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DarkFactory v0.1.0-rc.10
Fixes Android content overlapping the status icons and bottom navigation bar after the SDK upgrade. The shared native container now handles system bars, camera cutouts and keyboard spacing across pairing, host selection and Fleet.
The signed Android APK has versionCode 163 and uses the existing release certificate. Install it over the current app to retain saved hosts. The pairing and encrypted transport protocol is unchanged from rc.9.
Both Go modules now require Go 1.27.4, which fixes GO-2026-6859 in the HTTP standard library. Other dependency upgrades identified in the November 12 audit remain separate.
Android validation covers API 36 emulator tests, paired Fleet, gesture and three-button navigation, landscape, and keyboard opening and dismissal. Physical Samsung A55 acceptance remains open. This release does not restart or upgrade an existing daemon automatically.
DarkFactory v0.1.0-rc.9
v0.1.0-rc.9 refreshes the toolchain and fixes two races that shipped in
v0.1.0-rc.8. The wire protocol is unchanged: an rc.8 daemon pairs and
talks to this phone client, and this APK (versionCode 162) installs over the
rc.8 APK without re-pairing. You do not have to upgrade both sides together.
What changed
Dependencies
bbolt1.3.11 → 1.5.0. Thestate.dbformat did not change; a 414 MB live
database was opened by the new daemon and restored all four session rows.x/sys→ 0.49.0, Wails 3.0.0 → 3.1.0 for the optional desktop shell.
Android
- AGP 9.5.1, Gradle 9.9.0, and AGP's built-in Kotlin 2.4.21;
compileSdkand
targetSdk36 with Build-Tools 36.0.0. targetSdk 36routes back gestures to the predictive-back dispatcher, so
MainActivityregisters anOnBackInvokedCallbackon API 33+ and keeps
onBackPressedfor older releases.versionCodeis the checked-in high-water mark (android/version.properties,
now 162), never a commit count. CI reads the same file.
Fixes
- Session stop could answer
already_exitedfor a session it had just
terminated: closing the PTY master delivers SIGHUP, which can kill the group
before SIGTERM is sent.Stopnow reports the stop it caused and waits for
the process to finish. - Attaching at the moment a prompt printed could drop those bytes permanently,
because the scrollback snapshot and the live subscription were taken in two
steps. They are now one decision under the writer's lock, so an attach
neither loses nor repeats the chunk at the seam. A full 4 MB scrollback
attach costs about 2 ms.
CI
- Dependabot watches both Go modules, the Gradle project and GitHub Actions;
alerts and automated security updates are on. Grouped minor/patch PRs;
AGP/Kotlin majors are ignored because they are migrations. - Android jobs install SDK 36/Build-Tools 36 and cache the Gradle wrapper, so a
GitHub release-asset outage cannot break every run from scratch.
Verifying this release
make checkexit 0 at the release revision (vet, tests,-race, UI gate
static half,clientbench-check,desktop-check).make dist VERSION=0.1.0-rc.9andsha256sum -cpass locally; the CI release
job rebuilds the same target from the tag and attests provenance with Sigstore
(gh attestation verify <file> -R Wintoplay/darkfactory).- Android:
lintDebug,assembleDebug, signedassembleRelease,
android-pq-checkandandroid-pq-live; certificate unchanged
(CN=DarkFactory Android, SHA-256A6:71:F0:BA:…:F8:33). - The green workflows at the tag are listed on the release page.
Open limits
targetSdk 36runtime behavior (predictive back, edge-to-edge) has no
device or API 36 emulator run yet; the CI emulator is API 34. Treat the
gesture and inset behavior as unverified until that pass exists.- Real-phone acceptance over Tailscale and the notification matrix remain open,
as they were for rc.8. - The native Wails window checks predate this change.
- SS-4 (
snapshot + seqon the wire) is still open; reconnects can repeat
bytes. The in-process attach seam is now atomic.
DarkFactory v0.1.0-rc.8
v0.1.0-rc.8 is the first public release carrying the hybrid (post-quantum)
native transport. The phone and daemon now agree on X25519 + ML-KEM-768 keys,
pairing sends a sealed one-time code instead of a visible one, and encrypted
responses must end with an authenticated marker.
The daemon and the APK have to be installed together. This release changes
the previously unreleased v2 pairing and completion wire, and the daemon now
refuses the older v1 device rows by default. A phone still on the rc.7 APK
cannot connect until it installs this APK and pairs again.
