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AiSOC v23.5.0
Added
-
The entity queue says where an entity was seen (#1950). A
user,ip
ordomainrow showed only value, score and count — butrootwith 40
points could be a brute force on one internet-facing box or one failed
login on each of ten servers, andNT AUTHORITY\SYSTEMis on every
Windows machine, so triage from the list meant opening every entity.
Fusion now rolls up each contributing alert's hostname per entity —
bounded at twelve hosts with least-contributing eviction, aged out with
the same decay window, never recorded forhostentities (a host's host
is itself) — and the wire carrieshosts: [{name, alert_count, last_seen}]count-ranked, plus the host on each contribution. The
console shows the top three on the row with an honest+N, the full
ranked list and per-contribution hosts in the detail drawer, and renders
no host line at all when no contributing alert named one. Designed by
@relains in #1950, who also enumerated why the display-hack alternative
(overloadingentity_valueat the gateway) was the wrong layer. -
Opt-in auto-close for cases that stay
resolvedpast a cooling-off
window (#1945).resolvedis deliberately not terminal — it stamps
resolved_atbut notclosed_at, and every closure metric reads
closed— so a resolved case nobody revisited sat open forever. With
CASE_AUTO_CLOSE_ENABLED=true, an hourly sweep closes cases that have
stayed resolved forCASE_AUTO_CLOSE_AFTER_DAYS(default 7). The
human/system split keeps the window safe: only a human setsresolved
(the clock starts on a deliberate act), a reopen clearsresolved_atand
the claim UPDATE requiresstatus = 'resolved', so a case that came back
to life — or that a human closed or reopened mid-sweep — is untouched.
Each close is its own transaction, stamps the custody chain as a system
action, and fails soft per case. Ships off by default: closing cases
changes what closure metrics and MTTR dashboards report, so the operator
turns the janitor on. Partial index onresolved_at WHERE status='resolved'keeps the hourly scan off the table. Contributed by
@alexmateescu. -
Related cases with inspectable evidence. The case Overview now shows
other cases in the same tenant that share linked alerts or exact typed
observables, including closed cases. Results are ranked by distinct shared
evidence and include explicit result/evidence truncation, loading, empty,
error and retry states. Shared and linked alert IDs open their detail pages. -
Certificate authentication for Microsoft Entra ID and Microsoft 365 audit.
Both connectors accept an Entra app certificate instead of a client secret:
new optionalcertificate_pem(secret, PEM private key, optionally with the
certificate),certificate_thumbprintandprivate_key_password(secret)
fields;client_secretis now optional. The token request sends an RS256
client_assertion(x5t, plusx5t#S256when the PEM carries the
certificate) built withcryptography, in a shared
app/connectors/ms_cert_auth.py. Exactly one of secret or certificate must
be configured (the certificate wins if both are); existing secret-based
instances are unchanged and the token scope of each connector is untouched. -
AISOC_LLM_THINKINGknob for thinking-tier models (#1883). A
thinking-tier model streams chain-of-thought intoreasoning_contentand
it counts againstmax_tokens— measured live on the bundled gateway, a
forensic-shaped call burned 4,093 of its 4,096-token budget on reasoning
and returnedfinish_reason=lengthwith empty content, so the truncation
gate marked every such investigation INCONCLUSIVE. Setting
AISOC_LLM_THINKING=0|off|falsesendsenable_thinking: falseso the
whole ceiling buys answer tokens; unset leaves the provider default
untouched (deep-investigation roles arguably want reasoning on), and the
gateway'sdrop_params: truemakes it a no-op on providers without the
knob. The carry also fixes the non-OpenAIextra_bodymerge to compose
with the knob rather than silently replacing it — pinned by a test that
fails on the plain assignment. Contributed by @alexmateescu. -
Vectra AI Platform connector.
vectra_aireads Vectra AI Platform
network, identity and cloud detections through the v3.4 detection events
API,GET /api/v3.4/events/detections, with OAuth2 client credentials
exchanged at the tenant's own portal (#1858, part of #356). The portal URL
must be HTTPS and the secret key is vaulted; the bearer token is cached
until shortly before it expires and exchanged once more if Vectra refuses
a cached one early. The read opens at the window's start through
event_timestamp_gteand followsnext_checkpointwhile
remaining_countsays there is more, building every request from the
configured portal; a refused or unreachable opening request fails the poll,
a later page failing keeps the pages already read, and the 25-page bound is
logged when it binds. The stream emits a detection again on every update,
soexternal_idis thedetection_idand a poll raises the newest event
of each detection once; an event stamped after the read began is left for
the next window, and a detection a Vectra triage rule has marked is not
raised. A host detection fills the host column and an account detection
the user column, never both. Vectra does not score individual detections,
so no severity tier is invented fromthreat,certaintyor the
undocumentedseverity: all three stay inraw_event, and
ocsf_classes.gofilesvectra_aiat 2001 Security Finding, which
promotes whatever the severity. Setup and troubleshooting are on the new
Vectra AI Platform page. -
ESET PROTECT connector.
