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macOS Inspector 2.1.0 - Extension permissions and PDF sharing copies

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@bacescuandrei bacescuandrei released this 09 Oct 17:06
· 1 commit to main since this release

macOS Inspector 2.1.0

Released October 9, 2026. This release explains browser extension permission declarations and adds previewed PDF sharing copies. Mac audit and PDF Inspector remain separate local workflows.

Getting started

  1. Download macos-inspector-2.1.0-macos.zip and SHA256SUMS below.
  2. Compare the ZIP's SHA-256 with SHA256SUMS, then extract it.
  3. Double-click macOS Inspector.command and keep the launcher window open.
  4. Choose Privacy and browsers for extension evidence, or PDF Inspector for document inspection and sharing copies.

Requires macOS and Python 3.10 or newer. Core operation needs no account, administrator privileges, or mandatory Full Disk Access. Protected browser sources can be unavailable, and collection limits remain visible. The package is not Apple-signed or notarized. Follow the installation guide if macOS blocks its first launch; do not disable Gatekeeper globally.

Browser extension permissions

After a browser audit, open Browser extension permissions in Simple or Analyst view. Each observed extension shows its recorded identity and version, required versus optional capabilities, host patterns, content-script restrictions, and evidence limits. Full HTML reports and investigation summaries include these explanations; original structured evidence remains available.

  • Chromium-family browsers: inspect bounded Manifest V2/V3 declarations from the highest numeric version directory found in the local selection. This is an observed version, not confirmation that the browser runs it.
  • Firefox: explain recorded addon permission metadata and enabled state when present. These records do not establish current runtime grants.
  • Safari: retain limited legacy inventory and explicitly disclose that Safari app/WebExtension permissions were not assessed.

For example, an extension requesting all websites and cookie access deserves a review of its purpose and actual browser settings. Those requests alone do not prove access to every cookie, malicious behavior, or compromise. Optional permissions remain optional declarations, not confirmed grants. Native messaging does not prove that a host exists or has run. No extension is disabled or removed.

Unreadable, malformed, unsupported, symlinked, oversized, or truncated sources remain limited. Input sizes, directory enumeration, permission lists, normalized records, and per-profile output are bounded. Requested permissions are not a software reputation database, and no browser store or online service is contacted. Review reports before sharing: extension IDs, profile names, local paths, and host patterns can be sensitive.

See Browser extension permissions for the workflow, supported evidence, bounds, and interpretation examples.

PDF sharing copies

After a new PDF inspection, use Prepare a sharing copy and press Preview sharing copy. Review the preview and expand All fields in this sharing copy, then download the reduced HTML or JSON. Both exports contain the same summary fields and use generic filenames.

An explicit field allowlist retains the recorded assessment, structural-name counts, action-type counts, evidence-record counts, and scope caveats. It excludes document and attachment names, metadata, timestamps, inspection identifiers, destinations, file paths, JavaScript contents and hashes, raw context, and diagnostics. Include document SHA-256 is off by default and must be selected explicitly.

For example, you can share a summary that reports a JavaScript action without sending its script text, destination, or original filename. The reduced summary intentionally cannot replace the detailed evidence needed to investigate that action. Counts and optional fingerprints can still identify a document: this is not anonymization, an authenticated original, or a safety verdict.

Original reports and PDFs remain unchanged. Preview preparation uses the authenticated local API; downloads are generated in the browser, and no sharing copy is saved on the server. Changing the document or hash option invalidates the preview, including late responses. Historical reports retain their original private export links; inspect the document again to use the current-result sharing workflow.

See the PDF sharing guide.

Interpretation and request handling

OpenAction entries outside a recovered catalog no longer claim a document-open trigger. Their evidence remains visible with an explicit interpretation limitation. Ordinary catalog actions and their chains remain supported. The parser still does not validate final cross-reference reachability; recovered older revisions can contribute superseded evidence.

JSON APIs now require one bounded Content-Length, reject transfer-encoding conflicts and incomplete bodies, and limit body read time. Sharing previews reject missing, oversized, invalid, or symlinked source reports and require the same authenticated local session as other private APIs. Report-access cookies alone cannot authorize them.

Validation and remaining limits

All 162 Python tests, 88 browser tests across Chromium and WebKit, and 26 synthetic trust/response scenarios passed locally. Coverage includes real authenticated PDF previews and downloads, stale-response handling, hash opt-in, malformed and limited sources, escaped output, both audit views, four display widths, targeted accessibility checks, and extracted portable-launcher startup and shutdown. The portable archive was rebuilt deterministically and checked for integrity. GitHub CI repeats Linux/macOS unit checks, both browser engines, and packaging before publication.

These checks do not establish real-world malware-detection accuracy, comprehensive browser compatibility, effective extension grants, PDF anonymization, or resistance to every hostile document. The PDF parser does not execute scripts, render pages, decrypt content, contact destinations, or reconstruct every reader's final object graph. It is static triage, not an antivirus engine, sanitizer, or complete operating-system sandbox. Same-user or administrative compromise remains outside the local-session protection boundary. Review the validation guide and feature guides before drawing security conclusions.

The published 2.0.0 tag and artifact are unchanged. This release adds a normal commit on the existing history. It also includes the previously merged dead-code cleanup contributed by Cristian Chiriac in PR #1.

Portable artifact

Filename: macos-inspector-2.1.0-macos.zip
SHA-256: 407374231c7783d5e7cba8d34f7590ee03a07f39627bf175f50c4fa1e916a987

Verify the archive against the matching SHA256SUMS before launching. The package is not Apple-signed or notarized.