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v0.10.0 — Recurring audit & the supervision dial
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Added
- Working memory: continuous mid-session capture, consolidated at boundaries.
Context is now staged as you work, not only at a boundary. A new global
working-memorymemory prompts the model to stage durable context at task milestones
(cohort working-note "…"), and a deterministicStophook (cohort working-capture)
records what changed each turn as a backstop — both into a git-ignored, disposable
.cohort/state/working-memory/. At the next compaction or session start,
compact-recall/session-recallsurface the staged notes so the durable ones are
promoted into memory and the rest cleared. This captures the reasoning an exit can't
(there's no model turn at exit) because it's written during turns. Adds a canonical
stophook event, mapped across all three adapters. Governed by the sameauto_capture
opt-out. session-recall— the exit→next-session memory bridge. AtSessionEndthe
model gets no turn and its context is already gone, so nothing model-authored can be
saved at exit — which is how a closed session lost its context. A new global
session-recallhook closes the gap from the next session's side: on a
non-compactionsession_startit surfaces the prior session's auto-captured record
once and injects a nudge to promote its key decisions, in-flight state, and open
questions into durable memory before resuming. It writes nothing but a git-ignored
marker (so each record surfaces at most once) and stays silent on thecompact
source, wherepost-compact-memoryalready owns the recall. The exit-time analog of
thepre-compact-capture/post-compact-memorypair.- Grok can write code natively, sandboxed by bubblewrap.
cohort engine work grok
now dispatches grok-cli as a write doer that edits a throwaway worktree directly — the
Codex-equivalent "native filesystem" path, so Grok can implement and review with real
file access, not only propose a gated patch. Because grok-cli has no sandbox of its
own, Cohort imposes one with bubblewrap: every write is kernel-confined to the
worktree, the user's real home (SSH keys, other repos) is not mounted, and only the
network for the xAI API is left up. The API key rides the environment, never argv.
Requiresbwrap(Linux); where it's absent the doer refuses rather than run grok
unconfined, andengine propose grok --agenticremains the gated fallback. - Supervision dial:
cohort autonomy(paired → autopilot). Choose how often Cohort
stops to ask, from confirm-every-step to run-up-to-the-PR. It tunes discretionary
friction over cheaply-reversible actions only, on a fixed safety floor no level can
lower: the human PR-merge gate, the code egress/secret/footprint gates, verification of
every foreign diff, and the operational hard-limits — and confirm-for-irreversible stays
stop-and-ask at every level. "Full autopilot, no checks" is deliberately not offered
(merge is human by construction; the honest ceiling is autopilot up-to-PR). The level
is machine-local (stored understate/, never synced) and fail-closed, so a pulled
config can never raise a machine's autonomy. A newautonomy-levelsmemory + a
session-start hook make the current level ambient to the coordinator. /audit— recurring, rotating whole-application adversarial audit. The recurring
sibling of/scout: rather than reviewing a target you name, it audits the app you
didn't, on a staleness rotation with a coverage ledger (docs/audit/ledger.md) so no
dimension goes more than ~4 runs unlooked-at — and it sweeps the project's declared
critical path (whatever can move money, write prod data, grant access, deploy, or
act irreversibly) every run. Fourteen distinct dimensions, each with a diagnostic
"tell" (critical-path, security, correctness, concurrency, resilience, dead-ends,
honesty, performance, naming, docs, tests, supply-chain, accessibility, ops),
cross-vendor fan-out, round-two refutation, and a close-the-loop step (file tickets,
update the ledger, record per-dimension false-positive rate). Read-only and advisory,
coordinator-verified — same posture as/scout. Generalized from a project-specific
audit command so it fits any application, not one domain.- GitHub Copilot CLI renderer (
--ide copilot, experimental). A fourth renderer
alongside Claude/Codex/Cursor, doc-verified 2026-07-24 against the official Copilot
CLI docs (docs.github.com/en/copilot). Agents compile to
~/.copilot/agents/<name>.mdwith a realtools:alias allow-list
(read/search/web/edit/execute); advisory is enforced mechanically by
restricting that list to the read-only aliases, the same invariant Claude/Codex/Cursor
apply via their own mechanisms. Skills compile to~/.copilot/skills/<name>/SKILL.md.
Hooks compile to their own dedicated~/.copilot/hooks/cohort-hooks.json— Copilot
loads every*.jsonunderhooks/independently, so no merge op is needed there,
unlike Codex/Cursor. Memory merges an@importinto
~/.copilot/copilot-instructions.md, mirroring Claude'sCLAUDE.mdshape.command
is a declared parity gap (Copilot CLI has no user-definable slash-command mechanism).
