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wardlatch 0.1.19

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@github-actions github-actions released this 17 Nov 21:20
Immutable release. Only release title and notes can be modified.
v0.1.19
dc2fb58

Four branches in one release: the coverage protocol (PR #37), the identity-equivalence pattern (VU#604762), no SAFE
from a stale list, and the never-a-false-SAFE suite, with what the suite and an attacker's pass found fixed. From
this release the workflow publishes to npm itself, through npm's trusted publishing, and each release carries a
signed SBOM.

Upgrading

Nothing to do: npx wardlatch@latest picks it up. A few rows that read SAFE before now read UNKNOWN or REVIEW, on
purpose: a Homebrew Deno whose keg folder and program name different versions, a program that names two versions, a
cut lockfile or dpkg status file, and a Mac at Apple's newest release once Wardlatch's list of releases is more than
30 days old. Each says why.

Added

  • Starlette before 1.0.1, CVE-2026-48710 (starlette-2026-06, CISA KEV 2 Sep 2026, so "exploited"). A malformed
    Host header makes request.url.path differ from the path Starlette routed, so a check that allows or denies by
    request.url can be bypassed. Python MCP servers run on Starlette: the MCP Python SDK requires it. Read from
    starlette-<version>.dist-info in site-packages, and, new, from the Python lockfiles and pin files under the folders
    searched: uv.lock, poetry.lock, pylock.toml, Pipfile.lock and requirements*.txt, as text, nothing run.
    Below 1.0.1 is EXPOSED. A pin that is a range, a URL or no version is UNKNOWN, and so is a file cut short, a line the
    reader can't read, or an include from another folder. It was declined until now as a developer package (D3).
  • MCP Python SDK and FastMCP (mcp-python-2026-10): CVE-2026-116684 (a token for another resource server
    accepted), CVE-2026-116685 (credentials sent across a cross-origin redirect) and FastMCP's GHSA-vqqp-x5qm-5qp4 (a
    client secret sent to an authorization server an MCP server advertises). Below each fix is EXPOSED (mcp 1.8.0 to
    1.29.1 and 2.0.0 to 2.1.1; fastmcp and fastmcp-slim 4.0.0 to 4.1.1). At or past it, the SDK and FastMCP are REVIEW,
    never SAFE. The vendors say upgrading alone changes nothing: the fix is a setting off by default, and the row names
    it (validate_token_resource=True; issuer=). Not in CISA's catalog.
  • Xcode before 27.2 (xcode-2026-10): CoreDevice's symlink file read (CVE-2026-112605) and an Instruments
    authorization issue (CVE-2026-112602), and Xcode 27's two sandbox escapes (CVE-2026-86948, CVE-2026-86949). Read
    from the version.plist of every Xcode*.app in /Applications and ~/Applications, matched as a Mac's disk matches
    names, and from the Xcode xcode-select points to, each install once. A beta (Xcode-beta.app) is REVIEW at the
    fixed number. Not in CISA's catalog.
  • Docker Desktop before 4.97.0, CVE-2026-114409 (docker-desktop-2026-10): third-party API keys and OAuth
    tokens written in cleartext to its logs and diagnostics bundles (and, before 4.94.0, the Docker Hub token,
    CVE-2026-123082). Below 4.97.0 is EXPOSED. At or past it, Docker says logs containing credentials can remain after
    upgrading. Wardlatch lists Docker Desktop's log folder by file name and date only, never a file's contents. A file
    older than 4.97.0's release, or older than this copy of Docker.app, makes the row REVIEW, naming the folder and
    telling you to delete the logs and rotate the tokens. A folder that can't be listed is UNKNOWN. Not in CISA's catalog.
  • Fix age on every EXPOSED line: "fix public for N days (since YYYY-MM-DD)", and fixAgeDays (with fixAge) on
    each EXPOSED row in --json. Attackers can now turn a public fix into an exploit within hours, so the line says how
    long the fix has been out. Every incident file carries fixPublished, the advisory's date with its source. Where
    there is no fixed release (a malicious release, a leaked key, a compromised authority) it carries no date and the
    reason, and the line says "fix date unknown". "Today" is the same as every other date check's (lib/clock.mjs).
