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ReD-Pot 1.0.1

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@github-actions github-actions released this 17 Nov 06:01

Bug-fix release from the 1.0.0 live test. No configuration or database change (rpot.json schema version 2).

Upgrading from 1.0.0: in place, keeping persona, baits, admin token, enrolled sensors and the database: on the
manager and on every remote sensor, git pull (or check out v1.0.1), then sudo ./install.sh update (--yes for
unattended runs). See "Upgrading" in docs/INSTALL.md. Older versions (v0.3.x / v0.4.x): uninstall, then install.

Fixed

  • Network map / console panels could fail with HTTP 500 and incoming events could be rejected under concurrent
    load.
    The console used one database connection for every thread, and the read paths (network map, world map,
    summary, incidents ...) ran on it while events were being stored. Overlapping use broke statements
    (InterfaceError: bad parameter or other API misuse), and an event batch answered with HTTP 500 could already be
    partly stored, so the decoy's retry stored some events twice. A batch is now stored completely or not at all. Reads now use their own
    read-only connection per thread (WAL: they see the last committed data and never block event storage); writes
    keep the single connection under the lock. The network map and world map APIs also share one computation
    between identical requests and reuse it for up to 5 s, so many open screens no longer pile up 24 h scans (their
    time range is rounded up to the UI's presets: 15 min, 1 h, 24 h, 7 days, 30 days, 90 days).
  • Network map: HTTP 500 "database or disk is full" on busy managers. The 24 h network map sorted every event of
    the range through an SQLite temp file (about 19 MB at 350k events a day), and the console's /tmp is a 16 MB tmpfs.
    SQLite's temp files now go to the data volume (SQLITE_TMPDIR=/var/lib/rpot/tmp, the same as the 1.0.0 hotfix),
    and the map query is bounded: the newest 20,000 source/decoy pairs, with a note when more exist; internal-only views
    are filtered in the query itself.
  • Attack map, "Live external activity" missed L4 events. Internal sources were filtered out only after a 400-row
    window, so a burst of internal traffic (a vulnerability scan, our own attack test) could empty the external feed even
    right after an external L4. Internal and allow-listed sources are now left out before the limit. The newest 10 L4+
    events of the range always stay in the 40-row feed, so internet scanner noise (L2/L3) no longer pushes an L4/L5
    out. The feed follows the map's level selector (never below L2), and its caption shows the level. Its cost depends
    on the feed size, not on the number of sources: events are read newest first in pages and the scan stops when the
    feed is full or reaches the start of the time range (hard cap 25 000 rows per scan); source classification uses a
    bounded LRU cache.
  • IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (::ffff:192.168.1.10, from a dual-stack socket) were classified as external and
    never matched IPv4 entries of allowlist, internal_nets, wall_allow or the manager's decoy-network UI deny
    list. They are now treated as the plain IPv4 address everywhere a source is classified, and stored as plain IPv4
    (decoys send it that way, and the manager normalises incoming events and bait-document beacons too).
  • Installer: the admin token was printed twice at the end of a manager install (the rpotctl init line and the
    summary). It is printed once, in the summary, and kept in INSTALL-INFO.txt. rpotctl init run by hand still
    shows it.
  • Remote sensor on DHCP locked out after an address change. The decoy follows a new lease, the manager's
    sensor-API allow-list did not, and there was no supported way to change it. The sensor installer now warns when
    the manager link is a DHCP lease (static address or DHCP reservation needed; confirm, default no), the L4 "stopped
    reporting" alert of a remote sensor points at the fix, and the new install.sh set-access changes the lists (see
    Added).
  • A clock jump on the manager raised false tamper alerts. A forward step of the system clock (NTP after a snapshot
    restore, date -s) opened an L4 "stopped reporting — possible tampering" incident for every decoy. Decoy silence is
    now measured on the monotonic clock; a detected jump starts a grace period for decoys without a baseline and is
    logged once on the console output. Admin sessions still end on a large forward jump (cookie expiry is wall-clock
    time).

Fixed (security)

