Toward classified Instruction Set Architecture using Neural Network

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List

- What is Instruction Set Architecture (ISA)?
- Difficulty in Classifying ISA
- Threat model
- Manual approach in Classifying ISA
- Deep learning approach in Classifying ISA
- Result

Instruction Set Architecture (ISA)

- Assembly code run on a certain platforms. E.g. x86, nios, powerpc, arm ...
- Popular ISA can be divided into 2 categories:
 - RISC: Reduced Instruction Set Computer
 - CISC: Complex Instruction Set Computer
- ISA contains:
 - Opcode
 - Register
 - Memory location
 - Operands

RISC vs. CISC

```
Fix instruction length
```

```
| Ox00400df0 | e asm.offset=0 ;e asm.instr=0; e asm.flags=0; | Ox00400df0 | pid 10 | 27bdfe88 | afa40178 | 8ca40000 | afbf0174 | afb60168 | afb3015c | afb20158 | afb10154 | afb00150 | afa5017c | Ox00400df0 | > | |
```

Dynamic instruction length

```
[0x00004df0]> e asm.offset=0 ;e asm.instr=0; e asm.flags=0;

[0x00004df0]> pid 10

f30f1efa

4157

4156

4155

4154

4189fc

55

4889f5

53

4883ec48

[0x00004df0]> ■
```

Classified ISA is never easy

Let's play a game!

Score: 10

What ISA is this?

- A. aarch64
- B. avr
- C. sh
- D. mips

```
stp x29, x30, [sp, -0x160]!; [13] -r-x section size 62160 named .text
0x00402a60
                fd7baaa9
0x00402a64
                fd030091
                                mov x29, sp
                f55b02a9
                                stp x21, x22, [sp, 0x20]
0x00402a68
0x00402a6c
                f603002a
                                mov w22, w0
                                                             ; argc
0x00402a70
                f50301aa
                                mov x21, x1
                                                             ; argv
0x00402a74
                200040f9
                                ldr x0, [x1]
                                                             ; argv
                e83300fd
                                str d8, [sp + arg_60h]
0x00402a78
                                fmov d8, xzr
0x00402a7c
                e803679e
                                stp x19, x20, [sp, 0x10]
0x00402a80
                f35301a9
                                adrp x19, 0x413000
0x00402a84
                930000b0
```

Score: 10

What ISA is this?

```
A. aarch64
B. avr
C. sh
C. mips
G. mipsel
H. riscv64
```

```
push {r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, sb, sl, fp, lr}; [13] -r-x section size 19760 named .text
0x000110a4
                f04f2de9
                               mov sb, 0
0x000110a8
                0090a0e3
                                ldr r7, [obj.long_options.10819] ; [0x11bac:4]=0x15e18 obj.long_options.10819
0x000110ac
                f87a9fe5
                               vpush {d8}
0x000110b0
                028b2ded
0x000110b4
                ecd04de2
                               sub sp, sp, 0xec
                               movw r4, 0x63bc
0x000110b8
                bc4306e3
0x000110bc
                014040e3
                                movt r4, 1
0x000110c0
                0950a0e1
                                mov r5, sb
                0960a0e1
                                mov r6, sb
0x000110c4
0x000110c8
                                str r0, [sp + var c8h]
                24008de5
                                                              argc
```

Score: 10

What ISA is this?

A. aarch64

E. powerpc64

. nios2

B. avr

F. armv8

J. s390

C. sh

G. mipsel

K. powerpc

D. mips

H. riscv64

L. sparc64

```
; [12] -r-x section size 12604 named .text
0x000117a0
                6171
                                addi sp, sp, -432
                                sd a0, 32(sp)
                2af0
0x000117a2
0x000117a4
                8861
                                ld a0, 0(a1)
0x000117a6
                06f7
                                sd ra, 424(sp)
                22f3
                                sd s0, 416(sp)
0x000117a8
0x000117aa
                26ef
                                sd s1, 408(sp)
0x000117ac
                4aeb
                                sd s2, 400(sp)
                                sd s3, 392(sp)
0x000117ae
                4ee7
0x000117b0
                                sd s4, 384(sp)
                52e3
                                sd s5, 376(sp)
0x000117b2
                d6fe
```

All pictures are assembly of the same code


The binary is coreutils/cat.c


- They are instruction code of line 3, 4, 5

 What do you feel right now?

```
2 int
3 main (int argc, char **argv)
     size t outsize;
     size t insize;
     size t page size = getpagesize ();
8
    char *inbuf:
9
     char *outbuf;
10
     bool ok = true;
     int c;
12 int argind;
13
     dev t out dev;
        snip...
```








How IDS/IPS work?

