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TOMBSTONE v0.2.0 — C99 Proofs & Verified Toolchain Reuse
TOMBSTONE v0.2.0 — C99 Proofs & Verified Toolchain Reuse
TOMBSTONE v0.2.0 consolidates the formal-verification work introduced across Phases 8–20 and adds the first OPT-inspired CI reuse implementation.
The verification programme targets the actual C99 implementation, records the assumptions behind each result, and preserves unsuccessful attempts alongside accepted evidence. Automated gates reject missing, incomplete, stale, or incorrectly identified proof results.
Changes since v0.1.0:
-
Release provenance and reproducible source assets — PR #9
Added post-merge CI records, an exact source-commit identity, and SHA-256 manifests for the original v0.1.0 source release. Packaging independently generates the archive twice and requires identical bytes. These assets remain tied to the immutable v0.1.0 release. -
Phase 8: bounded symbolic verification — PR #10
Introduced CBMC checks that directly include the production C99 deletion engine. Symbolic inputs of up to four bytes exercise splice relationships, return statuses, observation classification, and unchanged outputs on failure. A verification-only hash-success stub keeps the SHA-provider assumption explicit. -
Phase 9: unbounded splice-relation checks — PR #11
Added mathematical contracts and loop invariants to the actualsplice_equalhelper used by the witness API. Frama-C/WP checks exact relationships between before, removed, and after buffers for arbitrary valid lengths, including runtime safety and the absence of caller-memory writes. -
Phase 10: witness validation before hashing — PR #12
Isolated and verified the production helper that checks arguments, sizes, offsets, and length mismatches before hashing begins. Native fault-injection tests separately exercise all three SHA failure sites and check that unsuccessful calls preserve the caller’s output. -
Phase 11: modular public-witness verification — PR #13
Added modular WP checks for fingerprint collection, private witness staging, and the publictb_witness_deletefunction, recording 88/88 discharged obligations. The implementation commits output only after successful staging. These results retain explicit external SHA-provider and toolchain-model assumptions. -
Phase 12: actual OpenSSL provider failure evidence — PR #14
Exercised the real C99 OpenSSL wrapper with injected allocation, initialization, update, and finalization failures. Tests check error propagation, output preservation, and context cleanup. An assumption ledger distinguishes these observed behaviours from outstanding universal provider proofs. -
Phase 13: optional pinned HACL backend — PR #19*
Added an optional HACL* SHA2-256 backend whose upstream source files are pinned to an immutable revision. Adapter checks, failure injection, and provider-parity tests compare its behaviour with the existing implementation. OpenSSL remains the default; upstream HACL* verification does not automatically verify TOMBSTONE’s integration. -
Phase 14: production receipt-parser checks — PR #20
Added contracts for actual C99 decimal accumulation and duplicate-field detection, plus bounded parser checks and adversarial receipt tests. Coverage includes numeric boundaries, malformed inputs, output preservation, canonical fixture bytes, and chain tampering. Complete parser and canonical-encoding proofs remain separate obligations. -
Phase 15: Rust ABI and executable evidence — PR #21
Compared actual C99 layouts, alignments, enum values, and status codes with the Rust FFI representation. Added error-output tests, input-limit checks, and independent executable rebuild comparisons across supported Linux compiler, architecture, and provider combinations. This records target-specific evidence without claiming a compiler-correctness proof. -
Phase 16: external anchors and target assumptions — PR #22
Addedverify-chain --trusted-head-filefor checking a chain against a separately retained commitment. Strict file and syntax validation accompanies an explicit target/trust ledger. The supplied anchor is never treated as trustworthy merely because it matches the receipts being checked. -
Phase 17: chain-rejection and anchor checks — PR #24
Extended direct-source verification of chain argument checks and invalid-genesis rejection before hashing. Native replay covers frozen receipt orderings, chain prefixes, incorrect links, digest tampering, and trusted-head mismatches across GCC/Clang, x86-64/ARM64, and both SHA providers. -
Phase 18: unbounded receipt-chain verification — PR #26
Added a conditional WP proof of the actual chain verifier for arbitrary valid nonempty chain lengths. The 54/54-obligation theorem covers genesis, predecessor-link equality, optional trusted-head comparison, and caller-memory preservation under explicitly stated helper contracts. -
Phase 19: actual receipt-helper refinement — PR #27
Targeted the realequal32andcalculate_hashbodies to refine assumptions used by the chain proof. Verification covers byte comparison and hash-helper control flow, with separate error-path checks. Libc comparison semantics, formatter behaviour, and streaming SHA-provider obligations remain explicit premises. -
P19-03: caller-memory composition and ownership — PR #29
Connected helper and chain contracts through a separately named caller-memory theorem and a model of provider ownership, call ordering, and cleanup. This accommodates private provider-state effects without silently weakening the original Phase 18 theorem or claiming that concrete backend heap behaviour has been fully proved. -
Phase 20: receipt validation, formatting, and model correction — PR #30
Added verification of actual receipt validators, formatter bounds and memory effects, both hex-encoder bodies, and their shared helper/chain composition. An isolated correction addresses the reproduced Frama-C Bytes-model inconsistency. Fresh contradiction checks, affected library-lemma replays, and semantic negative controls guard acceptance while historical failures remain preserved. -
Verified toolchain reuse and measured CI savings — PR #31
Added restoration of an independently pinned toolchain after checking its producer, dependency identities, archive digests, and complete file manifest. Missing approved artifacts or changed inputs require a cold build; integrity failures stop acceptance. A forced-cold path remains available, and every canary and proof still runs afresh.
