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RunR 0.6.4

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@brkfun brkfun released this 03 Nov 17:19
· 37 commits to main since this release
v0.6.4

RunR is an open-source, self-hosted serverless platform on Kubernetes and Knative: functions, containers, sandboxes, WebAssembly and durable workflows, with an API, a web console, the runr CLI, SDKs, a Terraform provider and a GitHub Action. You install it on infrastructure you operate, connected or air-gapped. It is developed by BRF Teknoloji and released under the MIT License.

0.6.4 brings bot protection to every form anyone can send without signing in: the sign-in (also an organization's sign-in page and the two-factor step after it), the demo sign-in, the sign-up and the public forms. Cloudflare Turnstile, Google reCAPTCHA (v2 checkbox) and hCaptcha are the providers, and the protection is off until one is set. While the provider cannot be reached, or its keys are wrong, the console solves a local proof-of-work check in the browser instead, so the forms neither stop working nor open up; a token the provider refuses is still refused, and so is an answer in HTTP 4xx (429 included) that names no key error. The platform sets the provider, the forms and the fallback under Administration → Access & security → Bot protection or with the Helm values captcha.*, and an organization can use its own provider keys for its white-label host names, which guard only its own sign-ins and invitations; the secret is write-only and stored encrypted. A counter of the local checks (captcha_fallback_total) and in-app alarms to whoever can fix it tell when the provider is down or the configuration is wrong, and the in-app tutorial tours the new page. A secret value changed with helm upgrade, such as a password or captcha.secret, now rolls the pods, so it applies at once. 0.6.4 adds one database migration, and its new Helm values are optional. CHANGELOG.md has the complete history. Downloads and the documentation are on runr.sh.

Install

  • Kubernetes (Helm): the chart comes from BRF's public Helm repository, without credentials:
    helm repo add brf-tech https://helm.brf.sh
    helm upgrade --install runr brf-tech/runr --namespace runr --create-namespace --set domain=runr.example.com
    See the README and docs/install.md; helm show values brf-tech/runr lists every value. A pinned install adds --version 0.6.4; the API and UI images, the region agent and the event gateway follow the chart version.
  • Single host (Docker Compose, also air-gapped): compose/README.md, from a checkout of the release tag (git clone -b v0.6.4 https://github.com/BRF-Tech/runr.git).
  • CLI: curl -fsSL https://runr.sh/install.sh | sh on Linux and macOS. The archives of every platform are at runr.sh/dl (https://runr.sh/dl/cli/v0.6.4/) and attached below; check them against checksums.txt (docs/cli.md#install).
  • Terraform / OpenTofu: source = "brf-tech/runr", version = "~> 0.6", from the Terraform Registry; terraform init checks the archive against SHA256SUMS, signed with the RunR release key (key ID 2588846B241BC095). runr.sh serves the same archives under runr.sh/brf-tech/runr, for OpenTofu and for configurations that use that address (docs/terraform.md#install).
  • GitHub Action: uses: brf-tech/runr/actions/deploy@v0.6.4; it downloads the CLI from runr.sh (docs/github-action.md).
  • Images: every image is published under ghcr.io/brf-tech/runr by release-images.yml, for linux/amd64 and linux/arm64, and pulls anonymously.

The documentation is at runr.sh/docs and in the documentation index here.

Upgrading from 0.6.3

Upgrade in place with helm upgrade of the running release; never uninstall and install again, and back up the database first (Procedure in docs/upgrade.md). From 0.6.3 nothing has to be set: 0.6.4 adds one database migration, captcha_settings, which the pre-upgrade migration Job runs; its new Helm values captcha.* are optional, the bot protection stays off until a provider is set, and the images keep their names (0.6.3 → 0.6.4 in docs/upgrade.md).

