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v0.1.4
Final hardening pass on an independent re-review of v0.1.3.
Fixed
- NTFS alternate data streams: writes to
.exactground.json::$DATA,.exactground.json:xor a trailing-dot name are writes to the policy file, and are denied. - cmd caret escapes (
np^m install x) are removed and the install is checked normally. - Program names built at run time are denied as unverifiable when an install verb or a package manager appears. Covered forms: call-operator expressions (
& ('np'+'m') install x,& ('npm') ...,& $(...)) and loops (for %I in (npm) do %I install x,foreach,ForEach-Object,for ... do). cmd /candpwsh -Commandfollowed by an unquoted command now parse the whole rest of the line.- Writes whose target is built with
Join-Path, string concatenation or environment variables ($env:APPDATA,%APPDATA%,$HOME,~,XDG_CONFIG_HOME,EXACTGROUND_CONFIG_DIR) into ExactGround's config, approval or cache directories are denied. The same applies when the command names those files in split form ('ex'+'actground'). backgroundno longer matches the policy-path hint (false positive).
The false-positive table stays allowed: git add, apt/brew/winget/choco installs, code --install-extension, npm run/npm test, pip list, reads, and ordinary Join-Path writes inside the project.
Out of scope, stated plainly (new SECURITY.md)
A same-user agent that deliberately obfuscates its commands can defeat any hook-based guard, including this one. ExactGround will not chase that class further. For adversarial agents, use an OS sandbox or container, or a separate OS user.