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Privacy and threat model
All data is stored in ~/.findplus/ (SQLite database, secrets, logs). There
is no cloud sync and no telemetry. Secrets (secrets.json, alerts.json,
apple-account.json) are written at file mode 0600 inside a 0700
directory, and never appear in the database or logs.
Five things are easy to miss:
- Telegram messages carry names. An alert or daily summary sent to Telegram names the person, the place and the time ("Sam arrived at School at 8:12 AM"), and a summary lists a whole day of stops. That text goes to Telegram's servers. Send nothing to Telegram if you do not want that. A WhatsApp or webhook channel carries the same text to its own service.
-
Backups are unencrypted copies. Find+ keeps daily copies of the database in
~/.findplus/backups/(or the folder you chose). Each one holds your full location history and the app-lock PIN hash and salt. They never hold sign-in tokens or keys. Treat them like the database: use FileVault, and remove the folder if you remove the data. See Backup-and-restore. -
The sign-in window keeps nothing. In the app, Google sign-in runs in a throwaway window whose cookies and history are wiped when it closes. Find+ keeps the session it gets from Google, not your password and not the
oauth_tokencookie. See Sign-in. - Update checks go to GitHub. About every six hours Find+ asks GitHub's releases API for the newest version and, in the app, downloads it from the same release. Nothing about you is sent; GitHub sees this computer's IP address. Turn it off in Settings > Updates. See Updates.
- The app lock does not stop alerts or summaries. While Find+ is locked it keeps polling and still sends alerts and the daily summary. The lock only guards the dashboard, CLI and API.
This history consists of locations reported through Google's Find Hub network. Your trackers use nearby participating Android devices to report their location. Location updates can therefore be delayed, sparse, or unavailable, and this application should not be treated as real-time emergency or child-safety GPS tracking.
Apple Find My locations come from nearby Apple devices and can be delayed, sparse or unavailable. Find+ can only query accessories whose keys you hold; genuine AirTags require extracting pairing keys, which most users cannot do.
Alerts inherit the network's delay. An arrival or departure may be reported minutes to hours late.
A tag with no recent fix is stale, not at home and not left behind. Find+ reports it as unknown.
The app lock stops casual browsing. It does not encrypt the database; anyone with access to this user account or the disk can read it. Use FileVault.
Find+ is not affiliated with Apple or Google. Find Hub and Find My are their trademarks.
| Threat | Mitigation |
|---|---|
| Physical access to this machine while unlocked | Enable the app lock; auto-locks on idle and reboot. |
| Disk access (stolen drive, another OS booted from it) | Use FileVault. The app lock does not protect data at rest, and backups/ holds unencrypted copies of the database, so it is covered by the same advice. |
| Someone who can read your Telegram chat | Messages name people, places and times. Use a private chat and a bot only you control. |
| Account access (your Google or Apple account is compromised) | Find+ stores tokens locally; revoking the app's access on the provider side stops further polling. |
| Someone on your network | Find+ binds to 127.0.0.1 only, refused elsewhere unless FINDPLUS_ALLOW_PUBLIC_BIND=1 is set. |
| A malicious web page in your browser (DNS rebinding, cross-site requests) | The API validates the request's Host/Origin against the expected loopback address and port and rejects anything else, so a page from another origin cannot reach it even by resolving a hostname to 127.0.0.1, and cannot bypass the check by naming a different port. |
| The sign-in window, or a page posing as it | The window is limited to Google's own hosts, opens no popups or downloads, and wipes its store when it closes. It posts to 127.0.0.1 only, with the exact origin, a Find+ client header and an unused single-use state; anything else is refused. It is a window of a Find+-built app, not your browser, so a lookalike page in your browser cannot use these routes. |
| The Chrome helper extension, or something posing as it | The helper acts only on a sign-in or unlock Find+ started (single-use state, 10-minute limit, dropped after a failed hand-off), only toward 127.0.0.1:8647, and only after that port answers as Find+. The daemon accepts its posts only from the pinned extension origin with that unused state. See Chrome-helper-privacy. |
The daemon listens on 127.0.0.1:8647 only. Every state file it writes
under ~/.findplus/ (the database, secrets.json, alerts.json,
apple-account.json, and apple/*.json) is created at file mode 0600
inside a 0700 directory. Binding to any other address, or accepting a
request whose Host or Origin header does not match the loopback address
on the daemon's own port, is refused by default. A Host or Origin naming
the right loopback address but a different port is refused the same as a
foreign one, so a page that rebinds a hostname to 127.0.0.1 cannot pick
its own port to get past the check.