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119 changes: 119 additions & 0 deletions bip-templatehash-csfs-ik.md
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```
BIP: ?
Layer: Consensus (soft fork)
Title: Next-transaction and Rebindable Signatures
Author: Gregory Sanders <gsanders87@gmail.com>
Antoine Poinsot <mail@antoinep.com>
Steven Roose <steven@stevenroose.org>
Comments-Summary: No comments yet.
Comments-URI: https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/wiki/Comments:BIP-?
Status: Draft
Type: Standards Track
Created: ?
License: CC0-1.0
```

## Abstract

This document proposes bundling three new operations for [Tapscript][tapscript-bip]:
[`OP_TEMPLATEHASH`][templatehash-bip], [`BIP348 OP_CHECKSIGFROMSTACK`][csfs-bip], and [`BIP349 OP_INTERNALKEY`][internalkey-bip].

These minimal operations introduce modular functionalities which improve existing second layer protocols and make new
ones possible through plausible interactivity requirements.

## Motivation

The three proposed operations are simple, well-understood, and enable powerful new capabilities while minimizing the
risk of surprising behavior or unintended applications. They improve existing, well-studied protocols and make promising
new ones possible.

`OP_TEMPLATEHASH` enables committing to the transaction spending an output. `OP_CHECKSIGFROMSTACK` enables
[BIP340][schnorr-bip] signature verification of arbitrary messages. `OP_INTERNALKEY` allows to push the
[Taproot][taproot-bip] internal key on the stack.

The ability to commit to the future transaction spending an output is useful to reduce interactivity in second-layer
protocols. For instance it can [reduce roundtrips][symmetric-greg] in the implementation of [LN-Symmetry][optech-eltoo], or make
creating an [Ark][optech-ark] "VTXO" [non-interactive][ark-case-ctv]. Additionally, it enables [significant
optimizations][fournier-dlc-ctv] in the implementation of [Discreet Log Contracts][optech-dlcs].

The ability to verify a signature for an arbitrary message in Tapscript enables delegation and oracle attestations. This capability can
for instance [significantly reduce][bitvm-ctv-csfs] the onchain footprint of [BitVM][bitvm-website]. Reducing the onchain
footprint of an application is beneficial to users of Bitcoin especially as it reduces economic demand for
extremely large transactions that induce further mining centralization pressures[^large-txs-mining-centralization].

Together, these features enable rebindable transaction signatures, making possible a new type of payment channel: LN-Symmetry ("Eltoo").
Its simplicity makes advanced constructs like multiparty channels practical, while also enabling simplifications of 2-party channels such as [Daric][daric-channels]. The same techniques can also substantially improve [statechains][statechains-optech]. Rebindable signatures also enable further interactivity reduction
in second layer protocols, as illustrated by the Ark variant "[Erk][ark-erk]" or the [dramatic simplification][greg-rebindable-ptlcs]
they bring to upgrading today's Lightning to [Point Time Locked Contracts][optech-ptlcs].

The ability to push the Taproot internal key on the stack is a natural and extremely simple optimisation for rebindable
signatures.

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This BIP appears to be missing a Specification section.

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added mini implementation section for completeness

## Rationale

This proposal seeks to extend Bitcoin's scripting capabilities in areas that are useful to proven approaches to scaling
Bitcoin payments. The operations proposed to achieve
these capabilities are contained within the more modern and well-studied Tapscript context. They are simple, composable
and unlikely to be made obsolete by future extensions to Bitcoin Script. They build upon existing operations and
therefore present a minimal cost to validation and implementation complexity.

More modular operations (such as [BIP346][txhash-bip]) also enable these capabilities, and more. However they also present
more implementation complexity and introduce more risks of enabling, or substantially simplifying, undesirable
applications. As the additional capabilities have not been demonstrated to enable new important use cases or
substantially improve existing ones, this proposal favours the minimal approach.

`OP_TEMPLATEHASH` enables the same capability [BIP119][ctv-bip]'s `OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY` does. The former is preferred because:
