

# POLISCI 101Z: Introduction to International Relations

Adithya Ganesh

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## Contents

### 1 Lecture 1: 6-24-19

This lecture will focus on the main themes typically discussed in international relations.

Example headline dealing with Iran deal - Iran would agree to not work on nuclear weapons, and US would remove economic sanctions. Trump decided to withdraw from the deal.

Another example headline - "EU Decarbonization Plan for 2050 Collapses After Polish Veto." Recall the Paris Climate Accord, in which ...

Headline 3 - "WTO warns of rising trade barriers ahead of G20 summit."

Headline 4 - "UN Report: Record number of South Sudanese face critical lack of food." Some 60% of the Sudanese population are at risk for not having enough food (it's about 7 million people).

As we study these topics, we will think like scientists and ethicists.

Key idea: the problem of international anarchy. There is no common power that performs the standard functions of a domestic government.

Example functions that a world government performs:

- Preserve peace.
- Protect environment.
- Regulate economy.
- Redistribute income.

This course examines the causes of (and solutions to) four international problems.

- War.
- Environment.
- Trade.
- Poverty.

#### 1.1 Unit 1 - War

Some recent wars:

- War that arose due to US invasion of Iraq in 2003.
- India-Pakistan war in 1999. Over the Cargill sector in Kashmir.
- Civil war in Libya, which led to the overthrow of the Libyan regime.

- Russian tanks rolling into the invasion of Ukraine.

Major wars of the twentieth century:

- Assassination of archduke Franz Ferdinand by a Serbian nationalist; many viewed as the trigger for World War 1.
- WW2: 15 million soldiers died.
- Korean War: 5 million people died.

If you ask during what periods major powers were fighting against each other, this is a rarity (despite the significance of the previous inter-state conflicts).

Key questions:

- Why does war occur?
- Are some countries war-prone?
- How can leaders prevent war?

Ethical question:

- Under what condition might war be justified?

## 1.2 Unit 2 - Environment

CO2 production is growing, which is pretty worrisome. But some problems appear to be getting better - CFC production has fallen a lot since 1987, when the Montreal Protocol was introduced.

Key question:

- When do countries enter (and honor) environment agreements?
- What ethical issues should enter the debate?

## 1.3 Unit 3 - International Trade

Many people believe in the advantages of free trade. But not everyone agrees (some people think socialism is better).

There is a global trend toward freer trade. Average traffics across time have declined since 1985.

Note - agriculture is a major point of contention in trade debates - since countries don't want their farmers to have to deal with foreign competition.

## 1.4 Unit 4 - Poverty and Capital Flows

Globally, there are 746 million people in extreme poverty (in 2013).

Some key questions:

- Why do countries give aid, and to whom?
- Is the IMF necessary, and is it driven by political concerns?
- What obligation do rich nations have to poorer ones?

Reading load is about 100 pages / week. Lectures reinforce and supplement the readings. Attend lectures (M, T, W only), review slides (posted after lectures).

Section timeline: register on Canvas. Sections begin this week.

## 2 Lecture 2: 6-25-19

Recall that international anarchy means that there isn't a centralized government to manage the world; this creates issues that we may take for granted in a domestic context.

### 2.1 Democracy and War

Is there a connection between democracy and war? If so, what is the definition.

Quotes from world leaders:

- "Democracies don't attack each other...Ultimately the best strategy to insure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy everywhere." (1994 State of the Union Address, Bill Clinton).
- "The reason why I'm so strong on democracy is democracies don't go to war with each other. And the reason why is the people of most societies don't like war, and they understand what war means." (George Bush, Nov. 2004).
- "...America has never fought a war against a democracy, and our closest friends are governments that protect the rights of their citizens." (2009 Nobel Acceptance Speech, Barack Obama).

Plans for next 3 lectures:

- June 25: Theories about democracy and war
- June 26: How to evaluate evidence
- July 1: Evidence about democracy and war

Casual hypotheses have three parts:

- Dependent variable
- Independent variable
- Connecting logic

Clinton's dependent variable is *peace*, and the independent variable is whether the country is a democracy.

Hypothesis should be

- General (eliminate the proper nouns)
- Falsifiable (could be proven wrong)

We will consider two types of mechanisms that could connect democracy to peace.

- Structural
- Normative

Structural mechanisms:

- Democracy -> constraints on the executive
- Constraints reduce the propensity for war

Democratic structures could contribute to peace by:

- Empowering voters
- Delaying mobilization
- Conveying information

Empower voters arguments:

- Leaders want to remain in office
- Voters will remove belligerent leaders
- Thus, democratic leaders have electoral incentives to be peaceful.
- Autocratic leaders don't have the same constraints

This idea is due to Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, 1795.

Can critique this argument. 1. isn't necessarily true. 2. some voters want war (e.g. Nazi Germany, also Philippines). 4. Some autocrats may be overthrown if they are sufficiently poorly viewed by the people.

Some case studies to look into:

- Putin's Russia, invading Ukraine
- Vietnam war, when Nixon got elected
- Eisenhower's election during the Cold War.

There are also electoral autocracies, e.g. Mexico in the 80s.

Note the "Delay Mobilization" mechanism.

- Democracies have checks and balances (sometimes called veto players).
- These checks delay decisions to use force.
- Delay reduces the propensity for war ...
  - Affording time to negotiate
  - Reducing the risk of surprise

Two critiques: democracy may not lead to delay; and delay may not reduce the risk of war.

**"Convey Information" mechanism.**

- Democracy increases transparency about intentions and capabilities.
- Democracy can increase credibility.
- By raising transparency and credibility, democracy prevents misperceptions that could lead to war.

Tomorrow, we'll discuss **normative mechanisms**.

### 3 Lecture 3: 6-26-19

In this lecture, we'll talk about normative mechanisms that could connect democracy with peace.

**Normative Mechanisms.**

- At home: Democratic leaders solve disputes peacefully. Autocratic leaders use violence.
- Abroad: leaders "externalize" domestic norms; they apply the same norms they use at home.

**Some terminology.**

- Suppose there are two types of political regimes.
- There are three kinds of dyads: DD, DA, AA.

Version 1: "unconditional externalization." we expect that DD is peaceful, AA is war-prone, DA is typically peaceful.

Version 2: conditional externalization.

- DD is peaceful.

- DA is slightly less peaceful,
- And AA is war-prone.

Version 3: democratic crusade. Democratic states try to export their norms.

- DD: peaceful.
- AA: slightly less peaceful.
- DA: war-prone.

Nuances:

- Democratic norms take time to develop.
- Democratic norms are not upheld everywhere.

When we test theories, we have three steps.

- Collect data.
- Describe the data.
- Analyze the relationships between variables.

Ideally, we'd like to run experiments, but often running experiments is difficult. There are a couple of strategies to use when we can't run experiments:

- Select all known cases (may be experiments)
- Take a random sample (may be inefficient?)
- Choose extreme values of the IV (e.g. Turkmenistan is not democratic).

Some things to avoid:

- Choosing only one extreme of the IV.
- Selecting based on a value of the DV.
- Picking cases that "prove" your point.

Steps 2: describe the data.

There are some simple things:

- Find the range.
- Compute the mean.

Approval of Bush on Iraq graph.

Important statistic: MoE refers to the variance in the result that could emerge based on repeated sampling.

There are a number of ways to analyze relationships between variables.

- Cross-tabulation (just taking two variables, and arraying them in a table).
- Scatterplot
- Regression

Nuclear weapons experiment, (Herrmann, Tetlock and Visser, APSR 1999).

They said: think about a country that has savagely attacked its neighbor, a long-time friend of the United States. The attacker ...

- Version 1: has no nuclear weapons.
- Version 2: has nuclear weapons that give it the capacity to kill millions of people in a single airstrike.

Interestingly, more people wanted to use force when the country had nuclear weapons.

Interesting case study - think critically about the quality of the data. The “Safe Celebration Study” (Sept 2004) - do they tailgate safely or not?

- Surveyed 986 college students
- 9/10 tailgate safely

Some concerns...

- Funded by Anheuser-Busch
- Relies on self-reported behavior
- Excluded students under 21

## 4 Lecture 5: 7-1-19

The focus of today: focusing on evidence about democracy and war.

Typically, when analyzing theories, we follow three steps:

1. Collecting data
2. Describing data
3. Analyze relationships.

Recall from before, the dependent variable is war vs. peace, and the independent variable is regime type, in this case democracy.

How do we define war?

Russett defines wars as “large scale institutional violence.” Typically, when we talk about war, we refer to wars between sovereign states.

- Before WWI, territory was sovereign if it received diplomatic missions from UK and France.
- After WWI, could also demonstrate sovereignty by being a member of League of Nations or the UN.

Authors exclude colonial, civil, tribal wars. The dataset we will consider is called the Correlates of War dataset.

- Each war must include at least 1000 battle fatalities.
- This excludes:
  - Mere declarations
  - Accidents
  - Rogue commanders
  - Unresisted invasions

Class survey: how to operationalize democracy:

- Free and fair elections; (Fixed periods; 2 or more different parties)
- Checks and balances / separation of powers.
- Potentially, civilian control of military.
- Policy matches what people want.
- Civil participation - vote.
- Free speech / free religion.

How does Russett operationalize democracy?

1. Creates an index (polity index), based on
  - Political participation, executive recruitment, diffuse power
  - Excludes civil and economic liberties.
2. Divides the index into segments  $(-100, -25)$  autocratic;  $(-25, 30)$  is anocratic,  $(30, 100)$  is democratic.
3. Requires stability ( $\geq 30$  for 3 years).

How do Farber and Gowa operationalize democracy? Two variables, democ / autoc.

- If democ score  $\geq 6$ , then it's a democracy.
- If autoc score  $\geq 5$ , then it's an autocracy.
- Otherwise anocratic.

They omit interruptions, transitions, and interregnums.

After operationalizing variables, the authors obtained samples. They collected dyad-years (pairs of countries, corresponding to particular years).

The authors focused on certain dyads and years.

Russett focused on:

- 1946 - 1986
- Only "politically relevant" dyads.

Farber and Gowa focused on:

- 1816 - 1980.
- Except WWI and WWII.
- All dyads, not just politically relevant ones.

First, note that war is a rare event. In Russett's data, of 29081 dyad-years, he finds war in 32.

Second, note that democracy is rare, too.

- Before 1914, only 16% of countries were democratic.
- 1914-1945, 38% of countries were democratic.

Are DD dyads less likely to fight?

In Russett's data, 32 instances of nondemocratic dyad wars. There were 0 democratic dyad wars.

If democracy were unrelated to war, how many wars would we expect in each type of dyad?

- Null hypothesis, war is unrelated to a country's state as a democracy.
- Under the null hypothesis, the rate of war overall should be equivalent to the rate of war in the democratic dyads.

We can use the chi-squared test to determine whether this difference occurred by chance.

1. Calculated chi-squared, which measures how much the table we observed differed from what we expected.
2. Use the chi-squared to find the probability of seeing a difference that large by chance alone.

Formula:

$$\chi^2 = \sum_{k=1}^n \frac{(x_i - m_i)^2}{m_i}.$$

Recall Russett's table:

	Democratic	Nondemocratic
War	0	32
Peace	3878	25171

Calculating, we find that the  $\chi^2$  statistic is 5. To find out how significant this is, use a  $\chi^2$  table or a calculator. If the null were true, mere chance would produce a pattern this strong only 3% of the time. Russett concluded: the pattern almost certainly did not arise by chance alone.

## 5 Lecture 6: 7-8-19

### Case study, Israel and Palestine.

Timeline (focusing on territory).

- 1923, British Mandate.
- 1947, UN Partition Plan.
- 1948: State of Israel declared.
- 1948: Arab-Israeli War.

Outcome of Arab-Israeli war: Israel gained control of 78% of the territory. The armistice line was called the green line.

- Israel took Sinai, Gaza, Golan, West Bank, and East Jerusalem.
- UN Security Council passed Resolution 242. Called for Israel to withdraw.

Who controls the territories now?

- Sinai: Returned to Egypt as part of 1978 Camp David accords.
- Gaza: Israel disengaged in 2005, but still controls borders.
- Others: Israel still occupies Golan, West Bank, and East Jerusalem.

### PLO Goals.

- Sovereign state.
- Based on 1967 borders.
- Capital in East Jerusalem.

### Israeli Goals.

- Jewish state
- Democratic state
- In Holy Land

### Israel wants security.

Historically, there have been many conflicts in Israel's history from 1948 - 2006.

### There is some common ground.

- Many Palestinians accept Israel, reject violence.
- The Israeli center-left wants a 2-state solution
- Most of the international community wants a 2-state solution.

Let's apply the framework we've learned. Perhaps conflict persists because of problems with:



- Divisibility
- Information
- Commitment

#### **Obstacles to dividing territory.**

- In theory, territory is divisible.
- In practice, division is difficult.

#### **There are Jewish settlements in the West Bank.**

#### **Water resources in the West Bank.**

#### **In theory, Jerusalem could be divided.**

- Could split or put under international control.
- Not a new idea:
  - UN partition plan called for *corpus separatum*
  - Jordan controlled E Jerusalem 1949 - 1967.

