not run for this page: the
collector as root on this host after the change on 2026-11-08 that made it
read the audit log, nor an enforcing filter. seccomp_derivation_test drives
the source choice and the parsing of audit-log records with synthetic input.
The script refuses a run that lost records. On the kernel log that is a
callbacks suppressed line. On the audit path it is a rise in the lost
counter of auditctl -s, which the script reads before and after each shape:
LOST: the audit subsystem lost 12 record(s) during the run.
A derivation that misses a call yields an allowlist that kills
the process it was built for. Raise the backlog (auditctl -b
65536), check that auditctl -r is 0, and run it again.
The kernel reports the user, the group and the capabilities a running process holds. While a capture runs, read them:
grep -E '^(Uid|Gid|CapEff):' "/proc/$(pidof sipnab)/status"A run that started as root and dropped to nobody printed:
Uid: 65534 65534 65534 65534
Gid: 65534 65534 65534 65534
CapEff: 0000000000000000
CapEff of all zeros means the process holds no capability. The same run
with --no-priv-drop printed Uid: 0 0 0 0 and a CapEff that is not zero:
it kept root.
The log states each step as sipnab takes it:
| Step | Log line |
|---|---|
| The drop | Dropped privileges to user 'nobody' (uid=65534, gid=65534) |
--chroot |
Chrooted to /var/lib/sipnab/jail, before the line of the drop |
--no-priv-drop |
Privilege drop disabled (--no-priv-drop) |
What ran: on 2026-11-11, sipnab 0.5.245 built from source ran as root on the
loopback interface inside an Ubuntu 24.04 container with no network, three
times: with no option, with --user nobody --chroot /var/lib/sipnab/jail,
and with --no-priv-drop. The output and the log lines above are from those
runs. Not run for this check: a run that got its rights from
--setup-caps.
| Symptom | Cause | Fix |
|---|---|---|
Permission denied on 'eth0'. Grant capture capabilities once, exit 1 |
The binary has no capabilities, or something replaced it since |
sipnab --setup-caps again |
Permission denied on 'eth0'. This process runs with NoNewPrivs set, exit 1 |
NoNewPrivileges=yes or no-new-privileges makes file capabilities ineffective |
AmbientCapabilities=CAP_NET_RAW CAP_NET_ADMIN in the unit, or start as root |
Permission denied on 'eth0'. CAP_NET_RAW is not in this process's capability bounding set, exit 1 |
The container or unit dropped the capability |
--cap-add=NET_RAW, or CapabilityBoundingSet= naming it |
Failed to drop privileges: User 'nobody' not found. Create it with 'useradd -r -s /usr/sbin/nologin nobody' or use --user <name> |
The user does not exist on this host. With --chroot, 0.5.233 and earlier also printed this when the directory held no etc/passwd naming the user |
Create the user, or name another with --user. On 0.5.233 or earlier, upgrade, or add the user's entries to the directory |
Failed to chroot: chroot(/var/empty) failed: No such file or directory (os error 2) |
The --chroot directory does not exist |
Create it |
A root run reading files stops before it reads any with exit 2, and the message names the hard open-file limit (quoted in full) |
The set needs one descriptor per file plus 64, more than the hard open-file limit allows | Raise ulimit -Hn or LimitNOFILE=, or read fewer files per run |
--sandbox required refuses, needs 5.13 or newer
|
The kernel predates Landlock |
best-effort, or a 5.13 or newer kernel with Landlock |
--sandbox required refuses, built without Landlock support (CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK)
|
The kernel is new enough, and its build left Landlock out |
best-effort, or a kernel built with CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y and landlock in lsm=
|
--seccomp enforce refuses |
No SIPNAB_SECCOMP_ALLOWLIST, or one it cannot read |
Derive a list on this host |
derive-seccomp-allowlist.sh prints NO RECORDS
|
The filter never installed, or the records went to a log the script did not follow | Check sudo auditctl -s: with a non-zero pid, the records are in the audit log, which the script follows; name another file with SIPNAB_DERIVE_AUDIT_LOG
|
derive-seccomp-allowlist.sh exits 66, cannot be read
|
An audit daemon holds the audit socket and its log is not at the path auditd.conf names | Set SIPNAB_DERIVE_AUDIT_LOG to the log's path |
Privilege and [privilege]
list every flag and key. The threat model says what each
step defends against.
Website · Repository · Issues · Generated from docs/ — edit there, not here.
Getting started
- Installation
- First CLI Triage
- Glossary
- Cookbook
- Runnable Examples
- Real World Captures
- Troubleshooting
- Measure Call Quality
- Run as a Service
- Tuning Capture
- Encapsulations
- Capture With Least Privilege
- Collect and Forward HEP
- Read Captures From Archives
- Rtpengine Relays
- Ask a Media Relay About Itself
- Ask Each Calls rtpengine Engine
- Backers
Using the TUI
CLI & automation
- CLI Reference
- Error Messages
- Capture Queries
- Expectations
- Filter DSL
- Follow A Call
- Output Formats
- Stability
- SIP Response Codes
- SIP Methods
- SIP Header Fields
- SIP Parameters
- SIP Lint Rules
- MOS and Codecs
Configuration
Integrations (API & MCP)
- REST API
- Prometheus Metrics
- Authentication
- Require Client Certificates
- MCP
- MCP Deployment
- MCP Across an Estate
- Manage Many Instances
- MCP Tools
- MCP Tools Core
- MCP Tools Signaling
- MCP Tools Captures
- MCP Tools Security
- MCP Tools Media
- MCP Tools Relay
- MCP Tools TFPS
- MCP Tools Server
- MCP Tools vCon
- MCP Tools TLS
- MCP Protocol
- Uprobe Walkthrough
- Capture SIP over TLS
- WASM Plugins
- Run Commands and Send Alerts
- vCon Export
- vCon Capture Stack
- G729 Decoding
Your SIP server
- Use OpenSIPS as the SIP Server
- Run sipnab beside OpenSIPS
- Use Kamailio as the SIP Server
- Run sipnab beside Kamailio
- Use Asterisk as the PBX
- Run sipnab beside Asterisk
- Use FreeSWITCH in the Voice Stack
- Run sipnab beside FreeSWITCH
Add to your voice stack
- Add a vCon Server
- Send vCons to a vCon Server
- Send vCons to vcon store
- Add TFPS
- Control TFPS from sipnab
- Ban SIP Scanners with fail2ban
- Feed fail2ban from sipnab
- Add rtpengine
- Name rtpengine Media with sipnab
- Add rtpproxy
- Name rtpproxy Media with sipnab
- Add Homer
- Connect sipnab to Homer
- Add Prometheus and Grafana
- Add sipnab Metrics to Prometheus
Development & internals
- Internals Index
- Internals Subsystem Guide
- Internals Invariants
- Internals Testing
- Internals Walkthroughs
- Internals Build CI Release
- Internals Profiling
- Internals Domain Primer
- Library API
- Benchmarks
- Fault Model
- Threat Model
- Assurance Case
- Architecture
- Internals Threading
- Internals TUI Testing
- Internals Zero Copy Payloads
- Internals Uprobe Capture
- Internals Rtpengine Control Plane
- Internals Relay Control Decoding
- Internals vCon Exporter
- Internals Operator Guide Notes
- Internals Postmortems
- Internals Code Map
- Internals Lint Rules
- Internals Encapsulation Decoding
- Internals MCP Design Notes
- Internals Metrics And Output Notes