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macOS Inspector 2.0.0 - PDF Inspector and private local sessions
macOS Inspector 2.0.0
Released October 9, 2026. This release adds local PDF triage and requires authorization for the dashboard API and HTTP report access.
Getting started
- Download
macos-inspector-2.0.0-macos.zipandSHA256SUMSfrom the assets below. - Verify the ZIP's SHA-256 against
SHA256SUMS, then extract it. - Double-click macOS Inspector.command. The launcher opens an authorized local browser session. Keep its window open while using the application.
- Use Mac audit for application, process, and system checks, or PDF Inspector for document analysis. Do not open the source HTML files directly.
Requires macOS and Python 3.10 or newer. No account, mandatory Full Disk Access, or administrator privileges are needed for core operation. Some collectors require additional permissions, which remain explicit. The package is not Apple-signed or notarized; see the installation guide before the first launch.
PDF Inspector
Inspect a PDF before opening it. From the audit page, choose PDF Inspector, select a local document, and press Inspect PDF. Selection alone does not start analysis. PDF analysis and its history have their own HTML page and module script, separate from Mac audit controls, process actions, and scan history. Opening the PDF page does not load audit code, Mac inventory, or audit history. Back to Mac audit returns to all existing system-investigation features; the browser session works across both pages in the same tab.
The redesigned document page includes clear selection, inspection, and review steps, grouped evidence, HTML/JSON export links, and labeled mobile evidence rows. Saved PDF reports are available after returning from the audit page; transient file selections are not guaranteed to survive navigation or refresh. The browser asks before leaving an in-progress analysis. Browser navigation and direct page links are supported. Small transitions and a busy indicator respect reduced-motion preferences; no simulated progress percentage is shown.
The report records PDF headers and recovered objects, parsed structural names, JavaScript strings and supported streams, declared open and interaction actions, action chains, destinations, attachment references, and document metadata. Supported compressed object streams and escaped names are inspected. Script excerpts and records are bounded. The uploaded bytes receive a SHA-256 identity; HTML and JSON reports stay local and recent inspections have their own history.
No PDF viewer is opened, JavaScript is not executed, attachments are not launched, and destinations are not contacted. A URI link is not an observed web request. Document-open actions, document-level script registration, additional events, and user interaction are shown separately. No result labels a document safe or malicious. Encryption, unsupported filters, malformed objects, revisions, unresolved references, and analysis bounds restrict interpretation explicitly.
The original PDF is not retained by Inspector. Reports can contain sensitive document data. The built-in parser needs no extra package or online service. It is static triage, not a conformance validator, antivirus engine, sanitizer, or complete OS sandbox.
Reading a result
- An ordinary invoice link appears as a declared destination. Inspector does not visit it or claim that a request occurred.
- A JavaScript open action appears with its declared trigger, object context, script excerpt, and interpretation limits. This is a reason to review the source, not proof of malware or reader execution.
- Encrypted content or unsupported filters restrict analysis. An incomplete result cannot establish that JavaScript, actions, or attachments are absent.
The PDF Inspector guide covers the workflow, practical examples, supported structures, privacy behavior, and limitations.
Consolidation of the 1.4.4 foundation
Failed YARA commands no longer produce Pass merely because stderr is empty. Collection errors now contribute to recorded coverage limits. Local server binding no longer performs reverse DNS, preventing slow hostname resolution from delaying dashboard or portable-launcher startup. Existing application trust, process follow-up, rule provenance, report-selection, and guarded process-response checks remain in place. The published 1.4.4 tag and history are not rewritten.
Private local sessions
The launcher authorizes the browser using an owner-only per-launch link without a user account or password. The launch fragment is exchanged and removed from the address. API credentials are origin-scoped and are never attached to cross-origin requests. Report access uses an independent HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict cookie with a private path. Report cookies cannot authorize API calls or process actions. Restarting the server invalidates prior credentials.
This is a breaking change for unauthenticated API integrations and old direct HTTP report links. API callers must exchange the launch credential using POST /api/session and send the returned API token as a Bearer header. Reopen the launcher to authorize another browser session. Reports saved on disk remain readable locally.
Verification and limits
All 143 Python tests passed using an existing runtime with optional cryptographic support. The default local runtime skips only the two optional cryptography checks. All 82 browser tests across Chromium and WebKit and all 26 synthetic trust/response scenarios passed. This includes real authenticated PDF uploads and report downloads in both browser engines, an extracted portable-launcher/worker check with shutdown cleanup, static PDF features, malformed/limited input, private sessions, DNS-independent loopback startup, worker execution, HTML escaping, responsive layouts, separate-page isolation/navigation, interrupted-navigation confirmation, reduced motion, and targeted accessibility. A read-only Security and Live Triage collection on the local Mac completed without collection errors and its evidence manifest verified. These checks do not establish real-world malware-detection accuracy or eliminate every parser risk. CI is configured to repeat Linux/macOS unit checks, Chromium/WebKit checks, and deterministic packaging before publication.
PDF uploads are capped at 25 MiB, one concurrent analysis, bounded objects/tokens/nesting/decoded bytes/evidence, a ten-second upload read timeout, a twenty-second wall-clock worker timeout, and a ten-second worker CPU limit. Linux adds a 512 MiB address-space cap; macOS relies on algorithmic and time bounds rather than that hard cap. Same-user or administrative compromise remains outside the local-session protection boundary.
Portable artifact
Filename: macos-inspector-2.0.0-macos.zip
SHA-256: 451411e29c84014a2efd628a149a0101a283338988de073f0c59caa4c6a6d4a4
Verify the archive against the matching SHA256SUMS before launching. The package is not Apple-signed or notarized.