What changed
Hybrid E2EE (daemon and Android)
GET /api/v1/e2ee/host-keyadvertisesmaxVersion: 2, suite
x25519-mlkem768-v1, and a P-256-signed bundle with the X25519 and
ML-KEM-768 public keys and an epoch.- New pairing is v2-only on the phone. It computes and confirms the suite-bound
fingerprint before sending, then encrypts the one-time code to that bundle,
bound to the host and the exact ephemeral material (sealedCode). Invalid
material is rejected before a grant is consumed or a device row is created;
unknown versions and suites fail closed; bundle epochs cannot roll backward
under an existing pin. - Keys are HKDF-SHA256 over
X25519(host, epk) || ML-KEM-Decapsulate(kem);
both secrets are required. A v2 row has no stored client key and refuses a v1
envelope. - Completed v2 streams require the encrypted
DFE2EE-END-v2marker. EOF before
it is truncation, not success. Android rejects missing, reordered, modified,
oversized or trailing frames and no longer turns a failed upstream stream
into a completed local response. Notification bodies are bounded. - The custom variable-time X25519 ladder and hand-written ML-KEM arithmetic were
removed. The phone uses pinned Bouncy Castle 1.86 lightweight APIs and the
build verifies the provider artifact. The provider jar also contains
decapsulation, so the APK is no longer described as containing no
decapsulation implementation; its notice is inthird_party/bouncycastle/. --e2ee-min-suitedefaults to 2.--e2ee-min-suite=1is an explicit legacy
compatibility opt-in with weaker guarantees.
Platform
- Android: Kotlin 2.4.21, JDK 21,
versionCode 161. - Go: both modules require 1.27.3, the smallest release with every
standard-library advisory reachable from this tree fixed. - The app-menu entry prefers the installed native shell again.
- New
protocol securityworkflow: production JVM interop, disposable-daemon
pairing, protocol and terminal fuzz targets, Android compile/lint and
emulator acceptance, symbolic ProVerif models, both Go advisory scans, and a
Java/Kotlin/JavaScript inventory.
Local install pipeline
make install-statusandmake install-restarttreat a zombieserveas
stopped. Before this, a replaced binary could be left installed with no
daemon running, becausekill -0succeeds for zombies.
Downloads
| File | What it is |
|---|---|
darkfactory_linux_amd64.tar.gz |
static daemon + README, installer, systemd user unit and desktop entry |
darkfactory_linux_arm64.tar.gz |
the same for arm64 |
darkfactory_0.1.0-rc.8_amd64.deb |
Debian/Ubuntu package, amd64 |
darkfactory_0.1.0-rc.8_arm64.deb |
Debian/Ubuntu package, arm64 |
darkfactory_0.1.0-rc.8_android.apk |
Android client, versionCode 161, versionName 0.1.0-rc.8 |
darkfactory_0.1.0-rc.8_android.apk.sha256 |
APK checksum |
SHA256SUMS |
checksums for the Linux artifacts |
Verify build provenance
The Linux artifacts and SHA256SUMS carry GitHub artifact attestations created
by .github/workflows/release.yml. With GitHub CLI 2.55 or newer:
gh attestation verify darkfactory_linux_amd64.tar.gz --repo Wintoplay/darkfactorySHA256SUMS is integrity, not authenticity, until it is checked against that
attestation or the certificate fingerprint in these notes.
Android APK
The APK is built on a maintainer workstation from the tagged tree and is not
covered by the CI attestation. It is signed with the project release key
(CN=DarkFactory Android):
adb install -r darkfactory_0.1.0-rc.8_android.apk
apksigner verify --print-certs darkfactory_0.1.0-rc.8_android.apk
sha256sum -c darkfactory_0.1.0-rc.8_android.apk.sha256Certificate SHA-256:
a671f0ba896599e0aa3776a1f375a397b892b37de4b84c52359234e6d3c6f833
The APK asset was replaced after the first upload: that build reported
versionCode 6, because the code was derived from the commit count and this
repository's public history is a six-commit export. Android refused the update
from 160 with "App not installed". The asset now in place is versionCode 161
(SHA-256 a01e1f3c22004d2e33c8e40fdde41418024b983ebe599c5c97d9aae841745ad4),
which upgrades rc.6 and rc.7 in place. Re-download it if you fetched it before
2026-11-09 12:40 UTC. The versionCode is now a checked-in high-water mark.
It upgrades rc.4–rc.7 in place, but pairing has to be redone: the transport
is v2, and the phone must compare the new fingerprintV2 with the one the
desktop shows. Devices paired with an older APK are kept in the database but
refused by the default policy; either re-pair with this APK or start the daemon
with --e2ee-min-suite=1 to keep the legacy rows working.
Scope and limits
This is a prerelease. There has been no physical-phone run of the v2 client and
no external cryptographic audit. The ProVerif models cover one exchange under
ideal cryptography and trusted out-of-band comparison; they do not verify the
Go/Java code, the Android UI, side channels, concurrency, expiry, persistent
replay, or the algorithms' computational security. Static host keys provide no
forward secrecy against later host-key theft: private identity material stays
in state.db, and the bundle trust anchor is P-256. Branch protection requiring
the new security jobs is not enabled yet. Do not expose the daemon directly to
the Internet; read the threat model before pairing a device.
DarkFactory v0.1.0-rc.7
v0.1.0-rc.7 is a patch release for v0.1.0-rc.6. The daemon and UI are
unchanged.
