Skip to content

Releases

Release v0.11.0

Choose a tag to compare

@github-actions github-actions released this 14 Nov 08:57
52cd7bf

What's New in v0.11.0

Security

  • read_file withholds a file with more than one hard link (#703). A hard link to .env under another name (notes.txt) matched no name rule and was returned verbatim. On Unix a regular file whose nlink is above 1 is now refused, and the refusal points to read_file_raw (approval); a single-link file is unaffected, and nothing changes on other platforms. It reads only the nlink of the metadata it already has: no directory scan, so a legitimately linked file (a hard-linked build artifact) needs read_file_raw too. The git diff filter and cora_search hits stay name-based.

  • A known secret is now redacted in more of the forms it takes in a sink (#681). The matcher (SecretSet::redact) only knew the value alone, its JSON escape, base64 of the value alone and percent-encoding, so Authorization: Basic base64("user:" + token), a docker config.json auth, a base64'd .env, xxd -p hex, a JSON \/ or \uXXXX escape (Python ensure_ascii, PHP) and a value split by a zero-width character reached the provider, the log and the other sinks unredacted. A value now also matches as base64 (standard and URL-safe) at each of the three offsets inside a larger payload, keeping only the characters that do not depend on the neighbouring bytes, as lower- and uppercase hex, and with \/ and \uXXXX escapes (surrogate pairs included). Text holding a zero-width, bidi or soft-hyphen character is scanned a second time with those characters removed, and the matches are mapped back onto the original. At most 24 needles per value, the 8-character floor still applies (no needle is shorter), and a text without invisible characters is scanned once; redaction throughput on mixed text is about 350 MB/s (was about 660 MB/s). Residual, documented in the threat model: arbitrary transforms (line-wrapped base64, mixed-case hex, gzip, ROT13, a value cut in pieces) are not recognised; the shape detector (#597) cannot close that either.

  • A server the plugin lock refuses no longer reaches the model through resources or prompts, and an unapproved or revoked server is not started at all (#680). Before, a refused server's tools stayed out, but tole still connected to it, listed its prompts as /mcp: commands, offered it in mcp_read (ReadOnly, no approval) and rendered its prompts into the next message. Now register_server_tools records the admission decision on the session's own registry (ToolRegistry::mcp_admitted, per session, never process-wide), the roster probes extras and offers mcp_read only for admitted servers, tole chat lists and renders /mcp: prompts only for them, and the host skips a server with no lock entry, a revoked one, or every server under an unreadable lock before connecting (plugin_gate::Gate::refuse_unseen), with the same refusal note as before. A server whose manifest changed is still connected once, to detect the change. Prompts and resource templates stay outside the manifest hash; they are reachable only from an admitted server.

  • Live tool events no longer show secrets the session log hides (#677). The tool_started input, the tool_finished preview of an output or error, and the reasoning that serve SSE (GET /sessions/{id}/events), ACP tool_call_update and the TUI forward were the raw values, while the log of the same turn was redacted (#596). The turn loop now redacts every observer event with the session's own secret set (Storage::egress_secrets), before the 200-character preview cut, so a cut never leaves part of a secret. Streamed answer text is model output and is not redacted live (its committed entry is).

  • The advisor's context no longer lets a secret dodge redaction by being split with an invisible character (#587). advisor::clean redacted known secret values and only then stripped control characters, so a value split by a zero-width, bidi or control character (tok\u{200b}-...) was not redacted and re-formed once the character was removed. Control and invisible characters (newline and tab kept) are now stripped first, then secrets are redacted, then the fence markers are neutralized, then the text is capped. The multi-round discussion sanitizer (#588) uses the same order.

  • A session directory swapped for a symlink no longer redirects the session log (#639). JsonlStorage resolves its directory once, walks the canonical path from / with O_NOFOLLOW | O_DIRECTORY at every component, holds that directory handle, and opens the session file, its .lock sidecar and compaction's temp file relative to it (the rename and the directory sync too). Before, O_NOFOLLOW covered only the last component, so a job that swapped .tole or .tole/sessions for a link could have the .lock sidecar created elsewhere. Unix only; no new dependency; other targets keep the path-based open. Regression tests swap the directory after create and after open and assert nothing is created through the link.

  • Webhook routes on tole serve, part 1b of #582: the security gate. No job is fired yet; filters and the action come in part 2, and tole hook in part 3.