- it does not unnecessarily modify legacy scripting contexts;
- the template hashed minimally departs from Taproot signature hashes, simplifying the implementation
and, importantly, committing to the Taproot annex;
- it does not limit itself to the verify semantic required by the legacy `OP_NOP` upgrade hooks, making rebindable
signatures usage more efficient;
- it prevents surprising interactions with programs in a transaction input's `scriptSig`.

## Implementation

[`OP_TEMPLATEHASH`][templatehash-bip], [`BIP348 OP_CHECKSIGFROMSTACK`][csfs-bip], and [`BIP349 OP_INTERNALKEY`][internalkey-bip] implemented as specified in their corresponding documents.

## Backward compatibility

This document proposes to give meaning to three Tapscript `OP_SUCCESS` operations. The presence of an `OP_SUCCESS` in a
Tapscript would previously make it unconditionally succeed. This proposal therefore only tightens the block validation
rules: there is no block that is valid under the rules proposed in this BIP but not under the existing Bitcoin consensus
rules. As a consequence these changes are backward-compatible with non-upgraded node software. That said, the authors
strongly encourage node operators to upgrade in order to fully validate all consensus rules.

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If there is a reference implementation for this opcode package, could you please add a section that links to the corresponding code?

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no current one exists, we haven't moved forward on bitcoin-inquisition with templatehash and likely won't until the BIP becomes stable

## Acknowledgements

This proposal is similar to the combination of opcodes Brandon Black previously
[proposed](https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/lnhance-bips-and-implementation/376) for activation under the name "LNHANCE".

## Copyright

This document is licensed under the Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal license.

[^large-txs-mining-centralization]: Large transactions are difficult to relay through the p2p network as they make it
harder for nodes to reason about miners' block templates. This may lead to a situation where such transactions get
submitted directly to miners. See [this discussion][sipa-large-txs] for more details.

[templatehash-bip]: bip-templatehash.md
[ctv-bip]: bip-0119.mediawiki
[csfs-bip]: bip-0348.md
[internalkey-bip]: bip-0349.md
[schnorr-bip]: bip-0340.mediawiki
[taproot-bip]: bip-0341.mediawiki
[tapscript-bip]: bip-0342.mediawiki
[optech-ark]: https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/ark
[optech-dlcs]: https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/discreet-log-contracts
[optech-eltoo]: https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/eltoo
[optech-ptlcs]: https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/ptlc
[txhash-bip]: https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/pull/1500
[symmetric-greg]: https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/ln-symmetry-project-recap/359
[ark-case-ctv]: https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/the-ark-case-for-ctv/1528
[bitvm-ctv-csfs]: https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/how-ctv-csfs-improves-bitvm-bridges/1591
[sipa-large-txs]: https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/non-confiscatory-transaction-weight-limit/1732/8
[ark-erk]: https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/evolving-the-ark-protocol-using-ctv-and-csfs/1602
[greg-rebindable-ptlcs]: https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/ctv-csfs-can-we-reach-consensus-on-a-first-step-towards-covenants/1509/18
[fournier-dlc-ctv]: https://gnusha.org/pi/bitcoindev/CAH5Bsr2vxL3FWXnJTszMQj83jTVdRvvuVpimEfY7JpFCyP1AZA@mail.gmail.com
[bitvm-website]: https://bitvm.org
[daric-channels]: https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1295
[statechains-optech]: https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/statechains/
175 changes: 175 additions & 0 deletions bip-templatehash.md
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```
BIP: ?
Layer: Consensus (soft fork)
Title: OP_TEMPLATEHASH
Author: Gregory Sanders <gsanders87@gmail.com>
Antoine Poinsot <mail@antoinep.com>
Steven Roose <steven@stevenroose.org>
Comments-Summary: No comments yet.
Comments-URI: https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/wiki/Comments:BIP-?
Status: Draft
Type: Standards Track
Created: ?
License: CC0-1.0
```