Verification at the final reviewed PR head, 1d25cb602d95d92265d24ffeee625c9a702f27f8, completed:
- 22/22 workflows passed.
- 14/14 Phase 20 jobs passed.
- 1,392/1,392 positive WP/runtime-error obligations discharged under the documented premises.
- All three designated semantic negative controls rejected their deliberately incorrect implementations.
- Original Phase 18/19 theorem replays completed without changing their contracts.
- 34 new reuse and replay-binding regression tests passed alongside the existing 117 evidence-tamper checks.
Three cold/reuse benchmark pairs measured:
| Preparation mode | Median preparation plus fresh canaries |
|---|---|
| Cold build | 65.469 seconds |
| Verified reuse | 54.044 seconds |
This is a 17.45% reduction, saving approximately 11.4 seconds per preparation. Every trial executed fresh canaries and produced matching semantic outcomes. The measurement excludes the shared container-image download and does not represent whole-CI speedup. Proof-result caching remains disabled.
The public C99 ABI and frozen v1 receipt fixtures are preserved. The existing v0.1.0 release remains immutable. TOMBSTONE remains an offline C99 evidence engine with Rust interfaces, licensed under Apache-2.0.
Formal results remain conditional on their documented libc, provider, and memory-model premises. Actual SHA-provider refinement, complete canonical-JSON/parser semantics, Rust ownership refinement, and source-to-executable correctness remain open. Model regressions do not establish general toolchain soundness. These results do not prove historical deletion, trusted identity or time, or secure erasure.
Release source: 881e7db29054a02273b0e924b08409a777ce42ea
Contributions: @EmergentMonk
Executed Phase 20 proofs · Reuse benchmark · Full changelog: v0.1.0 → v0.2.0
TOMBSTONE v0.1.0 — Initial Release
🪦 TOMBSTONE v0.1.0 — The Data Is Gone. The Tombstone Has a Checksum.
Initial Public Release — C99 Cryptographic Evidence Engine, Rust CLI, ncurses TUI & GTK4 Desktop
TOMBSTONE is an offline-first, deterministic cryptographic evidence system designed to record byte-level file transitions, verify explicitly witnessed deletion splices, and generate canonical, hash-linked receipts.
It distinguishes what cryptographic evidence can establish from what it cannot.
What began as a simple experiment involving a deleted line of text has evolved into a complete C99 evidence engine, three Rust-powered interfaces, and an independently reviewed verification framework.
The data is gone. The tombstone has a checksum.
What's Included
1. C99 Cryptographic Evidence Engine
- OpenSSL EVP-backed SHA-256 fingerprinting.
- Binary-safe hashing, including embedded NUL bytes.
- One-shot and streaming fingerprint APIs.
- Exact deletion-splice verification using supplied before, removed and after bytes.
- Explicit classification of witnessed deletions, observed transitions and unchanged content.
- Versioned C99 ABI with deterministic error handling.
The C99 implementation is the authoritative source of cryptographic and evidence semantics.
2. Canonical JSON Receipts
- Restricted RFC 8785-compatible canonical JSON encoding.
- Domain-separated SHA-256 receipt commitments.
- Cryptographically linked receipt chains.
- Strict parsing and duplicate-key rejection.
- Genesis-to-head verification.
- Optional independently trusted final-head verification.
- Preserved golden receipt vectors.
Receipts contain fingerprints, sizes, classifications and optional verified deletion offsets rather than deleted plaintext.
3. Rust Command-Line Interface
A deterministic, automation-friendly CLI providing:
- SHA-256 file fingerprinting.
- Observed-transition recording.
- Explicit deletion-splice verification.
- Canonical receipt verification.
- Ordered hash-chain validation.
No network services, telemetry or cloud dependencies are required.
4. Interactive ncurses TUI
A terminal interface featuring guided cryptographic evidence workflows, receipt inspection, chain verification and explicit create-new-only receipt export.
