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ReD-Pot 1.0.0
First release of ReD-Pot Community Edition (MIT), built from v0.4.0. It keeps every decoy role, the baits and
honeytokens, scoring, the dashboard and remote sensors, and sets the Community Edition limits: at most 3 decoys, one
decoy per network interface on that interface's own IP, a fixed persona and bait set, no outbound alerting and no
offline replay. See "Community Edition limits" in the README.
Upgrading: fresh installs only. Uninstall v0.3.x / v0.4.x (sudo ./install.sh uninstall), then install 1.0.0
(new persona, baits and admin token; remote sensors join again). Commands that change an existing install refuse a
configuration made by an older version.
Added
- Export: Incidents → Export JSON downloads incidents and alert records for a date range (whole UTC days, To
included, at most 366 days) as one JSON file with a"complete": truemarker. Admin sessions only; one export at a
time; larger than 200 MB is refused with the counts instead of being cut off.
The same from the command line:sudo ./install.sh export --from D --to D [-o FILE] [--force](file mode 0600, never follows symlinks,--forcereplaces only a regular file), and inside the
console containerrpotctl export(JSON on stdout) andrpotctl slots(decoy slot counts). - Decoy limit (3 decoys: local decoys + remote sensors + pending joins), enforced by the installer,
rpotctl,
enrollment, the database and the sensor API. The dashboard shows "n of 3 decoys", disables Add a sensor when full
and explains why; pending joins can be cancelled, which frees the slot at once. Revoking a remote sensor frees its
slot; a local decoy frees its slot only withinstall.sh remove-decoy. A full manager answers a valid join with
"decoy limit reached" and the token stays unused. - Edition label in the dashboard header;
editionin/api/summary, slot counts in/api/fleet. sensor.gapnote: after an outage a remote sensor reports how many events it could not deliver (count and first/last
timestamp only), shown on that decoy's incident.- Alert records are stored in the database (
alert_records) as the source for Export, whether or notalerts.json
is enabled. They follow the event retention. tests/lab_scenarios.sh setup|attack|all|downbuilds a 3-decoy bridge lab (FS01, DC01, WEB01) and runs the simulated
workstations;DRY_RUN=1prints the commands.- Release pipeline (GitHub Actions): CI on every push and pull request (tests on Python 3.12/3.13, CE gate, shell
syntax, dependency audit). A version tag builds the image for linux/amd64 and linux/arm64, publishes
ghcr.io/redsidesecurity/red-pot:<version>with provenance and SBOM, checks the pushed image's source-hash label
against the installer'ssrc_hash(), then creates the GitHub Release from this changelog.
Changed
- SSH decoy: an open interactive shell is no longer closed when no further channel is opened within 60 s.
- Connection floods (pentest F-02): one decoy-wide connection budget for every TCP service, SMB and HTTP included
(250 concurrent, 20 per source IP, thread ceiling 320 under the container's 384); SMB sessions without a named logon
idle out after 60 s. A listener no longer dies when the decoy runs out of threads: that client is dropped and the
listener keeps serving. Sources that hit a cap raise a level-3conn.floodevent (once a minute per source). - SMB named-pipe flood (pentest N-3): SMB named pipes (
\srvsvc,\wkssvc) no longer start a thread each; RPC
requests are answered in the SMB session's own thread. Every open pipe is charged to the decoy's connection budget:
at most 8 per SMB session, 16 per source IP, 128 per decoy, and none once the decoy is within 32 threads of its
thread ceiling (a pipe is refused before a new client is). A refused open getsSTATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; the
session keeps working. Idle pipes close after 60 s (null session) or 300 s (named logon), and all of a session's
pipes close with the session. The SSH decoy allows 10 channels per connection (OpenSSHMaxSessions), charged the
same way. - Resource-exhaustion detection: a source that hits its own pipe cap raises
smb.pipe_flood(level 4); its own
SSH channel cap, or holding all its connection slots while the decoy is full, raisesresource.exhaustion(level 4).
