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Driven by a second hunt, through fake cheat and airdrop lure repos: nine more malicious repositories across five campaigns, including a GitHub Pages redirector kit shared by a crypto claimer and an Adobe impersonation. This release teaches the scanner the delivery-side patterns that hunt exposed.
- New structural check: REDIRECTOR (High). Fires when a single HTML or JavaScript file combines all three signals of the remote-config redirector kit: a fetch() call with a literal URL or an XMLHttpRequest being opened, an atob() base64 decode, and a location redirect assignment (window.location, location.href, location.replace). One or two signals never fire. The check runs on loose files and on HTML and JavaScript entries inside zip archives, and is covered end to end by a synthetic kit fixture in the test suite.
- SS099 extended. File-host lure links now also match direct-download paths with no archive extension (/file/, /directdownload/, /download/ segments and download query parameters), and URL shorteners (cutt.ly, bit.ly, tinyurl.com, rb.gy) match when the same line also carries a download signal: the words download, installer or setup, or an archive extension. A bare shortener link still does not fire.
- Oversize archives are no longer skipped silently. A zip over the scan size cap now produces an ARCHIVE-UNREADABLE info finding stating it was not inspected due to size; the oversize skip counter still records the skip.
- New pattern rule (100 total, up from 99): SS100 (Medium) antivirus-disable instruction. Mentions in a detection context ("detected by Windows Defender") do not fire.
- 197 tests (up from 177).
What v1.2 still cannot do: judge the intent of an encrypted payload whose strings decrypt only at runtime, follow a redirector or fetch its remote config to see where it leads, inspect encrypted archives, open archives nested inside other archives, or inspect non-ZIP archive formats.