net: add more sanity check in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb()

syzbot/KMSAN reports access to uninitialized data from gso_features_check() [1]

The repro use af_packet, injecting a gso packet and hdrlen == 0.

We could fix the issue making gso_features_check() more careful
while dealing with NETIF_F_TSO_MANGLEID in fast path.

Or we can make sure virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() pulls minimal network and
transport headers as intended.

Note that for GSO packets coming from untrusted sources, SKB_GSO_DODGY
bit forces a proper header validation (and pull) before the packet can
hit any device ndo_start_xmit(), thus we do not need a precise disection
at virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() stage.

[1]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in skb_gso_segment include/net/gso.h:83 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in validate_xmit_skb+0x10f2/0x1930 net/core/dev.c:3629
 skb_gso_segment include/net/gso.h:83 [inline]
 validate_xmit_skb+0x10f2/0x1930 net/core/dev.c:3629
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x1eac/0x5130 net/core/dev.c:4341
 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3134 [inline]
 packet_xmit+0x9c/0x6b0 net/packet/af_packet.c:276
 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3087 [inline]
 packet_sendmsg+0x8b1d/0x9f30 net/packet/af_packet.c:3119
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x9c2/0xd60 net/socket.c:2584
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2638
 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2667 [inline]
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x490 net/socket.c:2674
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x44/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b

Uninit was created at:
 slab_post_alloc_hook+0x129/0xa70 mm/slab.h:768
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3478 [inline]
 kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x5e9/0xb10 mm/slub.c:3523
 kmalloc_reserve+0x13d/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:560
 __alloc_skb+0x318/0x740 net/core/skbuff.c:651
 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1286 [inline]
 alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc8/0xbd0 net/core/skbuff.c:6334
 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xa80/0xbf0 net/core/sock.c:2780
 packet_alloc_skb net/packet/af_packet.c:2936 [inline]
 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3030 [inline]
 packet_sendmsg+0x70e8/0x9f30 net/packet/af_packet.c:3119
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x9c2/0xd60 net/socket.c:2584
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2638
 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2667 [inline]
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x490 net/socket.c:2674
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x44/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b

CPU: 0 PID: 5025 Comm: syz-executor279 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc7-syzkaller-00003-gfbafc3e621c3 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/17/2023

Reported-by: syzbot+7f4d0ea3df4d4fa9a65f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/0000000000005abd7b060eb160cd@google.com/
Fixes: 9274124 ("net: stricter validation of untrusted gso packets")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Author: edumazet

include/linux/virtio_net.h

@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@
 #define _LINUX_VIRTIO_NET_H
 
 #include <linux/if_vlan.h>
+#include <linux/ip.h>
+#include <linux/ipv6.h>
 #include <linux/udp.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/tcp.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/virtio_net.h>
@@ -49,6 +51,7 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb,
 					const struct virtio_net_hdr *hdr,
 					bool little_endian)
 {
+	unsigned int nh_min_len = sizeof(struct iphdr);
 	unsigned int gso_type = 0;
 	unsigned int thlen = 0;
 	unsigned int p_off = 0;
@@ -65,6 +68,7 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb,
 			gso_type = SKB_GSO_TCPV6;
 			ip_proto = IPPROTO_TCP;
 			thlen = sizeof(struct tcphdr);
+			nh_min_len = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr);
 			break;
 		case VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP:
 			gso_type = SKB_GSO_UDP;
@@ -100,7 +104,8 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb,
 		if (!skb_partial_csum_set(skb, start, off))
 			return -EINVAL;
 
-		p_off = skb_transport_offset(skb) + thlen;
+		nh_min_len = max_t(u32, nh_min_len, skb_transport_offset(skb));
+		p_off = nh_min_len + thlen;
 		if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, p_off))
 			return -EINVAL;
 	} else {
@@ -140,7 +145,7 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb,
 
 			skb_set_transport_header(skb, keys.control.thoff);
 		} else if (gso_type) {
-			p_off = thlen;
+			p_off = nh_min_len + thlen;
 			if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, p_off))
 				return -EINVAL;
 		}