    • Each [hooks.<route>] table in the user config serves POST /hooks/<route>. A project config cannot define or change a route: its hooks table is ignored with a warning.
    • A route needs an HMAC-SHA256 key, named by hmac_key_env or hmac_key_file (a regular file, not a link or FIFO, at most 4 KiB, at least 16 bytes). A route that cannot load stops tole serve before it listens, naming the route. Only insecure_loopback = true skips the signature, and it loads on a loopback bind only, for loopback clients.
    • Deliveries are checked with tole_core::webhook (#643): native X-Tole-Timestamp and X-Tole-Signature within ±300 s, or GitHub X-Hub-Signature-256. The bearer token is not a webhook credential, and a failed signature counts toward the source IP's failed-auth limit.
    • Every delivery id is recorded as hook_seen in the cron ledger. A repeat gets 200 duplicate, after a restart too; an accepted delivery gets 202.
    • Limits per route:
      • rate_per_minute (default 30, at most 600), counted from the ledger so it survives a restart;
      • max_body_bytes (default 256 KiB, at most 1 MiB);
      • an unknown route (404) or an oversized body (413) is answered before the body is read.
    • The key never appears in errors, logs, responses, config check or the ledger.
    • Accepted limits, written in the threat model:
      • a GitHub delivery replayed after the 7-day retention verifies again, since GitHub signs no timestamp;
      • the ledger grows by one line per accepted delivery and is not rotated;
      • bad-signature limiting is per IP and in memory.
  • Agent-created cron jobs (#581 part 2). An agent creates a job only through the new cron_create tool (Risk::Write, so each call is approved or allowlisted). The tool exists in run, chat and serve sessions at depth 0 outside plan mode; a cron run, a child agent and the MCP server face do not have it. The host saves the job paused in the session workspace, with created_by = agent and creator_allow (the session's allow list). The tool input refuses an id, a script, skills, a profile, a pause state and every provenance field by name. Its allow may name only the creator's allow patterns, and the creator's deny patterns are always kept; a command: delivery is refused. tole cron resume is the human enable and now records enabled_by = cli.

    • Behavior change: every job not saved through tole cron create (a hand-written line without created_by included) is blocked unless it was enabled with tole cron resume (not_enabled), stays within its creator's allow list and deny patterns (allow_exceeds_creator), and is not a script (script_untrusted).
    • Behavior change: an agent run whose workdir holds the cron dir is blocked (ledger_in_workdir), because its file tools could write job records. Give such a job a workdir that does not contain $TOLE_CRON_DIR (by default <codecora home>/tole/cron).
    • tole cron edit keeps an agent job's creator, grant and enable, and refuses an --allow beyond the creator's.
    • The ledger fold keeps a live job's created_by and creator_allow from the line that created it (tole_core::ledger::PROVENANCE), so a later line cannot change them.
    • No config defines jobs, and a cron run reads no project config from its workdir. When jobs gain MCP servers, they go through the plugin lock (#636).

    Design: docs/automation-design.md §5.

  • Sensitive files are read redacted (#598 part b). read_file on .env*, *.pem, id_*, .npmrc, .netrc or *.key (file name, case-insensitive, by the requested name or the resolved real path, so a symlink to .env counts) returns KEY=«redacted» lines, a key file a single «redacted», and no content hash. The verbatim read is the new read_file_raw tool, Risk::Write: approve its call, or start with --allow read_file_raw. The git tool's diff hides every hunk line of a sensitive file, and cora_search hides the text of a hit in one. read_file now opens a file without blocking or following a final symlink and checks it on the handle, so a FIFO swapped in after the check cannot hang the read. tole doctor adds a secrets report: which secret names are set, which tools may receive each, what reaches the children of model commands and of a child session (never a value). Tool list and approval: docs/secrets-integrations-design.md §10.

  • Known-value secret redaction, part 1 of #595 (epic #594). New tole-core module secrets with SecretSet: it collects the values of every secret-named env var (the ENV-1 name rule, now secrets::is_secret_name, shared with the child-env scrub) plus explicitly named values (a provider key, URL userinfo passwords), and redact replaces each value and its base64 (standard and URL-safe), percent-encoded and JSON-escaped forms with «NAME»; overlapping matches merge, unm...

Read more

tole v0.10.1

Choose a tag to compare

@github-actions github-actions released this 04 Nov 13:34
95e92e6

What's New in v0.10.1

Patch release: TUI fixes from the Cora scan backlog (#516) — and GitHub Releases now ship binaries via release.yml (#515).

Fixed

  • Cora-scan minors on the TUI surface (#514): the unknown-command hint no longer byte-slices the typed command (empty or multibyte input could panic), the @file walk also skips names containing a newline, and the status snapshot drops a discarded float division and a duplicate impl block. Waived with reasons: holding the session lock across a turn (exclusive &mut storage by design), counting compactions via compaction::history (one-shot command, no storage counter), and un-cleaned temp dirs in status tests (OS temp, no tempfile dependency).

📦 Platforms

Platform File
Linux (x86_64) tole-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu-v0.10.1.tar.gz
Linux (ARM64) tole-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu-v0.10.1.tar.gz
macOS (Apple Silicon) tole-aarch64-apple-darwin-v0.10.1.tar.gz
Windows (x86_64) tole-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc-v0.10.1.zip

🚀 Install

# From crates.io (canonical — `tole upgrade` tracks it)
cargo install tole-cli

Or download a binary archive below, verify it against checksums-sha256.txt, and put tole on your PATH.

Full changelog: https://github.com/codecoradev/tole/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md

tole v0.10.0

Choose a tag to compare

@ajianaz ajianaz released this 04 Nov 07:47
c5bb74b

tole v0.10.0

TUI steering, follow-up queue, collapsible output, @file, markdown & diff styling (#462).