  • A daily coverage sweep in CI (.github/workflows/coverage-sweep.yml, scripts/coverage/gap-issues.mjs). Every
    day, and by hand with no inputs, it reads the sources and runs the coverage check. It opens or updates one issue per
    gap ("Coverage gap: ()", label coverage-gap) with the job's own token, contents: read and
    issues: write only. It never commits, pushes or opens a pull request. The metric is "fix public → named":
    baseline 91 days, target under 24 hours (docs/COVERAGE-PROTOCOL.md).
  • Bridge advice for a bundled Brotli (docs/BRIDGE-BROTLI.md). When Pillow, opencv-python or
    opencv-contrib-python carries a Brotli decoder without the fix and has shipped no fixed release, the EXPOSED line's fix
    adds "While no fixed release exists:" and points to an opt-in, reversible swap for Homebrew's fixed Brotli, on a
    Mac. The page gives exact commands, a backup first, a check and an undo, and warns that a reinstall reverts the swap.
    Text only: Wardlatch changes nothing. The commands were run on copies of the two packages' .dylibs folders, never
    on the installed ones, and the undo gave back the original files byte for byte.
  • Class first: the coverage report and the gap issues list identity- and equivalence-class gaps before the others.
  • Two new patterns, P8 and P9 (docs/PATTERNS.md). P8: a self-erasing compromise (a commit
    reverted, its run and logs deleted) is not "never ran", so an incident of that kind must read history and say UNKNOWN
    when history is absent. P9: the fixed version is not the fixed state (a fix that is a setting, or residue an update
    leaves). Two new incident keys enforce P9: fixNeedsConfig (REVIEW at or past the fix) and residueWhenFixed
    (what an earlier version left, by name and date).
  • macOS Audio flaw CVE-2026-65339 (apple-audio-2026-08, a new kind of check, apple-cve, lib/macos.mjs
    appleCveRow). Apple's "Audio" entry, "An app may be able to leak sensitive user information", fixed in Tahoe
    26.6.2 (17 Aug 2026) and Sequoia 15.8 (14 Sep 2026). Below the fix on its own line is EXPOSED; Sonoma 14 and older,
    a beta, an unread build or an unplaceable version is UNKNOWN; off a Mac the row says iPhones and iPads are not
    checked. CISA's catalog (2026.11.13) does not list it. Tests: test/apple-audio-2026-08.test.mjs.
  • CERT/CC VU#604762, a Mac's disk opening one file for two spellings of its name (16 Nov 2026): Deno before 2.7.14
    (deno-2026-06, CVE-2026-49401, --deny-* rules), Terraform built with go-slug before 0.18.3 (terraform-2026-08,
    CVE-2026-14978, .terraformignore; read from the go-slug line Go writes into the program) and setuptools before
    83.0.0 (setuptools-2026-07, CVE-2026-59890, MANIFEST.in). EXPOSED below the fix on a Mac; on Linux, where the
    vendors say the flaws are not, SAFE with that reason (Deno, Terraform) or no row (setuptools). Nothing is run. Two
    new keys for version files: scan (a program's bytes read in pieces) and onlyOn (the systems the flaw is on).
    Every Deno is read from its program, never from a folder's name, which need not match it: mise's and asdf's
    (installs/deno/<version>/bin/deno), the official installer's ~/.deno/bin/deno and Homebrew's keg
    (Cellar/deno/<version>/bin/deno, reached by opt/deno and bin/deno). A program that can't be read, or carries no
    version, is UNKNOWN, and so is a Homebrew keg whose folder and program name different versions. The version is the
    user agent Deno compiles in, Deno/<version>+<commit>, measured on Deno's own 2.7.13 and 2.7.14 macOS arm64 release
    builds (16 Nov 2026; COVERAGE-PROTOCOL D8), which read 2.7.13 EXPOSED and 2.7.14 SAFE.
    Tests: test/equivalence-2026-11.test.mjs.
  • ConnectWise ScreenConnect client, CVE-2026-84869 (screenconnect-2026-09, CISA KEV 11 Sep 2026). PR #37's
    coverage list declined it as a "self-hosted server": the flaw is in the client, and ConnectWise says servers are not
    affected. Reads the host client's and the access agent's Info.plist on a Mac: below 26.6.5 is EXPOSED; at or past
    it REVIEW (no real bundle read yet); a Linux agent folder UNKNOWN; an agent named for the attacker instance in
    Huntress's report EXPOSED.