When the decoy-wide thread or connection cap refuses a client, the manager opens or raises a level-4 decoy incident
"Decoy NAME saturated - possible DoS". That incident names the top holders (source IPs and their counts), not the
refused client, and always writes an alert record when it opens or rises (otherwise at most one per decoy per 5 min).
Flood events now carry the total refused since the flood started (refused), the count since the last report
(new) andduration_s. The first refusal is reported at once and a summary follows within 60 s. - Decoy service health: every 30 s each decoy checks its listeners; a dead or unbound one is restarted and reported
(sensor.service_down/sensor.service_up). The manager opens a level-4 "service down - possible DoS" incident on
that decoy and/api/sensorsshowsservices_downand per-service health; the dashboard marks a down service in red. - Persona: the installer asks only the AD/DNS domain and the industry. Company name, NetBIOS name and mail domain
are derived from the domain and shown on the review screen. Users come from a larger built-in name pool (70 first
names × 72 last names), 14 picked per install by a random seed, which also picks the username format. Internationalised
(xn--) domain labels are refused with a hint.--domainis required with--yes(no default domain).
The NetBIOS name is the first domain label without hyphens (corp.ararat-bank.am→ARARATBANK); when that is
longer than 15 characters, its first word (northwind-traders-intl.com→NORTHWIND). Before:ARARAT-BANK,
or a 15-character cut such asREDSIDE-SECURIT(pentest F-04). - Fewer honeypot tells (pentest F-04, F-05):
- Bait files are dated per file at office-hours times with their own minutes and seconds (before, every file carried
the install time's seconds)..docxbaits have Word-like metadata: author and editor from the staff list, created
and modified dates matching the file date,app.xml, and ZIP entries dated like Word's (no install time). - The DC's LDAP directory looks like a real Server 2019 domain: about 125 objects, including the default containers,
CN=Builtinwith the builtin groups, the default domain groups, the Default Domain (Controllers) Policy GPOs,
a company OU tree with department OUs and groups, and one workstation per employee (also known to the KDC).
EverymemberOfpoints to an existing object,membermatches it, and the primary group is not listed. - A null session can no longer list shares (Server 2019 default). Logged-on bait users still can.
- The NetBIOS node-status reply carries the decoy interface's real MAC address instead of a made-up one.
- Bait files are dated per file at office-hours times with their own minutes and seconds (before, every file carried
- One decoy per interface: each decoy answers on its interface's own IP; the address question is gone. The
installer offers each interface once and allows at most min(3, usable interfaces) decoys. A 1-NIC server holds one
local decoy, which shares the management IP (host SSH moves to a random port).--no-ssh-movewith a decoy on the
management interface is an error. Interfaces with unusual names are listed as Not usable. add-decoyoffers only interfaces without a decoy, checks the decoy count with the running manager first, and needs
the manager to be running.- Remote sensor install: no placement or address question; the decoy answers on the IP of the chosen decoy interface.