## Abstract

This document proposes a new operation for [Tapscript][tapscript-bip]: `OP_TEMPLATEHASH`. It introduces the ability to
push on the stack a hash of the transaction spending an output.

## Motivation

`OP_TEMPLATEHASH` can be used to commit to the transaction spending an output[^commit-exact-tx]. This capability
can replace the use of pre-signed transactions in second-layer protocols. By reducing interactivity it makes such
protocols simpler, safer, and sometimes notably more efficient. For instance it can remove the need to share HTLC
signatures in the Lightning Network protocol's [`commitment_signed` message][ln-commit-signed][^ln-second-stage], make
receiving an Ark "VTXO" [non-interactive][ark-case-ctv], and [reduces roundtrips][symmetric-greg] in the implementation
of LN-Symmetry. It is also a [significant optimisation][fournier-ctv-dlcs] for [Discreet Log Contracts][optech-dlcs].

## Specification

`OP_TEMPLATEHASH` redefines `OP_SUCCESS187` (0xbb) in the Tapscript execution context with further restrictions.

Upon execution of the opcode, the template hash of the transaction in context is pushed onto the stack as defined below,
and script execution continues.

The template hash uses a tagged hash as introduced by [BIP340][schnorr-bip] and [BIP341][taproot-bip]. We use a new tag
for this purpose: *TemplateHash*.

The template hash re-uses the *sha_sequences*, *sha_outputs* and *sha_annex* pre-computed transaction data introduced in
BIP341. Numerical values in 4-byte are encoded in little-endian.

The template hash is the *hash<sub>TemplateHash</sub>* of the following transaction fields concatenated:

- Transaction data:
- *nVersion* (4): the version of the transaction.
- *nLockTime* (4): the locktime of the transaction.
- *sha_sequences* (32): the SHA256 of the serialization of all input sequence, as per BIP341.
- *sha_outputs* (32): the SHA256 of the serialization of all outputs in `CTxOut` format, as per BIP341.
- Data about this input:
- *annex_present* (1): as defined in BIP341 (0 if no annex is present, or 1 otherwise).
- *input_index* (4): index of this input in the transaction input vector. Index of the first input is 0.
- If an annex is present:
- *sha_annex* (32): the SHA256 of the annex, as per BIP341.

## Rationale

The template hash follows BIP341's signature message format, with minimal necessary deviations. This reuses a
tried-and-proven approach to hashed messages, and importantly makes it possible to reuse the pre-computed subfields
introduced by BIP341 to prevent quadratic hashing. Besides the hash tags, this results in at most 109 bytes being hashed
upon execution of the operation[^hashed-msg-max-size]. This is strictly less hashing than is necessary for other
existing operations.

The specific fields from the BIP341 signature message that are ommitted when computing the template hash are the
following:
- *hash_type*: this is the sighash type identifier. Only a single hash type is supported by `OP_TEMPLATEHASH`, so there
is no need to commit to such an identifier.
Comment on lines +66 to +67
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If that’s the case, it should be mentioned in the specification.

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The specification only specifies a single hash type, I'm not sure what you mean for me to do?

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I don’t see any references to sighash types in the specification section, let alone that OP_TEMPLATEHASH only supports a single hash type. What is the sighash type that you need to use with OP_TEMPLATEHASH, and shouldn’t that be mentioned in the spec?

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There is no signature, so there is no sighash type byte. It is absent, so it is not part of the specification. In this paragraph we simply underline the differences with the BIP341 signature message. Because the sighash type is committed there, the difference is underlined here.

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Ah, I see. The phrase “only a single hash type is supported by OP_TEMPLATEHASH” confused me in the context of hash_type being omitted, and I think the context could be made clearer. Perhaps something like:

Suggested change
- *hash_type*: this is the sighash type identifier. Only a single hash type is supported by `OP_TEMPLATEHASH`, so there
is no need to commit to such an identifier.
- *hash_type*: refers to the sighash type identifier in the context of BIP341 signatures. The input for `OP_TEMPLATEHASH` is fixed, so there
is no need for a mechanism to modify the hash composition.

- *spend_type*: this value is defined by BIP341 as *2\*ext_flag + annex_present*. Since no extension is appended to the
signature message, *ext_flag* is set to 0. Therefore we commit directly to *annex_present*.
- *sha_prevouts* / *sha_scriptpubkeys*: committing to these fields as is would introduce a hash cycle when the hash is
committed in the output itself. Committing to all other prevouts or scriptpubkeys would introduce hashing a quantity
of data quadratic in the number of inputs. It would also prevent spending two coins encumbered by a template hash
check in the same transaction. Finally, the flexibility of not committing to the specific coins spent is also
desirable to recover from mistakes[^no-commit-other-coins].
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Wouldn’t the commitment to all of the inputs’ sequence fields, sha_sequences, indirectly commit to the count of inputs, and therefore prevent adding another input?

(Or maybe I’m misconstruing what sha_sequences exactly is, feel free to correct me in that case.)

