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Added
cfc applications run and stop provide opt-in, administrator-controlled
confinement for fresh headless application trees. Network access is denied
by default; --allow IP approves exact numeric peers for the whole tree
across TCP/UDP ports, including any relay that peer provides. Ordinary CFC
rules can further restrict new connections. Revocation stops the complete tree.
The initial confinement profile requires x86_64 Linux, cgroup v2, systemd
262+, Bubblewrap 0.13+, working system D-Bus and libbpf interface filters.
Launches verify the native filters and require a sealed runtime on a
supported local filesystem. Private namespaces, dropped capabilities and
seccomp restrict local relays and inherited resources. Desktop services,
shared home directories, standard input/output and live grant changes are
unavailable. This mode covers only explicitly launched trees; ordinary
socket attribution and established-flow authorization remain unchanged.
Security
All profile defaults now refuse unattended and unanswered connections.
Explicit administrator overrides remain supported. Incomplete process
identity and compatible undecidable rules refuse before pause or prompts.
Fast Allow is disabled in every runtime configuration, including existing fast_allow = true settings. Allowed flows use NFQUEUE.
Hostnames are diagnostic only. New hostname rules and imports are rejected;
compatible legacy hostname rules refuse before a lower Allow or fallback.
Replace them explicitly with executable or numeric destination scopes.
New executable rules require the canonical target explicitly instead of
silently rewriting aliases. This does not recover legacy alias intent or
pin future executable contents; hash scopes remain a separate control.
Parsed NFQUEUE Deny/Reject decisions commit to SQLite before their verdict
or live publication. Audit failure drops the packet and stops the worker.
Kernel drops, malformed packets and journal delivery are outside this gate.
Enabled nftables units load independently before daemon initialization and
are required by NetworkManager and systemd-networkd. Failed table loading
blocks those managers; daemon failure leaves filtering installed. This
contract excludes initramfs networking and already configured interfaces.
Control mutations verify each peer's actual group credentials. Non-root
prompt replies require delivery to that user, persisted prompt Allows retain the
prompted image binding, and rule imports publish committed batches atomically.
Packet attribution, rejection parsing and eBPF object selection validate
their inputs more strictly. Build jobs use read-only repository permissions;
release publication runs after successful builds with separate write access.