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Security
This page summarises the security model that the Paxeer X Network specification defines and how to report a vulnerability.
Do not open a public issue, discussion or pull request. Use GitHub private vulnerability reporting from the repository Security tab, and include:
- the affected commit and component
- prerequisites and an end-to-end reproduction
- the violated invariant and plausible impact
- whether exploitation needs sequencer, guarantor, governance or custody privileges
- any proposed mitigation, test vector or proof obligation
Do not probe public infrastructure, validators, custody deployments, user data or third-party systems. Do not move funds, publish exploit details or keep secrets found during research. The supported branch is main. There is no bounty. Full policy: SECURITY.md.
The limited beta has not opened yet. The gateway API becomes available when it does. This is a mainnet beta on real value, so there is no faucet for general use; approved developers receive test allocations from the team.
Agent activity is ordered and executed in the LayerX kernel. Periodic checkpoints go to the Paxeer X chain (EVM chain ID 125), which holds custody, checkpoint registration, guarantor bonds, challenges, withdrawals, disputes and emergency exits. An ordinary kernel action does not require a chain transaction.
A checkpoint is not proven valid. A threshold of bonded guarantors re-executes each batch and puts capital behind the result.
Before signing, a guarantor downloads the complete batch, verifies every signature, replays every transition, recomputes every root and stores the data-availability bundle. An attestation counts only if it asserts both replay and data possession. The initial set is N = 7 guarantors with threshold T = 5. A guarantor can attest or withhold; it cannot change state.
This is an economic guarantee, not a validity proof. If a threshold colludes, or all run the same faulty binary, an invalid root can be finalised. Two conflicting attestations from one guarantor are a self-contained proof: the chain-domain contract checks them without replay and slashes the full bond.
A checkpoint accepted on the chain domain is settled (level L4) only after the challenge window, PARAM_CHALLENGE_WINDOW_MS (one day), elapses with no accepted fraud claim. Within it, any party may submit a re-execution disagreement. An invalid-root claim is not mechanically verifiable in v1; governance adjudicates it under a timelock. Withdrawals and exits are payable only against a settled root. Levels L0 to L4: Finality.
Loss from a colluding quorum is bounded by rate, not by total custody. Each asset has a withdrawal rate limit W, enforced by the kernel at withdrawal request and again by the chain-domain contract per settled checkpoint. Bonds must satisfy T * B >= SAFETY_MARGIN * W, with SAFETY_MARGIN >= 2. Every withdrawal carries a nullifier, and the contract rejects a spent nullifier before doing any other work.
Custody lives on the Paxeer X chain: the custody precompile (0x1013), the checkpoint anchor precompile (0x1014) and the settlement contracts in contracts/. Bonds are held there because the slashing authority is the chain-domain contract. These contracts verify certificates, proofs against a state root, nullifiers and windows; they do not interpret kernel activity. A deposit credits the kernel only against finalised custody state. Custody-backed supply is reconciled against custody at every checkpoint with zero tolerance; a mismatch stops batch sealing and arms emergency exit.
Exit opens when checkpoints stall, a forced-inclusion request goes unanswered, an equivocation is proven, or governance declares an emergency. The agent proves its balance against the last finalised checkpoint and withdraws from custody without the sequencer. Activity after that checkpoint is discarded.
| Actor | Trusted for | Not trusted for |
|---|---|---|
| Agent | Its own keys, counterparties and payloads | Encoding, sequences, asserted balances |
| Sequencer | Order, batches, timestamps within bounds | Validity, fair inclusion, minting, forging receipts |
| Guarantor | Full replay and data availability | Individual honesty, independence, liveness |
| Service (HTTP 402) | Its own price and delivery | Debiting anyone without a live grant |
| Chain-domain contracts | Custody, checkpoints, bonds, slashing, exits | Kernel business logic |
Normative sources: threat model, guarantors, checkpointing. Fees and the treasury: Fees.