#### **In practice, dividing Jerusalem would be hard.**

- Israel says Jerusalem can't be divided (1980 law).
- Palestinians say Jerusalem must be their capital.
- Holy sites sit together and may be "indivisible."
- Settlers complicate the issue.

#### **Holy Sites in the Old City.**

#### **Both sides have reasons to delay.**

- For Israel, delay would allow more settlements and walls, changing the *de facto* division of territory.
- For Palestinians, delay would cause demographic patterns to shift in their favor.

#### **Democracy is making bargaining difficult.**

- We have discussed whether democracy promotes or impedes peace.

#### **Potential veto players.**

- *Israel*. In 2009, centrist party (Kadima) won the most seats, but a right-wing coalition took control. Right-wing Likud won in 2013, 2015, 2019.
- *Palestinians*. In 2006, Hamas won a majority in the Palestinian parliament, now controls Gaza.

#### **Would the parties keep an agreement?**

- A commitment is credible if the actor has an *interest* in carrying it out.
- Does each side think the other has an interest in carrying out an agreement?

#### **Many Israelis don't trust the Palestinians. Why?**

- Palestinians have been attacking from Gaza.
- PA might not be able to control extremists.
- PA might not be willing to control extremists.

#### **Many Palestinians don't trust Israel. Why?**

- Israel insists new Palestinian state be disarmed.
- Israeli settlements are signals of negative intent.
- Israel makes regular incursions into “Area A.”

How to ensure commitment? Some have proposed third-party enforcement.

**But...would third-party promises be credible?**

In our class survey:

- If a democracy invaded a neighbor, only 47% would support US intervention (and only 13% strongly).
- If a civil war broke out, only 46% would support US intervention (only 7% “strongly”).

**Would Trump side with Israel?**

- US Embassy in Jerusalem
- David Friedman, US Ambassador to Israel.

**For reflection.**

- Why haven’t Israel and the Palestinians reached a bargained solution?
- What steps would you recommend to promote peace?

## 6 Lecture 7: 7-9-19

Has interstate war become obsolete?

On the  $x$  axis is the year, and on the  $y$  axis is the historical percentage of states involved in war. Using the same criteria as in the Correlates of War dataset.

**Some impressive zeros since 1946.**

- There have been no wars between West European countries. This is pretty unusual.
- There have been no wars between developed countries.<sup>1</sup>
- No wars between US and USSR / Russia.
- No wars between great powers since 1953.

**A puzzle.** If interstate war has been declining, what could explain this trend?

How could we make war less likely?

- Increase the costs of war.
- Enforce commitments.
- Reduce uncertainty.
- Eliminate contentious issues.

**Since 1945, what might have caused the following:**

- Increased the costs of war?
  - Nuclear weapons
  - Common market.
- Enforced commitments?

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<sup>1</sup>Need to determine definitions of developed country.

- The UN was formed.
- Reduced uncertainty?
  - The UN reduce uncertainty.
- Eliminated contentious issues?

#### **A few possibilities.**

- Democracy.
- Trade.
- Nuclear weapons.
- International organizations.

#### **Democratic peace.**

Statistically, democracy has been spreading; whether you think about it in terms of the number of democracies or the percentage of democratic countries in the world.

#### **Democracy could contribute to peace by...**

- Sensitizing leaders to the costs of war.
- Making commitments more credible.
- Increasing transparency / information.

#### **Commercial peace.**

- World trade has soared since 1950s.

Idea that trade contributes to peace:

- Montesquieu wrote: “The natural effect of commerce is to bring peace.”
- JS Mill wrote that: “Trade is the principal guarantee of the peace of the world” and “is rapidly rendering war obsolete”

#### **Trade could increase the costs of war.**

- Trade is mutually beneficial (due to the theory of competitive advantage; developed by Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and other influential writers). When two countries trade, it helps both countries.
- War disrupts commerce, imposing economic costs.

#### **Trade could reduce uncertainty.**

- Countries can use trade sanctions to signal resolve without fighting.
- Economic exchange might also contribute to information and mutual understanding.

#### **Trade could eliminate contentious issues.**

- In the past, countries conquered territory to gain access to economic resources.
- Today, countries trade for those resources.
- By reducing the need to take territory, trade reduces one historically common motive for war.

#### **Problems with these arguments**

- Unequal trade can be a source of tension.
- Trade causes reallocation of resources away from declining sectors to more efficient ones. But it might create loss of opportunity for people in these declining sectors, and thus violence.

- Trade policies can be a source of tension.

### **Testable hypothesis.**

- For each dyad, measure either the volume of trade or how much each depends on trade with the other.
- **Hypothesis:** war should be less common in dyads with high trade, than in dyads with low trade.

Looking at data, trade is correlated with peace. But wait, the relationship could be spurious; there could be some factor  $x$  that leads to both trade and peace.

Examples:

- Democracy
- Capitalism
- Human rights conditions
- Affinity / good relations; democracy; alliances; geography; etc.

### **Wait! Causation could run the other way.**

We hypothesized that peace implies trade; but it could be the other directions.

### **Nuclear weapons.**

It could be that the existence of nuclear weapons is contributing to peace.

### **Many non-nuclear states are under a “nuclear umbrella.”**

### **Nuclear weapons...**

- Increase the cost of war
- Reduce uncertainty about capabilities
- Increase uncertainty about resolve

### **Theory: nuclear deterrence.**

- Deterrence: a strategy of preventing an attack through the threat of a retaliatory action that would cause unacceptable damage.
- Nuclear deterrence: preventing an attack through the threat of nuclear retaliation.

### **To deter effectively.**

- Able to retaliate. This requires survivable “second strike” forces.
- Willing to retaliate. Would leaders actually push the nuclear button?

### **Evidence for a nuclear peace.**

- There has never been a nuclear war.
- Nuclear weapons have been used only once, against a non-nuclear state (US-Japan 1945).
- Only one war between nuclear states (India-Pakistan 1999), and it was minor.

### **But non-nuclear dyads have become more peaceful, too.**

### **International organizations.**

Today, we have more IOs than ever.

- United Nations
- Regional organizations, many focused on the topics of security and the maintenance of peace.

### **International organizations such as the UN can...**

- Increase the cost of war, e.g. by banding countries together by fighting a country that is belligerent.
- Enforce commitments

**But the UN has taken action in relatively few wars.**

Of 39 interstate wars since 1945...

- UN applied military sanctions in only 2 (Korea, Persian Gulf war).
- UN applied economic sanctions in 3 (Persian Gulf, Yugoslavia).

Of 168 civil wars from 1946-2003...

- Military sanctions: 2
- Economic sanctions: 13.

**If the UN were successful in preventing war...**

We might expect:

- Most dyads would not erupt into wars.
- If a dyad does erupt into war...
  - The UN was unable to prevent a war
  - And might not be able to end the war
  - So UN involvement might not make sense.

**Implication.**

- To many, the UN looks like a failure.
- But perhaps its success is mostly invisible!

## **7 Lecture 8: 7-10-19**

**Agenda.**

- What causes civil war?
- Why are civil wars so prevalent today?
- When do civil wars end?

**Interestingly, interstate war has become less common, but civil war and insurgency (uprising) have not.**

**What is a civil war?**

- A civil war is a violent conflict between the state and non-state armed groups for political control.
- Battle-death threshold
  - >1000 battle-deaths total (Fearon and Latin 2003)
  - 25 battle deaths (UCDP PRIO)

**Types of civil wars.**

There are many ways to categorize civil wars, e.g.

- Political aims
- Ideological cleavages
- Foreign intervention

## **What causes civil wars today?**

We will discuss 2 different classes of explanations for civil war onset:

- Motive based explanations
  - Grievance
  - Greed
- Opportunity based explanations

## **Ethnic / Islamist tensions have grown (see graph.)**

### **These tensions drive groups to rebel.**

- Connecting logic: groups rebel because they “hate” the state authority due to differences in identity and cultures.
- Hypothesis: Ethnic and religiously-motivated groups are more likely to cause civil war.

### **Test: Ethnic hatreds?**

- Note that  $P(\text{War}|\text{Ethnic Grievance}) = 0.108$ .
- Note that  $P(\text{War}|\text{Non-ethnic grievance}) = 0.073$ .
- The  $p$ -value is roughly 0.07.

### **Test: religious hatreds.**

- $P(\text{War}|\text{Islamist}) = 0.095$
- $P(\text{War}|\text{Non-Islamist}) = 0.089$ .

### **Is “greed” to blame?**

- The state controls lots of “prizes”
- Chronic poverty means few opportunity costs to fighting.
- Groups rebel because they can profit from war.
- e.g. Blood Diamond case in Sierra Leone.

### **Lots of group try and fail to rebel.**

- Greed and grievance are insufficient to explain civil war onset by themselves.
- The state is typically good at destroying (or negotiating with) emerging threats.
- Some groups have better opportunities to rebel.

### **Groups have different opportunities to rebel.**

- Groups today are relatively weak; so must be careful in when and how they choose to rebel.
- Strategic choices:
  - Regular fighting (conventional military engagements)
  - Insurgent fighting (Guerrilla and terrorism tactics)

### **Historical civil wars were fought between conventional forces.**

- e.g. The Confederacy during the US civil war thought of itself as a fully functional independent government.

### **Modern civil wars involve insurgency.**

### **Why does insurgency matter?**

- Insurgency allows rebel group to avoid detection / destruction by the state.
- Insurgency still puts pressure on state to meet rebel demands.
- Opportunities to conduct insurgency make civil war more likely.

### **Operationalizing our Hypothesis.**

What conditions make insurgency more likely?

- Areas where it's harder to detect rebel groups
- Areas where it's harder to destroy rebel groups.

*Factors that may influence the presence of rebel groups.*

- Low population vs. high population density area.
- Existence of roads.
- Presence of civilian shields (e.g. hospitals, schools).
- Low income / low education areas.
- Rebel detection tends to be harder in rough terrain.
- Rebel destruction is harder in weaker states (e.g. countries below the median GDP tend to be more likely to fight).

### **What causes civil war?**

- Motive and opportunity are not sufficient
- War requires:
  - Conflicting preferences
  - Opportunity to negotiate (or fight)
  - Bargaining failure

### **Why might opportunities for insurgency cause bargaining failures?**

- Rough terrain → information problems. e.g. State fails to identify an emerging insurgent threat and miscalculates response.
- Weak governance → commitment problems. e.g. State identifies a threat, but can't credibly commit to accommodate its demands.

### **Why have civil wars become more common?**

Are conflicts breaking out more frequently? Not exactly. The increase in civil war today is due to the accumulation of ongoing civil conflicts.

### **Civil wars last a long time.**

- Median duration of conflicts, 1946-2007.
  - Civil: 20 months
  - Interstate: 3.4 months

### **What are the obstacles to ending civil war?**

#### **Disarmament dilemma prolongs civil war.**

#### **Logic of disarmament dilemma.**

- Settlement requires rebels to disarm.

- But the government can exploit disarmament.
- Fearing exploitation, rebels might prefer to keep fighting.

#### **What resolves the disarmament dilemma?**

- Power-sharing (e.g. in Iraq)
- Independence (but this leads to slippery slope-style problems)
- Ceasefire? (e.g. in Syria civil war)

But: in nearly all of these cases, fighting resumes. The core problem is that these are not credible commitments.

#### **What makes civil war settlements credible?**

- Third party enforcement
- Why?
  - Raises the costs of cheating.
  - Monitor compliance.
  - Threaten military force or economic sanctions for non-compliance.

#### **Third-party = peacekeepers.**

The UN frequently serves as a third-party to oversee the enforcement of a civil war settlement.

#### **Does peacekeeping work?**

If you control for selection effect, then yes.

#### **Midterm format.**

Midterm is 50 minutes. Two types of questions.

- T/F or multiple choice questions (probably 20).
- Short answer (choose 4 identification questions out of 6).
- Covers reading, lectures, and discussions.

Final exam is up to 3 hours.

Review session on Tuesday.

## **8 Lecture 9: 7-15-19**

Note that we have a midterm on Wednesday, and there will be a review session.

Two aspects of the ethics of war:

- Groups for war (Jus ad bellum)
- Conduct in war (Jus in bello)

We will describe three different ethical traditions to this question:

- Political realism
- Consequentialism
  - Utilitarianism
  - Case study: Hiroshima
- Non-consequentialism



- Christian Just War
- Islamic Just War

### **Political Realism.**

Realists claim that the real world is a violent world. And states in IR are like gladiators.

### **In this state war...**

- "It is better to seek salvation via the sewer." - Bismarck (Have to play the same game, and be brutal in war.)
- "Notions of right and wrong have no place." - Hobbes

### **Example: Melian Dialogue (416 BC).**

This dialogue takes place during the Peloponnesian war.

"the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must"

The Athenians crush the Melians.

### **Some implications.**

- A realist would say that moral behavior is dangerous and irresponsible.
- A realist would say that moral rhetoric is hypocritical and pointless.

