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@alidaram99 alidaram99 released this 03 Oct 17:04
· 2 commits to main since this release

Final hardening pass on an independent re-review of v0.1.3.

Fixed

  • NTFS alternate data streams: writes to .exactground.json::$DATA, .exactground.json:x or a trailing-dot name are writes to the policy file, and are denied.
  • cmd caret escapes (np^m install x) are removed and the install is checked normally.
  • Program names built at run time are denied as unverifiable when an install verb or a package manager appears. Covered forms: call-operator expressions (& ('np'+'m') install x, & ('npm') ..., & $(...)) and loops (for %I in (npm) do %I install x, foreach, ForEach-Object, for ... do).
  • cmd /c and pwsh -Command followed by an unquoted command now parse the whole rest of the line.
  • Writes whose target is built with Join-Path, string concatenation or environment variables ($env:APPDATA, %APPDATA%, $HOME, ~, XDG_CONFIG_HOME, EXACTGROUND_CONFIG_DIR) into ExactGround's config, approval or cache directories are denied. The same applies when the command names those files in split form ('ex'+'actground').
  • background no longer matches the policy-path hint (false positive).

The false-positive table stays allowed: git add, apt/brew/winget/choco installs, code --install-extension, npm run/npm test, pip list, reads, and ordinary Join-Path writes inside the project.

Out of scope, stated plainly (new SECURITY.md)
A same-user agent that deliberately obfuscates its commands can defeat any hook-based guard, including this one. ExactGround will not chase that class further. For adversarial agents, use an OS sandbox or container, or a separate OS user.