Skip to content

v0.15.0

Latest

Choose a tag to compare

@edgrosvenor edgrosvenor released this 16 Sep 05:13
737b3e5

Device authorization: a CLI or installer obtains a purpose-specific credential through human approval in the browser, or through an exact-loopback callback with PKCE.

PR A (#138) shipped the shared authorization lifecycle: profile and purpose policy, hash-only start, browser-bound decision, serialized single exchange, cadence and expiry, containment and connection-wide denial, and exact-bound bearer use (the credential's bound subject must equal the host's resolved request subject, and kind or profile withdrawal is a terminal denial).

PR B (#140) shipped the presentation and clients: POST /bfc/device-authorizations, GET|POST /bfc/device, POST /bfc/device/token, GET|POST /bfc/loopback/authorize, POST /bfc/loopback/token, the approval views, the scripted clients, the prune command and the HTTP contract docs.

Disclosed: the denial-reason closed vocabulary is not database-enforced, and DeviceAuthorizationStart carries an internal id and reveal-once nonce that consumers must not serialize directly.