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@github-actions github-actions released this 18 Nov 13:20
abd68f1

Redaction fill-tolerance and five JWT shapes at both redaction sites; win32 probe/weak-executor TTL

What

  • Closes #3730: the shell-audit redaction site (redactShellCommand) gains the
    display site's Cf/DI condensed-union bare-token sweep — a zero-width byte
    (e.g. U+200B, U+070F, U+1160, U+FE0F) inside ANY bare credential token (jwt,
    sk-, ghp_, AKIA, xoxb-, AIza, gsk_, …) can no longer split it past redaction.
    Benign text keeps its invisible bytes byte-identical (condensation exists
    only in the matching view).
  • Closes #3736 claim 1: the shared JWS scanner (src/utils/jws-redaction.ts)
    is widened at BOTH redaction sites for five previously-leaking shapes —
    n-part JWE absorption (never across an adjacent eyJ header; the empty
    encrypted-key dir-JWE is covered when its IV segment passes the token-like
    check — spec-length IVs of 16+ chars), unsigned 2-segment tokens with any
    ≥1-char payload (e30/bnVsbA/Ingi), standard-base64 + / = dotted headers
    whose standard-alphabet header is 40+ chars (bare, key= assignment, and
    =/==-padded placements), _eyJ underscore boundaries, and ≥1-char
    signatures.
  • Known bounds (documented residuals, tracked for a follow-up): an empty-key
    JWE whose IV segment fails the token-like check (the segment lacks the
    uppercase/mixed-case/digit or length-16 composition the heuristic requires
    — e.g. an all-lowercase or all-digit IV shorter than 16 chars, or any IV
    shorter than 8 chars) stays fully visible (pre-existing — base is
    byte-identical); a standard-alphabet token whose header is 13-39 chars
    (e.g. the canonical 36-char HS256 header with +///= later segments)
    is not covered by the 40+ generic arm and can stay visible (real JWTs are
    base64url, so reach is limited); a dot-glued standard-base64 token directly
    after an eyJ token can keep its final segments visible (the absorption loop
    stops and the overlapping generic span is dropped); a mixed-case ≥8-char
    English tail directly appended to a token absorbs; an all-lowercase
    <16-char ciphertext tail stays visible; the generic arm can over-redact a
    benign dotted identifier whose first run is 40+ chars of [A-Za-z0-9+/]
    followed by 20+/10+ char segments (and /swarm close re-applies current
    policy when re-archiving shell-audit lines, so such identifiers logged
    under the previous policy may be redacted in the archived copy).
  • Closes #3736 claim 2: every failed/unavailable win32 runner-probe result is
    now TTL-bounded (runnerProbeFailureTtlMs(), env
    SWARM_SANDBOX_RUNNER_PROBE_FAILURE_TTL_MS, default 60 s, mirroring
    executorFailureTtlMs()) so installing or replacing the runner binary is
    recoverable, and getExecutor() re-creates a WEAK executor after the
    executor TTL instead of pinning the PowerShell fallback for the process
    lifetime. Recovery bound: ≤ probe TTL + executor TTL + next-caller delay
    (both default 60 s) — this bounded recovery covers the weak-executor path;
    a strength === 'none' executor and the capability-probe/assessment
    memoization still pin as before (pre-existing; tracked). The #2475
    downgrade warnings are now bounded per attempt/reconstruction while broken
    (one warn per failed probe attempt plus one per weak-executor
    reconstruction; the two TTLs are independently configurable and other
    callers may probe between reconstructions, so the combined cadence is the
    sum of those two bounded rates — the bounded re-probe cadence IS the
    recovery mechanism) instead of once per process.
  • Glued compositions (sk-abc-<JWT>) now select the leftmost-longest family
    span at BOTH sites (disclosed behavior change: the old shell pre-pass
    labeled them jwt; the new span is strictly more redaction).
  • Same-class siblings outside this change's surfaces (probe-verified /
    source-traced, recorded for follow-up #3743): the memory-storage secret
    scanner (src/memory/redaction.ts findSecrets) has the zw-split gap; the
    capability-probe/assessment memoization layer
    (src/sandbox/capability-probe.ts:927-968) can stay weak after executor
    recovery.

Why

Bare credential tokens split by invisible bytes, and five real JWT-family
shapes, survived in cleartext in shell-audit and failure-evidence output
(#3730/#3736, independently reproduced at base: 8/9 probe fixtures leaked);
and one transient win32 probe failure permanently downgraded every sandbox
execution of the process to the weak PowerShell wrapper.

Verification

  • Five frozen acceptance checks (checkpoint manifest, anchor published
    pre-implementation on both issues): C1 RED→GREEN, C2 GREEN→GREEN, C3/C4
    ERROR→GREEN, C5 GREEN→GREEN; full replay 5/5 PASS at the implementation
    commit (logs in the issue-tracer trace).
  • 9 named mutation probes killed (condensed-pass delete, Cf-alternative drop,
    absorption delete + absorb-across-header, D4 pass delete, signature-bound
    restore, probe TTL→permanent, weak→Infinity, AccountKey omission).
  • Battery: tsc 0 errors; biome ci full tree green; the 12-suite redaction
    corpus, the 63-file guardrails-shell glob, and the sandbox suites
    (capability-probe, executor, runner-client families) green per-file; one
    3716 signature-boundary pin re-derived per the critic-approved plan (the
    {10,} signature bound the issue removes).

7.204.11 (2026-11-18)

Bug Fixes

  • 3730,3736: execution review — empty-key JWE accepts a one-follower prefix and stops at real next tokens (1a667d9)
  • 3730,3736: final-critic round 1 — commit the empty-key one-follower fix, unsigned tokens followed by extra dots, residual disclosures corrected (cf46bcd)
  • 3730,3736: redaction fill-tolerance, five JWT shapes at both sites, win32 probe/weak-executor TTL (7029eb7)
  • 3730,3736: redaction fill-tolerance, five JWT shapes at both sites, win32 probe/weak-executor TTL (a481004)
  • 3730,3736: reviewer round 1 — merge pre-starting generic spans, absorb eyJ-initial JWE tails, leftmost mixed boundary, bounded assignment probing; release fragment (90d2013)
  • 3730,3736: reviewer round 2 — one canStartTokenAt guard predicate for every acceptance shape; exact linear assignment-candidate computation (6752a7a)
  • 3730,3736: reviewer round 3 — assignment candidate anchors via the segment's cumulative run offset (cd27a94)
  • 3730,3736: swarm-pr-feedback round 1 — equal-start span merge, discriminating pins, disclosure completion, stale comments (7da4229)
  • 3730,3736: swarm-pr-feedback round 1b — Stage-B reviewer corrections (46475fd)