media: dvb-usb-v2: af9035: Fix null-ptr-deref in af9035_i2c_master_xfer

In af9035_i2c_master_xfer, msg is controlled by user. When msg[i].buf
is null and msg[i].len is zero, former checks on msg[i].buf would be
passed. Malicious data finally reach af9035_i2c_master_xfer. If accessing
msg[i].buf[0] without sanity check, null ptr deref would happen.
We add check on msg[i].len to prevent crash.

Similar commit:
commit 0ed554f
("media: dvb-usb: az6027: fix null-ptr-deref in az6027_i2c_xfer()")

Signed-off-by: Zhang Shurong <zhang_shurong@foxmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>

Author: ZhangShurong

drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/af9035.c

@@ -322,6 +322,8 @@ static int af9035_i2c_master_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap,
 			ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 		} else if ((msg[0].addr == state->af9033_i2c_addr[0]) ||
 			   (msg[0].addr == state->af9033_i2c_addr[1])) {
+			if (msg[0].len < 3 || msg[1].len < 1)
+				return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 			/* demod access via firmware interface */
 			u32 reg = msg[0].buf[0] << 16 | msg[0].buf[1] << 8 |
 					msg[0].buf[2];
@@ -381,17 +383,16 @@ static int af9035_i2c_master_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap,
 			ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 		} else if ((msg[0].addr == state->af9033_i2c_addr[0]) ||
 			   (msg[0].addr == state->af9033_i2c_addr[1])) {
+			if (msg[0].len < 3)
+				return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 			/* demod access via firmware interface */
 			u32 reg = msg[0].buf[0] << 16 | msg[0].buf[1] << 8 |
 					msg[0].buf[2];
 
 			if (msg[0].addr == state->af9033_i2c_addr[1])
 				reg |= 0x100000;
 
-			ret = (msg[0].len >= 3) ? af9035_wr_regs(d, reg,
-							         &msg[0].buf[3],
-							         msg[0].len - 3)
-					        : -EOPNOTSUPP;
+			ret = af9035_wr_regs(d, reg, &msg[0].buf[3], msg[0].len - 3);
 		} else {
 			/* I2C write */
 			u8 buf[MAX_XFER_SIZE];