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ExactGround v0.1.3 — re-review security fixes
Security release. It closes the bypasses an independent re-review found in v0.1.2. Upgrade recommended.
Threat model: ExactGround stops an agent that hallucinates or mistypes a package name in a normal install command. It is a cooperative guardrail, not a sandbox against an agent deliberately evading it; use OS or container sandboxing for that.
- Policy files:
- Your user-level
config.jsonnow needs approval, like project files:exactground trust --user. - Shell commands that write ExactGround's policy, approvals or cache are denied whatever the verb (
copy,xcopy,robocopy,move,[IO.File]::WriteAllText,Out-File, redirection), as are inline write one-liners that build those paths.
- Your user-level
- Every tool is inspected:
- The hooks now match all tools.
- Any tool that carries a
command(for example Claude Code's PowerShell tool) is treated as a shell. - Every non-read-only tool, such as NotebookEdit or MCP filesystem tools, has its paths checked.
- Package managers are found however they are invoked: variables (
n=npm; $n install x,$pm="npm"; & $pm install x,%PM%), 8.3 short names (NPM~1.EXE),.cmd/.ps1suffixes and full paths are resolved and checked.iex,Invoke-Expression,Start-Processand-EncodedCommandcombined with a package manager are denied. - No false positives:
git add,apt/brew/winget/choco installandcode --install-extensionstay allowed (tested). pip install -r: files with extra hard links, or whose real path leaves the project through a junction or linked directory, are refused.- Tests: 46 offline tests (10 new); CI green on Windows and Linux with Node 20 and 24.
Install: claude plugin marketplace add alidaram99/exactground · codex plugin marketplace add alidaram99/exactground --ref v0.1.3 · gemini extensions install https://github.com/alidaram99/exactground --ref v0.1.3 · npx -y github:alidaram99/exactground#v0.1.3 check <pkg>