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Releases
v1.16.0 — OpenCode V2 support (dual V1 + V2)
Dual-generation support
OpenCOOP now loads on both OpenCode generations from one package:
- V1 (
@opencode-ai/plugin): the loader callsserver(input)and consumes the returned{ tool, dispose }hooks — unchanged behaviour. - V2 (
@opencode/plugin): the loader callssetup(ctx)and the plugin registers all 20 tools throughctx.tool.transform.
Config key: plugin on V1, plugins on V2. Same package: @opencoop/opencode-plugin.
Implementation
src/plugin-core.ts— shared bootstrap and all 20 tool definitions, so both runtimes behave identically.src/v2.ts— V2 entry point. Tool input schemas are emitted as raw JSON Schema (zodShapeToJsonSchema) because the V2 host rejects foreign zod instances (Schema vendor zod does not support JSON Schema conversion).src/index.ts— default export{ id: "opencoop", server, setup }.@opencode/pluginis a devDependency plus an optional peerDependency, so V1 users install nothing extra.
Verified
- V1: headless
opencode serveregisters all 20 tools. - V2:
@opencode/cli@2.0.32+opencode runexecutedopencoop_guideend to end.
Also in this release
- Version badge and
/api/statusreport 1.16.0. - Removed the stray
app.js.bakfrom the published package.
v1.15.0 — Security: authenticated remote access
🔐 Security Release
This release fixes an unauthenticated MCP transport vulnerability (reported privately by Christian Terorde / 0xwaidwerk — thank you!).
What was wrong
In HOST mode the server bound 0.0.0.0 and /mcp dispatched tools (read_file/write_file) without any authentication, so anyone who could reach the listener (e.g. via the public tunnel) could read/write the shared workspace. The web API/config and invite generation were unauthenticated too.
What changed (no feature loss)
- Local stays trusted, remote requires a token. Your OpenCode + browser over loopback need no token.
- Tunnel edge proxy stamps public traffic with a per-process secret → it can never impersonate the local user (SSH -R arrives from 127.0.0.1).
- Invite links now redeem into member tokens (30 days) and are enforced per tool/API call with
read/write/adminpermissions — revocation is instant. - Server binds
127.0.0.1by default (LAN/public opt-in viabindAddress). - Admin token (auto-generated) never leaves the host.
- Strict CORS, Host-header allowlist (anti DNS-rebinding), CSRF guard, rate limiting, security event log.
- Also fixed:
revoke_accessnow actually revokes; member tokens required for/api/connecton guests.
Upgrade
npm install -g @opencoop/opencode-plugin@latestClear the OpenCode plugin cache (rm -rf ~/.cache/opencode), restart OpenCode, open the web UI and re-generate invite links (old links still work for the web page, but guests must click Connect again to receive a token).
Verification
35/35 security acceptance tests pass (unauthenticated tunnel requests rejected, read-only enforcement, instant revocation, CORS/CSRF/Host-header protections). See SECURITY.md.
Credit: Christian Terorde (0xwaidwerk) — responsible disclosure.