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@github-actions github-actions released this 25 Oct 17:14
Immutable release. Only release title and notes can be modified.
v0.1.7
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Learn about vigilant mode.

attest 0.1.7 / GitHub Action v1.0.7

This is a bounded storage-correctness release. It fixes filesystem lock acquisition under
cross-process contention while preserving the storage API, on-disk format, error catalogue,
attestation predicates, policy semantics, and every earlier immutable public record.

Python patch boundary

Only these two Python distributions are built once and published through their separate protected
PyPI Trusted Publishers:

  • attest-store==0.1.2 replaces the lock-file check-then-create race with atomic exclusive
    creation and a safe existing-lock fallback while retaining no-follow, regular-descriptor, and
    advisory-lock validation.
  • attest-cli==0.1.5 exact-pins attest-store==0.1.2 and otherwise preserves its command and
    dependency contract.

The remaining public internal graph is unchanged: attest-core==0.1.0,
attest-collect==0.1.0, attest-sign==0.1.1, and attest-policy==0.1.0 are neither rebuilt nor
uploaded. attest-export remains unpublished. The machine-readable release contract records
"pythonDistributionsPublished" as exactly attest-store==0.1.2 and attest-cli==0.1.5.

Clean Python 3.12 and 3.13 environments must byte-match both public artifacts, install the exact
six-package graph, execute the CLI, require certifi 2026.10.19 or later, and reject the
development-only virtualenv 21.14.12 and python-discovery 1.6.4 packages from the runtime.

Retained Action security baseline

The new Action image carries the corrected store and CLI bytes without weakening the reviewed
runtime boundary. It retains source-built Git 2.52.0 and curl 8.23.0, exact musl 1.2.5-r24,
the locked certifi 2026.10.19 CA bundle, matching OpenSSL runtime libraries, the minimal
HTTP/1.1-only Git transport, four zstd image layers, and the digest-guarded isolated Python path.

Reviewed candidate

Protected dev candidate run 40114789855, attempt 1, completed every repository, corresponding
source, component, two-platform container, image-scan, SBOM, provenance, and identity-attestation
gate for source commit 62b72c2537176c84bc232f727f223a9ea21ae80b.

  • Multi-platform image:
    sha256:14e47087c9e6346c8115ba29eb00a922fcc3da630411058f8f35fee7684bf356
  • Enumerated 115-file build context:
    sha256:580c0b7881882817ae7ca65dfe1bbdcd06c5bea77556c8b77ff5b04e11cacc73
  • Public identity-attested corresponding-source artifact:
    sha256:7472c920350b428c850a6f18f2e17693431b0e89761ef52498b009b0ea447805
  • Linux/amd64 manifest:
    sha256:0b14b2da68d2abce405cf87bf7abf56497cd13707bde1b2da634b83bfe31608f
  • Linux/arm64 manifest:
    sha256:40ad43b5cc948eeedb09373e241d0e42448cd04e93e2f33e7365a46c0c136de8

Both architectures passed all 23 real-container contracts. Both image scans reported zero
vulnerabilities. The component scan retained only the existing Git-for-Windows-only
CVE-2026-62960 match covered by the exact approved not-affected OpenVEX statement; curl 8.23.0
was clean. Independent verification reproduced the context digest and validated the exact image,
source, manifests, labels, component policy, and GitHub-hosted workflow identities.

Cancelled run 40086747745 remains immutable incomplete evidence. It passed the pre-build gates
but reached the former 60-minute build ceiling before emitting a binary, so it is not a candidate
and is never reused. Run 40114789855 used the approved 90-minute ceiling without changing an
input, runner class, privilege, or verification gate.

Release gate and compatibility

The exact merged main commit and reviewed image must complete three consecutive attempt-1
20-job performance runs. Each run and the recomputed 60-sample nearest-rank p95 must remain
strictly below the 18-second release SLO; the strict 15-second engineering target is reported
independently.

Only after that evidence passes may the protected release publish the two Python patches, promote
the reviewed manifest without rebuilding to image 0.1.7, create immutable source v0.1.7 and
Action v1.0.7, and complete production dogfood. Moving major tag v1 is a separate reviewed
promotion. It remains on immutable v1.0.6 until the release, same-repository proof, safe fork
denial, public verification, and independent promotion checks all pass.

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