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Bug-fix release from the 1.0.0 live test. No configuration or database change (rpot.json schema version 2).
Upgrading from 1.0.0: in place, keeping persona, baits, admin token, enrolled sensors and the database: on the
manager and on every remote sensor, git pull (or check out v1.0.1), then sudo ./install.sh update (--yes for
unattended runs). See "Upgrading" in docs/INSTALL.md. Older versions (v0.3.x / v0.4.x): uninstall, then install.
Fixed
- Network map / console panels could fail with HTTP 500 and incoming events could be rejected under concurrent
load. The console used one database connection for every thread, and the read paths (network map, world map,
summary, incidents ...) ran on it while events were being stored. Overlapping use broke statements
(InterfaceError: bad parameter or other API misuse), and an event batch answered with HTTP 500 could already be
partly stored, so the decoy's retry stored some events twice. A batch is now stored completely or not at all. Reads now use their own
read-only connection per thread (WAL: they see the last committed data and never block event storage); writes
keep the single connection under the lock. The network map and world map APIs also share one computation
between identical requests and reuse it for up to 5 s, so many open screens no longer pile up 24 h scans (their
time range is rounded up to the UI's presets: 15 min, 1 h, 24 h, 7 days, 30 days, 90 days). - Network map: HTTP 500 "database or disk is full" on busy managers. The 24 h network map sorted every event of
the range through an SQLite temp file (about 19 MB at 350k events a day), and the console's /tmp is a 16 MB tmpfs.
SQLite's temp files now go to the data volume (SQLITE_TMPDIR=/var/lib/rpot/tmp, the same as the 1.0.0 hotfix),
and the map query is bounded: the newest 20,000 source/decoy pairs, with a note when more exist; internal-only views
are filtered in the query itself. - Attack map, "Live external activity" missed L4 events. Internal sources were filtered out only after a 400-row
window, so a burst of internal traffic (a vulnerability scan, our own attack test) could empty the external feed even
right after an external L4. Internal and allow-listed sources are now left out before the limit. The newest 10 L4+
events of the range always stay in the 40-row feed, so internet scanner noise (L2/L3) no longer pushes an L4/L5
out. The feed follows the map's level selector (never below L2), and its caption shows the level. Its cost depends
on the feed size, not on the number of sources: events are read newest first in pages and the scan stops when the
feed is full or reaches the start of the time range (hard cap 25 000 rows per scan); source classification uses a
bounded LRU cache. - IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (
::ffff:192.168.1.10, from a dual-stack socket) were classified as external and
never matched IPv4 entries ofallowlist,internal_nets,wall_allowor the manager's decoy-network UI deny
list. They are now treated as the plain IPv4 address everywhere a source is classified, and stored as plain IPv4
(decoys send it that way, and the manager normalises incoming events and bait-document beacons too). - Installer: the admin token was printed twice at the end of a manager install (the
rpotctl initline and the
summary). It is printed once, in the summary, and kept inINSTALL-INFO.txt.rpotctl initrun by hand still
shows it. - Remote sensor on DHCP locked out after an address change. The decoy follows a new lease, the manager's
sensor-API allow-list did not, and there was no supported way to change it. The sensor installer now warns when
the manager link is a DHCP lease (static address or DHCP reservation needed; confirm, default no), the L4 "stopped
reporting" alert of a remote sensor points at the fix, and the newinstall.sh set-accesschanges the lists (see
Added). - A clock jump on the manager raised false tamper alerts. A forward step of the system clock (NTP after a snapshot
restore,date -s) opened an L4 "stopped reporting — possible tampering" incident for every decoy. Decoy silence is
now measured on the monotonic clock; a detected jump starts a grace period for decoys without a baseline and is
logged once on the console output. Admin sessions still end on a large forward jump (cookie expiry is wall-clock
time).
Fixed (security)
- Firewall apply had an open gap and could fail open.