eset_protectreads ESET PROTECT detections
(antivirus, HIPS, firewall, network intrusion, web access and ESET Inspect
rule hits) through the ESET Connect API,GET /v1/detections, signing in
as a dedicated API user with an OAuth2 password grant (part of #356). The
region is a fixed choice of ESET's five, so the password, which is vaulted,
is only ever sent to that region's*.eset.systemshosts; the bearer token
is cached until shortly before it expires and exchanged once more if ESET
refuses a cached one early. The read asks for the window through
startTimeandendTimeand followsnextPageTokenuntil ESET returns
an empty one; a refused or unreachable opening request fails the poll, a
later page failing keeps the pages already read, and the 25-page bound is
logged when it binds. ESET's202 Acceptedfor a slow query is waited out
by re-sending the same request with itsresponse-id, within ESET's own
120-second limit. A detection is raised once, in the window that contains
itsoccurTime. The distinct devices behind a poll's detections are looked
up throughdevices:batchGet, 50 a request and at most 500 a poll, for
the hostname, addresses and operating system; a failed, rate-limited or
still-pending lookup costs the host, never the detection. Network detections are
oriented by ESET's recorded direction, so an inbound peer is the source.
ESET's ladder stops atSEVERITY_LEVEL_HIGH, which stayshigh; nothing
is raised ascritical, and an unspecified level carries no tier.
ocsf_classes.gofileseset_protectat 2001 Security Finding. Setup,
regions and troubleshooting are on the new
ESET PROTECT page. -
WithSecure Elements connector.
withsecure_elementsreads Elements
EDR Broad Context Detections (BCDs) through the Elements API,
GET /incidents/v1/incidents, with an API client's ID and secret
exchanged for a read-onlyconnect.api.readtoken (part of #356). The
host is fixed atapi.connect.withsecure.com, so the secret, which is
vaulted, is only ever sent to WithSecure; the token is cached until shortly
before it expires and exchanged once more if WithSecure refuses a cached
one early. An optional organization ID lets a partner account read a
customer organization. The read asks for the window through
createdTimestampStartandcreatedTimestampEnd, oldest first, and
followsnextAnchoruntil WithSecure leaves it out; a refused or
unreachable opening request fails the poll, a later page failing keeps the
pages already read, and the 25-page bound is logged when it binds. A BCD
is updated whenever a detection joins it, so the window is on its creation
and each BCD is raised once; the window opens at the persisted
createdTimestampcursor, so a poll cut short or a run of failed polls is
caught up. BCDs WithSecure closed itself asmerged,autoFalsePositive
orautoAcceptedBehaviorare not raised. Each BCD's detections are read,
most severe BCD first, and the devices they name looked up, for the
process, command line, hash, user, host, addresses and MITRE ATT&CK ids,
within bounds that keep a poll under WithSecure's 300-a-minute EDR rate
limit; a failed lookup costs the context, never the BCD, and a 429 or a
credential refused part-way through stops the lookups. WithSecure's five
severity levels each keep their own tier,criticalincluded, and a BCD
without one falls back to itsriskLevel, whoseseveremaps to
critical.
ocsf_classes.gofileswithsecure_elementsat 2001 Security Finding.
Setup and troubleshooting are on the new
WithSecure Elements
page.
Security
-
The LLM gateway no longer sends the platform's provider key to a
tenant-selected endpoint (#1953, carried in #1954). When a tenant's BYOK
row selected its own endpoint but the stored key was absent or failed to
decrypt, the resolver fell back to the environment key — the platform's
own gateway/provider credential — and sent it wherever the tenant's
base_urlpointed, so a tenant could harvest it with a deliberately
broken vault token. An environment key is now inherited only when the
resolved destination is exactly the environment's own endpoint (scheme,
host, port, path and query compared; userinfo refused), the triage worker
pins the resolver's paired key at the call site so the SDK cannot
substituteOPENAI_API_KEY, keyless operation is permitted only for
local/custom providers that never stored a key, and the agents' air-gap
check mirrors the API's egress classifier instead of blocking one
hostname. The gateway container normalises empty-vs-absent env before
LiteLLM's entrypoint (Bedrock's SDK credential chain and keyless custom
endpoints both keep working), with negative controls running in CI that
sabotage the config three ways and assert each breaks the right test.
