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ScrapeLens v0.1.3

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@cesarhmatias cesarhmatias released this 07 Nov 14:40
· 75 commits to main since this release

πŸ” ScrapeLens v0.1.3

Security release. Sanitized exports hide far more secrets, the proxy relay accepts only the capture's own browser, and session writes no longer follow swapped folders.

⚠️ Update if you used proxy credentials or sanitized exports

  • Sanitized exports from v0.1.2 and earlier can contain tokens. Values such as access, refresh, JWTs, sk_live_, ghp_, AKIA, __VIEWSTATE and private_key could stay visible. Review or re-export old sanitized sessions before sharing them.
  • Proxy relay in v0.1.2: another local process could use your proxy credentials by reusing a source port. The password itself was not exposed.

πŸ’₯ Breaking

  • MCP export_session with include_sensitive=true now asks you to confirm the session, destination and contents. If the client cannot ask, it returns an error unless the server runs with --allow-sensitive-export. Declining writes nothing.
  • MCP export destinations must be inside --out-dir. Paths outside it, .., symlinks and git repositories are refused.
  • MCP import_session reads only from --sessions-dir and --extra-sessions-dir. The error says how to allow another folder.
  • Browser choice in the App: accepted browsers are Chrome (with Beta, Dev, Canary and Chrome for Testing), Chromium, Brave, Edge and Arc. Other programs are refused, and nothing is run to identify them. Flatpak and Snap wrappers are not accepted yet. CloakBrowser is no longer listed, because it was never measured.

πŸ”’ Security fixes

  • Sanitizer: detects secrets by value format (JWT, ghp_, sk_live_, xox*-, AKIA, AIza, PEM keys and high-entropy values), including inside other fields. MCP output masking uses the same rules. The entropy threshold was measured on synthetic data only.
  • Proxy relay: admits a connection only when its whole connection tuple belongs to the capture's browser process tree. A local connection flood no longer takes the browser's slots in the measured scenarios. The relay closes as soon as the browser exits.
  • Session writes: folders are created and written through held descriptors, so swapping a folder for a symlink during a write cannot send the session elsewhere. "Keep this run" and text exports use the same protection.
  • Exported Python scripts escape every non-ASCII character, so hidden text direction characters cannot disguise a script.
  • Test-only settings are no longer in release binaries, and test certificates are generated at test time.
  • Open files limit: the App and MCP raise their soft limit at start. At the macOS default of 256, pages through the relay could lose resources.

Known limits

  • A local user with tens of thousands of open sockets can make the relay use a lot of memory on Linux (up to about 14.5 GB measured) and break page loads. This affects availability, not credentials. A fix is planned.
  • A local process of the same user with access to the capture's browser is outside the relay's protection.
  • The relay's flood results depend on the machine: 9 of 10 and 10 of 10 full pages in measured runs on Linux in Docker.
  • Cleanup after a failed export, and copying raw artifacts into a full export, can still be affected by a local process with write access to those folders.

βœ… Validation

Validated with local test proxies; not verified against commercial providers.

  • Linux .deb and AppImage, amd64 and arm64: real capture through a test proxy with right and wrong passwords, with no password in any output.
  • Relay under load (arm64 in Docker, 20 repetitions of 3 scenarios): 0 of 60 sessions marked partial, same URLs as without the relay.
  • Cookies (amd64): Chrome and Firefox in .deb and AppImage, and a mixed profile with a locked keyring.
  • MCP: 11 export and import cases.

Not exercised: "Keep this run" and cURL/Python export through the real interface (automated tests only), the macOS bundle opened on screen, bare-metal Linux, and KWallet.


πŸ“¦ Packages and checksums (SHA-256)

Platform File SHA-256
macOS (Apple Silicon arm64) ScrapeLens-0.1.3-macos-arm64.zip eecee877e5d063325e9f7fc9f5ac88370bb21821de54d0e1c2328a9b257faad9
Linux (amd64 / x86_64), Debian/Ubuntu ScrapeLens_0.1.3_amd64.deb a9d414d9df1b95298e60c476671cf8c93d525ba601ec7ef7b588052c62a0dee9
Linux (amd64 / x86_64), AppImage ScrapeLens_0.1.3_amd64.AppImage 64608903f5e36bb226cf27552c108226690d935093d13167a3b19666e86769be
Linux (arm64 / aarch64), Debian/Ubuntu ScrapeLens_0.1.3_arm64.deb 79738cc8c7cc176959291fce7a72e860d990adb71f199696f8a4e575fc69f534
Linux (arm64 / aarch64), AppImage ScrapeLens_0.1.3_aarch64.AppImage 04ccff1c8c7305beb899b6d97ae857f9ac79994ead1b7c2950c94e0c92d3caf3

macOS note: ScrapeLens.app has a local signature (ScrapeLens Local Signing, executable SHA-256 f32262b78f4c03042ca477d2e63289a4cc8b26034ff8a6c92b6c6871f9172f74) and is not notarized by Apple. After extracting the .zip to /Applications, remove the quarantine attribute:

xattr -dr com.apple.quarantine /Applications/ScrapeLens.app

On the Keychain prompt, click Allow, not Always Allow.

πŸ“„ License

Distributed under the MIT License.