Added

  • TUI steering, follow-up queue, collapsible output, @file, markdown and diff styling (#462): Enter while a turn runs pushes the draft on the existing soft-interrupt queue (#377), so the turn commits it as an attributed user message at its next safe point and continues (nothing is cancelled; a steer the turn never reached runs next, or returns to the editor after a cancel); Alt+Enter queues a follow-up shown as queued: … rows above the editor, the head runs after the turn ends with an answer (one at a time), Alt+Up pops the last back into the editor, and Esc / Ctrl+C cancel and return the whole queue to the editor. Ctrl+O expands/collapses tool output (multi-line results are collapsed to the first line plus [+n lines · Ctrl+O]), Ctrl+T hides/shows reasoning; both are UI state only. Typing @ opens a file panel (depth ≤ 3, ≤ 2000 files listed, 50 shown, Tab/Enter insert the path); answers get minimal markdown styling (headings, **bold**, inline code, fenced code) and +/-/@@ rows of tool output are green/red/dim, all sanitized before styling. Not included (deferred): tables, nested lists, italics and links in markdown; retroactive collapse of already-printed scrollback; diffs beyond the 200-character tool preview; @ insertion at an in-buffer cursor.
  • TUI model picker, thinking level and slash-command menu (#461): /model and Ctrl+L open a filter-as-you-type picker over the provider's /models, /model <id> sets one directly, Ctrl+P cycles the models used in this run; /thinking [level] and Shift+Tab cycle minimal → low → medium → high → unset and the editor border shows the level; typing / opens a command menu (Tab completes, Up/Down select) for /compact, /new, /resume (picker over the global session index), /session (the status lines), /name and /quit; unknown commands are refused with a prefix hint. Model, effort and name are session registers (fact/model, fact/reasoning_effort, fact/session_name), so the next provider call uses them and they survive tole resume; /name is what sessions --all and resume <name> show. /compact requests the forced pass before the next prompt (no mid-turn compaction; its optional instructions are not supported yet and are reported as ignored). Not included (deferred): /resume paging beyond the newest 50, replaying the old transcript after /new / /resume.
  • Terminal UI MVP (#460): bare tole on a TTY now talks to the agent. Inline viewport with a streaming transcript (answer text as it arrives, reasoning dimmed, tool calls and results as compact lines), a multi-line editor (Enter sends, Shift+Enter / Alt+Enter / Ctrl+J newline, Up/Down history), a footer (folder, session, model, effort, context used / window (%), session tokens from the status snapshot), inline y/n approval for Write and Destructive tools (the normal --allow / --yes rules still apply), and Esc to cancel the running turn. Sessions are ordinary tole sessions (tole resume, sessions --all). Hidden tole tui subcommand (what bare tole runs) goes through the normal config gate. Not included (deferred): in-line cursor movement, slash commands beyond /quit, memory loop, MCP prompt commands, sibling notices, soft interrupts (#377/#383).
  • Reasoning effort (#457): --effort <minimal|low|medium|high> / TOLE_REASONING_EFFORT / config reasoning_effort (flag > env > config > user config > unset, validated; shown by tole config check) is sent as reasoning_effort on OpenAI-compatible chat completions only when set, so an unset request body is byte-identical. A session's durable fact/reasoning_effort register overrides it and survives resume (an empty or invalid value falls back to the default). A provider that answers HTTP 400 naming reasoning_effort gets ONE degraded retry without it: the rejection is remembered for that provider and recorded under the namespaced tole_degraded key of the step's usage row, never counted as a provider step. New core API: openai::{parse_reasoning_effort, REASONING_EFFORTS}, OpenAiProvider::with_reasoning_effort, Provider::last_degraded (default None). Not included (deferred): a setter for the register (the TUI /thinking command, #464) and the ACP config option.
  • Multi-client daemon design note (#382): docs/daemon-design.md records how jcode's daemon works (single server, Unix socket, client registry, 5-minute idle timeout, exec() hot-reload, client auto-reconnect), a clearly speculative mapping onto tole, the user stories that would un-park it, and an explicit anti-goal. PARKED (tier B): docs only, no code, nothing to build without a user story and owner approval.
  • Claude Code session import (#381): tole import-claude <transcript.jsonl> imports a Claude Code session (the ~/.claude/projects JSONL or claude -p --output-format stream-json output) as a NEW tole session cc-<claude-session-id>; continue it with tole resume cc-<id> "<prompt>". Prompts and assistant text become messages, tool_use / tool_result blocks become intent / result entries (Claude Code tool names are kept as history only, never executed), model, version, branch and timestamps are recorded in the fact/cc_import register, and the header takes the transcript's cwd. Additive: existing sessions are untouched and importing the same session twice is refused. Malformed lines, thinking blocks and sidechain (subagent) lines are skipped (malformed ones with a warning); a dangling prompt or open tool call at the end is dropped and reported so the session rests at Final. New core API: ccimport::{import_file, import_str, CcImport}, JsonlStorage::cwd. Not included (deferred): attaching to a running claude process (and its double-attach guard), image blocks, a live provider round trip (unverified).
  • Detach a running turn (#217): stop waiting without aborting anything. POST /sessions/{id}/detach (serve; 202, 409 when no turn runs) and the MCP tool tole_session_detach set a new CancelToken::detach() flag. The running tool settles and its result is committed; before the next provider call the turn writes a durable detached entry and settles pc=Final as the new TurnOutcome::Detached (stop reason detached; tole run exits 9). The session stays prompt-resumable, and a cancel always outranks a detach. A background job started with job_start in a serve/MCP/ACP session now nudges that session when it exits: a notice ([tole] background job <id> finished …) is queued on the soft-interrupt queue and delivered at the next safe point, which is the next turn's first when the session is idle. New core API: CancelToken::{detach, is_detached}, TurnOutcome::Detached, JobStartTool::with_completion_notice. Not included (deferred): the Ctrl-B key and a tole detach command for chat/run (they have no concurrent input while a turn runs; this lands with the terminal UI, #464), moving an in-flight run_command into a job (tools are not interruptible mid-call), nudges that survive a host restart (the queue is in memory; job_poll still has the result), and the ACP face.
  • MCP prompts and resources (#213): the MCP client now probes each server's prompts/resources capabilities (probe-first: a server that advertises neither is never asked and adds nothing). In tole chat, a server's prompts are listed at startup and invoked as /mcp:<server>:<prompt> [key=value ...]; the server renders the prompt, tole prints it and sends it as that turn's user message (text parts only, capped at 256k chars). Servers that advertise resources add one ReadOnly mcp_read {server, uri} tool (resources/read; text contents only). Server prompt text is server-controlled content (threat-model note added); tool calls it provokes still pass the approver. New core API: mcp::{probe_server_extras, get_server_prompt, parse_prompt_command, McpReadTool, McpExtras, McpPromptInfo}. Not included (deferred): tole prompt run outside chat, quoted/spaced argument values, resource templates, resources/list surfacing, and subscriptions.
  • Session forks (#210): tole branch <id> [--at <entry-id>] starts a new session holding the source's history up to a settled entry (a final assistant answer; default: the last one), so approach B can be tried without losing approach A; continue it with tole resume <new-id> "<prompt>". tole sessions --tree nests forks under the session they were cut from. A fork is a separate append-only file whose header records forkedFrom: {session, entry} (additive; older files replay unchanged), so replay and todo hydration are correct per branch and the source is never touched. Usage rows and registers are not copied. New core API: JsonlStorage::fork / forked_from, storage::ForkOrigin. --at and the default cut only accept a final assistant message with no tool calls hanging off it. Not included (deferred): several leaves inside one file with lineage-following readers, resume by branch head, and a --fork flag on resume.
  • Image input (#212): tole run|chat|mission --image <path|data:…;base64,…> (repeatable) attaches images to the first message, and tole_core::turn::run_turn_with_images is the embedder entry point. Paths must resolve inside the workspace jail (.. and symlink escapes refused); inline images are spilled to <codecora home>/tole/images/; png/jpeg/gif/webp sniffed from bytes, 10 MiB cap. The OpenAI wire gets text + image_url content parts; the write-once log stores only a reference (payload.images: path, mime, bytes, fnv1a64), and each request re-loads the file re-checking jail and hash, so replay/resume keeps working and a changed or missing file reaches the model as an [image unavailable: …] note. A non-vision model is a loud model-capability error: TOLE_VISION=0 refuses before any request, ...
Read more