What was wrong
install.sh derives the desktop entry, icon and systemd user unit from
$HOME/XDG, not from --prefix. Its uninstall branch removed those files
unconditionally, so install.sh --uninstall --prefix /tmp/anything deleted the
real ~/.local/share/applications/darkfactory.desktop, its icon, and
~/.config/systemd/user/darkfactory.service. That is why a desktop icon could
disappear and a running window fall back to the name dev.darkfactory.Desktop:
GNOME had no launcher left to map the window's WM_CLASS to.
What changed
--uninstall now removes the desktop entry, icon and unit only when they belong
to the install being removed: either BINDIR is the default ~/.local/bin, or
the unit's ExecStart names that same binary. A disposable --prefix uninstall
leaves the operator's launcher alone and says so.
test/install-uninstall.sh covers both directions and runs as
install-script-check in make check.
Downloads
| File | What it is |
|---|---|
darkfactory_linux_amd64.tar.gz |
static daemon + README, installer, systemd user unit and desktop entry |
darkfactory_linux_arm64.tar.gz |
the same for arm64 |
darkfactory_0.1.0-rc.7_amd64.deb |
Debian/Ubuntu package, amd64 |
darkfactory_0.1.0-rc.7_arm64.deb |
Debian/Ubuntu package, arm64 |
darkfactory_0.1.0-rc.7_android.apk |
Android client, versionCode 160 |
SHA256SUMS |
checksums for the Linux artifacts |
The desktop entry, icon and unit shipped in v0.1.0-rc.6 were already correct;
only the uninstall path changed. v0.1.0-rc.6 stays published.
Verify build provenance
The Linux artifacts and SHA256SUMS carry GitHub artifact attestations created
by .github/workflows/release.yml. With GitHub CLI 2.55 or newer:
gh attestation verify darkfactory_linux_amd64.tar.gz --repo Wintoplay/darkfactoryAndroid APK
The APK is built on a maintainer workstation from the tagged tree and is not
covered by the CI attestation. It is signed with the project release key
(CN=DarkFactory Android) and upgrades rc.4–rc.6 in place:
adb install -r darkfactory_0.1.0-rc.7_android.apk
apksigner verify --print-certs darkfactory_0.1.0-rc.7_android.apkCertificate SHA-256:
a671f0ba896599e0aa3776a1f375a397b892b37de4b84c52359234e6d3c6f833
The APK contents are the same as rc.6 apart from the version: the 160 px TUI
touch paging and the OpenCode composer autocorrect="off" fix.
Scope and limits
This is a prerelease. There has been no external security review, and full
phone acceptance is still open. Do not expose the daemon directly to the
Internet; read the threat model before pairing a device.
DarkFactory v0.1.0-rc.6
DarkFactory v0.1.0-rc.6 is the first public prerelease: a private workspace
manager for coding agents with durable PTYs, git worktrees, and browser, Linux
desktop, and Android clients.
Downloads
| File | What it is |
|---|---|
darkfactory_linux_amd64.tar.gz |
static daemon + README, installer, systemd user unit and desktop entry |
darkfactory_linux_arm64.tar.gz |
the same for arm64 |
darkfactory_0.1.0-rc.6_amd64.deb |
Debian/Ubuntu package, amd64 |
darkfactory_0.1.0-rc.6_arm64.deb |
Debian/Ubuntu package, arm64 |
darkfactory_0.1.0-rc.6_android.apk |
Android client, versionCode 159 |
SHA256SUMS |
checksums for the Linux artifacts |
Install with the script (checks SHA256SUMS first):
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Wintoplay/darkfactory/main/install.sh -o install.sh
sh install.sh --desktopVerify build provenance
The Linux artifacts and SHA256SUMS carry GitHub artifact attestations created
by .github/workflows/release.yml. With GitHub CLI 2.55 or newer:
gh attestation verify darkfactory_linux_amd64.tar.gz --repo Wintoplay/darkfactoryThis checks the Sigstore-signed SLSA provenance against this repository, the
workflow, and the tagged commit, independently of the release page.
Android APK
The APK is built on a maintainer workstation from the same tagged tree and is
not covered by the CI attestation. It is signed with the project release key
(CN=DarkFactory Android), so it upgrades rc.4 and rc.5 in place:
adb install -r darkfactory_0.1.0-rc.6_android.apkVerify the signer before installing:
apksigner verify --print-certs darkfactory_0.1.0-rc.6_android.apkCertificate SHA-256:
a671f0ba896599e0aa3776a1f375a397b892b37de4b84c52359234e6d3c6f833
This build fixes Android terminal scrollback paging (one page per 160 px of
finger travel instead of one page per touchmove) and stops the OpenCode
composer from being autocorrected.
Scope and limits
This is a prerelease. There has been no external security review, and full
phone acceptance is still open. Do not expose the daemon directly to the
Internet; read the threat model before pairing a device.