### **Utilitarianism and war.**

- Consequentialist: the moral value of an action/institution lies in its consequences
- Hedonist: pleasure/happiness is the ultimate good

### **Utilitarian principle.**

An action or policy is morally right if it produces the greatest balance of happiness over unhappiness.

### **Applying utilitarianism to nuclear weapons.**

U.S. dropped two nuclear bombs in 1945:

- Hiroshima (Aug. 6)
- Nagasaki (Aug. 9)

### **Hundreds of thousands died.**

- Hiroshima (in 1945, 140K died; next 5 years, 60K died).
- Nagasaki (in 1945, 70K died; next 5 years, 70K died).

Total of 340K.

### **How might a utilitarian analyze the decision?**

Did it save lives? (Use counterfactual reasoning)

- Look at U.S. casualties that may have been saved
- Look at the positive good created by ending the war

### **Claim: the alternative was invasion.**

There were two

### **Invasion would have killed...**

- Truman says 500K Americans would have died.
- Churchill claims that 1M soldiers would have died.

Utilitarians would conclude that the atomic bombing was justified because it saved lives.

Utilitarian counter-arguments.

- War might have ended without invasion
- Invasion might not have been so deadly
- There are more humane ways to use the bomb

**War might have ended without invasion.**

Evidence:

- Japanese were getting weaker
- Soviets were about to tip the scales
- U.S. could have relaxed its demands

**Invasion might not have been so deadly.**

- Martin Bernstein: at most, 46K Americans would have died. According to Bernstein, the 500K / 1M figures from before were post-hoc justification (and not necessarily true).

**More humane way.**

Why not just show them how powerful this weapon is?

But, US worried about:

- Failure / embarrassment
- Disclosure to enemy (they might have information about military power that could be used against you)

But: even after bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, Japan didn't surrender.

**Warning shot.**

Drop a bomb in e.g. Tokyo Bay, A Forest, Mt. Fuji.

**Tactical strike.**

Could we do a tactical strike against a military target? But, they needed a target 3 miles in diameter.

**Allow evacuation.**

But, U.S. feared

- Bomb could fail.
- Japan could intercept.
- POWs as human shields.

**Did dropping the bomb save lives?**

- Relative to non-nuclear alternatives?
- Relative to other nuclear options?

**Divine command and war.**

How authoritative are divine commands?

- Texts often ambiguous
- They require interpretation

**Christian tradition.**

- Originated with St. Augustine
- Between skepticism and pacifism

#### **Grounds for war.**

- Just cause
- Last resort
- Chance of success (interestingly tied in with utilitarian tradition)

#### **Conduct in war.**

- Discrimination (acceptable to kill military, but not civilians.)
- Proportional tactics (goal of the war is to solve an injustice; can't use force that isn't proportionate to the injustice).

Islamic just war thinking shares similar conclusions.

#### **Key concepts.**

- *dar al-Islam* (house of Islam, territory under the control of Islam, the Zone of Peace) versus *dar al-harb* (non-Muslim world)
- Jihad is striving, toiling for God (somewhat misrepresented in literature / media).

#### **Grounds for war (Islam.)**

- Just cause (e.g. there is a debate about whether you can fight a war to propagate Islam)
- Last resort

#### **Jihad against Jews and Crusaders (1998)**

- Highly controversial (signed by bin Laden)
- Says the US has been occupying holy places, killing Muslims in Iraq.
- Calls for military action vs. US allies

#### **Conduct in war.**

- Discrimination. The Quran says "fight in God's cause against those who wage war against you, but do not transgress God's limits"
- Proportional tactics

#### **For reflection: apply ethics to a contemporary issue.**

- U.S. counterterrorism policy
- The ongoing war in Syria
- Preemptive strike vs North Korea
- Israeli-Palestinian relations

## **9 Lecture 10: Midterm review**

#### **Format.**

- Exam: in class (be on time).
- True / false questions (20) + ID questions (4 of 6).
- Writing utensils.

- Exam is closed book, but you get a reading list.

### **Identification question.**

- Clearly and succinctly define the term
- Contextualize the term
- Consider how it is important to IR
- Where possible, cite readings
- Write legibly

Write for the full time (10 minutes, 2 paragraphs).

### **Example: “Insurgency.”**

- Concise definition
- Historical example
- Use of reading example

Underline key concepts so graders don’t miss them.

### **Statistics and experiment design.**

#### **Chi-squared test.**

- Statistical test for categorical data
- Measures how far the observations deviated from what we expected under the null hypothesis of no relationship
- Tells us how likely it is that the observed difference between the categories arose by chance

#### **Reliability vs. validity.**

Used to describe measurements.

*Validity.* Does the measure capture the concept?

*Reliability.* Would different people’s measurements of the concept produce the same results?

We can think of four cases (Valid vs. invalid  $\times$  reliable vs. unreliable).

Unreliable but valid (maybe centered around the right thing, but high variance).

#### **Statistical terminology.**

- Independent variable
- Dependent variable
- Hypothesis
- Connecting logic
- Spurious Relationship (a relationship that you detect between two variables that might be caused by a confounder. e.g. correlation but not causation)
- Operationalization (when you want to measure a concept, and you define a concrete measurable variable)
- Null hypothesis
- Reliability
- Validity
- Cross-tabulation

- Regress
- Scatterplot
- Chi-squared test
- Empirical evidence
- Sampling error (when due to pure chance, your sample differ from the population)
- Marging of error
- Non-sampling error (e.g. when you non-randomly sample your units, or measure something incorrectly)
- Selection effect (e.g. in Fortna reading, when your sample is biased due to some selection reason. For example, when looking at peacekeeping, sample is necessarily more violent.)

### **Democratic peace theory.**

#### **Structural reasons why democracy are more likely to stay peaceful.**

- Empower voters, delay mobilization, transparent
- Assumptions needed:
  - voters dislike war
  - political leaders care about staying in office
  - veto players, transparency

### **Normative.**

- States externalize about the norms that that are used to resolve disputes at home
- Democracies have solve domestic disputes through peaceful methods and autocracies solve domestic disputes through violent methods
- Unconditional vs. conditional
- Democratic crusade - export democratic norms to autocracies

Recall the readings:

- Russett (claims that normative theories of democratic peace are weaker, thinks it is a good thing democracies delay mobilization)

### **Is Democratic Peace Theory Right?**

- Since 1946, only one possible case of two democracies fighting a war (Kargil War 1999, between India and Pakistan)
  - Is this by chance?
  - Are common interests (e.g. opposite to the Soviet Union a better explanation for why democracies have not fought each other?); due to Farber and Gowa (1995).

### **Bargaining theory.**

The literature / readings are good. Go back to the section notes (combined section on July 3rd).

*Puzzle of War.*

- War is costly -> must be deals that both states prefer to war (bargaining range).
- Example: Mexican-American war (settlement would have saved casualties, but it fell apart).
- Conflicting preferences are not sufficient for war ->

Need three things for war to break out:

- Conflicting preferences
- Opportunity to fight / negotiate (e.g. it's unlikely that Sweden and Nicaragua will fight because of the distance)
- Bargaining failure

### **What is the bargaining range?**

- Let's assume that State A and state B value some territory at 100. Both State A and B have a 50 pct chance of winning the war and would pay \$20 for fighting.
- Calculating the payoff each side can expect from war.

$$\text{War value} = \text{Prob. Win} \times \text{Gain of war} - \text{Costs of war}$$

- Bargaining range for each player is the intersection between deals that post prefer to war.

### **How does the BR change with costs of war?**

- The bargaining range expands / shrinks with the costs of war.
- e.g. if war becomes more costly, both side would prefer a negotiated settlement.
- Bargaining range expands as the costs of war increase.

### **BR range shifts to the left or right depending on who is more / less likely to win.**

#### **Causes of bargaining failure.**

- Issue indivisibility
- Information problems
- Commitment problems
  - Preventive wars
  - Preemptive wars

#### **Issue indivisibility.**

- Issues that cannot be divided into a range of potential settlements (e.g. King Solomon Baby problem).

#### **Information problems.**

- State *A* sometimes has incomplete information about state *B*'s capabilities / resolve / costs of fighting.
- State *B* has an incentive to misrepresent this information in order to negotiate a better deal for itself.
- Private information + incentives to misrepresent increase risk of underestimating opponent's willingness to go to war.
- *Analogy*: Poker game and bluffing.
- Examples: WMDs in war on terror (Iraq War, 2003).

#### **Commitment problem.**

Idea: states may end up in war because one or both sides are not able to commit to abide by the terms of an agreement that would allow them to avoid fighting.

States may have an incentive to defect from their agreement.

Analogy: Stanford Honor Code

There can be many kinds of commitment problems that lead to war, but two common examples are preventive and preemptive wars.

### **Preventive wars.**

Wars that occur in the context of large power shifts.

Bargaining range is more favorable to *A* today, but will be more favorable to *B* in the future.

Example: U.S. - China wars. China's economy will eclipse US in 5 years, and thus there's an incentive to fight a war earlier.

Examples: 2003 Iraq War (WMDs), Iran-Iraq War (1981)

### **Preemptive wars.**

- These are wars that occur in response to large first-strike advantages.

*Examples.* Rare, but 1967 Six Day War, and Pearl Harbor are plausible examples.

### **Lake (2010/11).**

Uses Bargaining theory to examine outbreak of 2003 Iraq War and evaluates how useful it is.

Critiques following assumptions of bargaining mode:

- States are unitary actors.
- Bargaining is modeled as a two-player game
- Bargaining theory does not include the costs of enforcing a settlement
- States are rational actors.

### **Israel-Palestine case study.**

Israeli Goals:

- Jewish state
- Democratic state
- In the Holy Land

PLO Goals:

- Sovereign State
- Based on 1948 Borders (aka "Green Line")
- Capital in East Jerusalem

**Focus: think about this as an example of the bargaining problem.**

### **Issue Indivisibility?**

- In theory, territory is divisible, but in practice it is very difficult.
- Complicating issues:
  - Israel's Jerusalem law insists that Jerusalem be unified, but Palestinians insist on East Jerusalem as capital of Palestine.
  - Israel Settlements in West Bank and East Jerusalem
    - \* Changes the de facto division of division of territory
    - \* Gives incentive to delay.
  - Water Resources in West Bank (very few water resources).

### **Commitment problems.**

- Israelis do not trust Palestinians (Palestinians have been attacking from Gaza).

- PA might not be willing or able to control extremists
- Israel insists Palestinian state to be disarmed
- Israeli settlements are signal of negative intent.

### **Ethics of Warfare.**

Four theories of ethics and war.

### **Political realism.**

- Thucydides, The Melian Dialogue

### **Utilitarianism.**

- Pick the option that produces the greatest net happiness. (Critique: Holt).

### **Christian Just War Theory**

- Rights to go to war
  - Self defense, last resort, chance of success
- Rights during war
  - Discriminate between combatants and civilians, proportional tactics

### **Islamic War Theory.**

- Rights to go to war. Just cause (including propagating Islam, last resort).
- Rights during war (Discriminate between combatants and civilians, proportional tactics)

## **10 Lecture 11: 7-22-19**

In survey data, people say they are quite concerned about environmental issues. The main reason:

- Pollution is *individually* rational.
- Coercion could solve the problem, but that's difficult in a condition of anarchy.

Example: overgrazing (leads to loss of nutrients).

What happens when too many animals graze?

- Desertification
- Soil erosion
- Invasive weeds

Thus, the land eventually becomes unstable.

There are a couple of cases to consider when thinking about the tragedy of the commons.

- I own the grass (then I'll overgraze)
- If you own the grass (then I'll not overgraze)
- If the grass is common property (then I'll overgraze).

Concretely, the pursuit of individual self-interest leads to a collectively bad outcome.

Identify international environmental problems that have a similar logic. Several examples, including air pollution, overfishing, aquaculture, etc.

We can model this broad setting using game theory. Consider a game between two countries: *A* and *B*. Assume the following:



- Each can contribute to reducing pollution.
- Both contributing would be better than neither.
- But: contributing is costly.

*Numerical example.* Assume:

- If both countries contribute, they produce a public good worth \$4 per country.
- If one contributes, the contributor produces a public good worth \$2 per country.
- If neither contributes, no public good is produced.
- It costs \$3 for each to contribute.

It follows that:

- If they both contribute, they each get 1.
- If only one contributes, one gets 2, and another gets -1.
- If neither contributes, they both get 0.

We can summarize this in a matrix, where rows indicate action of each player, and entries indicate net payoffs per agent. This is analogous to prisoner's dilemma.

Importantly, the prisoner's dilemma:

- Does not depend on lack of communication.
- Does not arise from uncertainty.
- Does depend on a lack of mutual concern.

Tomorrow, we will discuss potential ways to solve the game.

## 11 Lecture 12: 7-23-19

Last time, we emphasized that there isn't a technical solution to the prisoner's dilemma (see the Hardin reading). There are four potential solutions to this broad class of problems we will discuss:

- Technology
- Coercion
- Reciprocity
- Domestic pressure

We will also discuss how international agreements can reinforce these mechanisms.