tole v0.9.0

Choose a tag to compare

@ajianaz ajianaz released this 29 Oct 05:42
a55a868

Context compaction, global session index, command allow/deny, failover chain, child-agent handoff.

Includes the 0.8.2 hardening patch (see CHANGELOG.md [0.8.2]), which was never tagged or published on its own.

Added

  • Context compaction, wired (#440, 2/2): chat, resume and mission compact between turns once a prompt reaches --compact-at (default 0.8; config compact_at) of the model's context window. The window is TOLE_CONTEXT_WINDOW / config context_window, else what the provider's /models reports for the session's model (context_length, context_window, max_context_length, max_model_len, max_input_tokens, top_provider.context_length) — looked up lazily, only once a prompt passes 8k tokens, at most once per process; with neither, compaction stays off and says so once. A failed summary call is reported and the session continues uncompacted. --no-compaction / config no_compaction turns it off; tole status lists each compaction; tole config check shows the effective values and their sources.
  • Context compaction, core (#440, 1/2): tole_core::compaction. compact() summarizes the settled turns before the kept tail with the session's provider and commits ONE compaction entry (summary, first kept entry, compacted count, prompt size before) together with the summary call's usage row — atomic, append-only, the transcript is never rewritten. view() is what the provider sees: the transcript as is, or the latest summary (inside the untrusted-content fence used for tool results, introduced as a record rather than instructions) followed by the kept tail; the turn loop sends view(). due() compares the last call made AFTER the last compaction against Policy { window, at, keep_turns }, so the summary call never re-triggers it. Inactive until the CLI wiring (window resolution, --compact-at, --no-compaction, mission/chat/resume hooks, tole status) lands.
  • Global session index (#439): every face that starts a session (run, chat, mission, serve/ACP/MCP) appends one line to $CODECORA_HOME/tole/sessions-index.jsonl (default ~/.codecora/tole/, owner-only, append-only, a bad line is skipped): id, absolute session file, cwd, face, start time — never prompt text. tole sessions --all lists sessions from every project newest first, with their cwd and first-prompt preview read from the session file (gone files are hidden); --grep <text> filters on prompt, name or cwd. tole resume <id> for a session of another project refuses with the exact command to run there (cd <project> && tole resume <id>): resuming from here would apply this directory's workspace jail, config and trust to that session. TOLE_NO_SESSION_INDEX=1 turns recording off.
  • Command-level allow/deny patterns (#438): run_command:<argv pattern> in --allow / config allow matches run_command calls by the argv the tool executes (same splitter, no shell, so ; never chains a second command): one glob per argument, a final lone * = any further arguments, the program compared literally for an allow (run_command:* allows nothing). A leading ! makes any pattern a deny that wins over every allow and over --yes; a deny compares the program by file name, case-insensitively, without .exe/.cmd/.bat/.com (/bin/RM, rm.exe vs rm *). Fail closed: while a run_command deny is configured, a command runs unattended only when an explicit run_command: allow names it (a bare run_command allow or --yes is not enough) and never when its program is a known wrapper (sh, bash, env, sudo, xargs, ...); everything else asks the human (refused where nobody can be asked). Denies travel with allow lists, a child agent always inherits its parent's denies, and a child's command pattern must be covered argument by argument by a parent pattern (list_covers: under a parent command deny only a parent run_command: allow covers it; a child wildcard only by the same glob or a lone *). In AllowlistApprover::deny_only (no allows), a run_command: deny refuses every run_command call. tole_core::approval::pattern_verdict is the one evaluation both approvers use.
  • --trust workspace (#437): read_only plus write_file / edit_file through a path guard. The tools are jailed to the workspace root (canonicalized, so ../ and symlinks cannot escape), and the guard keeps files another tool may later execute prompting: any dot-component (.git/hooks, .envrc, .vscode/, .tole/, .github/), build and task files (build.rs, Cargo.toml, Makefile, package.json, pyproject.toml, SKILL.md, AGENTS.md, ...) and scripts (.sh, .ps1, ...). delete_file (Destructive) and run_command keep prompting; the preset needs an explicit --workspace (or config workspace) and refuses a home or filesystem root. Not a sandbox: ordinary source files stay writable. The guard checks the RESOLVED target the tool will write (relative to the canonical jail root, symlinks followed; Windows trailing dots/spaces normalized, 8.3 short names refused), never the raw path text. It is a pattern suffix (write_file@workspace) matched by tole_core::approval::pattern_allows, so --allow and child agents use it too. API: Tool::approval_target (default None; decorators must forward it) and ToolRequest::target are new.
