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AIP:21 - Discussion #31
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I like the master node proposal for the following reasons:
What I don't like about the master node proposal:
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I like the proposals, here are some reasons for it:
My thoughts on some of the existing comments
What kind of performance would you measure and why? I'd go with the same approach as with other masternodes where every block a % is rewarded to the address specified with the masternode. The more masternodes there are, less frequently MN would get rewarded. And if masternode is out of sync, it wouldn't be rewarded at all which gives additional incentive to MN operator to keep them in sync and running.
This makes me feel weird. Personally I wouldn't mess with the delegate slots and would prefer going the with the path where we'd decide how big of a % do we share with one of the masternodes in the network on every forged block. However I'm not aware how this would impact forging itself. Also, I'm curious @Jarunik, which other blockchains use this approach at the moment?
Based on my observation it seems that majority of active delegates are OK with "loosing" 10%. Strangely it seems that more are inclined towards the 10% than increasing inflation for additional 0.2 ARK. Please note that this is just based on my personal observation from the chats.
Great question, from what I understand the issues that we are seeing now (with nodes rolling back and unable to go in sync) should not be present in v2. I think the major deciding factor is to make it more expensive for any malicious individual or a group to handicap the network. Questions/concerns/thoughts
OtherI found this to be a good read on masternodes, eg. global list (for payment), what happens if masternode is offline, what if MN operator spends the collateral etc: https://docs.dash.org/en/latest/masternodes/understanding.html |
I generally view this change as a bad idea. I'm not opposed to the concept of masternodes, but I think adding complexity to the reward system at this stage will create confusion, inefficiency (polling the masternodes) and potentially introduce new attack vectors. 2000 ARK is simultaneously too small to prevent a malicious actor from purchasing a large number of 'trusted' masternodes and too much to encourage everyday people from doing so. At this moment in time, it takes $956,301.36 to purchase the lowest delegate spot. The same money could 'buy' 692 masternodes. If ARK were more valuable this would be less of a concern, but at this stage it is not. I much prefer a flexible approach managed by the community as a whole that rewards positive relay nodes. If or when the price of ARK exceeds $50, I would reconsider, but at that point, I think the community driven approach will have created enough relay nodes as to prevent the underlying issue. |
Stale issue message |
My Concerns:
Unclear how master node rounds would integrate into delegate rounds
Measuring Performance
Suggestion to solve the problem differently: Random Delegate Spot
Benefits:
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