Science (or nature) could decrease costs and/or increase benefits of contributing. This could align individual and collective incentives.

Let's consider the game from yesterday, with a change of payoffs. What is A's cost of contributing fell from \$3 to \$1. Then, we might get a table like

- A, B both contribute. A gets  $4 - 1 = 3$ , B gets  $4 - 3 = 1$ .
- A contributes, B doesn't. A gets  $2 - 1 = 1$ , B gets  $2 - 0 = 2$
- A does not contribute, B contributes. A gets 2, B gets -1.
- If A and B don't contribute, A gets 0, B gets 0.

With these new payoffs, *A* should contribute, and *B* should not contribute, so we have a new equilibrium.

Now, if the value of the collective good rose, assume 8 if one contribute, 4 if one contributes. Then we get the following results:

- *A*, *B* both contribute. *A* gets 7, *B* gets 5.
- *A* contributes, *B* doesn't. *A* gets 3, *B* gets 4.
- *A* does not contribute, *B* contributes. *A* gets 4, *B* gets 1.
- If *A* and *B* don't contribute, *A* gets 0, *B* gets 0.

In this case, the payoff for contributing is always higher (regardless of what the other country does), so the equilibrium is *A* and *B* both contributing.

Example: the ozone layer (blocks harmful UV radiation). In this setting, science shifted the benefits / costs. The benefits of action increased as people learned about the dangers of CFCs. The costs of action decreased as companies developed substitutes for CFCs. Political response: 1987 Montreal Protocol: countries pledged that they would phase out over time the use of CFCs with the goal of protecting the ozone layer.

Kofi Annan stated that the Montreal Protocol is the most successful international agreement that he had ever encountered.

Broader significance of the Montreal Protocol:

- First treaty to address a global environmental threat
- Embodied the principle of "differentiated responsibilities" (maybe richer countries can implement these changes more quickly).
- Acted without scientific certainty (precautionary principle).
- Can strengthen the treaty without formal amendments - (ratcheting provision).

For more on costs and benefits, see Sprinz and Vahtoranta.

Second way to solve international problems: *coercion by a strong state*.

- The PD involves a commitment problem: states could promise to contribute, but the promise would not be credible.
- A strong state could solve the commitment problem by punishing shirkers and/or rewarding contributors.

What is an enforcer imposed a \$2 cost on cheaters? Then the game would go this way:

- *A* contributes, *B* contributes, *A* and *B* get 1.
- *A* contributes, *B* does not contribute, so *A* gets  $2 - 3 = -1$ , *B* gets  $2 - 2 = 0$ .
- *A* doesn't contribute, *B* contributes, *A* gets  $2 - 2 = 0$ , *B* gets  $-1$ .
- *A* and *B* don't contribute; so *A* gets  $-2$ , *B* gets  $-2$ .

Some problems with this approach:

- Would the strong state actually punish? Punishment is costly to both the target of the sanctions, but also the country that is imposing the sanction.
- Would other countries join in the punishment?

**Example.** Whaling moratorium: in 1985, moratorium came into effect. Whale catch by Japan, Norway, and Iceland has falling drastically since then.

**Limits of the agreement.** Japan and others have exploited a loophole: countries may whale for "scientific purposes." Now, violators are US allies, e.g. Japan, Norway, Iceland. Would US really punish these countries?

But recently, in July 2019, Japan withdrew from the IWC; it promptly resumed commercial whaling.

**Strategies of reciprocity.** This is the third class of solutions to the problem.

If the game is played repeatedly - the incentives change. With repetition, players can use strategies of reciprocity. You condition your move based on what others do in previous plays of the game. There are various versions of this:

- “I will cooperate only as long as you cooperate.”
  - e.g. I will limit my fishing if other countries do so.
  - e.g. I will restrain my use of fossil fuels if other countries do the same.
- If leaders care enough about the future, this strategy could sustain cooperation.

Let’s see how reciprocity would work. Recall the matrix looks like

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1, 1 & -1, 2 \\ 2, -1 & 0, 0 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} 1, 1 & -1, 2 \\ 2, -1 & 0, 0 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} 1, 1 & -1, 2 \\ 2, -1 & 0, 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

- “I will cooperate in every period, but if you ever defect on me, I will never cooperate with you again.” (grim trigger strategy). Then:
  - *Payoff to cooperating:*  $1 + 1 + 1 + \dots$
  - *Payoff to defecting:*  $2 + 0 + 0 + \dots$

Lessons from the repeated prisoner’s dilemma:

- Defection is profitable in the short term.
- With strategies of reciprocity, the long-term benefits of ongoing cooperation can outweigh the short-term incentive to defect.

**International agreements can facilitate reciprocity by...**

- Setting clear expectations
- Monitoring behavior
- Coordinating punishments

**Mobilize domestic interests.**

Another way to solve environmental problems: use international agreements to mobilize domestic groups.

- Give groups the right to sue in domestic courts.
- Create benchmarks for “naming and shaming”
- Foster international linkages among groups.
- Change preferences/beliefs of ordinary citizens.

But, would citizens support an agreement? Tried to assess whether people would enter into hypothetical agreements (see Bechtel and Scheve (2013)).

Next assignment: policy memo. Goal: work with another student to advise the U.S. government about a major problem involving:

- Environment (unit 2), or
- Trade (unit 3), or
- Poverty/aid (unit 4)

Four-page memo: should have four parts:

- Executive summary

- Problem
- Solution
- Political feasibility

Deadlines:

- Mon, July 29 at noon (Partner with another student and send names to TAs).
- Fri, 8/2 at noon: send TAs two sentences: problem and recommendation.
- Wed, 8/14 at 4:30: submit memo.

On 8/7: no lecture (work with partner on policy memo).

## 12 Lecture 13: 7-24-19

Today: we will discuss the ethics of climate change. Before the Paris agreement, we had the Kyoto Protocol of 1997.

- Annex 1 countries committed to binding reductions in GHG emissions relative to 1990.
- Non-annex I countries had no binding commitments

Kyoto didn't work - no limits on China, India, other developing countries.

Lack of political support in rich countries:

- US never ratified, then withdrew signature
- Canada failed to reach target, withdrew
- Japan missed target

Deepest cuts came from collapse of USSR - because of economic collapse.

Main features of Paris agreement -

- Goal: prevent temperature from rising more than  $2^{\circ}\text{C}$  by 2100 (relative to pre-industrial levels). Ideally, no more than  $1.5^{\circ}$ .
- Method: intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs).

Paris attempted to solve the problems of Kyoto

- All countries submitted INDCs;
- Rich countries help LDCs shoulder cost
- Regular monitoring and reporting
- Commitment to ratchet up. Initial pledge; and the ability to increase commitment

Could Paris work? Factors:

- Technology
  - Innovation could decrease costs of contribution
  - Increasing evidence of harm could spur action
- Coercion
  - Rich countries will help pay for mitigation
  - Will they punish countries that cheat?
- Reciprocity

- Agreement calls for monitoring and ratcheting
- These provisions could facilitate reciprocity
- Domestic politics
  - Agreement could sway the domestic public
  - Violations could prompt shaming and lawsuits

US is...

- Withdrawing from Paris
- Increasing oil / gas drilling
- Imposing tariffs on solar panel imports

Question - do we have a moral responsibility to address climate change?

Utilitarian argument:

- Climate change is bad.
- Climate change can be reasonably averted

Problem 1: scientific uncertainty:

- Negative feedback mechanisms, such as cloud cover
- Positive feedback mechanisms, such as methane from thawing permafrost and the ice albedo feedback

Problem 2: how much to weigh the future?

- Solving climate change requires immediate sacrifices in exchange for future benefits.
- How should we weight current versus sfuture payoffs?
- Need to compute a discount rate to calculate things effectively.

Problem 3: contingency

- Assume no single nation can cause or prevent climate change
- If others don't act; my country shouldn't act (efforts are futile)

**Some non-utilitarian approaches to climate justice.**

- Corrective justice
- Egalitarian justice
- Shared responsibilities

*Corrective justice.* Broadly just means - "you broke it, you buy it"

This would imply that US, China, UK should repair climate change. These are standard objections:

- The harm was unintentional. (reply: if unintentional, countries shouldn't pay punitive damages, but they should still pay compensation)
- Current generation shouldn't pay for the sins of previous generations. (reply: current generations should pay, because they are the beneficiaries of exploitation by previous generations)

Posner - discusses more objections.

*Egalitarian justice.*

Idea: give each person an equal share of the atmosphere. Or an equal share of the remaining carbon budget.

Problem: rich are emitting far more than their equal share. To implement egalitarian justice, you could:

- Require rich countries to cut emissions
- Or: allow emissions trading: rich could buy pollution rights from the poor. or: cap and trade

*Shared responsibilities.*

(from Goodin's article).

- Shared rights
  - Sovereign countries have right to exploit resources. Can't intervene unless there is a transboundary impact
- Shared duties
  - Shared duty not to pollute
  - Intervention is supererogatory
- Shared responsibilities (the idea he most strongly supports)
  - Countries have a duty not to pollute, a duty to "pick up the slack," and also to intervene against others

Question: no individual can have a discernible effect on global climate change. Given this fact, do you, personally, have a moral obligation to reduce your emissions of CO<sub>2</sub>?

## 13 Lecture 14: 7-29-19

Free trade refers to unregulated economic activity. Protectionism is when you impose barriers.

Many American oppose free trade (65% argue for more restrictions).

If you ask economists, 95% of economists in the US support free trade, while 88% of economists worldwide support free trade.

### **Classic case for FT.**

- FT increases overall economic welfare (increases the size of the pie).
- The pie gets bigger in both countries. Importantly, both sides gain, even when one country is better at making everything.

Intuitively - it might be the case that LeBron James is the world's best lawnmower, but it doesn't make sense to get LeBron James to mow everyone's lawn.

This lays out a case for collaboration, even if you're really smart.

This is an old argument, dating back to Adam Smith, Ricardo.

### **Consider a simple economic model.**

That is, suppose there are:

- 2 countries (France and Switzerland)
- 2 goods (wine and cheese)
- 1 factor of product (labor).

Assumptions:

- Each country has 1 million workers
- Production process is linear

Key concepts:

- Absolute advantage (you can create more product at same amount of time).

- Opportunity costs

We will consider 2 cases:

- Each country has AA in one good
- Each country has AA in both goods

The second case is kind of surprising, which shows that trade is beneficial even when one country has AA in both goods.

**France has AA in wine, Switzerland has AA in cheese.**

Suppose:

- France: Wine for 100 labor units, cheese for 50 (red).
- Switzerland: Wine for 50 labor units, cheese for 100 (blue).

You can draw a graph as follows:




Figure 1: france-graph

Under autarky, each country can consume only what it produces.

What price would be acceptable to both sides?

- France: In trade, refuse to pay more than  $100w$  for  $50c$ .
- Swiss: In trade, refuse to pay more than  $100c$  for  $50w$ .

In particular, there is a wide range of acceptable prices. Red: range that is acceptable to France; blue: range that is acceptable to Switzerland.

Trade would both to consume more. Suppose the trading price is  $100/100$ . Then..., the CPF looks like (it moves outward).

New case: France has AA in both goods. In this setting, suppose that:

- France can produce 100 wine, 50 cheese.




Figure 2: bargaining-range

- Swiss can produce 10 wine, 20 cheese.

It turns out that understanding this case requires us to understand absolute vs. comparative advantage.

- Absolute advantage: lower absolute cost of producing  $x$ .
- Comparative advantage: lower opportunity cost of producing  $x$ .

Importantly, Switzerland has a comparative advantage in cheese. France has to give up 200 wine to make 100 cheese, while Switzerland has to give up 50 wine to make 100 cheese.

Now, obviously - Switzerland gains from trade.

But also, France gains too:

- With trade: France could make 100m wine, then trade 20m wine for 20m cheese.
- Result: consume 80m wine, 20m cheese.

Without trade:

- If France consumed 80m wine, it could only consume 10m cheese.
- If France consumed 20m cheese, it could only consume 60m wine.

Other arguments for free trade:

- Trade increases welfare via economies of scale. In some industries production costs fall as output increases (due to learning, technology, machinery).
- Trade increases welfare due to competitions. Firms will feel compelled to cut costs, enhance their products, and improve their services.

Conclusions:

- FT increases aggregate welfare, even when one country has an AA in all goods.
- Puzzle: why do countries have trade barriers?






Figure 3: cpfs

## 14 Lecture 15: 7-30-19

Even though economists are in favor of free trade, protectionism is widespread. Why is this?

**Tariffs.** There are two types:

- Ad valorem tariff (tax is a % of the good's value; e.g. sales tax).
- Specific tariff (tax is a fixed amount per unit).

Interestingly, rich countries have lower tariffs, on average. Note that:

- High income countries (3.6% avg pct tariff)
- Middle income countries (9.2% avg pct tariff)
- Low income countries (12.1% avg pct tariff).