  • web_search backends beyond the fleet contract (#436): TOLE_WEB_SEARCH_METHOD (GET default, or POST with the JSON body {"query", "limit"}), TOLE_WEB_SEARCH_HEADERS (Name=Value pairs, ${VAR} expanded from the environment, sent only to the backend; transport headers and line breaks refused; errors never echo a value) and TOLE_WEB_SEARCH_FIELDS (wire=backend, e.g. snippet=description,results=items). A malformed value fails startup instead of dropping the tool. API: tole_core::web::WebSearchTool::from_env now returns Result<Option<Self>, String>; WebSearchTool::new(url) and from_lookup are new.
  • User config (#433): $CODECORA_HOME/tole/config.toml (default ~/.codecora/tole/config.toml) holds global defaults with the project config's keys and validation. Precedence is flag > env > project config > user config > default, key by key; it needs no trust record, --no-config ignores it too, and tole config check shows both files and the winning layer per key ((user config)).
  • TOLE_SKILL (#434): preload skill files from the environment (SKILL.md paths, separated like PATH) — the env layer of the skill key, so --skill still replaces it and it replaces the config's skill list. Server faces refuse it like --skill, and the refusal names the variable.
  • Code review with cora (#422, 3/3): when cora mcp (cora ≥ 0.19) is attached, the system prompt of tole run / tole chat names the agent-as-reviewer flow — mcp_cora_cora_review_prepare with the diff, the model's own judgement, then mcp_cora_cora_review_finalize with the same diff and its findings — so "review this change" uses cora's deterministic checks and verdict without an LLM key in cora. Absent in plan mode and without the review tools.
  • Supported sibling versions (#422): cora ≥ 0.19.0 and uteke ≥ 0.21.1, kept in one place (tole_cli::ecosystem). tole doctor prints an ecosystem: section reporting each binary as supported, too old (with its upgrade command) or not installed; it never blocks, since both are optional.
  • Provider failover chain (#209): failover::FailoverProvider retries a step on the next provider of an ordered chain when the active one is unavailable (connection failure, timeout, dropped stream, HTTP 5xx or 429); request errors (401/403/404/400, malformed responses) fail loud and never fail over. The answering provider stays active and the primary is retried after a cooldown. Each step records the route under tole_route in its usage row (durable, auditable); rows holding only tole's own keys are not counted as provider steps. Wired into every session face through TOLE_FALLBACK_BASE_URL / TOLE_FALLBACK_API_KEY / TOLE_FALLBACK_MODEL (a reserve without its own key is refused; the primary's key is never sent to another host). A stream that breaks after part of the answer was already shown live does not fail over (no duplicated output); a reserve that fails before the cooldown ends wraps back to the primary; and after a failover only the last provider's error decides the turn loop's transient retry, so an earlier timeout no longer makes a reserve's 401 look retryable.
  • Child-agent handoff schema and verify gate (#383): tole_core::handoff defines the typed handoff document (role explore / implement / verify / fix, artifact references by path and rev, verification evidence), strict validation of the model-authored input (workspace-relative paths, option-safe refs, bounded fields), the close gate (an implement/fix child without passing verification is Unverified / VerifyFailed, never closed silently) and the prompt for the follow-up fix child. agent_start takes role and consumes (artifact references the child reads itself), a role child gets a handoff_submit tool, and agent_poll reports the gate and a ready-made fix_prompt (the parent decides whether to start the fix child; nothing is spawned automatically). Design and anti-goals (no DAG engine) in docs/child-agents-handoff.md.
  • Sibling change notices, core (#380): sibling_watch tracks which files each child agent reads and writes in one shared append-only log (owner-only, bounded) and tells a child, once per stale path, when a sibling changed a file it had read or written; the Tracked tool decorator records read_file / write_file / edit_file / delete_file on success. Interrupts gain a source: a notice is delivered at the next safe point as an attributed entry (source: notice) and never withdraws output or supersedes a final answer. Wiring into tole run children follows separately.
  • Sibling change notices (#380): sibling_watch tracks wh...
Read more

