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v2.0.0: Block symlinks that escape the upload path

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@yaron-cider yaron-cider released this 18 Nov 12:17
adc32ae

⚠️ Breaking changes

  • Symlinks that point outside the upload path now fail the upload. Before, the uploader followed these links and packaged their targets, but the secrets scan never saw them. If your artifact contains such links, replace them with real files or remove them before uploading.
  • Paths that resolve under /proc, /sys or /dev are rejected (Linux/macOS).

Security

  • The secrets scan and the uploader now use the same fully resolved path, so every uploaded file has been scanned.
  • Symlinks are checked on every file. Links that resolve inside the upload path are still allowed.
  • The runner-token check now also catches a .git/config given directly as the path, or reached through a symlink.

Fixes

  • Symlink loops inside the artifact no longer hang or cut short the directory walk or the .git search.
  • A clear error is raised when the path is neither a regular file nor a directory.