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commit to the count of inputs, and therefore prevent adding another input?

Yes, it commits to the total number of inputs. Typically this would be 1, but you can certainly have more for batching scenarios.

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Right, but when your OP_TEMPLATEHASH commits to the spending transaction having a single input, you would not have the flexibility to add a second output to provide more funds, i.e., doesn’t that contradict your flexibility point?

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there's an included footnote for a (weak) example with respect to value, though it doesn't apply to prevouts per se. If the other coin gets swept, you can "contribute" a new utxo to make it whole and rescue the locked funds.

It's not the primary motivation for the design decision compared to the others.

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On second reading, I do see what you mean. It seems to me that this could be discussed more explicitly than such a subtle footnote.

- *sha_amounts*: the BIP341 rationale for committing to the amounts of all spent coins is to be able to prove to an offline
signer the fees of a transaction. Although `OP_TEMPLATEHASH` can be used as a building block for rebindable
signatures, the utility of committing to spent amounts but not spent scriptpubkeys [is
limited][greg-attack-input-ownership]. Still for rebindable signatures, committing to spent amounts can be justified
as defense-in-depth against implementation mistakes[^commit-spent-amounts]. However, the lack of flexibility this
introduces also makes it harder to recover from a mistake in committing to the next
transaction[^no-commit-other-coins]. Furthermore, committing to all spent amounts also makes overcommitting funds to
such a script result in the output being forever unspendable instead of the excess just going to fees at spend time.

The design of `OP_TEMPLATEHASH` was inspired by the design of [BIP119][ctv-bip] `OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY` but differs in
several important ways.

First of all, `OP_TEMPLATEHASH` is only defined for Tapscript, as modifying legacy Script comes with an unnecessarily
increased risk surface. In addition, sticking to Tapscript allows leveraging more powerful upgrade hooks (`OP_SUCCESS`s
instead of `OP_NOP`s) which make it possible to push the template hash on the stack instead of being constrained to
strict assertions with no stack modification. Pushing the template hash on the stack substantially improves the
efficiency of using `OP_TEMPLATEHASH` as a building block for rebindable signatures.

Unlike `OP_TEMPLATEHASH`, `OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY` also commits to the scriptSig of all inputs of the spending
transaction. `OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY` gives txid stability when the committed spending transaction has a single input,
and when the scriptSig of this single input has been committed by the hash.
Taproot scriptSigs must be empty and therefore under the single input case `OP_TEMPLATEHASH` has no requirement
to commit to scriptSigs to achieve txid stability.
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everytime I read through this always my biggest question is "why not commit to all script sigs being empty" or "what are the potential downsides to having multi input malleability"

would be nice to have an explanation in this to explain why this trade off is okay

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  1. the input is segwit, so it already explicitly commits to its own scriptSig being blank
  2. the purported benefit to committing to other scriptSigs in addition was to ensure txid stability, but without fixing the other inputs' prevout ahead of time, this cannot be achieved in general. (The "BitVM Trick" was to ensure this was actually possible, but I consider this not an intentional design decision; I'd rather the "sibling input commitment" be done properly if that's what we want!)

Given that it doesn't ensure the "next transaction" commitment we are aiming for which includes additional hashing on top of taproot hashes already existing, it was not added to the proposal.


Finally, BIP119 `OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY` does not commit to the Taproot annex (or its absence). `OP_TEMPLATEHASH` does.
Deviating from other operations which do commit to the annex would be unnecessary and surprising. Committing to the
annex also makes usage of `OP_TEMPLATEHASH` forward compatible with potential future meaning that it could be given. Not
committing to it would also prevent using `OP_TEMPLATEHASH` in conjunction with annex-based proof of publication
techniques unless additional signatures are included, as used for instance [in the LN-Symmetry demo][symmetry-annex-publication].

Programmable transaction introspection capabilities have been proposed as an alternative to a primitive which only
allows committing to the exact next transaction. It remains to be shown that these more flexible capabilities do
enable important use cases which justify each proposed change's specific semantics and implementation complexity. It
has been suggested that the new primitive should have its own upgrade hook from which to softfork in additional
consensus meaning for more flexible introspection at some future point. We have not done so due to the fact that Taproot
and Tapscript already presents plentiful upgrade hooks for the future.