tole v0.8.1

Choose a tag to compare

@ajianaz ajianaz released this 09 Oct 09:54
42e0096

Usage reporting, chunked read_file, scan-driven fixes.

Fixed

  • The usage report no longer renders an absent per-step messages count as a measured 0; it is null in the status JSON when unknown (found by the pre-tag scan).
  • read_file rejects an empty path with a clear message instead of a confusing "is a directory" error.

Added

  • tole status and the serve status JSON now report token usage, cache-hit rate and a per-step request-size split (system+tools vs history, stored per step under tole_wire in the usage record); fact/mission gains cached_tokens. Instrumentation only: the wire, budgets and durable entry shapes are unchanged (#211, part 1 of 3).

Changed

  • read_file now returns at most 20,000 characters per call and accepts offset/limit (characters); the result carries truncated, total_chars and next_offset so large files are read in chunks instead of being re-sent whole on every later step (#211, part 3 of 3).

tole v0.8.0

Choose a tag to compare

@ajianaz ajianaz released this 09 Oct 06:30
04a12c8

Project config (.tole/config.toml) with a trust model, CodeCora-home resolver, gh remote host fix.

Added

  • Project config .tole/config.toml (#208): per-directory defaults for model, base_url,
    system_prompt, memory, sessions_dir, workspace, trust, allow, mcp_server, the
    hooks (on_pretool/on_posttool/on_turnend), skill, plan_mode, no_auto_mcp,
    no_skills and the [mission] table (max_steps, max_minutes, max_tokens, verify,
    verify_timeout). Precedence is flag > env > config > default; list keys are replaced
    wholesale by the higher layer and booleans can only be turned on by flags. The file is
    untrusted input from the repo: it applies only after you trust it (tole config trust;
    content-bound, stored outside the repo in $CODECORA_HOME/tole/trusted-configs.json).
    Interactive commands ask [y/N] showing the full content and a diff; serve/acp/mcp and
    non-interactive runs fail closed. --config <path> names a file explicitly (trusted) and
    --no-config ignores it. Secrets (api_key, tokens, ...) are rejected, Destructive tools
    can never be allowlisted through the config, and faces that refuse hooks, skills or MCP
    servers refuse them from the config too.
  • tole config check|trust|untrust: validate the file and show every effective value with its
    source (flag/env/config/default); trust or untrust the current content.

Changed

  • CI: the bare --no-default-features profile of tole-cli is now tested (not only checked), and the ACP/serve e2e tests are gated on shell-tools (#349).
  • --skill / --no-skills on tole serve/acp/mcp/mission are now refused in builds without the mcp feature too (they were silently ignored there), and the refusal also covers values coming from the project config (#346).

Fixed

  • The gh tool is only targeted at a remote whose host is exactly github.com: the string no longer matches inside a longer hostname (github.com.evil.io), the userinfo or another forge's path, and host:port URLs parse correctly (#352).
  • tole approvals now honors TOLE_SERVE_URL (precedence: --url > env > default http://127.0.0.1:7801) as its help text always claimed (#339).
  • CodeCora home is resolved in one place: skills and the update-check cache no longer fall back to the current directory when HOME is unset, and CODECORA_HOME now means the same thing everywhere ($CODECORA_HOME/tole/...; the update-check cache moves from $CODECORA_HOME/.codecora/tole to $CODECORA_HOME/tole) (#344).

tole v0.7.2

Choose a tag to compare

@ajianaz ajianaz released this 08 Oct 08:28
96dda8c

Scan backlog, systemone error bodies, bare-profile build, dependency updates.