Contributed by @knowlet. -
The threat-actor attribution API fails closed, and the default stack
carries the key (#1901, SEC-15/NC-7, carried in #1904).
/api/v1/actors/*was fail-open by design: an unset
AISOC_THREATINTEL_SERVICE_TOKENwarned once and allowed every caller, so
a deployment that exposed the service beyond the private network served
actor profiles to anyone who could reach the port. The gate now answers
503 when the token is unset (the open behaviour survives only behind an
explicitAISOC_THREATINTEL_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED=1),ensure_env.py
generates the token as the sixteenth secret, and compose forwards it to
the enforcingthreatintelcontainer and the callingagents
container — a generated value that reaches neither end is a 503 for every
attribution call, pinned by a tree-derived, negative-controlled gate.
Contributed by @alexmateescu. -
Tenant provisioning refuses demo identities outside development
(#1901, SEC-2, carried in #1904). The demo dataset creates a
known-password administrator inside the live tenant, and the seeder's own
production guard covered only the standalone script —
provision_from_waitlistbypassed it, so a production waitlist
provisioning that asked for demo seeding got the known-password admin. A
non-developmentENVIRONMENTnever seeds demo identity now, whatever the
caller asked for. Contributed by @alexmateescu. -
The archived prototype's region reads require the tenant context
(GHSA-grv9-vcqp-f37v, #1957). Inplans/cyble-aisoc/platform/backend,
GET /regions/tenants/{tenant_id}/eventsand.../homecarried no auth
dependency while their sibling PUT did — an unauthenticated caller could
read any tenant's home region and migration audit trail (operator
identity, free-text notes). Both now require the tenant context and map
cross-tenant reads to 403; the reporter's framework-level method stays as
a regression gate that walks FastAPI's dependency table (145 routes) and
refuses any tenant-scoped route with zero dependencies — and refuses a
clean verdict over a table it could not enumerate. The shipping services
never had these routes. Reported by @wuming815. -
MFA verify is throttled; a phished
mfa_tokencan no longer sweep the
TOTP space (#1942).POST /auth/loginconsults the shared
LoginThrottle, but passing login only issues the challenge — the
session is minted by/auth/mfa/verifyand/auth/mfa/webauthn/verify,
and those routes consulted no throttle at all: a leaked challenge token
bought an unthrottled brute force of the 6-digit code space, every wrong
answer a free 401. Both verify routes now check the same throttle class
before any cryptography, scopedmfa-account:<user-id>so the password
stage's counter and the code stage's cannot collide, count failures toward
the shared lockout thresholds, reset on success, and answer 429 with
Retry-Afteronce locked. The throttle's principal digest is keyed (HMAC
under the process secret): emails are enumerable, so the previous unsalted
hash fell to an offline dictionary against a leaked Redis dump
(CodeQL py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing on this change's own diff).
Behavioural lockout tests drive the real in-process throttle to refusal on
both routes. Contributed by @alexmateescu. -
BREAKING: action requests require a principal by default (#1900,
NC-3).AISOC_ACTIONS_REQUIRE_PRINCIPALshippeddefault=False, so a
principal-lessActionRequestpassedauthorize_actionwith no identity
attached and separation of duties recorded itselfunevaluatedon
exactly those requests — a control reporting itself satisfied on the
traffic it could not evaluate, while the sibling approver knob already
defaulted to require (an approval with no identity cannot satisfy
separation of duties at all). The product's own dispatch path has stamped
the invoking principal since the approvals fix, and its call site
carries a comment anticipating this flip. External principal-less
callers must now attach one, or set
AISOC_ACTIONS_REQUIRE_PRINCIPAL=falsedeliberately as the documented
opt-out. Contributed by @alexmateescu, with tests for both the default
refusal and the opt-out. -
Analyst-authored rule patterns can no longer pin a worker (ReDoS)
(#1943). The rule engine compiles analyst- and LLM-authored pattern bodies
on/detection/test,/rules/{id}/executeandrun_hunt, on the stdlib
backtracking engine with no bound — one catastrophic pattern
((a|a)*$-family) against a 48-character payload runs effectively
forever. The regex rule runner now compiles on theregexengine and
bounds every search withAISOC_REGEX_TIMEOUT_SECONDS(default 2.0s),
failing closed with "rule timed out" so the analyst fixes the pattern
instead of a worker silently burning. Review found a second, worse site