## Backward compatibility

This document proposes to give meaning to a Tapscript `OP_SUCCESS` operation. The presence of an `OP_SUCCESS` in a
Tapscript would previously make it unconditionally succeed. This proposal therefore only tightens the block validation
rules: there is no block that is valid under the rules proposed in this BIP but not under the existing Bitcoin consensus
rules. As a consequence these changes are backward-compatible with non-upgraded node software. That said, the authors
strongly encourage node operators to upgrade in order to fully validate all consensus rules.

## Implementation

* https://github.com/instagibbs/bitcoin/tree/2025-07-op_templatehash

## Test Vectors

For development and testing purposes, we provide a [collection of test vectors](bip-templatehash/test_vectors). The test
vectors are separated into two JSON files. The [first one](bip-templatehash/test_vectors/basics.json) is a short list of
simple test cases exercising the various fields of a transaction committed to when using `OP_TEMPLATEHASH`. The [second
one](bip-templatehash/test_vectors/script_assets_test.json) is a more exhaustive suite of tests exercising `OP_TEMPLATEHASH`
under a large number of different conditions. It reuses the [Bitcoin Core Taproot test framework][feature_taproot.py]
introduced with the implementation of BIP341. Format details and usage demonstration are available
[here](bip-templatehash/test_vectors/README.md).

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Is there already a reference implementation for this proposal? If so, please include a section linking to it.

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done

## Acknowledgements

Credit to Jeremy Rubin for his leadership and perseverance in defending how a simple primitive which
allows committing to the entire spending transaction is useful for reducing
interactivity in second layer protocols. This BIP draws on the design of BIP119 and is
heavily inspired by his exploration of the potential uses for such a primitive.

## Copyright

This document is licensed under the Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal license.


[^ln-second-stage]: Second-stage HTLC transactions are currently enforced through a 2-of-2 multisig between the channel
partners. Committing to the HTLC transaction directly in the commitment transaction's HTLC output is a drop-in
replacement for the multisig, which has the advantage of not requiring Lightning nodes to transmit and store signatures
for every HTLC at every state it is still active for.
[^commit-exact-tx]: All the transaction's fields are committed to except the inputs' prevout. This means the output must
be spent by this exact transaction, although the other spent outputs may vary.
[^no-commit-other-coins]: It is possible to commit to an underfunded transaction to spend a coin. If the transaction
commits to more than one input, it is possible to recover from the mistake by creating a separate coin of an appropriate
value and spending it along with the encumbered coin. Committing to other inputs this transaction must spend or their
input removes the ability to recover from such a mistake.
[^commit-spent-amounts]: Adding commitments to the spent amounts may offer extra protection when reusing a public key
previously associate with a rebindable signature. See [BIP118's rationale][apo-bip-spent-amounts] for more about this.
[^hashed-msg-max-size]: If no annex is committed, 77 bytes are hashed: 72 bytes of transaction data + 5 bytes of data
about this input. Committing to an annex adds 32 additional bytes of data about this input, bringing the total to 109.


[schnorr-bip]: bip-0340.mediawidi
[taproot-bip]: bip-0341.mediawidi
[tapscript-bip]: bip-0342.mediawidi
[csfs-bip]: bip-0348.md
[ctv-bip]: bip-0119.md
[apo-bip-spent-amounts]: https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0118.mediawiki#cite_note-3
[ark-case-ctv]: https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/the-ark-case-for-ctv/1528
[symmetric-greg]: https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/ln-symmetry-project-recap/359
[greg-attack-input-ownership]: https://gnusha.org/pi/bitcoindev/CAB3F3Dv1kuJdu8veNUHa4b58TvWy=BT6zfxdhqEPBQ8rjDfWtA@mail.gmail.com
[symmetry-annex-publication]: https://github.com/instagibbs/bolts/blob/eltoo_draft/XX-eltoo-transactions.md#update-transaction
[ln-commit-signed]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#committing-updates-so-far-commitment_signed
[fournier-ctv-dlcs]: https://gnusha.org/pi/bitcoindev/CAH5Bsr2vxL3FWXnJTszMQj83jTVdRvvuVpimEfY7JpFCyP1AZA@mail.gmail.com
[optech-dlcs]: https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/discreet-log-contracts
[feature_taproot.py]: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/v29.0/test/functional/feature_taproot.py
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