But: tariffs vary within income groups. E.g. South Korea has 8.9% tariff, while U.S. has 2.9% tariff.

Also, tariffs have historically varied over time.

There are also nontariff barriers (NTBs).

- Quotas / licenses: quantitative limits on imports.
- product standards: block imports that don't meet standards (sanitary, environmental, medical, etc).

Subsidies are another type of NTB (they help domestic producers beat foreign competition).

Currency policies can be NTBs.

- Restrict access to foreign currency
- Devalue your currency (if a country cheapens its currency, foreigners will buy more from that country, and consumers in the country will buy less from foreigners).



Figure 4: Case 2: CPFs for France shifts towards the right, even though they have an AA in both goods

China as currency manipulator. e.g. Romney says that companies have shut down and people have lost their jobs because China has not played by the same rules. Would prevent Chinese consumers from buying stuff from the U.S. and making Chinese

How could China keep its currency low?

- China could print new currency, use it to buy dollars and U.S. debt and hold them as financial assets (China holds 1.1T of US debt).
- Consequences: supply of Chinese currency rises (lowering its value), demand for the U.S. dollra rises (raising its value).

What evidence is there that this is happening?

Before 2010, value of Yuan is completely flat relative to the USD. Eight year low right before 2019.

The problem of substitutability: there is more than one way to block an import. Makes it hard to ensure that a country is practicing free trade.

Question: why might protectionism be in the national interest?

- National defense
- Infant industries
- Market power
- Industrialization

P = protectionism. Some people say that protectionism means that it is important for national security.

e.g. steel tariffs - administration notes that US should build steel at home. Similar for aluminum.

Justification for automobile tariffs? Commerce dept concluded that imports of autos / certain auto parts posed a threat to US national security.

Rebuttal -

- What wouldn't qualify? (it's a slippery slope).
- There are alternatives: buying from allies, and stockpiling for emergencies.

Infant industries:

- Shield young firms from foreign competition until they can succeed on their own
- Example - blocking Google / Twitter In China led to Baidu / Weibo

Rebuttal:

Might not work:

- Can government pick winners?
- Can the infact be weaned?

There are alternatives:

- Let private investors support the industry
- If you must help an infant, subsidize it

Market power:

(Krugman is famous for this)

Talked about how countries that strategically use subsidies to help one country gain at the expense of another.

*Example.* Suppose:

- 2 regions (US and Europe)
- 2 firms (Boeing and Airbus)
- Only 1 firm can remain profitable

Initial payoffs: numbers in cells are profits, in \$ millions.

	Airbus Produce	Airbus Abstain
Boeing Produce	(-5, -5)	(100, 0)
Boeing Abstain	(0, 100)	(0, 0).

There is no dominant strategy here. If Boeing produces, Airbus should abstain. If Boeing abstains, Airbus should produce.

Interestingly: subsidies give Airbus a dominant strategy. Government might add +10 if they produce, but no plus if they abstain.

	Airbus Produce	Airbus Abstain
Boeing Produce	(-5, -5+10)	(100, 0)
Boeing Abstain	(0, 100+10)	(0, 0).

Knowing this: Boeing will stay out, and Airbus will take the profits.

Rebuttal:

- Requires a super wise government
- Applies to only a few industries

Tomorrow, will discuss argument that protectionism could help LDCs industrialize (shift from primary to secondary products).

## 15 Lecture 16: 7-31-19

Some people argue that protectionism could help LDCs industrialize (shift from primary to secondary products).

- Primary: agricultural production
- Secondary: industrial production

Why is it better to focus on industrial production?

*Claim 1.* Industrial goods have better prospects

- Engel's law: as income rises, % spent on food will fall, while % spent on non-food (industrial) items will rise.
- Technology: synthetic substitutes can reduce the demand for primary goods.

*Claim 2.* Prices of primary goods are more volatile.

Why?

- Business cycles in rich countries
- Unpredictable weather

LDCs used protectionism to address these problems.

Import substitution industrialization:

- Latin America, 1930s-1960s
- High barriers on final products
- Allow inputs to enter freely

Did ISI work?

### **Domestic policies.**

Key ideas about domestic policies:

- Protection actually helps some domestic groups
- Their influence depends on political institutions.

Consider the following model, with these assumptions.

- Two products: shirts and cars.
- Two factors of production: labor and capital (means machines, factories, etc.)
- Two countries with different factor endowments. One country - lots of labor; another country - lots of capital.

As from before, recall that trade leads to specialization.

- Under autarky: you make both shirts and cars.
- Under free trade: specialize according to comparative advantage

Specialization will cause certain industries to expand, others to contract.

e.g. country with a lot of labor will focus on shirts; country with a lot of capital will specialize on capital.

We will consider two theories on who wins domestically. See Stolper-Samuelson and Ricardo-Viner.

Stolper-Samuelson:

- Assumption: both factors of production are highly mobile (labor and capital). e.g. this means that people who make shirts can move. And, the equipment that is used to make shirts, can be reconfigured to make BMWs (questionable assumption).
- Prediction: trade -> class conflict

In a labor abundant country, labor-intensive industries will grow. This leads to a shortage of labor in shirt industry, so wages rise.

This leads to surplus capital in shirt industry - so value of capital falls.

In a capital abundant country, capital-intensive industries will grow. Labor will move from shirts to cars, and capital will move from shirts to capital.

- Causes a shortage of capital in auto industry -> value of capital rises.
- Causes a surplus of workers, so wages fall.

In this setting, FT helps capitalists, hurts workers.

Political implications of SS theory:

- In labor-abundant countries:
  - Workers should favor free trade
  - Capitalists should favor protectionism
- In capital-abundant countries:
  - Capitalists should favor free trade
  - Workers should favor protectionism
- Implies a fight between classes (labor vs capital).

Objection to Stolper-Samuelson: assumes that factors of production can be redeployed easily. True in some cases, not in others.

Ricardo-Viner theory: a different way of thinking about this process.

- Assumption: some factors are fully mobile.
- Prediction: trade → conflicts between industries, rather than classes.

*Example.* Suppose that capital is hard to move.

- In a labor abundant country, trade → redeployment of labor, but some capital remains stuck. Can't move capital from car to shirt.
- How will this affect domestic groups?
  - Shirt capitalists will win
  - Car capitalists will lose
  - Effect on workers is harder to predict (depends on how much their wages change, etc).

The opposite is true in a capital-abundant country. Car capitalists will win, shirt capitalists will lose.

Political implications of RV:

- If capital is immobile, trade will hurt some capitalists while helping others.
- If labor is immobile, trade will hurt some workers while helping others.
- Thus: battle is between industries, rather than classes.

Puzzle:

- FT increases economic welfare (overall size of the pie).
- So: why don't winners compensate the losers?

One approach: trade adjustment assistance. Try to help workers who lose jobs because of foreign trade.

Ways to help:

- Training
- subsidies
- healthcare
- job search allowance / relocation allowance.

Another approach: tax reform. e.g. Scheve/Slaughter recommend cutting the payroll taxes of workers who earn less than the national median.

Puzzle: why do countries pursue protectionism instead of a combined policy of free trade + trade adjustment?

Briefly, we'll discuss domestic institutions and trade policy.

In U.S., Congress typically sets U.S. tariffs.

- Constitution empowers Congress to:
  - impose import duties
  - regulate commerce with foreign nations
- president needs 2/3 approval for treaty.

Smoot-Hawley tariffs of 1930 - brought protectionism to highest level in US history.

Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934:

Authorized the president to make reciprocal tariff reductions without congressional approval. Democrats largely supported this, while Republicans argued for protectionism.

Puzzle: why did Congress delegate to the President?

## 16 Lecture 20: 8-12-19

Structure of exam:

- 20 true false (10 min)
- 6 of 8 ID's (10 min each)
- 1 essay (30 min each)

Review session is Thursday @ 6:30pm.

Recall the course focuses on four international problems that arise in the context of anarchy.

- Unit 1: War
- Unit 2: Environment
- Unit 3: Trade
- Unit 4: Poverty

**Puzzle of foreign aid.**

- No world government redistributes income
- But many governments voluntarily send aid. Why is this?

Reasons countries might give foreign aid: stability, morality, reduce human rights.

**Measuring government aid.** We will talk about ODA (official development assistance).

**Before 1945 countries did not give ODA.** Instead, rich countries engaged with poor through trade, colonialism, conquest.

ODA emerged after World War II.

- In 1948, the US launched the MARshall Plan to rebuild economics of Western Europe.
- 18 countries received aid. More than half went to U.K., France, West Germany.
- No aid to Spain (Franco) or Eastern Bloc (Soviets).

By the 1960s, most rich democracies had their own aid programs. Since the 1960s, we can look at a graph of ODA in billions of 2015 US dollars. As of last year, US gave about \$120B in aid.

ODA may be given:

- Directly from the donor government to a recipient country (bilateral aid)
- Indirectly via an international organization (multilateral aid).

Many international organizations channel aid:

- UN (UNICEF, IFA, WHO, UNHCR)
- World Bank, etc.

Some countries give most of their aid multilaterally.

Sometimes, aid can be tied:

- Tied aid must be used to buy goods / services from the donor country.
- United aid does not have this requirement.

About 40% of US aid tends to be tied aid.

**Motives for giving aid.** Could be two main categories of reasons:

- Altruistic (give for humanitarian reasons)
- Egoistic (give for selfish reasons)

To infer leaders, we could study what leaders say, e.g.

- Speeches
- Interviews
- Memoirs
- Diaries
- Letters

But to get more insight, study behavior, e.g. whether they are egoistic / selfish.

If donors were egoistic, they would:

- Give little aid
- Favor “important” countries
- Deliver aid bilaterally
- Tie their aid

On the other hand, if the donors were altruistic, they would:

- Have large aid budgets
- Help less important countries
- Deliver aid multilaterally
- Not tie their aid.

Let's evaluate US aid according to these criteria (USAID).

- Federal budget is \$ 3.8T. About 1% of international budget is international affairs (of which a fraction is foreign aid). U.S. gives less than 0.2% of its national income.
- U.S. gives econ aid to strategically important countries. e.g. Afghanistan, Pakistan, Jordan. But overall, Sub-Saharan countries are the biggest recipients of U.S. development assistance.
- U.S. aid responds to political shifts - fell after the Cold War, but then has greatly risen. Rose a lot after 9/11.
- Interesting, U.S. aid changes a lot based on security council membership. Interesting research paper: how much is a seat on the security council worth?
- U.S. gives less than 30% multilaterally.
- Well, it's tied a lot, so not great (the highest percentage out of any donor countries we are talking about).

What about other donors? Longstanding goal: give 0.7% of national income. Most countries have not met this target. Only countries that have met: Denmark, Sweden, Luxembourg, Norway.

From readings: aid goes disproportionately to:

- Former colonies
- Military / political allies
- Culturally similar countries

See ("Who Gets Aid", short article).

But...most generous donors send aid elsewhere. e.g. Sweden.

Generous donors don't always give multilaterally, but they do avoid tying their aid.

If foreign aid reflected concerns about the poor - countries with the most domestic social spending would also give the most ODA. This is similar to the theme of norm externalization discussed in unit 1.

As Lumdaine predicted - domestic aid is positively related to foreign aid.

## 17 Lecture 21: 8-13-19

Today, we will focus on:

- Aid from international organizations.
- Effectiveness of foreign aid.

Example: international monetary fund. Need to revisit the 19th century to understand it.

From 1870 - 1914, there was the Gold Standard, which is an exchange rate system. The idea was:

- Each country pegged to gold.
- Participants committed to "convertibility."
- One advantage of this standard - it minimized exchange fluctuations (so exchange rate would be constant).

The effects of WWI:

- Governments printed money to pay for the war



- The gold standard collapsed (due to inflation).
- It was restored in the 1920s, but...

However, the gold standard collapsed again during the great depression.

Common practices during the depression:

- Competitive devaluation (to make goods cheaper).
- Exchange control.
- Protectionist barriers

Origins of the IMF: established at Bretton Woods, 1944, to prevent the mistakes of the Depression. Some inspiration came from White and Keynes.

The Bretton Woods System:

- Country A → USA → (@ \$35 / oz) gold.
- Country B → USA → (@ \$35 / oz) gold.
- Country C → USA → (@ \$35 / oz) gold.
- That is, all countries peg their exchange rate between its currency and the U.S. dollar.
- The U.S. completes the system by establishing an exchange rate with gold.

The Bretton Woods System:

- Stabilized exchange rates
- Constrained monetary policy.

IMF played the role of emergency “creditor.”

- Each member paid a quota to IMF (calibrated based on size of economy)
- IMF lent to countries in need
- But it imposed conditions on borrowers.

IMF played the role of “referee”

- Judged whether pegs should be changed
- Monitored convertibility of currencies

US policies in late 1960s led to

- Inflation, overvalued dollar
- Shrinking trade surplus

Therefore, a country would have two options:

- Deflate (politically unpopular)
- Devalue (required others to revalue)

Collapse of Bretton Woods

- Nixon chose devaluation
- Countries moved to floating rates
- IMF needed to reinvent itself.