the same class reaches: the KQL wildcard branch compiled the analyst's
value raw, making it a regex injection as well as unbounded — a KQL
value is a glob, so it is now escaped with only*translated, the same
construction the module's own wildcard-rule branch already used. Both
pre-fix sites were measured still backtracking after 4s on inputs the
fixed code answers in milliseconds. Contributed by @alexmateescu. -
honoand@hono/node-serveroverride floors raised to>=4.13.16
and>=2.1.6(Dependabot #236–#242; both ride in transitively through
@modelcontextprotocol/sdk). Within-major moves of existing floors in the
rootpnpm.overrides, re-resolved to 4.13.18 / 2.1.8 — the scoped-range
discipline from the minimatch incident, not a blanket pin. -
Mesh opt-out requires proof of key possession (#1944, carried in
part).POST /v1/opt-outtook any caller-named public key unverified, and
opt-out is a permanent publish denylist — so an anonymous caller could
permanently silence any contributing instance (and dissolve its
participation in every k-anonymity cohort) by merely reading its public
key off the mesh. A withdrawal now carries an Ed25519 signature over the
fixed domain stringaisoc-mesh:opt-out:v1, verified against the claimed
key; domain separation is test-pinned in both directions (an artifact
signature is not a withdrawal, a withdrawal is not a publish). The
contribution's other half — a platform bearer on the publish routes — was
deliberately not carried: publishes are already Ed25519-verified per
artifact, the hub is a federation surface, and foreign instances do not
hold this hub's platform secret, so a bearer would break federation
rather than secure it (sybil resistance remains an open gap that needs a
federation-compatible answer such as instance registration). Contributed
by @alexmateescu. -
opentelemetry-apire-locked to 1.45.2 across all thirteen Python
services (CVE-2026-126360, high). The CVE published against 1.45.1 the
same day it started failing every pull request's security audit — the
recorded fleet-level signature. The whole OpenTelemetry family moves
together (sdk 1.45.2, instrumentation 0.66b2) because the sdk pins the api
exactly, andfastapire-resolves to 0.162.7 inside its gate-pinned range
(>=0.117,<0.163), identical in every lock per the pin-agreement gate.
Lock-only; no manifest ranges moved. -
The privacy redactor now catches modern provider keys, every GitHub
token kind, and whole PEM private-key bodies (#1869). Three gaps in
Pseudonymizer.redact(): thesk-/rk-pattern had no-/_in its
class, sosk-proj-…,sk-ant-api03-…andsk-svcacct-…keys passed
through to hosted models on the LLM egress path; onlyghp_GitHub
tokens were matched, leavinggho_/ghu_/ghs_/ghr_/github_pat_
in clear; and the PEM pattern matched only theBEGINheader line, so
the base64 key body andENDline stayed in the text — on the public
replay path, which has no contract gate, every PEM body leaked. The new
patterns require a 20-character dash-free run (kebab-case names like
rk-worker-7d9f8b6c4-xk2lpandsk-learnstay), match all GitHub token
kinds, and consume the whole PEM block header-to-matching-END for any key
type including ENCRYPTED/DSA/PGP, tolerating JSON-escaped newlines;
certificates and public keys are deliberately not secrets. Verified
linear-time on 100 KB adversarial inputs; the vendored copy in
services/api/_vendoris regenerated and the sync gate pins it.
Reported and fixed by @goranai with runnable repros; three of the five
new tests fail on the old redactor. -
dnspythonre-locked to 2.9.2 in the api service (CVE-2026-128089,
high; rides in transitively throughemail-validator). The second CVE to
publish against the locked tree inside one day — lock-only, no manifest
range moves, three lines of churn.
Fixed
-
Distinct Wazuh documents are distinct events; repeat occurrences count
(#1951). The connector setexternal_idto the rule id, so every hit of
one rule shared one replay-stable event identity and fusion's occurrence
guard discarded real repeats as redeliveries — the count stuck while the
estate kept firing.external_idis now the indexer document_id;
fusion's occurrence rollup updates the alert'sfirst_seen/last_seen
window atomically with the count, inspects provenance before appending it
(an identified repeat of an id-less original is counted once, and a failed
rollup returns before the append so a retry can recover it), and ingest's
tenant directory serves the last observed answer when Postgres blinks
mid-outage instead of 503ing pushes after the cache TTL. An end-to-end
recurrence test drives the real connector output through authenticated
HTTP, Kafka, fusion and Postgres in CI, Redis windows expired for real.
