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v0.2.0-beta.5
Pre-release
Pre-release
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since this release
Security
outbound_node_changed(now incl. http response, link out/call and
third-party nodes with url/host fields) and newsecret_reference_added
(code/config newly reading a secret-named env/global/flow value) are emitted
on every proposal, not only when secrets were restored; red approve banner.- Unquoted values: strong secret names redact any value; weak names need a
random-looking value (digit/symbol, 16+ chars, or high entropy). - Full-field redaction is decided by length only (no time budget), so reads and
submits agree. - Redaction scanning is linear-time: the connection-string rule is a plain split
(was quadratic: 250k chars took ~46 s), every regex is length-bounded, and
fields over 256 KB are hidden whole. - More reviewer warnings when secrets are restored:
secret_wires_changed,
secret_scope_changed,outbound_node_changed,secret_tab_changed. - Secret-named URL query params are redacted; duplicate header names restore
one-to-one. - Strict placeholder restore on proposal submit:
[REDACTED]becomes the real
secret only in its original node/field/line, env and header entries matched by
exact name (never by index); added, duplicated, moved or renamed placeholders
reject the submit (redacted_placeholder_mismatch). Approve cards list
restored-secret fields and warn loudly (secret_destination_changed,
secret_node_code_changed) when such a node's destination or code changes. - Detection also covers DSN/connection strings, unquoted
password: x,
Buffer.from("user:pw"), thePWpattern, and content of node
name/label/info; string fields over 256 KB are fully redacted for AI.
The dashboard warns when the pattern list is empty, and the REST redaction
audit middleware only acts on AI REST routes under/mcp/. - Likely secrets are redacted from everything AI clients receive: MCP tools
(list_flows,get_flow,get_node,get_node_field,search_flows,
proposal tools and diffs), REST with an access link or OAuth token, and GET
links. Previouslylist_flowsreturned plaintext env values such as a group
OAUTH_POC_PASSWORDto OAuth read clients. Admin-session (dashboard) reads
are unchanged and show real values.- Env entries (tab, group, subflow, subflow instance, node,
global-config)
whose name matches a secret pattern getvalue: "[REDACTED]"and
redacted: true; secret-named node settings and name/value pairs in node
config (change rules, inject props, http headers) are redacted too. - Function
func/initialize/finalizeand all other string fields are
scanned for known token formats (AWS, GitHub, Slack, OpenAI, Stripe, Google,
JWT, PEM private keys, Bearer/Basic headers, URL passwords) and
name = "literal"assignments; only the literal is replaced. Redacted nodes
carry_aiRedactions(field paths). - Proposals restore
[REDACTED]placeholders to the original secret on submit
(full tab or node ops), so AI edits never overwrite a secret with the
placeholder; unmatched placeholders produce a
redacted_placeholder_unresolvedwarning. - The audit log records
ai.redactedwith the count per response and the
operation (never values);proposal.createdaddsrestoredRedactions.
- Env entries (tab, group, subflow, subflow instance, node,
Added
secretNamePatternssetting (dashboard Settings → Secret redaction: add,
remove, reset to defaults;PUT /settingsaccepts a list ornullto reset).
Lockable viasettings.jsaiAccess.secretNamePatterns.