What activities does the IMF undertake today?

- Loans
- Surveillance (bilateral and global)
- Technical assistance (money doctor)

Interestingly, during the recent crisis, the biggest borrowers were in Europe! e.g. Greece, Portugal, Ireland.

Question: are multilateral donors less political?

- They include many countries and diverse interests.
- But, their management structure favors the US:
  - IMF has weighted voting
  - World Bank usually has a U.S. director

About 9 countries form a majority in the IMF (due to weighted voting).

IMF and WB give more to countries that:

- Are U.S. military allies
- Vote with U.S. in the UN
- Serve on the WB governing board
- Rotate onto the Security Council

For reflection: should aid be given bilaterally or multilaterally?

Rest of lecture - talking about effects of foreign aid.

Argument (from Jeff Sachs) - the poor face a dilemma.

- They can't afford to invest.
- Without investments, they can't escape poverty.
- Thus, the poor are stuck in a poverty trap.

What kind of investments could help?

- Human investments (health, nutrition, education)
- Business: machines
- Infrastructure: roads, power, water.
- Natural: e.g. land
- Knowledge: science / tech.

It's argued that aid can provide investment.

- Aid to govts → public investments
- Aid to families → household investments.
- Microfinance → business investments,

thereby promoting growth and reducing poverty. For more on this, see Jeff Sachs' The Development Challenge.

But - aid doesn't always succeed. e.g. Zambia (source Easterly).

Potential reasons:

- Bad individual choices
- Bad government policies

- Bad political institutions

## 18 Lecture 22: 8-14-19

Today, we will talk about ethics and foreign aid.

Trajectory of international poverty over time:

- In 2010, about 2.4B people in developing countries were living on less than \$2 per day.
- These estimates were adjusted for “purchasing power parity”.

Percentage of world population living in poverty has declined, but total number has stayed the same.

- Percentage has declined, especially in Asia.
- But: percent has not changed in Africa.

Recent improvement:

- Since 2010, economy has improved
- 900M lives on less than \$1.90 a day
- 2.1B lives on less than \$3.10 a day.
- Still: the problems remain enormous.

Three ethical perspectives that we can think of:

- Utilitarian
- Libertarian
- Rawlsian

Utilitarian case for aid:

- We ought to prevent suffering and death if we can do so at low moral cost.

According to Singer, it is obligatory to feed victims of famine.

How much ought we give? Keep giving, until we “reach the level of marginal utility.” That is, give until you reach marginal utility (when giving more hurts you more than it helps).

Do you think we have an obligation to...

- Prevent suffering if we do so at low moral cost (yes).
- Give until we reach the level of marginal utility (this is complex. I think it is quite hard to predict the dynamics of “what helps”).

Rebuttal?

- Unrealistic: few would give that much
- Too impartial: ignores special obligations
- Ineffective: aid does not reduce poverty.
- Counterproductive: fosters dependency.
- My objection: Marginal utility is complex - there is a time dependence.

A different utilitarian view: “Lifeboat Ethics” (Hardin; wrote about tragedy of the commons)

- Limited carrying capacity
- Any more would sink the boat.

The Malthusian dilemma (overshoot and collapse)

Malthus - known for his pessimism about the future of humanity. Major contributions to economic thought: Principles of population.

Key idea: if you give aid, population might go up, and gradually crash after.

Rebuttals:

- Not close to carrying capacity
- Technology might change limits
- You could promote population control (birth control, etc.)
- Why not sacrifice ourselves?

Libertarian perspective, part 1

A government that taxes its citizens to provide foreign aid is coercing its people.

Statement from US libertarian party - "Individuals should not be coerced via taxes into funding a foreign nation or group."

Libertarian perspective, part 2

Individuals have no obligation to give.

- I acquired my property justly
- Anything I give is 'pure "charity"'

Rebuttals:

- Assumes property was acquired justly
- Other values may outweigh freedom.
- Need money to exercise liberty.

Rawlsian perspective (developed by Beitz)

- International distribution of resources is morally arbitrary: a matter of brute luck. (e.g. poverty is concentrated in the tropics).

In this situation, what would be just?

- Beitz imagines international original position (veil of ignorance)

Review of unit 4:

- Aid from govts.
- Aid from IO iEffects of aid
- Ethics of aid.

Tomz - undergrad research program.

## 19 Lecture 23: 8-15-19

Today: talking about Ethics for aid. Interestingly, citizens think foreign aid is a high fraction of the budget, but in reality, it is not very high (<1%).

Question: How do we think about Trump's proposed cuts in the context of a few different ethical frameworks?

Two types of frameworks:

- Consequentialist:
  - Singer (utilitarian). Marginal utility - should give until you reach the threshold of marginal utility.
  - Hardin: lifeboat ethics. Shouldn't have foreign aid, because there is a limited carrying capacity (lifeboat ethics).
- Non-consequentialist
  - Rawlsian. Veil of ignorance - probably pro aid. Distributive justice. Prefer policy that supports the least advantaged. Caveat - if aid is going to not least advantaged
  - Libertarian: Libertarian would agree with cuts. They believe individuals should decide where the money you own should go.

Logistics:

- Review session (6:30 - ?)
- Extra OH (Sat 12pm - 2pm CoHo)
- Final Exam (Sat 7pm - 9pm)

## 20 Review for midterm

Outline:

- Memorize statistical terms (Recall sampling vs. non-sampling error).
- Democratic peace theory (structural vs. normative; Russett).
- Bargaining theory (bargaining range, and how it changes based on costs of war).
- Bargaining failure (issue indivisibility, information problems, commitment problems).
- Ethics of warfare (Political realism, Utilitarianism, Christian Just war theory, Islamic war theory).
- Case studies
  - Kargil War (1999, India / Pakistan, only case of two democracies fighting a war).
  - Iraq War (2003, WMDs, information problem; preventive wars).
  - Iran-Iraq wwar (1981, preventive war)
  - 1967 Six Day war (preemptive war)
  - Pearl Harbor (preemptive war).
  - Israel Palestine case study.
    - \* Israel goals (Jewish state; Democratic state; in the Holy Lands).
    - \* PLO goals (sovereign state, based on 1948 borders, capital in east Jerusalem).
    - \* Think about this as example of bargaining failure. (Issue indivisibility, commitment, information problems).
- Reading overviews
  - Farber and Gowa
  - Fortna (selection effect in peacekeeping)
  - Russett (democratic peace theory)
  - Lake (use bargaining theory to examine 2003 Iraq War).

## Practice A.

(Raw reading list).

- Hoover and Donovan, *The Elements of Social Scientific Thinking*
- Russett, "Democratic Norms and Culture?"
- Russett, "The Fact of Democratic Peace"
- Farber and Gowa, "Politics and Peace"
- Frieden, Lake, Schultz, *World Politics: Interests, Interactions, Institutions*
- Lake, "Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory" (Iraq War)
- Beauchamp, "Everything you need to know about Israel-Palestine"
- Council on Foreign Relations, "Crisis Guide: The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict"
- Mueller, "War has almost ceased to exist: an assessment"
- Pinker, "Violence vnaquished"
- Fazal, "The reports of war's demise have been exaggerated"
- Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War"
- Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement"
- Fortna, "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace?"
- Thucydides, "The Melian Dialogue"
- Holt, "Morality, Reduced to Arithmetic"
- Crawford, "Just War Theory and the U.S. Counterterror War"
- Cornell, "Jihad: Islam's Struggle for Truth"

(Read list with summaries).

- Hoover and Donovan, *The Elements of Social Scientific Thinking*.  
Defines various terms, and experiment design in social science. Regression, Pearson's  $r$ , Sample bias, selection, etc.
- Russett, "Democratic Norms and Culture?"  
Notes that there are structural and normative reasons that democracies are more peaceful overall.  
Three structural reasons:
  - Empowering voters
  - Delay mobilization
  - Convey informationNormative models:
  - Unconditional externalization
  - Conditional externalization
  - Democratic crusade
- Russett, "The Fact of Democratic Peace"  
(see above). Did analysis on dyads. Russett uses  $\chi^2$  and concluded that there is a relationship.

- Farber and Gowa, “Politics and Peace”

More nuanced analysis on dyad-years. Probability of war by regime type and time period, number of dyad-years.

No statistically significant relationship between democracy and war before 1914.

Peace after 1945 (Cold War) coincides with common interests among a large number of states.

Farber and Gowa say that the relationship is spurious! Democracies tend to have common interests, which has led to recent peace. It’s not the case that democracies are inherently more likely to be peaceful.

- Frieden, Lake, Schultz, *World Politics: Interests, Interactions, Institutions*

Textbook that broadly describes bargaining range / costs of war. Incomplete Information.

- Lake, “Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory” (Iraq War)

Bargaining theory as one possible explanation of the Iraq War, shows it is an inadequate explanation of the Iraq War. Two player games vs. multiple actors. States don’t quite act rationally.

- Beauchamp, “Everything you need to know about Israel-Palestine”

1923: British Mandate

1947: UN Partition Plan

1948: Arab-Israeli War

1967: Six Day War

PLO Goals:

- Sovereign state
- Based on 1967 borders
- Capital in east Jerusalem
- Solution for refugees

Israeli Goals:

- Jewish State
- Democratic state
- In Holy Land

Israel wants security (given history of conflicts).

Why does conflict occur? Problems of:

- Divisibility (dividing Jerusalem is hard in practice)
- Information
- Commitment (history of conflict)

- Council on Foreign Relations, “Crisis Guide: The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”

(similar)

- Mueller, “War has almost ceased to exist: an assessment”

Reasons for peace:

- Democratic peace
- Commercial peace

- Nuclear peace
- IOs
- Pinker, “Violence vanquished”
 

Notes the same idea as before. But also, civil wars are more frequent. Less bad news: civil wars tend to kill fewer people.
- Fazal, “The reports of war’s demise have been exaggerated”
 

Advances in battlefield medicine / preventive care. Military evaluation practices.
- Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”
 

Civil war is due to the steady accumulation of conflicts since the 50s / 60s, rather than a sudden change. Civil wars tend to last a long time.
- Walter, “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement”
 

Civil wars rarely end, because of indivisibility, commitment, various issues.
- Fortna, “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace?”
 

Selection effect - peacekeeping does help, but we note that the conflicts that end up requiring peacekeeping tend to be selected for.
- Thucydides, “The Melian Dialogue”
 

Athenians crush the Melians.
- Holt, “Morality, Reduced to Arithmetic”
 

Criticizes the “save lives” argument for dropping the bomb.
- Crawford, “Just War Theory and the U.S. Counterterrorism War”
 

Argues that U.S. Counterterrorism policy is unethical.
- Cornell, “Jihad: Islam’s Struggle for Truth”
 

Argues that the term Jihad has been misrepresented to be associated with violent acts, when it actually means “striving on behalf of God”

Fill in



Subtest A.

*Readings.*

- Russett “Democratic Norms and Culture”
- Farber and Gowa, “Politics and Peace” (example of common interest: opposition of Soviet Union)
- Lake, “Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory”
- Beauchamp, Israel-Palestine
- Mueller, “War has almost ceased to exist: an assessment”
- Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”
- Walter, “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement”

*Ideas / examples.*

- Historical case studies
- Ethics of warfare (political realism, utilitarianism, Christian vs. Islamic just war theory)
- Statistical terms
- Preemptive vs. Preventive wars
- Causes of bargaining failure
- Spurious relationship (relationship)
- Validity vs. reliability
- Sampling vs. non-sampling error
- Civil war - settlement problems + disarmament dilemma (Mexican standoff). Peacekeeping works well for civil war settlements.
- Jus ad bellum vs. jus in bello.
- Utilitarian counterarguments to nuclear weapons
- Christian tradition vs. Islamic tradition, jus ad bellum vs. jus in bello

Christian tradition:

- Grounds for war (religion)
  - Just case
  - Last resort
  - Chance of success
- Conduct in war (religion)
  - Discrimination
  - Proportional tactics

Islamic tradition:

- Dar al-Islam vs. dar al-harb
- Just cause (propagate Islam)
- Last resort

Conduct in war is similar to Christianity

- Discrimination
- Proportional tactics

Example of bargaining failure: Mexican-American war.

Subtest A, practice solve.

- Russett “Democratic Norms and Culture”

Structural and normative models:

S:

- Delay mobilization
- Empower voters
- Convey information

N:

- Conditional
- Unconditional
- Democratic crusades

- Farber and Gowa, “Politics and Peace” (example of common interest: opposition of Soviet Union)

Argues that democracy / peace is not statistically significant before 1914, and that they can only obtain a correlation after 1945. Argues that this is due to interests, rather than politics. Correlates of war dataset.

- Lake, “Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory”

Uses bargaining theory to analyze Iraq war. Points out several shortcomings of the model:

- $n$ -player games vs. two player games
- Assumes rational actors
- Imperfect information?