Contributed by @knowlet. -
Case comments save again, and the Resolution panel actually persists
(#1932).casesApi.addCommentsent{"comment": ...}while the API's
AddCommentRequestread onlybody, so every post from the console
422'd — invisibly, because the workspace had already inserted the comment
optimistically and the catch showed "Saved locally (writes disabled in
demo)" on every deployment, demo or not. The model now accepts both key
names (bodycanonical,commentaliased for deployed consoles), the
console sendsbody, and a failed comment/task write on a non-demo
deployment now rolls the optimistic entry back, restores the composer text
and shows a real error instead of claiming a save. The Resolution textarea
wasdefaultValue-only with no save path anywhere — no client call, no
UpdateCaseRequestfield, nothing in the response — although the
aisoc_cases.resolutioncolumn has existed since migration 046 and the
console typed it;PATCH /api/v1/cases/{id}now acceptsresolution
(empty string clears it), case responses carry it, and the panel gained a
Save button wired to it. -
Analyst overrides no longer 500: the Alert model declares
disposition_source(#1894, #1895). The #1888 carry shipped migration
161 and stamped the column from both ORM writers, but
services/api/app/models/alert.pynever declared it — SQLAlchemy
compiles.values()against the mapped columns and raised
CompileError: Unconsumed column names: disposition_sourcebefore the
statement ever reached Postgres, so everyPOST /feedback/alert-override
died since that merge. The live recurrence suite missed it because it
drives the reopen predicate over raw SQL, not the endpoint path. Pinned
by tests that parse migration 161 and assert the model maps every column
it adds, and that the exact UPDATE the feedback endpoint issues compiles
— they fail on the undeclared model. Reported with the root cause and
the fix by @alexmateescu. -
UEBA baselines actually reach the agents context bundle (#1929).
ContextBundleBuilder._fetch_baselinescould not return a row on any
deployment, for four independent reasons: its default URL named:8086
(UEBA listens on 8004), the request carried no service credential or
tenant assertion against a router that fails closed, the bundle passed its
own entity vocabulary through although UEBA stores hosts asdeviceand
has noemailkind, and the response was read through field names
BaselineOuthas never had — so even a matching row produced an empty
baseline. The default is nowhttp://ueba:8004(set explicitly for
agentsin compose), calls present the UEBA service token (per-service
override, thenAISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN) plusX-AiSOC-Tenant-ID, entity
types are mapped (host→device;emailis not queried), and the wire
mapping readsfeature_stats/window_start/window_endas published.
deviation_scorenow comes from the entity's newest/anomaliesrow with
an honest "not computed" note when the lookup fails, instead of a silent
0.0. UEBA'sGET /baselinesgained a server-sideentity_idfilter (the
bundle used to fetch the newest page and filter client-side, so entities
outside that page were unreachable) andBaselineOutnow exposes
peer_group_id. A permanently broken UEBA source now logs onewarning
per process instead of per-entitydebuglines nobody sees. -
Cyble enrichment can be enabled on the Docker stack (#1898). The
enrichment service builds the Cyble Vision client unconditionally and gates
the provider onCYBLE_API_KEY/CYBLE_BASE_URL(config.go, logged by
main.go), butdocker-compose.ymlforwarded only the six free-tier
provider keys (VirusTotal, AbuseIPDB, GreyNoise, Shodan, URLScan, IPInfo),
so a credential an operator set in.envnever reached the container and
boot loggedcyble=falsewith nothing to say why. The enrichment service
now forwards both Cyble variables, complementing theCYBLE_*naming fix in
#1886. Pinned by a gate derived fromconfig.gothat fails when a Cyble
credential the config reads is not forwarded by the enrichment service in
compose. -
Kafka consumers in agents and UEBA recover from transient broker
outages instead of dying permanently (#1930). Both services
bootstrapped their consumer exactly once: aKafkaConnectionErrorat
startup (a broker still booting after a host reboot, a leader election, a
DNS record not up yet) ended the consume task for the life of the
container, while the container itself stayedUp— sorestart: unless-stoppednever acted, Compose does not restart unhealthy
containers, and on the reporting deployment six days passed with 1,058
fused alerts untriaged and ~827k events unscored. Both workers now run
under the same supervision the fusion worker shipped: transient failures
are retried with capped exponential backoff (escalating to an error
naming the operator action once a streak outlives any transient
explanation), Kafka-permanent failures (bad SASL credentials, missing
grants) stop the loop with the fix on the final log line, and/readyz
recovers on its own when a retry re-attaches. The restructure also closes
a client leak in UEBA (a failedproducer.start()left a started