- IDS/IPS works by detecting exploitation stage.
- How do they detect exploit?
 - a. Signatures
 - b. Heuristics
 - c. More signatures: develop 0-day signatures from bug bounty submitters
 - d. More heuristics: e.g stop sequence class of actions (behavioral)
- Like cat-mouse game, if there is no known signature, no detection.
- However, IDS/IPS work well for popular ISA, such as x86, x86_64

Why IDS/IPS fail to prevent future threat?

IDS/IPS cannot recognize the instruction inside malware



How many ISAs are there?

1

1

1

1

1

Arch

alpha

arc

arm

avr

m68k

mips

mipsel

msp430

nios2

riscv

s390

powerpc

?-bit

8

16

32-bit

1

1

/

1

/

1

1

64-bit

1

1

1

1

Little Endian

Big Endian

15

sh

sparc

x86 64


xtensa

https://github.com/cothan/binary-samples

... a lot


Threat model

At network level, can we detect ISA by looking at **large chunk** of data?



Threat model


At network level, can we detect ISA and its shellcode by looking at **small chunk** of data?



Checking Instruction Sequence

Can we detect ISA by looking at **instruction sequence**?

- Yes, by checking the syntax, registers, operands



x86: push r15; push rbp; mov rbp, rsi

mips: bgez v0, 0x401690; addiu a2, a2, 0x64c0

powerpc: mr r4, r30; lis r28, 2; ori r22, r22, 0x49;

Checking syntax, operands, registers

- False positive in disassembler
- Easily fall into junk code trap
- Trial and error process

It's hard, even for human.

"Junk code is a sequence of bytes that you have disassembled that are not actual instructions executed as part of a program. In addition to wasting time, I've seen people get alarmed and excited by the junk code they've found."

Nick Harbour, FireEye

Classified ISA from raw byte

Can we detect ISA by looking at a sequence of raw byte?

1. Heuristic

- Expensive analysis
- Easily bypassed by reordering instruction sequence

```
0x00004df0
                 f30f1efa
                                 endbr64
0x00004df4
                 4157
                                 push r15
0x00004df6
                                 push r14
                4156
0x00004df8
                4155
                                 push r13
0x00004dfa
                                 push r12
                4154
0x00004dfc
                4189fc
                                 mov r12d, edi
                                 push rbp
0x00004dff
                55
0x00004e00
                4889f5
                                 mov rbp, rsi
0x00004e03
                53
                                 push rbx
0x00004e04
                 4883ec48
                                 sub rsp. 0x48
```

Classified ISA from raw byte

Can we detect ISA by looking at a sequence of raw byte?

2. Neural Network

- Extensive training
- Good at classified/categorized ISA

Classified ISA using Deep Learning

Prepare Training set:

- 17 architectures, built by crosstool-ng
- 817 Mb from 2040 binaries
- All binaries are dynamically linked
- Radare2 script to extract instructions
- Each sequence has different length,
 longest sequence is ~2000 bytes
- Split each sequence into smaller 64 bytes chunk

```
~/W/2/s/e/p/binary-samples
  18955 aarch64-rp3.train
  12815 alphaev56.train
  12810 alphaev67.train
  19566 armv8-rp3.train
  18798 mips.train
  18807 mips64el.train
  16508 mipsel.train
  11905 powerpc.train
  15451 powerpc64le.train
  11157 riscv64.train
  10217 s390.train
  21422 s390x-64.train
  12892 sh.train
  15151 sparc.train
  18144 sparc64.train
  17295 x86 64-ubuntu18.04-linux-gnu.train
  15807 xtensa.train
267700 total
```