- Beauchamp, Israel-Palestine

Conflict between Israel and Palestine

- Israel wants to fight PLO over Jerusalem. Holy site for both.
- Bargaining failure:
  - \* Indivisible (Jerusalem for holiness)
  - \* Commitment (lack of trust)
  - \* Information (lack of information)

- Mueller, “War has almost ceased to exist: an assessment”

Four key reasons war has almost ceased to exist:

- Democratic peace
- Commercial peace
- Nuclear peace (deterrence).
- IOs

review

- Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”

Note that the counts of civil wars have increased since 1945, but this is not due to an increase in conflict rate, but rather a steady accumulation of ongoing conflicts (since civil wars tend to last longer). The reasons for why are below (see Walter).

- Walter, “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement”
  - Issue indivisibility
  - Disarmament dilemma (commitment problem)
  - Information problem (insurgents who are hard to track down)

*Ideas / examples.*

- Historical case studies
  - Kargill War (India and Pakistan) - the only war between two democratic states since 1945.
  - Mexican American War (failure of bargaining; outcomes for both parties were much worse than the available deal)
  - Palestine conflict
  - Iran-Iraq war (not sure)
  - Iraq war 2003 (information problem)
  - Hiroshima / Nagasaki (utilitarian argument)
  - Pearl Harbor (preemptive war)
- Ethics of warfare (political realism (Bismarck), utilitarianism, Christian vs. Islamic just war theory)
 

Realists say war is reality, don't be moral.

Utilitarians: greatest good for greatest number (Mill).
- Preemptive vs. Preventive wars
 

Preemptive: fighting for first strike advantage

Preventive: fighting because it'll prevent later conflict.
- Causes of bargaining failure
 

Indivisibility, Information problems, commitment problems,
- Spurious relationship
 

A apparent but false relationship between two variables that is due to a confounder.
- Validity vs. reliability
 

Does the measure model the concept: valid? Does the measure stay consist across time: reliable?
- Sampling vs. non-sampling error
 

Sampling: error due to sample being off just by chance

Non-sampling error: other forms of error.
- Civil war - settlement problems + disarmament dilemma (Mexican standoff).
 

Settlement is hard (Walter), because of divisibility, Information (terrain), and commitment (Mexican standoff).

- Jus ad bellum vs. jus in bello.

Jus ad bellum: ethics of going to war

jus in bello: conduct in war

- Utilitarian counterarguments to nuclear weapons

Are more humane alternatives possible? Is it possible to just demonstrate the power without killing civilians?

- Christian tradition vs. Islamic tradition, jus ad bellum vs. jus in bello

Christian: Self defense, last resort, chance of success. Jus in bello: discrimination, and proportionality.

Islam: Just cause and last resort. Jus in bello: discrimination and proportionality.

dar al-Islam (house of Islam), dar al-harb (the world outside of Islam).

Maybe flesh  
this out fur-  
ther

Subtest B.

*Readings.*

- Russett, "Democratic Peace Theory"
- Lake, "Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory"
- Beauchamp, Israel-Palestine
- Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement"

*Ideas / examples.*

- Historical case studies
- Preemptive vs. Preventive wars
- Causes of bargaining failure
- Sampling vs. non-sampling error
- Utilitarian counterarguments to nuclear weapons
- Originator of democratic peace?

Subtest B.

*Readings.*

- Russett, “Democratic Peace Theory”  
Structural norms (voter empowerment, delay mobilization, and information)
- Lake, “Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory”  
Criticizes the bargaining model. Notes that imperfect information (WMDs), commitment problems (No guarantee of regime change after US and Iraq agree to peace). Also,  $n$ -player games, and rational actor assumption.
- Beauchamp, Israel-Palestine  
This conflict won’t resolve because of indivisibility of Jerusalem and commitment issues.
- Walter, “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement”  
Information problems (insurgency), commitment problems (disarmament dilemma), and indivisibility.

*Ideas / examples.*

- Historical case studies
- Preemptive vs. Preventive wars  
Preemptive: first strike advantage.  
Preventive war (U.S. China war). 2003 Iraq War.
- Sampling vs. non-sampling error  
Sampling: when due to pure chance, sample differs from the population. Non-sampling error: when you randomly sample units or measure something incorrectly.
- Utilitarian counterarguments to nuclear weapons  
More humane ways to conduct. Warning shot. Bomb a non-populated area. Show them the capacity of the weapon. Invasion may not have been that deadly.
- Originator of democratic peace? Kant.

Subtest C.

- Historical case studies
  - Kargil War (
  - Iraq War (2003)
  - Iran-Iraq war
  - 1967 Six Day war
  - Pearl Hearbor
- Israel vs. Palestine
- preemptive vs. preventive.

Subtest C - practice solve.

- Historical case studies

- Kargil War (first example of a democracy-democracy conflict, India vs. Pakistan).
- Iraq War (2003). Information problem, preventive war. Crawford war on terror reading.
- Iran-Iraq war (preventive war, Iraq wanted to invade Iran following the Iranian revolution, but failed).
- 1967 Six Day war (Preemptive war)
- Pearl Harbor (preemptive war)

- Israel vs. Palestine

Roughly: Jerusalem hard to divide, Israel and Palestine have commitment problems.

- preemptive vs. preventive.

Preventive: war that occurs in the context of a large power shift. Preemptive: war in which first strike advantage is critical.



Subtest C - practice solve 2.

- Iran Iraq war: example of preventive war.
- Iraq war (2003): preventive war.
- Six day war (1967), Pearl Harbor (example of pre-emptive war).

Subtest D.

Describe the history of the Israel-Palestine conflict.

Israel declared a state in 1948, Arab-Israeli war happened. Israel gained control of 78% of territory.

PLO goals:

- Sovereign state
- Based on 1967 borders
- Wants capital in East Jerusalem
- Solution for refugees.

Israeli Goals

- Jewish state
- Democratic state
- In Holy Land
- Security.
- West bank control by Palestinian authority
- Jerusalem, home to holy sites, Islam / Jewish.
- Gaza strip controlled by Hamas.

Subtest D.

Describe the history of the Israeli Palestine conflict.

Arab-Israel war happened in 1967.

PLO goals:

- Sovereign state
- 1967 Borders
- Wants capital in East Jerusalem

Israeli Goals

- Jewish state
- Democratic state
- Holy land
- Security

West bank controlled by Palestinian authority Jerusalem, holy sites. Gaza strip: controlled by Hamas.

## **20.1 Hoover, 11-35**

- “by tinkering with the meanings of concepts, one can play with the foundations of human understanding and social control.”
- Variable: a name for something that is thought to influence a particular state of being in something else.

## **20.2 Hoover, 38 - 46**

Theory - “a set of related propositions that attempt to explain, and sometimes to predict, a set of events”

Model - “an implication of greater order and system in a theory”

Paradigm - “larger frame of understanding, shared by a wider community of scientists”

Laws / axioms (there are few in social science).

Induction: building theory through the accumulation and summation of a variety of inquiries.

Deduction: using the logic of a theory

## **20.3 Russett, Democratic Norms and Culture**

- Democracies are not always peaceful. It ignores the rally around the flag effect.
- “When a player employing a conditionally cooperative strategy like tit-for-tat is confronted by someone playing a consistently noncooperative strategy, noncooperation dominates.”

**The cultural / normative model.**

- Violent conflicts between democracies will be rare.
- Violent conflicts between nondemocracies, and between democracies and nondemocracies will be more frequent.

## 20.4 Farber and Gowa

- No statistically significant relations between democracy and war before 1914.
- Only after 1945 that the probability of war is significantly lower between democracies than between members of other pairs of states.
- Correlates of war dataset.

## 20.5 Russett 1993 - Factor of Democratic Peace

- Democratically organized

## 21 Section 1: 6-27-19

### Writing polisci.

- Response paper: 2 total, 1 before July 12.
- 2 p. 2x-spaced paper / email Iris by Wed 7pm.

Possible options for a response paper:

- Critique the reading.
- Propose alternate explanation to describe the phenomenon.
- Arbitrate between different arguments.
- Apply to a historical / current case.

**Russett (1993).** His main puzzle is:

*Q.* What is the relationship between democracy and war?

It's a conditional normative mechanism.

- Democratic states have peaceful norms of conflict resolution.
- Autocrats have violent norms of conflict resolution.
- Democratic states believe autocratic states are untrustworthy.
- Democratic state will pursue violent norms against autocrats.

## 22 Section 2: 7-3-19

Data analysis assignment: due July 16.

Recall that the Iraq War was a conflict between US and Iraq, 2003 - 2011. Fought over the belligerent nature of the regime under Saddam Hussein. Also, the US demanded Iraq to shut down WMD program, but they didn't. But it turned out that WMD program actually didn't exist.

Why do wars occur? 2 Explanations.

1. Behavioral theories of war.
  - Assumption: Leaders fallible to cognitive biases.
  - Leaders misinterpret information aka perceive an action incorrectly
  - Leaders are irrationally overconfident about capabilities.
2. Bargaining model of war.

- (a) Assumption: States are rational and try to maximize expected payoffs.
- (b) If war is costly: there always should be some deal that is less costly than war itself.
- (c) Expected payoff of fighting:

$$(\text{probability of fighting}) \times (\text{payoff if win}) + (\text{probability of losing}) \times (\text{payoff if lose}) - \text{cost of fighting}$$

There are some limitations of this model; if the resource is indivisible, then you won't be able to reason about the expected value.

Recall the class example of bargaining:

- Two players, Iris and Zuhad, can split \$100.
- If they fight, winner takes all (payoff = 100).
- Iris pays \$20 in medical bills, aka cost of fighting = 20; Zuhad pays \$40.
- Players have an equal chance of winning  $\text{pr}(\text{win}) = 0.5$ .

Expected value for Iris:

$$0.5 \times 100 + 0.5 \times 0 - 20 = 30$$

This means that Iris prefers any deal that gives her at least 30.

Expected value for Zuhad:

$$0.5 \times 100 + 0.5 \times 0 - 40 = 10$$

So we get a bargaining range between [30, 90] that should be acceptable to both parties.

If bargaining range still exists, why do wars happen?

1. Issue indivisibility (e.g. Israel-Palestine Conflict)
2. Information problem
  - Poker game problem; people bluff and misrepresent their capabilities
  - e.g. Berlin crisis
3. Commitment problems
  - Stanford Honor Code (aka can't trust people to do what you want them to do)
  - Example: Iran Nuclear Deal

### **Bargaining Failures.**

- Information problem: Hussein had incentives to conceal information to US re: weapons program.
- Commitment problem: US-Iraq agreement was reached, no guarantees US wouldn't use power to induce regime change.

### **Behavioral.**

- States not unitary actors - domestic political actors.
- Self-delusions and Bush's gut feeling about Hussein.
- Inability to estimate costs of war
- Cognitive biases, self-delusions, failure to update beliefs with new facts.

## 23 Section 3: 7-11-19

### Agenda.

- Data analysis tips.
- Recap: end interstate war?
- Application: GP Rivarly.

Passed out review sheet. Recall that the response paper must be turned in before next Wednesday.

The structure of the data analysis:

- Intro: Preview your results
- Connecting logic
  - Reasons / evidence (e.g. empirical support) → Identify the observable implications of connecting logic.
  - Analyze hidden assumptions.
  - Note, since all the data has to do with public opinion data, hypothesis should probably include the word belief.
- Results
  - Look at Marginal / Conditional probabilities.
  - $\chi^2$  test.
- Analysis
  - What do the results mean?
  - Sampling error (is the sample representative of the world's population distribution?)
  - Non-sampling error (problems that could occur by chance; e.g. differences between Stanford students and broader population; question wording; could prime the respondent to answer in a certain way).
  - Example of question wording: asking whether we want intervention in Iraq could be interpreted as asking whether we want to intervene in 2003 Iraq; vs. asking whether we want to intervene in ISIS.
- Conclusion.
  - Found some difference / no difference in the subpopulations associated with IV vs. not.

Recall that there are four reasons we've seen decline in interstate war:

- Democratic peace
- Commercial peace (increase in globalization)
- Nuclear peace
  - e.g. India / Pakistan; even though there
- IOs (International Organizations)

However, recently - people argue that we have seen a return to great power rivalry.

Two possible adversaries:

- Concerns about China
  - (e.g. US and China are currently in the midst of a brewing trade war)
  - Concerns that something will happen in Taiwan; US is obligated to defend Taiwan (see Taiwan American relations Act, etc.)

- Concerns about Russia.
  - Russia withdrew from a nuclear arms agreement.
  - Russia embarked on a nuclear modernization program (would increase the size of the arsenal, and the destructive power of the weapons).
  - Concerns among many that more nuclear weapons don't make the world more stable, but they increase the likelihood of accidents.

**Question.** What are the odds?

- What are the odds of a US China war; vs. what are the odds of a US Russia war?

**Factors for China.**

- Nuclear peace
- Commercial peace
- Democratic vs. nondemocratic peace
- Brinkmanship / accident?

Important factor: Freedom of Navigation Operations; complicated maritime law.

US economy is currently larger than China; but China's economy will be larger in 5 years. So it may make sense to wage war earlier (preventive war).

