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v0.2.3

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@github-actions github-actions released this 27 Aug 18:37
· 63 commits to main since this release

Added

  • Inbound filtering. CFC now filters both directions, under one policy:
    nothing enters without a rule, and inbound never prompts - an exposed
    machine is scanned continuously, and a bubble per inbound SYN would be a
    denial of service on the user's attention. A separate opt-in unit
    (colony-firewall-nft-inbound) loads a fail-closed chain (policy drop),
    guarded twice at start: the daemon must be active, and a lockout pre-flight
    refuses to load if a live remote session has no rule to readmit it after a
    restart. The inbound bundle seeds mDNS/LLMNR/DHCP/SSH scoped to private
    ranges only.

  • In-kernel enforcement that survives the daemon - for new processes too.
    The daemon compiles its process-wide deny rules into a pinned kernel table
    (EXE_RULES); the exec tracepoint consults it and writes verdicts itself.
    Kill the daemon: processes it knew keep their EPERM, and a denied binary
    launched afterwards is refused in 0 ms by the kernel alone. The daemon
    became a control plane. The exit tracepoint now evicts its own verdicts
    (using the kernel's group_dead, resolved from the live tracepoint format),
    so the pinned map cannot rot through pid recycling.

  • Content-bound rules. cfc rules add --exe <path> --pin-hash binds a
    rule to the binary's sha256: replace the file and the rule stops applying,
    instead of the replacement inheriting the permission. Per-rule and off by
    default - a package update revokes such a rule too, by design.

  • cfc status now reports where enforcement lives (pinned, inherited,
    process, unavailable) - losing the kernel layer is otherwise silent.

  • eBPF backend. Compiled into the daemon by default; still gated at
    runtime by [ebpf] enabled, which remains off. Build without it with
    cargo build -p cfc-daemon --no-default-features.
    Three kernel programs: sched_process_exec / sched_process_exit
    fill a kernel-sourced process table, so attribution no longer races a
    short-lived process through /proc; cgroup_skb/ingress observes the
    DNS answers this host actually receives, and those outrank
    PTR-derived names in the hostname cache. Verified live on kernel
    7.1.8. The daemon degrades to sock_diag + /proc + PTR whenever the
    feature is off, the object is missing, or the load fails.

  • colony-firewall-tray: a system-tray icon (StatusNotifierItem, so KDE
    and most bars natively; GNOME needs the AppIndicator extension) in the
    Windows Firewall Control mold. Shows enforcing / paused / unreachable
    at a glance, flags waiting prompts (attention icon + a rate-limited
    desktop notification), offers Pause 5 min / 30 min / 1 h / daemon
    default and Resume, and opens the GUI on left-click. Autostarts with
    the session; quitting the tray never touches the daemon.

  • The GUI honors $CFC_SOCKET, so it can be pointed at a daemon on a
    non-default socket (a --dry-run instance, a test socket) without a
    rebuild - the CLI already had --socket for this.

  • bootstrap-defaults now also seeds the DHCP clients (dhcpcd,
    NetworkManager, systemd-networkd; v4 renewals on 67/udp and DHCPv6 on
    547/udp). With enforcement starting before the network is configured,
    these are what let a strict machine get a lease at boot.

Changed

  • Inbound connect latency 2.78 ms -> 0.13 ms (the packet path no longer
    performs a socket lookup that cannot succeed for an inbound SYN); daemon
    RSS 78 MB -> ~31 MB; 18 threads -> 7; SQLite in WAL at full durability,
    2.5x faster event batches. Measured on a veth pair, method in the repo.

  • Filtering now starts before the network does. Both units are
    ordered Before=network-pre.target (the systemd firewall convention)
    instead of after it: the daemon is listening on the queue and the
    nftables table is loaded before NetworkManager, systemd-networkd or
    dhcpcd configure a single interface. There is no window at boot where
    the network is up but filtering is not. The nft unit also Wants= the
    daemon, so enabling enforcement alone pulls the daemon in.

Fixed

  • The inbound bundle opened three UDP ports to the whole internet. Its
    mDNS, LLMNR and DHCP entries shipped without a source network, admitting
    unicast UDP from any address on earth; the comment above them promised the
    opposite. Now one entry per private range, with a bundle-wide test.
  • A rule scoped to exe_path = "<unknown>" - the display placeholder for an
    unattributable process - matched every unattributable flow, which is every
    inbound flow. Four locks: the matcher, the API, load-time, and both UIs.
  • parent_exe was counted in rule precedence but never compared, so a rule
    carrying it matched every process while outranking narrower rules. Refused
    at the API boundary until it can actually be evaluated.
  • An unset rule direction now means outbound - its meaning before inbound
    filtering existed - instead of silently widening every pre-existing rule
    into an inbound admission the day the input chain is enabled.
  • An unparseable inbound packet takes inbound_action (which cannot be
    Allow) instead of no_ui_action (which can).
  • Deleting a deny rule now reliably lifts its in-kernel verdict, including
    for processes older than the attribution table's TTL.