Same experimental, doc-cited-but-not-live-verified caveat Codex/Cursor already carry. /auditgains a business track (go-to-market, business-ops, privacy). The audit now
reviews the business that ships the app, not only the code, as a second track with
its own evidence standard — a named artifact or a searched-and-documented absence
rather thanfile:line— budgeted separately so a business dimension never displaces a
code one. Adds a privacy code dimension (are the rights the law grants actually
executable in code — deletion, export, opt-out — with the deletion-vs-retention trap
named), go-to-market and business-ops business dimensions, a business-context
declaration in the ledger (stage, jurisdictions, entity/filings, data categories,
regulatory posture), top-tier + web-search + two-vendor routing for the business track,
and a hard "no legal/compliance conclusions" guardrail — reviewers frame questions
and tag anything needing counselREQUIRES PROFESSIONAL OPINION, and never touch personal
data to test a privacy claim. Go-to-market joins critical-path as always-on.
Changed
- Session capture is on by default now (opt-out, was opt-in).
auto_capture
flips fromfalsetotruein the scaffold and in the read default, so a session
end writes its minimal record (branch, change summary, timestamp) to
.cohort/sessions/unless a repo setsauto_capture = false. This is what feeds the
newsession-recallbridge — exit context is no longer lost silently. - Orchestration cap raised to 20, with an optional federated three-tier mode. The
global in-flight cap moves from 10 to 20, and/crewgains a Director→Manager→Agent
mode for large work: the Director delegates task-groups to ephemeral manager
sub-coordinators (≤5 agents per manager, ≤20 global), each verifying its own group while
the Director re-verifies group contracts and every foreign-engine diff. It stays
coordination discipline — no declared graph, no persisted status, no durable-session
scheduler (that's the design a prior panel rejected). Requires the platform to permit
nested agents (CLAUDE_CODE_MAX_SUBAGENT_SPAWN_DEPTH=2, or Agent Teams for the top
tier); flat single-coordinator is the fallback. Both cap numbers are single-sourced in
docs/model-tiers.mdand lint-checked for drift. Newdocs/orchestration-patterns.md
documents when federation pays off (and when it's over-engineering);ship.md's stale
"subagents cannot spawn subagents" is corrected to "not by default." - Supply-chain hardened. Floating dependency ranges are bounded (
PyYAML<7,
pytest<10,jsonschema<5) so a build can't silently pull a new major; a new
requirements.lockpins the exact runtime dependency closure for reproducible installs
(pyproject.tomlkeeps the human-authored ranges);jsonschemamoved to dev-only (it
was an unused runtime dependency); and CI installsbubblewrapso the grok
confinement test runs instead of silently skip-gating.
Fixed
- Concurrent-writer races on all JSON state, closed with a portable file lock. A new
stdlibfilelock.py(anO_CREAT|O_EXCLlock-file — the one primitive identical on
POSIX and Windows — plus a stale-steal and an acquire timeout) serializes every
read-modify-write on the project registry, the install manifest, and the sync
quarantine. Two concurrentcohortprocesses could previously lose a manifest op record
(a placed file with no reversal entry, breaking uninstall) or drop a quarantine record
(a gate bypass). The manifest guard covers every RMW call site, with the fresh-init
bootstrap and the full-uninstallstate/teardown correctly left unlocked. - Sync quarantine no longer trusts a just-pulled artifact.
cohort updateseeds the
trusted-office baseline from the pre-pull tree, so an artifact a pull introduces is
measured as a delta and withheld for review instead of folded into "trusted" on the
first update. - Python 3.10 floor restored. The
tomllibimport (3.11+) is guarded with a minimal
fallback parser, socohortno longer crashes at import on the declared 3.10 floor; CI
now tests 3.10 alongside 3.12. - Assorted audit LOW fixes: the egress opt-out fails closed on any indentation and a
.gitpath can't be smuggled past the gate via a Windows trailing-dot segment;
dangling-symlink uninstall only removes a link still pointing at our recorded target;
SCAFFOLDops default to preserved on pre-migration manifests;--forcehook restore
replaces a diverged entry instead of duplicating it (it would otherwise fire twice).
Security
- External-engine egress hardened (audit-driven). Closed several ways an external
engine could over-expose data. The grok bubblewrap doer no longer inherits the full host
environment or unrestricted network —_scrubbed_envpasses only a minimal per-engine
allow-list, and base-URL userinfo credentials are stripped. The agentic patch-proposer
now runs the code-enforced secret scan like every other egress path. A doer's committed
worktree files are secret-scanned (fail-closed) and bounded by a total wire-byte cap
before dispatch, so a runaway worktree can't be shipped off-machine unbounded. Verified
in the same pass: a user-local grok binary is still bubblewrap-jailed (the wrap is on
the command, not the binary path), and codex's inability to restrict reads under
workspace-writeis documented as a known residual rather than papered over.