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Looptimal v2.1.0

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@Rennlabs Rennlabs released this 02 Jul 03:31
· 24 commits to main since this release

Looptimal v2.1.0 — the pinned quickstart now actually works

The v2.0.0 tag predated both pyproject.toml and the hardened verification core below —
README's own uvx ...@v2.0.0 quickstart never resolved end-to-end from that tag. This release
closes that gap and ships everything built since v2.0.0.

Added

  • Cryptographic sealed-contract hardening — canonical_contract_hash() gains an optional
    HMAC-SHA256 keyed mode (--key-file / LOOPTIMAL_FRAMER_KEY) that folds a manifest of every
    file under sealed/ into the digest, closing the gap where oracle scripts had zero
    cryptographic binding to the contract hash. Unkeyed calls remain byte-identical to prior
    behavior.
  • Checker-only ("holdout") visibility tier, hard/soft gate labeling, structured
    {score, reason} critic verdicts
    , a judge-calibration recipe, and two new oracle
    patterns (cross-provider judge quorum; sealed tool-trajectory match).
  • Zero-clone quickstart — pyproject.toml + looptimal_cli/ so uvx --from git+... runs
    the tooling without a clone.
  • looptimal-persona-promote.py, loopprint-ls.py --global,
    scripts/check-no-network-imports.py, a real demo asset, a 20-item roadmap, a
    verification-receipt design spec (references/receipt.md), and an upfront single-pass /
    recurring-loop / blueprint mode fork in SKILL.md.

Changed

  • README: real badges, a 60-second "prove it" block, three sourced reward-hacking numbers, a
    "Where this fits" section (vs. ralph loops / native Claude Code loops / spec-kit / Kiro), and
    an accurate description of the keyed-seal security model.
  • The bug-report template now asks for both doctors' output.

Fixed

  • Four Windows CI portability bugs found via the real 3-OS matrix.
  • Every @v2.0.0-pinned command in README now resolves against a tag that contains what it
    claims to run.

Security

  • The cryptographic framer hash-pin named as "planned" in 2.0.0's disclosed residual is now
    shipped, opt-in, and adversarially verified.
  • A mandatory pre-tag adversarial review found and closed a real bypass before it ever
    shipped: the outer verifier's subprocess-environment sanitizer forwarded the framer's signing
    key into every oracle's environment — since an oracle runs maker-controlled code by
    definition, a maker could read the key back out and forge a keyed contract_hash in the
    documented, CI-recommended key-delivery mode. Closed, with an exploit-tested --selftest case
    proving it. Three related hardening fixes landed alongside it in the same pass (constant-time
    hash comparison, fail-closed on an empty explicit key, sealed-oracle check tightened to the
    executed program). No real secret was ever exposed — every gap was caught before the
    CI-integration feature that would have exercised it shipped.

Full detail: CHANGELOG.md.