consumer nothing would ever stop) and covers the bootstrap with the
teardownfinallyin both services. Theagentsservice gained the
/readyzcompose healthcheck it was missing (UEBA already had one; the
Helm chart already probes both paths), so a detached subscription is
visible indocker compose pswhile supervision recovers it. -
An offline endpoint's late-uploaded ESET detections are swept, not
skipped (#1890). ESET filters/v1/detectionsonoccurTime— when the
detection happened on the device — so a laptop that spent the night
offline uploads last night's detections stamped inside windows already
polled, and the clock-derived window never requested them again (the
connector shipped documenting this honestly as a vendor property). It is
now the same event-time watermark Wazuh uses: the window opens at the
persisted cursor (checkpointed_since_seconds), successful-but-empty
polls hold the left edge,apply_checkpointdrops what the overlap
re-reads, and the cursor advances on the newestoccurTimeingest
accepted — bounded by the seven-day lookback cap. Pinned by five tests
driving the real connector and real checkpoint machinery. -
Alerts → Entities (Risk-Based Alerting) works on a stock Compose
install (#1931). Two independent faults made the console's default
alerts view unusable: the API's/api/v1/fusion/*gateway only proxies
whenFUSION_SERVICE_URLis set and compose never set it, so every
entity-risk read answered 503; and once wired, fusion's wire shape crashed
the page (severity_histogramofundefined), because fusion publishes
severities/contributors/tracked_entitieswhile the console reads
severity_histogram/contributions/total. Compose now wires
FUSION_SERVICE_URL: http://fusion:8003onapi, and the gateway adapts
fusion's shape to the console contract: all five severity tiers
zero-filled,src_ip→ip,detection→title,points→raw_points,
promotedderived frompromoted_at/threshold,first_seenfrom the
oldest surviving contribution, and stats mapped
(tracked_entities→total,promoted_entities→promoted,
score_bands→bands; no inventedalert_count— the console computes it
from queue rows when absent). Fusion's malformed contribution timestamps
(…+00:00Z, an offset and a Z, emitted whenever a vendor event time
arrived timezone-aware) are fixed at the source and repaired in the
adapter for mixed-version deployments, and fusion's entity-risk detail
response now carries the enginethresholdso the detail route can answer
"promoted?" without a second call. -
Prometheus can finally parse a fusion scrape (#1881). The
aisoc-fusionjob had scraped the JSON/metricssince it was written
and never recorded a sample, because JSON is not exposition format.
GET /metrics/prometheusrenders the same figures — consumer counters,
consumer lag, the notification-journal backlog (with per-tenant labels),
and the lake writer's spool/backlog levels — read from the same sources
so the two endpoints cannot drift, and the scrape job points there. The
honest-absence rule survives the format change: a source that answers
Nonehas no sample that scrape, never a zero, and each scrape
builds a fresh registry so an outage cannot linger as a stale value.
Pinned by tests that parse the output with Prometheus's own text parser. -
Settings → API keys: Generate works again, and 4xx toasts name the
reason (#1934). The console hardcoded every new key's scopes to
['cases:read', 'detection:read'], anddetection:readhas never been a
valid scope (the real one isrules:read), so_validate_scopesrefused
every request and no API key could be created from the UI at all. The
default is now the read-only pair['cases:read', 'alerts:read'], pinned
by a drift gate (test_api_key_ui_scope_drift.py) that parses the
console's literal scope arrays and asserts each is a subset of the
server'sVALID_SCOPES, so the two lists cannot part again. The failure
was also unreadable:ApiError.messagecarried only the status line, so
the 422's body ("Invalid scope(s): …") never reached the toast — the
sharedrequest()transport now appends the server's FastAPIdetail
(string or validation array, capped) to the message, which improves every
console surface that toastserr.message. A scope picker in the key
dialog remains open as a follow-up; this restores the broken path and
fences the drift class. -
Cyble enrichment is configured by the name the code actually reads
(#1886). The enrichment service enables Cyble onCYBLE_API_KEY(and readsCYBLE_BASE_URL)
—main.gogates the provider oncfg.CybleAPIKey != "",config.goloads it
fromCYBLE_API_KEY, andservices/enrichment/README.mddocuments exactly
those names. But.env.exampleshippedCYBLE_VISION_API_KEY/
CYBLE_VISION_BASE_URL(plusCYBLE_VISION_TENANT_ID/CYBLE_VISION_FEEDS/
CYBLE_HUNT_API_KEY, which no service reads), and the auth-failure message told
operators to "check CYBLE_VISION_API_KEY" — so a key provisioned by the template
never took effect and the error pointed at the wrong variable. The template now
shipsCYBLE_API_KEY/CYBLE_BASE_URL, the unreferencedCYBLE_VISION_*
placeholders are dropped, and the error namesCYBLE_API_KEY. Contributed by @43n51c. -
An analyst's
false_positiveverdict is durable suppression; the AI's