On the manager-link interface host SSH moves (and the decoy follows DHCP there); on another interface the decoy binds
that IP and host SSH is pinned to the manager-link IP. The decoy-interface firewall policy applies on sensors too. - Manager unreachable: a sensor retries the batch in flight in memory for up to 60 s; after that, events go only to
a write-only local logundelivered-<NAME>.jsonlon the sensor (mode 0600,RPOT_UNDELIVERED_MAX_MB, default 50) and
are never sent later. - Sensor timestamps older than 15 minutes (was 7 days) or more than 5 minutes in the future are replaced by the
manager's time; the original is kept asdata.sensor_ts, and the manager log warns once per sensor about clock skew. rpot.jsonformat version 2.alertskeeps onlymin_level(thealerts.jsonthreshold).rpotctl inittakes--domain(required) and--profile;--net-modeishost(production,
--sensor NAME=role@IP%IFACE) orbridge(isolated lab). At most 3--sensorentries.- The version (1.0.0) has a single source,
rpot/__init__.py; the installer,rpotctland the image tag read it. - DC DNS fingerprint: the domain controller decoy's DNS now answers like a default Windows Server DNS: CHAOS
queries (version.bind) get NOTIMP with no version, other answers have RA set (header bit only; the decoy still
never recurses), and non-QUERY opcodes (DNS STATUS) get a 12-byte NOTIMP.nmap -sVreported it as
"NLnet Labs NSD"; it now reports "Simple DNS Plus" (OS: Windows), as it does for most real domain controllers. - DNS zone apex: the DC and Linux DNS decoys answered NXDOMAIN for the domain itself (SOA, NS, A) and for
_msdcs/_tcpwhile names below them resolved, and negative answers had no SOA. The DC now serves the domain
zone and an_msdcszone with Windows defaults (SOA primary = the DC,hostmaster.<domain>, 900/600/86400/3600),
NS and apex A = the DC, the Net Logon records (site,pdc/gc, DC and domain GUID records,DomainDnsZones/
ForestDnsZones). The Linux DNS role gets a BIND-style SOA and NS. Empty names such as_tcpanswer NOERROR with
no data, NXDOMAIN/NODATA carry the SOA, zone transfers stay refused, and nothing is resolved outside the zone. - RDP fingerprint: the RDP decoy now looks like Windows Server 2019 with Network Level Authentication required.
TLS is capped at 1.2 (no TLS 1.3) with the Schannel cipher order and 2048-bit DHE. The certificate is a per-install
self-signed one like the one Remote Desktop creates for itself: CN = host FQDN only, RSA 2048 / SHA-256, a 16-byte
serial, 6-month validity (re-issued when it expires), EKU Server Authentication and Key Usage Key Encipherment +
Data Encipherment, and no other extensions. A client that offers only Standard RDP Security or plain TLS gets an
RDP_NEG_FAILUREwithHYBRID_REQUIRED_BY_SERVERinstead of a silent close. RDSTLS and CredSSP with Early User
Authorization are accepted, and a bare TLS handshake on the RDP port shows the certificate, sonmap -sCreports
ssl-certon 3389 like on a Windows host. - LDAPS and HTTPS fingerprint: the domain controller's LDAPS (636) and the new Global Catalog over SSL port
(3269) present a certificate issued by a per-install fake enterprise CA named like the Active Directory Certificate
Services default (<domain>-<DC name>-CA, its key stays in the sensor data directory, mode 0600). The certificate
follows the "Domain Controller" template: CN and DNS name = the DC FQDN plus the DC object GUID, EKU Client +
Server Authentication, template nameDomainController, LDAP CRL and AIA locations, the DC account SID, an AD CS
style 19-byte serial and a 1-year validity from a backdated issue date. TLS follows Windows Server 2019 (1.0 to 1.2,
no 1.3, Schannel cipher order). The Linux web decoy's HTTPS now looks like Apache's default SSL site on Ubuntu
22.04: the "snakeoil" self-signed certificate, TLS 1.2 and 1.3 only,HIGH:!aNULLwith client cipher order. - Web decoy errors look like Apache (pentest N-4): unusual or malformed requests no longer get Python
http.serverpages. Error responses use Apache 2.4.52's error documents, reason phrases and header order
(Date,Server, ...,Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1last) with theApache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu) Server at <host> Port <port>footer, where host and port come from the request's Host header. Request handling follows
Ubuntu's Apache defaults:TRACEis 405 (TraceEnable Off); an unknown method is 501;PUT/DELETE/PROPFIND
on a static or missing path is 405;OPTIONSon a static or missing path is 200 withAllowand no PHP headers;
PHP pages answer every method exceptTRACE, as mod_php does; a malformed request line, bare-LF line endings,
HTTP/1.1 without Host, or an invalid Host is 400 and the bad input is not echoed; a request line over 8190
bytes is 414; oversized or too many header fields are 400 with Apache's note; HTTP/0.9GETgets the body only.
Keep-alive works as on Ubuntu (5 s, at most 100 requests per connection,Keep-Aliveonly when the client asks).
Static bait files are served without PHP headers and withLast-Modified,ETagandAccept-Ranges.