Fixed

  • systemone_decide surfaces the provider's 4xx/5xx error body (bounded) instead of "no error body" (#328).
  • tole-cli: the bare --no-default-features profile now compiles (#330); CI now
    checks that profile and tole-core --no-default-features --tests so neither can regress.

Changed

  • Dependency updates: rmcp 3.4.1 → 3.5.0, tokio 1.53.1 → 1.53.2,
    libc 0.2.189 → 0.2.190, uuid 1.26.1 → 1.27.0 (lockfile only).
  • Docs: the write_file parent-component symlink race is now documented as a
    residual limitation and git status/diff are documented as repo-wide by
    design; the previous "TOCTOU-safe" wording overclaimed (#329).
  • CI: Dependabot/Renovate PRs are exempt from the Branch Naming and PR
    Description checks (#322).

tole v0.7.1

Choose a tag to compare

@ajianaz ajianaz released this 08 Oct 06:09
2bceb83

Scan-gate hardening, tool-call authorization gate, SSRF and approval-prompt fixes.

Changed

  • Approval prompts now show control characters, bidi overrides and line separators in tool descriptions as visible escapes (shared sanitizer in ToolRegistry::decide) (#327).
  • Unknown-tool aborts (fresh and guarded replay) now settle the turn to Final like every other abort (#316). A bare tole resume <id> after one reports "nothing to resume"; send a new prompt instead. The Tier 1 abort-path contract moved from "parks at Planning, resume continues" to "settles to Final, next prompt continues".
  • serve approval-resume now honors /cancel, and BudgetExhausted maps to max_tokens there too (#318).
  • Tool specs sent to the provider now use a static Tool::summary() (defaulted method) instead of describe(Null); git and systemone were being advertised with validation error strings (#320).
  • The MCP server path (RegistryServer::execute_checked) now authorizes tool
    calls through the same crate-internal gate as drive/resume_turn.
    Behavior change for RegistryServer::new embedders: pre-hooks configured on
    an embedder-supplied registry are now enforced there (a configured deny-hook
    must not be bypassable on one path). No in-repo face is affected, since
    none can attach pre-hooks. Destructive refusal and error strings are
    unchanged (#303, part 3 of 3).
  • Internal refactor, no behavior change: drive and resume_turn now share
    one crate-internal tool-call authorization gate (gate.rs) with a typed
    denial and a Permit required to execute non-ReadOnly tools; tool risk is
    read once per call. Durable entry shapes and error strings are unchanged
    (#303, part 2 of 3).
  • Behavior change: agent_poll is now Risk::Write (a successful poll
    consumes the mailbox: it writes meta.json and forgets mailbox memories),
    matching the rule that a ReadOnly poll never mutates. --trust internal
    allowlists the exact name agent_poll, so poll loops stay prompt-free and
    agent_start still prompts; users on the read_only preset who approved
    agent_start are now prompted on every agent_poll; plan mode drops it
    together with agent_start (#300).

Fixed

Rescan-2 MAJORs (#276–#287):

  • Security: server-supplied text is sanitized before it reaches MCP approval
    prompts (#286); the subprocess env scrubber matches SECRET/TOKEN/
    PASSWORD/API_KEY-shaped names by substring (#284, TOKENIZERS_PARALLELISM
    kept); memory recall passes the query after -- (#280); a failed or
    timed-out request-body read on the MCP HTTP face is a 400, not an empty
    body (#277); MCP registration sync waits longer than the serial reactor's
    worst-case queueing (#285).
  • Redirects: web_fetch resolves relative Locations per RFC 3986 against
    the current hop and refuses non-http(s) hops (#281).
  • git rejects NUL bytes in argv with a clear error (#282).
  • Behavior change: AllowlistApprover::new(patterns, Deny|Ask) now
    ignores patterns — the default verdict is final (fail closed). Embedders
    that used new(p, Deny) as an allowlist must use allow_only(p) (#283).
  • Behavior change: the web_fetch SSRF guard now also refuses 100.64.0.0/10
    (CGNAT / Tailscale-style overlay networks), 0.0.0.0/8, 192.0.0.0/24,
    198.18.0.0/15, multicast (224.0.0.0/4, ff00::/8), reserved 240.0.0.0/4,
    site-local fec0::/10, and 6to4/Teredo addresses that embed a private IPv4.
    Fetching a host on a tailnet now requires TOLE_WEB_ALLOW_PRIVATE=1 (#317).
  • tole acp: a hanging /models endpoint no longer re-stalls every
    session/new (probe wait 60 s → 5 s, failures cached for 30 s, probe runs
    before the sessions lock is taken) (#319).
  • chat registers and hydrates todo_read/todo_write (#276); an agent
    mailbox is marked consumed only after a successful recall (#287).
  • Tests: the perf resume_replay gate actually replays 25 tool calls and
    asserts it (#278); turn_loop temp dirs are unique per call (#279).

