SigardaPanel v1.3.1

SigardaPanel v1.3.1

The SSH activity collector now falls back to journalctl (sshd unit) when /var/log/auth.log is absent, so brute-force telemetry works on minimal Ubuntu 24.04 hosts without rsyslog. Verified live: unique attacker IPs, per-IP attempt counts and probed usernames are reported from the journal.

Every file is signed (see 'Verifying releases').

SigardaPanel v1.2.0

SigardaPanel v1.2.0 — the open-source release.

Session security: browser sessions now use an HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite=Strict cookie instead of a token in localStorage, so XSS can no longer steal the panel session. Bearer tokens remain available for API clients; impersonation is in-memory only and no longer persists tokens to disk. Users will be signed in again after upgrading.

Self-hosting: public sign-up can be closed with SIGARDAPANEL_ALLOW_REGISTRATION=false.

Also in this release: worker panic recovery (a failing job can no longer crash the panel), site deletion now drops its MySQL databases, login rate-limiter memory hygiene, internal error detail no longer leaks through user-facing APIs, and the agent installer pins the latest signed release.

Every file is signed (see 'Verifying releases').

SigardaPanel v1.1.3

SigardaPanel v1.1.3

Deleting a site now drops its MySQL databases (direct DROP via the admin connection plus the agent database.delete job as fallback) instead of only removing the panel records, closing an orphaned-database/data-retention gap on client offboarding.

Every file is signed (see 'Verifying releases').

SigardaPanel v1.1.2

SigardaPanel v1.1.2 — stability release.

• Worker panic recovery: a panic inside any job task handler now fails only that job (with a notification) instead of crashing the whole panel process.
• Login rate limiter releases per-IP state once the window empties (bounded memory).
• Internal error details (filesystem paths, agent topology) no longer leak through user-facing API responses.

Every file is signed (see 'Verifying releases').

SigardaPanel v1.1.1

SigardaPanel v1.1.1

Security fix: the file-manager upload endpoint now sanitises the client-supplied multipart filename and re-validates the destination with safePath, closing a path traversal that let an authenticated user with write access to one site write files outside the site root (including the panel database). Recommended for all deployments; see the commit history for details.

Also: loud startup warning when SIGARDAPANEL_ENCRYPTION_KEY is missing and the derived fallback key is in use.

Every file is signed (see 'Verifying releases').

SigardaPanel v1.1.0

First release published from the clean installer repository. Every asset is covered by SHA256SUMS, which is signed with the minisign key listed in the README; the installer verifies it before installing anything.

Install: see the README. Update an existing install: sudo bash install.sh update (backs up, health-checks, rolls back automatically).

Highlights since v0.5.x

• Security: non-admin -> root paths closed (docker mounts, app units, nginx/DB injection, git hooks, backup restore); tenant isolation; account lockout; CSP and security headers
• Web login now supports 2FA and recovery codes; working web terminal; real SMTP email alerts
• Hardened systemd units; HTTPS-only nginx; no default credentials; member database optional

Older v0.5.x releases were removed because they contain known vulnerabilities.