What is the training data look like?

```
'd0000090 115e40f9 10e20291 20021fd6'
  [9]: X train[1]
        'd0000090 118240f9 10020491 20021fd6'
  [10]: X train[3]
         'd0000090 112e40f9 10620191 20021fd6'
[n [11]: X train[1234]
         'fd7bb9a9 fd030091 f96b04a9 f90301aa fa0302aa e83300fd 0800679e f35301a9 f55b02a9 f60303aa f76303a9 85faff97 3
30340f9 b30700b4 f70300aa f5031aaa 18008092 140080d2 fb7305a9 1b008052 3c008052 09000014 1a0500b4 f1faff97 1f000071 7b0
39c1a 94060091 b502168b 337b74f8 b30200b4 0101669e e20317aa e00313aa a7faff97 00ffff35 e00313aa 6cfaff97 e20316aa 1f001
7eb e10315aa 006b169b e0020054 1f0700b1 61fdff54 f80314aa 94060091 b502168b 337b74f8 d3fdffb5 1f2003d5 7f030071 2000809
2 fb7345a9 1803809a e00318aa e83340fd f35341a9 f55b42a9 f76343a9 f96b44a9 fd7bc7a8 c0035fd6 3b008052 dbffff17 f80314aa
-83340fd e00318aa f35341a9 f55b42a9 f76343a9 f96b44a9 fb7345a9 fd7bc7a8 c0035fd6 18008092 ebffff17
```

What is predict data look like?

```
In [15]: x[0]
Out[15]: 'c10183f9027eee8335000000001b800000000c3b80000000eb0383c00183f8027ef866810d00000009100b8faffffffc3415541545
553488b1d0000000044'

In [16]: x[1]
Out[16]: '000000000000757d0000fffffffffffffffff222122212221326316d432211f93322115d332633221722102633221028517930221322132213221322132212221fce2'


In [17]: x[2]
Out[17]: '3d0bc60000280738171df0003661007d01290739174927593728273837302220acd2380721000027930d2817cc822827660204283726021828073817410000c8'
```

Classified ISA using Deep Learning

Data preprocessing:

- Encode each chunk: Tokenizer, one-hot, word2vec

Classifier Learning:



Result

Туре	Encoder	Layers	Accuracy
CNN 3rd	Tokenizer	8	92%
CNN 2nd	One Hot	4	15%
CNN 1st	Tokenizer	4	9%

Training In Action

Demo


```
2028-04-29 22:54:23.622867: I tensorflow/stream_executor/cuda/cuda_gpu_executor.cc:981] successful NUMA node read from
SysFS had negative value (-1), but there must be at least one NUMA node, so returning NUMA node zero
2020-04-29 22:54:23.623170: I tensorflow/stream_executor/cuda/cuda_gpu_execujor.cc:981] successful NUMA node read from
SysF5 had negative value (-1), but there must be at least one NUMA node, so leturning NUMA node zero
2020-04-29 22:54:23.623500: I tensorflow/core/common runtime/apu/apu device.cc:1241] Created Tensorflow device (/job:lo
calhost/replica:0/task:0/device:GPU:0 with 2724 MB memory) -> physical GPU (device: 0, name: GeForce GTX 1850 Ti with M
ax-Q Design, pci bus id: 8800:81:88.0, compute capability: 6.1)
Model: "sequential 1"
 ayer (type)
                        Output Shape
                                              Param #
dense 1 (Dense)
                        (None, 512)
                                              8764
activation_1 (Activation)
                        (None, 512)
(ropout 1 (Dropout)
                        (None, 512)
 lense_2 (Dense)
                        (None, 512)
                                              262656
activation 2 (Activation)
                        (None, 512)
fropout_2 (Dropout)
                        (None, 512)
dense 3 (Dense)
                        (None, 6)
                                              3078
activation 3 (Activation)
                        (None, 6)
 Total params: 274,438
Frainable params: 274,438
Non-trainable params: 0
Frain on 513176 samples, validate on 57020 samples
Epoch 1/2
2020-04-29 22:54:24.431737: I tensorflow/stream_executor/platform/default/dso_loader.cc:44] Successfully opened dynamic
library libcublas.sp.10
ss: 329968705921349.8125 - val_accuracy: 0.9325
Epoch 2/2
```

Why Deep Learning instead of Machine Learning

Better accuracy


Can solve problem with unknown solutions

https://towardsdatascience.com/why-deep-learning-isneeded-over-traditional-machine-learning-1b6a991770 63



How do data science techniques scale with amount of data? 28

Let's get back to our threat model




If Answer is ISA instruction:

- Activate signature/heuristic filter

Else:

- Pass





Future work

The current accuracy can't get more than 93%. Need to improve.

Future work:

- Need more sample for embedded system like avr, sh, ...
- Apply different neural network
- Apply different encoder
- Apply deep learning to detect malware/shellcode in different architectures

Question?

THANK YOU