5. Native GTK4 Desktop Application
An optional graphical interface featuring six workflow tabs:
- Fingerprint
- Observe
- Witness deletion
- Inspect receipt
- Verify chain
- Save receipt
The desktop application uses the same authoritative C99 engine through Rust bindings. GTK4 remains optional and does not affect headless builds.
Phase 7 — Hardening and Independent Verification
TOMBSTONE v0.1.0 completes development Phases 0–7.
The hardening phase introduced:
- Clang libFuzzer testing of receipt parsing and deletion-splice verification.
- AddressSanitizer and fail-fast UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer.
- Negative-control testing to ensure sanitizer failures cannot silently pass.
- Independent Python SHA-256 and restricted canonical JSON verification.
- GCC versus Clang receipt equivalence checks.
- Linux x86-64 and ARM64 verification.
- Adversarial malformed-input, tamper-detection and chain-integrity tests.
- Reproducible C99 static archive checks.
Verification evidence:
- 2,000 bounded receipt-parser fuzz iterations passed.
- 2,000 bounded deletion-splice fuzz iterations passed.
- GCC/Clang receipt replay passed on x86-64 and ARM64.
- C99, Rust CLI, TUI, GTK4 and documentation checks passed.
- All six Phase 7 post-merge workflows passed.
- Independent exact-head Codex review reported no actionable correctness or security findings.
These results demonstrate executed regression coverage, not formal proof of freedom from defects.
Reproducible Release Evidence
The v0.1.0 source candidate was packaged from an immutable Git source reference and verified using independent archive generation and SHA-256 checksums.
Release source commit:
d6ae7d4016eb4efff6a684737711d809ec9d256f
SHA-256 — TOMBSTONE-v0.1.0-source.tar.gz:
cc01853d27367bec789b13280b00605307186d419dce09e10fc182c449426c64
The source archive was independently regenerated with identical bytes. The frozen checksum manifest and release-evidence documents were verified, including during the post-merge release-packaging workflow.
The initial release is source-only; no precompiled executable binaries are included in the verified source bundle.
Security and Evidence Limitations
TOMBSTONE deliberately does not claim capabilities that its evidence cannot establish.
- A verified deletion splice establishes a mathematical relationship between supplied byte buffers, not proof of a historical deletion event.
- SHA-256 fingerprints are not encryption.
- TOMBSTONE does not securely erase files or eliminate copies from backups, swap, undo histories or storage media.
- Hashes of short or predictable data may be susceptible to dictionary guessing.
- A locally consistent receipt chain can be rewritten wholesale without an independently trusted external anchor.
- Receipts do not establish authorship, trusted timestamps or real-world event authentication.
These boundaries are fundamental to the project's design.
Build and Test
C99 engine
make
make test
make sanitizer-test
make reproducibility
make docs-check
make fuzzRust CLI and TUI
cargo test --workspace --offline --locked
cargo build -p tombstone-cli --release --offline --locked
cargo build -p tombstone-tui --release --offline --lockedOptional GTK4 desktop
cargo test --manifest-path apps/gtk/Cargo.toml --offline --locked
cargo build --manifest-path apps/gtk/Cargo.toml --release --offline --locked
apps/gtk/target/release/tombstone-gtkGTK4 builds require the relevant system development libraries.
Project Information
- Repository: https://github.com/QSOLKCB/TOMBSTONE
- Version: v0.1.0
- License: Apache-2.0
- Language: C99, Rust
- Interfaces: CLI, ncurses TUI, GTK4
- Release type: Initial public, source-only
- Development: Phases 0–7 complete
Closing Statement
TOMBSTONE is built around a simple principle:
A hash remembers the bytes. A receipt records the claim. Verification establishes what the evidence actually supports.
It is not a secure-erasure utility, an authenticated event history or a substitute for independent witnessing.
It is a deterministic foundation for accountable, reproducible cryptographic evidence.
The data is gone. The tombstone has a checksum. 🪦
What's Changed
- docs: TOMBSTONE foundation, cryptographic receipt contract and branded header by @EmergentMonk in #1
- feat: Phase 1 C99 binary-safe SHA-256 fingerprint core by @EmergentMonk in #2
- feat(c99): Phase 2 exact deletion witnessing and transition classification by @EmergentMonk in #3
- feat(c99): Phase 3 canonical JSON receipts and linked tombstone verification by @EmergentMonk in #4
- feat: Phase 4 safe Rust FFI and deterministic C99-backed CLI by @EmergentMonk in #5
- feat: Phase 5 Rust ncurses TUI with C99-backed evidence workflows by @EmergentMonk in #6
- test: Phase 7 adversarial fuzzing, cross-architecture replay and release gate by @EmergentMonk in #8
- feat: Phase 6 optional GTK4 desktop interface over C99 evidence engine by @EmergentMonk in #7
Full Changelog: https://github.com/QSOLKCB/TOMBSTONE/commits/v0.1.0