If China / US got into war, it's possible that other countries would be involved.

US is aggressively building the Navy because of vulnerabilities in the Pacific.

The Thucydides trap (On the fear of a large nation overpowering another one leading to an increased probability of war).

**Factors for Russia.**

- Nuclear peace
- Historically, US has had more historical conflict with Russia.
- How Russia fights war:
  - Insurgent fighting (as opposed to regular fighting on a battlefield). US has less infrastructure to fight an insurgent war.

Consider survey data, what is the threat of Russia? We can analyze survey data.

- *IV*: Partisanship.
- *DV*: Perceived threat of Russia.

If we have a matrix

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} a & b \\ c & d \end{pmatrix},$$

where the entries are frequencies representing

- *a*: Republican; not threat.
- *b*: Republican; threat.
- *c*: Democrat; not threat.
- *d*: Democrat; threat.

We can compute various quantities:

$$\begin{aligned} Pr(\text{Rus Threat}) &= \frac{b + d}{a + b + c + d} \\ Pr(\text{Threat} \mid \text{Republican}) &= \frac{b}{a + b} \\ Pr(\text{Threat} \mid \text{Democrat}) &= \frac{d}{c + d}. \end{aligned}$$

Given the data, we have

$$\begin{aligned} Pr(\text{Rus Threat}) &= \frac{238 + 113}{32 + 72 + 238 + 113} = 0.77 \\ Pr(\text{Threat} \mid \text{Democrat}) &= \frac{238}{32 + 238} = 0.88 \\ Pr(\text{Threat} \mid \text{Republican}) &= \frac{113}{72 + 113} = 0.61. \end{aligned}$$

Even without doing a  $\chi^2$  test, we can see that there's a large divergence in opinion.

If we do the test, we find that the  $p$  value is less than 0.5.

Do we think that the poll has sampling error?

Representatives

- English only
- Only 869 people
- Online

Question wording:

- Scale
- "Imminent"
- "Threat"

Questions

## 24 Section 4: 7-18-19

Midterm. If you say things that are wrong; they will take off points.

Should the US use drones? Pros and cons.

Pros of drones:

- Drone strikes make US safer by decimating terrorists.  
upwards of 3500 militants killed.
- Drones kill fewer civilians. PCT of fatalities
- Drones make US military personnel safer.  
Less room for human error.
- Drone strikes are cheaper than engaging in ground / manned aerial combat.  
\$5B allocated for Drones, only about 1% of the entire military budget.

- Drone strikes are legal under international law.  
Article 51, self defense. anticipatory self defense.
- Drone strikes are legal under US law.
- Drones limit the scope / scale of military action.
- Subject to strict review process.
- Cannot risk falling behind rest of the world.
- Drone pilots have a lower risk of PTSD than pilots of manned aircraft.
- Majority of Americans support drone strikes.

Cons:

- Drone strikes create more terrorists than they kill.
- Drone strikes target individuals who may not be terrorists / combatants.
- Kill large numbers of civilians / traumatize populations.
- Kill low value targets
- Violate international law.
- Secretive, prevent citizens from holding accountable
- Violate sovereignty of other countries (without permission).
- Allow US to be emotionally disconnected from horrors of war. May propagate war.
- US drone strikes give cover for others to engage in human rights abuses.
- Extremely unpopular in affected countries.
- Drone operators have stress.

Team ant drone.

- Lot of accidents happen.
- Drone fails to target military leaders In the past. Succeeded in killing 14 military leaders of terrorism, but more civilians.
- Anti-US sentiment.
- Killing military leaders is not helpful in solving the true issue.

According to a July 18, 2013 survey by Pew Research, 61% of Americans supported drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.

*Core arguments.*

- Accidents. Crawford mention that accidents can make it possible to sidestep responsibility. Big challenge - how do you develop metrics that quantify the impact of drone strikes (got to measure civilian attitudes / radicalization).
- Drones reduce the risk for PTSD. Anti-drone mentioned the psychological effect impacts civilians at well (terrorizing relative to other military options).
- Proportionality. Effective in getting outcomes we want, but comes at a larger cost. e.g. Haven't had an attack from Al Qaeda since 2001, ISIS hasn't really done anything in a while.
- Thinking in analogies (compare to WW2). Reason that civilian casualties were very high is that firebombing Dresden was a good way to attack Nazis.



## 25 Section 5: 7-25-19

Policy memo.

Topic should be:

- Related to trade / environment / poverty.
- US-focus.
- Feasibility - needs to be tractable and you should be discuss why. Should be sufficiently limited to that it's possible to find research and support.

Research:

- Scholarly articles, books, think-tanks, NGOs. (e.g. see Heritage / Cato / Brettonwoods).

Writing:

- Emphasize broadcasting in advance, and be brief.

Pieces:

- Exec summary
- Problem
- Solution
- Feasibility
- Conclusion

## 26 Section 7: 8-8-19

Announcement:

- 2nd response paper due Wed 8/14 by 7pm
- policy memo due 8/14
- final exam review 8/15 (6:30 - 7:20)
- final exam, Saturday 8/17 (7pm - 10pm)

Agenda:

- Protectionism / tariffs
- US-China trade war
- Ethics of trade

Recap: free trade would help everyone, but states can't credibly commit to not be protectionists. Can model this with a prisoner's dilemma.

Two broad models:

- Stolper-Samuelson: trade -> class conflict. (assumptions: labor and capital are highly mobile).
- Ricardo-Viner: trade -> conflicts between industries (rather than classes). (assumptions: some factors are fully mobile).

Why protect?

- National interest
- Domestic politics (SS and RV)

- International politics -> optimal tariffs

Four broad ways to solve the commitment problem:

- Change costs / benefits
- Third-party / outside actor
- Strategies of reciprocity (tit for tat or grim trigger). Axelrod reading talks about why tit for tat is better.
- Domestic pressure. (Valhontra reading).

**US-China trade war.** It starts with a commitment problem, which states that:

- US and China can't commit to FT because tariffs can shift the terms of trade.

$$ToT = \frac{\text{price of exports}}{\text{price of imports}}.$$

Example: consider the ratio  $\frac{\text{price of soybeans}}{\text{price of iPhones}}$ . If numerator increases while denominator decreases, trade becomes more favorable to the U.S.

Last week: trade talks in Shanghai.

Why is there a US-China trade war? Five underlying factors.

- Trade deficit (US is importing a lot more than they are exporting; roughly US imports \$500B more than it exports).
- China currency manipulation / fair market (WTO accession / manipulation). China opened up its economy in 1979. Transformation is huge - almost more than US from 1800 to now.

One condition to join WTO is that you need a free and open market. But U.S. says this is not the case.

- IP theft: China takes IP property -> joint venture. In order for a foreign company to enter into Chinese market, they have to form a joint venture (and join with local players).

CFIUS: needs to review to make sure that China doesn't acquire / merge investment.

- 2025 Initiative (Made in China). Goal is to invest in AI / advanced technologies; creates a national security risk. (Huawei controversy).
- Great power rivalry: Power transition war? China may surpass the U.S. no later than 2050.

Solution	Who?	How?
Change costs	China	nuclear options w.r.t. U.S. debt. Would drive up interest rates, kill US economy.
Change benefits	US	Voters love free trade. Trump might change his mind
Reciprocity	Both US and China	committing to de-escalate and reduce tariffs
International organizations	WTO	Arbitrate / initiate dispute settlement mechanism

## 27 Review for final

Prisoner's dilemma in int'l politics.

- Prisoner's dilemma can be a useful representation of many types of problems

Repeated prisoner's dilemma

- States often engage in these interactions repeatedly
- Using strategies of reciprocity (e.g. Grim trigger, tit-for-tat), states can sustain cooperation if the long term benefits from cooperating outweigh the short term benefit a state can get from defecting. (Recall Axelrod's tournament)

Strategies of reciprocity are most likely to work when...

- Players value the future
- Reward for defecting is small
- etc.

Also - recall shadow of the future.

Recall trade: key terms (see the slides).

Engel's Law: as a country gets richer, smaller proportion goes to commodities.

General system of preferences (GSP)

WTO is about nondiscrimination / reciprocity.

Stolper-Samuelson assumes factors of production are mobile across sectors.

Ricard-Viner does not assume factors of production are mobile across sectors.

## 28 Review for final 2

Need to go over all readings. Everything in the class is fair game. Essay should be 30 minutes.

ID:

- Explain issue
- Contextualize
- Provide example
- Cite readings
- Explain significance for IR

Game theory:

- Prisoner's dilemma (defect); example of a commitment problem.
- If opponent is cooperating, you should defect (i.e. defecting is a dominant strategy; so Defect; defect is the Nash equilibrium).
- Repeated prisoner's dilemma. Need to use strategies of reciprocity (e.g. Axelrod's tournament).
- Prisoner's dilemma in int'l politics.
  - Classic application of PD: tragedy of commons, optimal tariff argument.
  - The barrier to settlement of civil war
  - Commitment problems generally as a cause of war.

Repeated PD:

- When games are iterated, you need to be cooperative.

When does reciprocity not work:

- When players value the future
- Reward for defecting is small
- Punishment for cheating is long and severe.

International institutions

- Help states use reciprocity to sustain cooperation

- Set clear expectations (e.g. what counts as “defecting”?)
  - monitoring behavior (need to know whether defection has occurred).
  - Coordinating punishments (helps avoid echo chambers)
- Examples: GATT / WTO, Paris Climate Agreement, etc.

Key ideas in trade:

- Free trade
- Protectionism
- Autarky (when a state is sustainable without international trade)
- Comparative advantage (when individual can produce an activity more efficiently than other activity).
- Absolute advantage (when individual produces an activity more efficiently than another group)
- Economies of scale (when scale allows you to do things more efficiently; e.g. bulk discounts).
- Ad valorem (tax is % of good’s value) vs specific tariff (fixed amount per unit)
- Nontariff barriers
  - Quotas (limits on imports)
  - Product standards (need to regulate sanitary / environmental / medical quality of goods).
- Infant industries
  - New industries - want to encourage them ideally
- Strategic trade policy
  - Sometimes good to be protectionist, sometimes good to be freer.
- LDCs and Industrialization.
  - Least developed countries.
  - Industrialization is good - because of technology, capital, automation, etc.
- Stolper-Samuelson.
  - Factors of production (labor / capital) are highly mobile.
  - In a labor abundant country, labor-intensive industries will grow.
  - Result: trade -> class conflict.
  - Summary: Factors mobile -> Class conflict.
- Ricardo Viner.
  - Factor of productions are not mobile
  - Some factors are fully mobile. Then leads to industry conflict.
  - S: Factors mobile -> Industry conflict.
- Trade adjustment assistance
  - Reduce damaging impact of imports.
- Tax reform
  - Generally, reform taxes.
- Smoot-Hawley 1930

- Law which implemented protectionist trade policies in the US.
  - Highest level in US history at time.
- Reciprocal trade agreements, 1934
  - Make reciprocal tariff reductions without congressional approval.
- optimal tariff
  - a country that is a large importer of a particular commodity can shift the economic burden of an import tariff from domestic consumers to foreign (Chicago PR)
- GATT: agreement to promote trade by reducing tariffs / quotas.
- Nonscrimination: human rights / trade?
- Most-favored nation: granted the most favorable trading terms available by another country
- preferential trade agreements
- generalized system of preferences (GSP): economic growth bc. duty free.
- Escape clauses: allows escape trade?
- WTO dispute process
  - once a complaint has been filed in WTO (multilateral dispute resolution).
  - If informal consultations fail, panel is formed automatically.
  - Panel findings
- Tragedy of commons.
- Kyoto - failed
- Paris - reasonable, prevent global temps from rise >2 deg C.
- Four broad solutions: CRDT (coercion, reciprocity, domestic, tech).
- Foreign aid
  - IMF: Vreeland notes that no one entity controls IMF.
  - Aid can fail - bc bad individual choices.
  - Bad govt. / political inst.
- Ethics
  - Realism
  - Utilitarian
  - Just war
- Ethics and environ
  - Utilitarian
  - Corrective
  - Egalitarian
  - Shared respo.
- Trade
  - Utilitarian

- Rawlsian (original position) difference principle.
  - Kapstein - Rawls
- Libertarian - maximize freedom.
- Hardin - lifeboat ethics

Reading review:

- Easterly: utopian nightmare
  - Helping prolongs the true nightmare. Have not gotten around to the most needy countries.
- Singer: utilitarian
- Hardin - ethics
  - Lifeboat ethics relates to population dynamics - since there's a carrying capacity, you'll overshoot.
- Armstrong: distributive justice.
  - Beitz builds on Rawls
- Sweatshops, NY Times.
- Kapstein: Rawls, globalization.
- McGee: rights. Trade shouldn't violate property, contract, or association rights.
- Beitz: international DP (inequalities should be arranged internationally so they benefit the least advantaged).
- Goodin - shared responsibilities.
- Just war
  - Christian / Islamic
  - Crawford / Cornell
  - Holt: Morality reduced to arithmetic.