helm repo update brf-tech
helm upgrade runr brf-tech/runr --version 0.6.4 -n runr --reuse-values
  • Bot protection is off until you set it. Set a provider with its site key and secret under Administration → Access & security → Bot protection, or with the Helm values captcha.provider, captcha.siteKey and captcha.secret (and, optional, captcha.forms, empty for every form) (Bot protection, captcha). The values are schema-checked: an unknown provider or form stops the upgrade with a message. With your own Secret (secret.create: false), put CAPTCHA_SECRET into it.
  • A sign-up CAPTCHA keeps guarding the sign-up form. One saved in Administration → Signup moves to Bot protection with the forms set to register, and the Helm values signup.captcha.* keep applying to the sign-up form while captcha.provider is none. It no longer fails closed: a wrong configuration (no site key or secret, a secret the provider refuses or that cannot be decrypted) or a provider out of reach hands out the local check instead of refusing every sign-up, and the administrators get an alarm; the settings page shows a wrong configuration under the keys. The CAPTCHA section of Administration → Signup and the captcha_* fields of /api/admin/signup-settings are gone; GET /api/auth/registration-status still reports the sign-up form's provider and site key.
  • The pods roll once. With secret.create: true (the default), the API, UI, Horizon, scheduler and Reverb pods carry the new annotation checksum/secret-values, a hash of the values' secret values salted with the stored APP_KEY; the first upgrade rolls them once, with the new images. After that, a helm upgrade that changes captcha.secret, a password, billing.webhookSecret or secret.appKey rolls them as well, so the new value applies at once (secretName and secret). With your own Secret, restart the pods after changing it.
  • The region agent and the event gateway move to 0.6.4. As in 0.6.0 to 0.6.3, they run at the installed version: after helm upgrade returned, the Job runr-region-reconcile-<revision> moves the regions' agents, queue consumers and topic publishers from agent:0.6.3 / queue-consumer:0.6.3 to ghcr.io/brf-tech/runr/agent:0.6.4 and queue-consumer:0.6.4; each rolls once. A region that pulls through a mirror of your own needs these two images there before the upgrade (Order of operations).
  • Back to 0.6.3: a plain helm rollback (or helm upgrade with the 0.6.3 chart where only one package version is kept) on the same database; there is no migration to undo: the captcha_settings table stays, unused by 0.6.3, and 0.6.3 goes back to the sign-up CAPTCHA settings stored before the upgrade. The region Job of the 0.6.3 chart moves the region images back to 0.6.3.
  • Terraform provider 0.6.4: its resources and data sources are the ones of 0.6.3.

From 0.6.2, upgrade straight to 0.6.4 and read 0.6.2 → 0.6.3 as well. From 0.6.1, also read 0.6.1 → 0.6.2. From 0.6.0, also read 0.6.0 → 0.6.1 first: before a rollback to 0.6.0, let the running deploys finish (Rolling back to 0.6.0). From 0.5.10, read 0.5.10 → 0.6.0 in docs/upgrade.md first — in particular what to decide before the upgrade — and the notes of 0.6.0 to 0.6.3 in CHANGELOG.md; everything said there applies. From 0.5.9 or earlier, read the notes of the releases in between as well; from 0.5.8 or earlier, add --set api.image.tag= --set ui.image.tag= to that upgrade once (step 3 of the Procedure).

Changes in 0.6.4 (2026-11-03)

Upgrade notes

One new database migration, captcha_settings (the bot protection's settings), run by the pre-upgrade
migration Job. Bot protection stays off until a provider is set: the new Helm values captcha.* are
optional (captcha.provider: none), and values of 0.6.3, --reuse-values included, keep working
(0.6.3 → 0.6.4 in upgrade.md). A sign-up CAPTCHA keeps guarding the
sign-up form only: one saved in Administration → Signup moves to Bot protection with the forms set to
register, and signup.captcha.* keep applying while captcha.provider is none; the captcha_*
fields of /api/admin/signup-settings are gone. A wrong configuration (a key missing, a secret the
provider refuses or that cannot be decrypted) no longer refuses every sign-up: the forms get the local
check and the administrators an alarm. With secret.create: true (the default) the API, UI, Horizon,
scheduler and Reverb pods get the annotation checksum/secret-values: the first upgrade rolls them
once, with the new images, and later a helm upgrade that changes only a secret value rolls them too.
The region agent and the queue consumer follow the release (0.6.4); gateway-auth, image-upload,
supply-chain and the Spin shim keep their versions.

