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@github-actions github-actions released this 28 Oct 11:45
· 24 commits to main since this release
a3375b4

Security

  • outbound_node_changed (now incl. http response, link out/call and
    third-party nodes with url/host fields) and new secret_reference_added
    (code/config newly reading a secret-named env/global/flow value) are emitted
    on every proposal, not only when secrets were restored; red approve banner.
  • Unquoted values: strong secret names redact any value; weak names need a
    random-looking value (digit/symbol, 16+ chars, or high entropy).
  • Full-field redaction is decided by length only (no time budget), so reads and
    submits agree.
  • Redaction scanning is linear-time: the connection-string rule is a plain split
    (was quadratic: 250k chars took ~46 s), every regex is length-bounded, and
    fields over 256 KB are hidden whole.
  • More reviewer warnings when secrets are restored: secret_wires_changed,
    secret_scope_changed, outbound_node_changed, secret_tab_changed.
  • Secret-named URL query params are redacted; duplicate header names restore
    one-to-one.
  • Strict placeholder restore on proposal submit: [REDACTED] becomes the real
    secret only in its original node/field/line, env and header entries matched by
    exact name (never by index); added, duplicated, moved or renamed placeholders
    reject the submit (redacted_placeholder_mismatch). Approve cards list
    restored-secret fields and warn loudly (secret_destination_changed,
    secret_node_code_changed) when such a node's destination or code changes.
  • Detection also covers DSN/connection strings, unquoted password: x,
    Buffer.from("user:pw"), the PW pattern, and content of node
    name/label/info; string fields over 256 KB are fully redacted for AI.
    The dashboard warns when the pattern list is empty, and the REST redaction
    audit middleware only acts on AI REST routes under /mcp/.
  • Likely secrets are redacted from everything AI clients receive: MCP tools
    (list_flows, get_flow, get_node, get_node_field, search_flows,
    proposal tools and diffs), REST with an access link or OAuth token, and GET
    links. Previously list_flows returned plaintext env values such as a group
    OAUTH_POC_PASSWORD to OAuth read clients. Admin-session (dashboard) reads
    are unchanged and show real values.
    • Env entries (tab, group, subflow, subflow instance, node, global-config)
      whose name matches a secret pattern get value: "[REDACTED]" and
      redacted: true; secret-named node settings and name/value pairs in node
      config (change rules, inject props, http headers) are redacted too.
    • Function func/initialize/finalize and all other string fields are
      scanned for known token formats (AWS, GitHub, Slack, OpenAI, Stripe, Google,
      JWT, PEM private keys, Bearer/Basic headers, URL passwords) and
      name = "literal" assignments; only the literal is replaced. Redacted nodes
      carry _aiRedactions (field paths).
    • Proposals restore [REDACTED] placeholders to the original secret on submit
      (full tab or node ops), so AI edits never overwrite a secret with the
      placeholder; unmatched placeholders produce a
      redacted_placeholder_unresolved warning.
    • The audit log records ai.redacted with the count per response and the
      operation (never values); proposal.created adds restoredRedactions.

Added

  • secretNamePatterns setting (dashboard Settings → Secret redaction: add,
    remove, reset to defaults; PUT /settings accepts a list or null to reset).
    Lockable via settings.js aiAccess.secretNamePatterns.