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klauspost/compressshipped atv1.20.1with a HIGH zstd decoder panic, and Trivy reported nothing — because the advisory names a subpackage and Go binaries record the module.GO-2026-6865/CVE-2026-116591/GHSA-fpmh-frq8-7rj8(HIGH, CWE-190): a crafted ~27 KB two-block zstd frame makesDecodeAlland the streaming decoder panic with an out-of-range slice index inhuff0.ReadTableinstead of returning a decode error. Vulnerable<= v1.20.1, patchedv1.20.2. The publishedapplegater/caddyui-caddy:stableshippedv1.20.1.Dockerfile.caddynow pins--with github.com/klauspost/compress@v1.20.4.- This is a third, distinct way a finding can be invisible to Trivy, and the first two explanations do not apply. Unlike the go-jose and crowdsec cases ([[T-0646]]), this advisory has a CVE id and is in OSV —
/v1/vulns/answers for all three ids. The cause is a package-vs-module naming mismatch: OSV and GitHub name the affected packagegithub.com/klauspost/compress/zstd, while a Go binary's build info and anygo.modrecord the modulegithub.com/klauspost/compress. Trivy matches on the recorded name, finds no advisory under the module path, and reports nothing — while listing the package atv1.20.1in its ownPackagesoutput, so this is not a DB-lag miss either (advisory published 2026-10-27, Trivy DB 2026-11-12). Measured, not inferred: a probego.modrequiringgithub.com/klauspost/compress v1.20.1yields 0 findings; one requiringgithub.com/klauspost/compress/zstd v1.20.1yields the HIGH withFixedVersion: 1.20.2— same Trivy, same DB, same version.govulncheckis unaffected because the Go advisory names the module correctly and matches on symbols. - The image gate therefore reads
unchanged, notimproved, and that is correct rather than a failure. Gate 1 is set arithmetic over Trivy findings; a finding Trivy never reported cannot be "closed" by fixing it. Trivy's counts are 4 before and 4 after, with the klauspost version visibly movingv1.20.1 → v1.20.4between the two scans. The fix is proven bygovulncheck -mode=binaryon the extracted binaries instead: 2 findings → 1,GO-2026-6865closed, 0 introduced. This is the gate's documented "what this verdict is not evidence of" limit meeting a concrete case. - Reachability: linked and statically reachable, but no live code path decodes hostile input — and the fix ships anyway. Re-derived against the artifact, which mattered: the build runs
-tags nobadger,nomysql,nopgx, so a first probe that omitted the real build tags and most plugins produced a confident but wrongbadger/smallstep-nosqlroute —dgraph-io/badgeris not linked into the binary at all (0 strings). A probe rebuilt with all 13 plugins,modules/standardand the real tags reproduces the binary's klauspost package set exactly.go mod whywithout-vendoris also misleading here: it reports a prometheuspromhttproute that runs throughprometheus/client_golang/prometheus.testand is test-only. The only non-test importers in the shipped closure are Caddy's ownmodules/caddyhttp/encode/zstdandDeRuina/timberjack(log rotation). The advisory is a decoder bug; Caddy'sencode/zstdis encoder-only — it callszstd.NewWriterand nothing else, andzstd_precompressed.gomerely declares the.zstsuffix so the file server can serve pre-compressed files untouched. Caddy compresses responses; it never decompresses a zstd request body. A sweep of the entire 1274-package shipped closure for non-testzstd.NewReader/.DecodeAll(finds hits only insideklauspost/compress/zstditself, with a negative control confirming the same sweep does fire forzstd.NewWriter.govulncheckcalls the symbols reachable because they are present and linked, which means linked, not exploitable. Bumped regardless: the fix is free, the module set is otherwise untouched, and a future config or plugin that decodes zstd would make it live. - The pin is load-bearing, not slack. MVS resolves to exactly
v1.20.1on its own —caddy 2.11.9,caddy-l4 v0.1.3,caddy-crowdsec-bouncer v0.15.0andprometheus/client_golang v1.25.0each requirev1.20.1and nothing in the graph requires higher — so without this line the build stays on the vulnerable version. Unlike the crowdsec floor, deleting it regresses the image, which the build now asserts:go version -mis written to a file and checked for>= v1.20.4, and a build with the pin removed and the assertion kept fails with the assertion's own message showingv1.20.1, verified rather than assumed. The pattern is deliberately narrow — it accepts onlyv1.20.xforx >= 4, with a trailing whitespace class so a pre-release pseudo-version likev1.20.4-0.2026…, which sorts belowv1.20.4, cannot satisfy it — so a future bump tov1.21.0fails the build until the pattern is widened in the same commit. That fails closed by design.v1.20.4rather than the minimumv1.20.2becausev1.20.2/.3/.4are all clean at both the module andzstdsubpackage paths in OSV, the per-repository GitHub endpoint lists only two advisories ever (both fixed at or belowv1.20.2), andv1.20.4is the current release. - The weekly pin watcher was not blind to this, and the gap was elsewhere.
scripts/check-pinned-modules.sh's image sweep ([[T-0669]]) queries GitHub's per-repository endpoint, which is keyed on the repository, so the subpackage spelling never arises. Replaying its exact matcher against the live payload matchesGHSA-fpmh-frq8-7rj8via the non-module-path branch, and sourcing its realrange_excludes_version/patch_already_in_versionconfirms the row is kept atv1.20.1and excluded atv1.20.4. The actual gap was thatklauspost/compresshad no--withpin, so it could only ever appear through the graph sweep — which is capped (40 unauthenticated, 400 with a token) and reports rather than gates. Pinning it moves the module into the per-pin section that is queried every run. - Caddy's module set is byte-identical across the change (
caddy list-modules --versionsdiff empty), the binary module diff is the singleklauspost/compressline,caddy versionstaysv2.11.9, andgetcapstill reportscap_net_bind_service=ep.
- This is a third, distinct way a finding can be invisible to Trivy, and the first two explanations do not apply. Unlike the go-jose and crowdsec cases ([[T-0646]]), this advisory has a CVE id and is in OSV —
Rebuilt and published: applegater/caddyui-caddy:v2.68.13, :stable, :latest.
Applying it needs a container recreate, not just a tag move. On each host, use Portainer's Re-pull image and recreate — measured hosts split between stale-image and stale-container failure modes. Verify from inside the container (docker exec <c> sh -c 'caddy version'), never from the tag.
Rollback: applegater/caddyui-caddy:v2.68.12.