Added

  • Bot protection on every anonymous form. A CAPTCHA guards the sign-in (also an organization's
    sign-in page and the two-factor step after it), the demo sign-in (the sign-in of a shared account
    of RUNR_FROZEN_ACCOUNTS), the sign-up and the public forms (sign-up e-mail resend, invitation
    accept). Cloudflare Turnstile first, Google reCAPTCHA (v2 checkbox) and hCaptcha as options; off
    by default. While the provider cannot be reached (network error, timeout, 5xx, a 2xx answer that
    is not its JSON or names internal-error; one retry), the API answers 409 with a local
    proof-of-work challenge, the console solves it in a Web Worker with a progress bar and sends the
    form again — a refused token still answers 422, and so does any HTTP 4xx of the provider (429
    included, with or without JSON), so a flood never opens the fallback; a local answer (base64 JSON
    only) is accepted only for 120 s after the provider failed. Every piece of that state is per scope
    — the platform's keys, or one organization's own keys: the window, the spent tokens and local
    answers, the configuration alarm, and the HMAC key of the local challenges, so an answer of one
    scope never passes in another and one scope's trouble never opens the other's window. A wrong
    configuration counts as an outage, never as a refusal for everyone: no site key, no secret, a
    stored secret that cannot be decrypted or keys the provider refuses (only invalid-input-secret,
    missing-input-secret — Cloudflare answers them with HTTP 400 — and hCaptcha's key pair
    codes; bad-request stays a refusal) hands out the local check and sends who can fix it — the
    platform administrators, or the organization's settings.manage holders for its own keys — a
    "configuration is wrong" notification (once an hour per problem); with a key missing the console
    skips the widget and solves the local check at once (misconfigured in GET /api/captcha/config), and the settings page shows the problem under the keys. When only the
    widget cannot load (an ad blocker) while the API reaches the provider, the console says so and
    asks to turn the blocker off. Every guarded form is throttled, and a token is bounded before it
    goes out (Turnstile 2048 characters, reCAPTCHA 8192, hCaptcha 32768; base64url and dots only),
    else 422 without a call; the challenge endpoint refuses a form its scope does not guard (422).
    Settings: an organization's own provider and keys (multi-tenant, for its white-label host names;
    they guard only its own surfaces — its members' sign-ins and its invitations; a sign-in naming
    it is checked with its keys whoever signs in, and for anyone but a member it then fails like a
    wrong password, so its keys never let anyone else in and nothing before the password tells who
    is a member) over the
    platform's (Administration → Access & security → Bot protection, with the forms, the fallback
    and the timeout) over the Helm values captcha.* (CAPTCHA_PROVIDER, CAPTCHA_SITE_KEY,
    CAPTCHA_SECRET, CAPTCHA_FORMS, schema-checked) over off; the secret is write-only and
    encrypted. GET /api/captcha/config, POST /api/captcha/local/challenge, GET / PUT /api/admin/captcha, GET / PUT /api/tenant/captcha; captcha_fallback_total in the Prometheus
    format at GET /api/admin/captcha/metrics, and more than one local check in 10 minutes sends the
    platform administrators an in-app notification (once per 10 minutes). The in-app tutorial tours
    the new page (security.md).

Changed

  • The sign-up CAPTCHA is the bot protection's register form. It no longer fails closed: a
    provider without a secret or out of reach hands out the local check instead of refusing every
    sign-up. The CAPTCHA saved in Administration → Signup moves to Administration → Bot protection
    with the forms set to register, so an upgraded install guards the same form as before; the
    Helm values signup.captcha.* keep guarding the sign-up form while captcha.provider is
    none. The CAPTCHA section of Administration → Signup and the captcha_* fields of
    /api/admin/signup-settings are gone.

Fixed

  • A secret value changed with helm upgrade applies at once. The pods read the chart's Secret
    as env when they start, and only a ConfigMap change rolled them: a new captcha.secret, password,
    billing.webhookSecret or secret.appKey waited for the next restart. The pod annotation
    checksum/secret-values (salted with the stored APP_KEY) rolls them now
    (helm-values.md).