Architecture-review follow-ups (#293–#299):

  • The gh tool is registered only when a GitHub origin is detected; the
    hardcoded codecoradev/tole fallback on the run/chat/resume/mission and
    tole mcp faces is gone (#293).
  • tole serve --transport mcp honors --plan-mode in its server-level
    registry (only ReadOnly tools remain) (#294).
  • One session-id rule everywhere: [A-Za-z0-9_-], at most 64 bytes
    (tole_core::storage::is_valid_session_id); an id accepted by serve/ACP
    is no longer rejected by tole chat --resume / tole status (#295).
  • tole acp caps live sessions at 256 with non-busy eviction (shared helper
    with serve and the MCP session tools) and prunes the approval state of
    evicted sessions (#299).

tole v0.7.0

Choose a tag to compare

@ajianaz ajianaz released this 07 Oct 07:03
3e1058d

Mission mode, durable task list, update machinery.

Highlights

Mission mode (issues #198 / #199 / #201)

Long autonomous runs with a model-maintained durable task list — todo_write / todo_read persist in the session transcript, survive crashes (hydrate-on-open), and enforce one in_progress task at a time. Budget tiers (--max-steps/--max-tokens/--max-minutes, --trust internal headroom), verify gates (--verify with retry loop), and nonzero exit on any non-complete status for CI-style gating.

Update machinery (issue #220)

Startup banner when a newer crates.io release exists (24 h cache, TOLE_NO_UPDATE_CHECK=1 opt-out) and tole upgrade [--check] [--yes] with post-install binary verification.

Web tools (issue #215)

web_fetch / web_search — read-only internet, SSRF-guarded (private-range refusal, DNS rebinding checks), 512 KB cap, content-type allowlist.

Also in this train

  • ACP streaming with plan visibility (#196), remote approvals (#200), run ergonomics: --prompt-file, --name, --timeout (#216), mobile-control REST guide (#202), MCP-over-HTTP default (#168) with hardened framing (#190/#191/#193).

Quality gate

Pre-tag full-codebase cora scan: every MAJOR triaged and fixed across PRs #236–#245 and #261–#275 — per-session todo state, MCP session-registry-first routing (bogus id fails closed), argv depth-guard hardening (quoting / env -i / exec -c / substitution escapes), eval judges requiring exit 0 (v0.5.0 false-PASS eliminated), git stdout cap + pathspec-magic jail, poll/step dual budgets, storage id backstop, and more. One real regression (mission exit sentinel) was caught by the e2e suite before merge and fixed.

Full log: CHANGELOG.md

tole v0.6.0

Choose a tag to compare

@ajianaz ajianaz released this 06 Oct 00:00
8fd2a98

Four faces on one durable core, hardened end-to-end.

Added

  • systemone_decide (#172/#173) — typed decisions (choice / score / noul + confidence) from any System One backend; active with SYSTEMONE_API_KEY, SYSTEMONE_BASE_URL selects the backend (hosted Jev default, self-hosted compatible).
  • Depth-1 child agents (#171/#174): agent_start / agent_poll spawn and harvest durable child sessions — structurally no grandchildren, ephemeral uteke mailboxes, optional per-child git worktrees (--agents-worktree).
  • ACP native model picker + per-session approval controls (#176/#177/#179): TOLE_MODELS advertises a durable model switch; an approval selector (ask/auto) plus allow_always relax the gate from the editor without weakening the Destructive tier.
  • Cooperative cancellation on all three server faces (#178/#184/#185): ACP session/cancel, REST POST /sessions/{id}/cancel, MCP tole_session_cancel — the turn settles stopReason: "cancelled" as a normal durable end; single in-flight tool calls are not interrupted (spec-conformant).
  • gitea tool (#169) — the Gitea counterpart of gh over the instance REST API.
  • SKILL.md support (#161/#162), --trust presets (#160) with the TOLE_TRUST env actually read (#165/#166).

Changed

  • mcp-http is a default feature of tole-cli (#168): a plain cargo install tole-cli exposes every documented face, including tole serve --transport mcp.

Fixed / Hardened

  • MCP-over-HTTP accept-loop hardening (#190/#191): 32-connection cap, 30s header-read timeout, 30s bounds on auth/body phases — slowloris parity with the REST face (#136).
  • The HTTP/1 timer wiring (#193): header_read_timeout requires a wired timer (hyper panics per connection otherwise) — caught by the pre-tag live smoke test, invisible to CI. H1-only preserved (no h2c sniffing).
  • Build/CI: the no-mcp profile compiles again (#175/#180); project-sync board-sync fixes with loud failures (#181–#183).

Validation

  • Full-codebase cora scan (release gate): the single MAJOR fixed pre-tag; 351/351 workspace tests; QA-sandbox live smoke green (auth, SSE, cap enforcement, h2c refusal, recovery, zero panics); CI green on all trains.