Malformed requests and unusual methods raisehttp.scanner. - Port scan detection on small decoys: a source touching every port of one decoy within 10 minutes (roles with at
least 3 ports: the 4-port file server, the web role) raisesscan.detected, besides the existing rule (5 distinct
decoy ports in 10 minutes). A full scan of the file-server decoy was not detected before. SMB plus RDP from one
client (3 of the file server's 4 ports) is not a scan. - Docs: README "Community Edition limits" and ATT&CK coverage; INSTALL §6 is now "alerts.json, events.json and Export";
the lab guide usestests/lab_scenarios.sh.
Removed
- Telegram and JSON webhook alerting, the hourly alert cap, the alert delivery log (
alertstable) andGET /api/alerts.
rpot.jsonkeysalerts.telegram,alerts.webhookandalerts.public_url. - Offline spool replay: events from a manager outage are no longer queued and replayed (
RPOT_SPOOL_MAX_MBis gone). - Decoys on extra addresses: macvlan networks, new free IPs, VLAN placement, vendor MAC addresses and the free-IP
check. Installer flags--placement,--decoy-ips,--company,--nics;rpotctlflags--company,--netbios,
--email-domain,--user-format,--macvlan,--gateway,--host-network,--decoy-net,--own-ipand
--net-mode macvlan;rpot.jsonkeysdecoy_netsandhostnet. rpotctl personaandrpotctl setup: the persona and the baits cannot be changed after install.--roles all(5 roles never fit the limit).- Upgrade code for v0.3 databases and configurations.
Security
- SMB
IPC$is pipe-only (pentest F-01, critical): before, an anonymous session could list and download the
decoy's working directory (the ReD-Pot source) throughIPC$. Now only thesrvsvc/wkssvcpipes open there;
any other name is "not found", the share root is "access denied" and a listing is refused.IPC$is backed by an
empty directory,ADMIN$/C$are never mapped to a directory, the decoy process runs from an empty directory,
and a share table that maps outside the bait tree stops the decoy. Every attempt to useIPC$,ADMIN$orC$
as a disk is a new level-3 eventsmb.admin_share("Tried to read admin share …"). - Decoy interfaces show only the decoy: on each decoy interface only that decoy's ports answer; every other port
(IPv6 included) looks closed, and the interface answers ARP only for its own address. This also hides other host
services on a decoy interface, including the management interface when a decoy shares it. Admin ports (web UI,
sensor API, host SSH) are accepted only on the management interface. - When a decoy shares the management interface, the web UI, sensor API and host SSH allow-lists default to the
admin's own SSH client (/32), and--yesrequires--allow-ui,--allow-sensorand--allow-ssh. An admin
connected over IPv6 keeps SSH access through a/128rule. - The same for remote sensors: when the decoy is on the interface that reaches the manager, the moved host SSH answers
only the SSH allow-list (default: your own SSH client) and the current session;--yesrequires--allow-ssh.
Before, it was open to the whole decoy LAN and--allow-sshwas ignored on sensors. - The sensor join string (a one-time token) is no longer put on any command line during the install: the enrollment
container receives it in its environment. Give it to the installer by pasting it when asked, on standard input
(--join -) or in a root-only file (--join-file FILE, mode 600).--join 'redpot://…'still works, but warns that
local users can read it in the process list while the installer runs. The dashboard's Add a sensor now shows the
commandsudo ./install.sh sensorand, in its own copy box, the join string to paste; the API'scommandfield no
longer contains the join string. - When a decoy shares the management interface, the installer first lists the host services that listen there and
will become unreachable on that interface (for example a VPN server), and asks for confirmation. With--yesit stops
unless--close-other-servicesis given. - The server does not route for a decoy LAN. Forwarded traffic arriving on a decoy interface is refused, and traffic
into a Docker network is accepted only for published ports, so a direct route to the console container's address
(port 8740/8741) cannot bypass the allow-lists. - The firewall fails closed:
firewall.sh applychecks that every chain is hooked (iptables, ip6tables while IPv6 is on,
DOCKER-USERorFORWARD). If a chain is missing, it exits with an error that names the chain and the rules are
removed again. With Docker's nftables firewall backend the chain is hooked intoFORWARDdirectly. The self-test
reports whether the firewall is in effect.- Install: the installer first checks these prerequisites, before it stops services or moves SSH. If
applystill
fails, the installer stops and the decoys are not started. The check tests the egress guard's owner match in a
temporary chain hooked fromOUTPUTand theFORWARDhook with an empty chain (the kernel accepts the owner match
only on the output path; mixing both made every install with a decoy fail), and removes its chains again. add-decoy/remove-decoy: if the new rules fail, the previous rules are put back for the running console and
decoys and the change is not started; if that fails too, the whole stack is stopped.- The
redpotservice first stops its containers, then applies the firewall, then starts them. After an unclean
shutdown Docker restarts the containers on its own when it starts, so they run without the firewall until the
service starts (after the network is online); ifapplyfails then, they are stopped and stay stopped.