firewall.sh applyremoved every ReD-Pot chain first and
hooked the new ones only at the end, while the console and the decoys kept running; Ctrl-C or a dropped SSH session
during add-decoy / remove-decoy could leave them without rules. The rules are now swapped make-before-break: the
new generation of the chains is built next to the one in effect and hooked only when complete, then the old one is
removed; a failed build is dropped and the previous rules stay. After an interrupted run (evenkill -9) the next
apply recognises the complete generation by checking every hook point, never by name.applyignores
SIGHUP/SIGINT/SIGTERM; the installer ignores SIGINT/SIGHUP/SIGTERM from writingfirewall.shto applying it and
runs it in its own session; when even the previous rules cannot be restored the stack is stopped before the rules
are taken out, and a failed apply says so honestly when the host is not protected. ip6tables failures count only
where IPv6 is on. The same script runs at boot. - Allow-lists widened silently. A network with host bits set (
1.2.3.4/0,192.168.1.10/2) was turned into its
network (0.0.0.0/0= anyone,192.0.0.0/2). Such input is now refused with the network and the single-address
form to type instead; interactive runs show the normalised list. trust_xff: the bait-document beacon trustedX-Forwarded-Forfrom any client and took its leftmost entry, so
a client could name an allow-listed address and mute the alert. It is now honoured only when the TCP peer is in
the newconsole.trusted_proxieslist (empty = never, even withtrust_xff), only its rightmost entry (the one
the proxy adds) is used, the proxy is recorded (data.via_proxy), and a source taken from it is never matched
against the allow-list. Off by default; the installer never sets it.- Allow-lists and ports read back from
installer.jsonare validated again before they reachfirewall.sh;
installer.jsonandINSTALL-INFO.txtare written atomically and never through a symlink.
Added
sudo ./install.sh update: in-place update of a manager or remote sensor (1.0.0 → 1.0.1, also from a 1.0.0
manager running the hotfix imagerpot:1.0.0-hotfix1, which it supersedes). It refuses anything
but a supported version step of the Community Edition (and says "already up to date" on 1.0.1), makes a backup
first (database with the sqlite backup API, configuration, compose file, firewall.sh, unit, with owners and
modes;/var/backups/redpot/<time>-<kind>-<version>/, root only), gets the new image the normal way (verified
download or local build), rewrites compose, unit and firewall.sh (manager), restarts and checks that the console
answers and the decoys run. On any failure (any error, also a dropped SSH session) it restores the previous image,
configuration (owners and modes kept), unit and firewall rules, reports "rolled back" only once the service runs
again, and otherwise says exactly what is wrong. An update cut off by a power loss is offered for rollback on the
next run (--resume-rollbackfor unattended runs; refused if the files changed after it); until then add-decoy,
remove-decoy and set-access refuse. Uninstall removes the update backups (kept with--keep-data).
Signals are ignored during the critical part. The image now carries anio.redside.editionlabel.sudo ./install.sh set-access: change the web UI, sensor API and host SSH allow-lists of a manager install
without reinstalling (persona, baits and admin token stay). Interactive with the current lists as defaults, or
--yes --allow-sensor 192.168.1.0/24(only the named lists change). It applies the install's exposure checks: on
an address a decoy shares, a list open to anyone or containing the decoy's own LAN is warned about and needs
confirmation (default no); with--yesit is refused unless--accept-exposureis given. It runs the firewall
preflight, rewritesfirewall.shand swaps the rules in (see above); if that fails, the previousfirewall.sh
stays on disk andinstaller.jsonis unchanged. Your current SSH client always stays allowed; open web UI /
sensor API connections from removed addresses are cut when theconntracktool is installed (otherwise they stay
until they close); host SSH sessions are never cut automatically; unchanged lists change nothing.set-accesswarns when the new sensor-API list leaves out an enrolled remote sensor's address (it would be
refused and go offline); interactive runs ask to confirm (default no).- The remote-sensor relay logs one line (at most once a minute per kind) instead of full tracebacks while the
manager is unreachable. add-decoyonto the management interface runs the same exposure checks (and needs--accept-exposurewith
--yesfor an exposed list).
Changed
- Installer, web UI allow-list: when the web UI allow-list is restricted (interactive or
--yes), the installer
warns that bait documents only report from addresses allowed to reach the console: the bait Word documents call
home to the web UI port. This is how the Community Edition works; README ("Community Edition limits") and
docs/INSTALL.mdsay the same. A separate beacon endpoint is planned for ReD-Pot Enterprise. - "Live external activity" caption shows the level filter and that the newest L4+ events are always kept.
- Docs: remote sensors need a static address or a DHCP reservation;
set-accessin Day-2 operations and
Troubleshooting.
Container image
ghcr.io/redsidesecurity/red-pot:1.0.1 (linux/amd64, linux/arm64)
- digest:
sha256:1fa9194b7a6169e9da9394ae1b999c0d319a51488e75ff4ba73621486e6a309a - source hash label
io.redside.src-sha256:b57dd48e62c7efd1d2372819292ac79d5c8f490c30d4e31d6465ba9b35bdd6ec - provenance:
gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/redsidesecurity/red-pot:1.0.1 --repo RedSideSecurity/ReD-Pot