  • Firewall apply had an open gap and could fail open. firewall.sh apply removed every ReD-Pot chain first and
    hooked the new ones only at the end, while the console and the decoys kept running; Ctrl-C or a dropped SSH session
    during add-decoy / remove-decoy could leave them without rules. The rules are now swapped make-before-break: the
    new generation of the chains is built next to the one in effect and hooked only when complete, then the old one is
    removed; a failed build is dropped and the previous rules stay. After an interrupted run (even kill -9) the next
    apply recognises the complete generation by checking every hook point, never by name. apply ignores
    SIGHUP/SIGINT/SIGTERM; the installer ignores SIGINT/SIGHUP/SIGTERM from writing firewall.sh to applying it and
    runs it in its own session; when even the previous rules cannot be restored the stack is stopped before the rules
    are taken out, and a failed apply says so honestly when the host is not protected. ip6tables failures count only
    where IPv6 is on. The same script runs at boot.
  • Allow-lists widened silently. A network with host bits set (1.2.3.4/0, 192.168.1.10/2) was turned into its
    network (0.0.0.0/0 = anyone, 192.0.0.0/2). Such input is now refused with the network and the single-address
    form to type instead; interactive runs show the normalised list.
  • trust_xff: the bait-document beacon trusted X-Forwarded-For from any client and took its leftmost entry, so
    a client could name an allow-listed address and mute the alert. It is now honoured only when the TCP peer is in
    the new console.trusted_proxies list (empty = never, even with trust_xff), only its rightmost entry (the one
    the proxy adds) is used, the proxy is recorded (data.via_proxy), and a source taken from it is never matched
    against the allow-list. Off by default; the installer never sets it.
  • Allow-lists and ports read back from installer.json are validated again before they reach firewall.sh;
    installer.json and INSTALL-INFO.txt are written atomically and never through a symlink.

Added

  • sudo ./install.sh update: in-place update of a manager or remote sensor (1.0.0 → 1.0.1, also from a 1.0.0
    manager running the hotfix image rpot:1.0.0-hotfix1, which it supersedes). It refuses anything
    but a supported version step of the Community Edition (and says "already up to date" on 1.0.1), makes a backup
    first (database with the sqlite backup API, configuration, compose file, firewall.sh, unit, with owners and
    modes; /var/backups/redpot/<time>-<kind>-<version>/, root only), gets the new image the normal way (verified
    download or local build), rewrites compose, unit and firewall.sh (manager), restarts and checks that the console
    answers and the decoys run. On any failure (any error, also a dropped SSH session) it restores the previous image,
    configuration (owners and modes kept), unit and firewall rules, reports "rolled back" only once the service runs
    again, and otherwise says exactly what is wrong. An update cut off by a power loss is offered for rollback on the
    next run (--resume-rollback for unattended runs; refused if the files changed after it); until then add-decoy,
    remove-decoy and set-access refuse. Uninstall removes the update backups (kept with --keep-data).
    Signals are ignored during the critical part. The image now carries an io.redside.edition label.
  • sudo ./install.sh set-access: change the web UI, sensor API and host SSH allow-lists of a manager install
    without reinstalling (persona, baits and admin token stay). Interactive with the current lists as defaults, or
    --yes --allow-sensor 192.168.1.0/24 (only the named lists change). It applies the install's exposure checks: on
    an address a decoy shares, a list open to anyone or containing the decoy's own LAN is warned about and needs
    confirmation (default no); with --yes it is refused unless --accept-exposure is given. It runs the firewall
    preflight, rewrites firewall.sh and swaps the rules in (see above); if that fails, the previous firewall.sh
    stays on disk and installer.json is unchanged. Your current SSH client always stays allowed; open web UI /
    sensor API connections from removed addresses are cut when the conntrack tool is installed (otherwise they stay
    until they close); host SSH sessions are never cut automatically; unchanged lists change nothing.
  • set-access warns when the new sensor-API list leaves out an enrolled remote sensor's address (it would be
    refused and go offline); interactive runs ask to confirm (default no).
  • The remote-sensor relay logs one line (at most once a minute per kind) instead of full tracebacks while the
    manager is unreachable.
  • add-decoy onto the management interface runs the same exposure checks (and needs --accept-exposure with
    --yes for an exposed list).

Changed

  • Installer, web UI allow-list: when the web UI allow-list is restricted (interactive or --yes), the installer
    warns that bait documents only report from addresses allowed to reach the console: the bait Word documents call
    home to the web UI port. This is how the Community Edition works; README ("Community Edition limits") and
    docs/INSTALL.md say the same. A separate beacon endpoint is planned for ReD-Pot Enterprise.
  • "Live external activity" caption shows the level filter and that the newest L4+ events are always kept.
  • Docs: remote sensors need a static address or a DHCP reservation; set-access in Day-2 operations and
    Troubleshooting.

Container image

ghcr.io/redsidesecurity/red-pot:1.0.1 (linux/amd64, linux/arm64)

  • digest: sha256:1fa9194b7a6169e9da9394ae1b999c0d319a51488e75ff4ba73621486e6a309a
  • source hash label io.redside.src-sha256: b57dd48e62c7efd1d2372819292ac79d5c8f490c30d4e31d6465ba9b35bdd6ec
  • provenance: gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/redsidesecurity/red-pot:1.0.1 --repo RedSideSecurity/ReD-Pot