is not (#1884, the governed form #1875's review asked for). The
reopen-on-recurrence control (migration 160) resurrected alerts an analyst
had already dispositioned as false positives — recurring benign activity
reopened the same alert indefinitely, which trains operators to distrust
the queue. Butalerts.dispositioncarried no authorship, and the AI
auto-triage writes its verdicts (includingfalse_positive) into the same
column, so suppressing on the bare disposition would let one
uncorroborated AI verdict silence a fingerprint forever — the
GHSA-qp9f-459j-w89c condition through a side door. Migration 161 adds
disposition_source(analyst|ai, NULL for rows that predate it:
unknown provenance is deliberately not durable), the analyst override and
batch re-disposition stampanalyst, the AI chokepoint stampsai, and
the reopen predicate excludes onlyfalse_positive+analyst. Pinned by
live-Postgres recurrence tests for all three authorship cases. Contributed
by @alexmateescu. -
Secured deployments keep their api/ingest/agents scrapes (#1881).
Those three/metricsendpoints refuse scrapes without
Authorization: Bearer $METRICS_TOKENonce the token is set (#1823), and
the bundled Prometheus sent no credentials — so hardening the metrics
surface silently cost the deployment its own monitoring. The compose
entrypoint now materialises the token into/prometheus/metrics_tokenat
boot (Prometheus cannot read environment variables from scrape configs)
and the three jobs present it viacredentials_file. With no token set
the file is empty and the dev-posture endpoints ignore the empty bearer,
so the default stack scrapes exactly as before — verified live in both
postures against a header-echo target. Diagnosed in #1876 by
@alexmateescu. -
The alerts list
searchparameter actually filters now (#1877).
GET /api/v1/alertsdeclaredsearch, the console sent it, and the
result set ignored it — a filter that looks applied and is not. It now
ILIKE-matches over the columns an analyst pastes into the box (title,
description, rule name/id, category, and the alert id cast to text), the
same idiom the admin-users, audit and tenant-provision searches already
use. Adispositionexact-match filter rides along so the operator queue
can span new+triaged escalated rows without a status filter. Contributed
by @alexmateescu; pinned by a live-Postgres test driving the real route. -
A truncated forensic reply becomes INCONCLUSIVE instead of findings
(#1873). A reply cut atmax_tokenscould still parse as JSON — the
greedy extraction glued whatever survived into a matchable blob — and the
fragment flowed into the report verbatim; the reporting deployment watched
a truncated run fabricate a kernel-rootkit narrative about its own SOC
host. The agent now gates onfinish_reason=length: the narrative is
suppressed, the run returns an explicit INCONCLUSIVE skeleton
("partial output is not admissible as findings") at floor confidence, and
the suppression lands in the audit log. JSON extraction is anchored at the
reply's end, so prose rambling after the object defers to manual instead
of being laundered into structured findings. Contributed by
@alexmateescu; pinned by tests that fail on the old agent. -
Prometheus actually scrapes the ingest service now. The scrape job
targetedingest-worker:9090— theMETRICS_PORTthe Go config parses
and nothing consumes — while/metricsregisters on the main router at
HTTP_PORT8080, so every ingest scrape had failed since the job was
written. Retargeted to 8080. Diagnosed in #1876 by @alexmateescu. -
A Wazuh source-side outage no longer deletes its window from the lake
(#1860). The connector's poll window was[now - since, now]: when the
indexer ran behind the manager — a flood-stage watermark blocking filebeat
for eight hours in the reporting deployment — every poll succeeded on an
empty window, the outage-backfill worker never fired (it keys on the
connector's own failures), and the backlog that drained later carried
original timestamps inside windows already polled, so nothing ever
requested it again. Canary events proved the loss end to end. The wazuh
alert stream now carries a durable event-time cursor (the platform's
existing checkpoint machinery, persisted only after ingest accepts) and —
new in the base contract —checkpointed_since_seconds()opens the
request window at the cursor: successful-but-empty polls hold the left
edge in place and the window grows over the gap instead of sliding past
it, bounded by a 7-day lookback cap that logs when it binds. Rows the
overlap re-reads are dropped by the cursor before resubmission, and the
paging fix from #1820 composes into incremental backfill: a backlog
larger than the page cap advances the cursor as far as it read and the
next poll resumes there. Manual backfill is the same knob: patch
connector_config.checkpoint.timeback and the next poll re-reads from
there. The vulnerability stream deliberately stays on the clock window —
one instance persists one cursor, and splitting it across two streams
would let whichever read last drag the other's left edge forward.