- Install: the installer first checks these prerequisites, before it stops services or moves SSH. If
- The NetBIOS name-service exception of the egress guard allows only small UDP answers from port 137, out of the decoy's
own interface to a host in that interface's subnet, never to port 53. - The installer refuses to install when uid 10001 (the containers' user) is used by a host account or host process.
add-decoynext to a running domain controller decoy works: a socket bound to one interface (the DC's NetBIOS socket,
0.0.0.0%eth0inss) counts only for that interface's addresses when the installer checks for busy ports.- Egress guard: decoy processes in the host network may only reply and report to the sensor API; the web UI,
127.0.0.1, the LAN and the internet are refused. - SMB share enumeration (
net view,smbclient -L) works on host-mode decoys behind the egress guard: the
srvsvc/wkssvcnamed pipes reach their RPC handlers inside the decoy process instead of over TCP127.0.0.1,
so the guard keeps loopback closed and no RPC port listens on127.0.0.1any more. - SMB
srvsvcserver info (NetrServerGetInfo) answers with the decoy's name, persona OS version and server type
(domain controller bits on a DC); it used to fail and drop the pipe. - The self-test lists host services that listen on all addresses.
- The console makes no outbound connections for alerting, so network monitoring sees no alert traffic from it.
- The undelivered log is opened write-only with
O_NOFOLLOW, never read back, and capped. - Enrollment validates the decoy IP; slot checks run inside the fleet lock, so concurrent join requests cannot exceed
the limit. A sensor beyond the limit gets 403 on ingest and config. - The export requires an admin session and the CSRF header, is sent with
Cache-Control: no-store, and contains bait
user names and attempted passwords: keep exported files private. - The image has no setuid/setgid files. Local host-network decoys and the decoy of a remote sensor now also run with
no-new-privileges:
they start as root with onlyNET_BIND_SERVICE,SETUID,SETGIDandSETPCAP, and the entrypoint drops at once
to uid 10001 withsetpriv, cutting the bounding set toNET_BIND_SERVICEand keeping only it (ambient) for ports
22/445. The console, sensor and relay roles refuse to run as root without that drop. sensor.gapnotes are rate-limited: at most one per decoy per 5 minutes (later reports in that window are merged
into it, counts summed), and decoy-incident notes keep only their newest 20 lines / 4 KB. The first/last timestamps
are the decoy's own clock and are dropped when older than 30 days or in the future.- A remote sensor that follows its interface's address never listens on
0.0.0.0when that interface has no IPv4
address: it waits briefly, then exits and is restarted.
Container image
ghcr.io/redsidesecurity/red-pot:1.0.0 (linux/amd64, linux/arm64)
- digest:
sha256:277f64452e99515fb6fdd9c19587b20acd5d44eef2928c9bb6b3f29d825dbe6d - source hash label
io.redside.src-sha256:c1ade7253a657b8191385e174640c3665cf91ffe3a50ae11d8b768977c43c5a8 - provenance:
gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/redsidesecurity/red-pot:1.0.0 --repo RedSideSecurity/ReD-Pot