Reported by @pitimon with production canary evidence and the fix
direction this follows. -
An OTX mega-pulse no longer stalls the threat-intel poll (#1861). A
subscribed pulse can be an aggregate feed carrying over a million
indicators (observed live: 1,263,473 in one pulse);handle_otx_feed
materialised every pulse's IOCs into one list and handed it to
ingest_iocsin a single call — per-item Redis dedup plus Qdrant
embedding on a million items meant the poll neither finished nor errored,
and every store stayed empty (otx=0). The client now yields IOCs through
a generator and the handler flushes in bounded batches of 1,000, keeping
memory and each ingest call bounded regardless of pulse size, with the
pulse-level context (tags, malware families, ATT&CK ids, TLP) still riding
on every indicator. OTX fetch and handler failures logrepr(exc)—
several httpx transport exceptions stringify to an empty string, and
error=""told an operator nothing. Contributed by @43n51c; pinned by a
batch-bound test that fails on the old handler. -
A threat-intel store that was down at first write is backfilled instead
of skipped forever (#1856).ingest_iocsdeduplicated on a single global
Bloom key (type:value) recorded before the best-effort writes to
OpenSearch, Qdrant and Neo4j, so a sink unreachable at first write never
received the batch — every later poll read it as duplicate. On a CORE
install (no OpenSearch), a feed landed in Qdrant and marked the key; moving
tofullnever backfilled OpenSearch, leaving the/iocssearch API and
enrichment feed-lookup blind to all but a handful of entries (observed
live: Qdrant 1,779 KEV rows, OpenSearch 10). Dedup is now keyed per sink
({sink}:{type}:{value}) and recorded only after that sink accepts the
write; steady-state dedup for present stores is unchanged, pinned by tests
that fail on the old pipeline. KafkaNEW_IOCevents now fire only for
indicators at least one sink actually stored (they previously fired even
when every sink failed), and the retro-hunt consumer dedups re-emissions
against its existing exposure rows. Contributed by @43n51c — the backfill
half of #1278, whose reporting half fixed the misleadingindexed: 0. -
Federated-search docs corrected: the feature is on by default, not
opt-in (#1865). The console page's "Enabling it" section said
/api/v1/federated/*answers404while the flag is unset and told
operators to setAISOC_FEATURE_FED_SEARCH=trueto turn it on. The setting
defaults totrue, so it is an opt-out: a stock install already serves
federated search, and404is returned only when the flag is explicitly
false. The page now documents it as on-by-default. Contributed by @43n51c. -
A large MISP or OpenCTI poll is ingested in bounded batches instead of one
unbounded call (#1864).handle_misp_feedandhandle_opencti_feedaccumulated
every event's (or indicator node's) IOCs into a single list and handed the
whole thing toingest_iocsin one call.ingest_iocsdoes per-item work —
a Redis dedup round-trip and a Qdrant embedding — for every indicator, so a
busy instance's 24-hour window (tens of thousands of attributes) held the
entire feed in memory and stalled the poll. Both handlers now stream their
IOCs and flush every 1,000, bounding eachingest_iocscall regardless of
how large the feed is. Contributed by @43n51c. -
Scheduled hunts no longer crash reading the lake on a slug tenant ref
(hunt.telemetry.lake.failed: Cannot parse uuid default). The hunt
scheduler's process-widetenant_refdefaults todefault, and the lake
reader bound it straight into a ClickHouse query whosetenant_idis a UUID
column — a parse error on every tick, not a miss, so afull-profile
deployment logged the failure every 30 minutes and scheduled hunts read no
telemetry. The scheduler now resolves the ref to a tenant UUID (the Postgres
store path already did) before the lake read; an unresolvable ref hands the
loaderNone, which its existing no-tenant guard skips cleanly, and the
synthetic provider is unaffected.