Fixed

  • Eight false SAFEs found by an attacker's pass (test/never-false-safe/attack.test.mjs, A1 to A9, each with a
    planted mutation). A program naming two versions that would be judged differently (a fixed one's text ahead of its
    own) is UNKNOWN, not the first one's verdict, and a scanned program not read to its end is UNKNOWN (A1). Terraform
    built with go-slug replaced (a => line) is UNKNOWN (A2). Homebrew's bin/deno and bin/git, the copies a shell
    runs, are read beside opt/ (A3). A PATH entry written ~/bin, which bash and /bin/sh search, is read as they read
    it instead of being dropped (A4). On an updated Mac, a shell start-up file that names SSL_CERT_FILE, SSL_CERT_DIR
    or CURL_CA_BUNDLE keeps the built-in curl and python3 from being judged by /etc/ssl/cert.pem (A5). PYTHONPATH's
    folders are searched as site-packages is (A6). Lockfiles: classic yarn's npm: alias read from its spec, a listed
    name installed from another package ("react-server-dom-webpack": "npm:@acme/fork@1.0.0") is UNKNOWN in npm and yarn
    lockfiles, and a pnpm lockfile re-indented or written inline is UNKNOWN, not "pins nothing" (A7, A8). One is left
    as a todo for the owner: the same alias in a pnpm lockfile's importers section (A7t). The suite's clock preload now stands in for every file lib/clock.mjs reads, so H11c no longer turns REVIEW by
    itself once this Mac's own update files are a month newer than the list (A9).
  • **A Homebre...
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wardlatch 0.1.18

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@github-actions github-actions released this 15 Nov 21:13
Immutable release. Only release title and notes can be modified.
v0.1.18
1dfd218

Nine new checks, a fix to the Chrome check, a corrected pip line, and a new mode, --reach. Each new check is a bullet
in the list below and an entry under "Added"; the corrections are under "Fixed". Every check reads files only and runs
nothing it finds.

  • React Server Components, CVE-2026-126187 (react-rsc-2026-11). React's advisory names three npm packages,
    react-server-dom-webpack, react-server-dom-parcel and react-server-dom-turbopack, in versions 19.0.0 through
    19.0.8, 19.1.0 through 19.1.9, 19.2.0 through 19.2.8 and 19.3.0, fixed in 19.0.9, 19.1.10, 19.2.9 and 19.3.1 (released
    14 Oct 2026; the CVE record was published on 10 Nov). It does not name react or react-dom. Wardlatch reads your
    projects' lockfiles and names each one that pins an affected version. Next.js carries its own copies of two of these
    packages, which no lockfile shows, and has its own advisory (GHSA-673q-mjm6-r5xr, no CVE number): next 16.0.0
    through 16.4.0, fixed in 16.4.1, is reported under that advisory's name. Neither advisory names the other.
  • Fortinet FortiClient for Mac, CVE-2026-121529 (forticlient-2026-11). Fortinet's advisory FG-IR-26-194 of
    10 Nov 2026 lists FortiClientMac 7.4.0 through 7.4.7 as affected, fixed in 7.4.8, and FortiClientMac 8.0 and 7.2 as
    not affected. Wardlatch reads the installed version from the app's Info.plist and never starts FortiClient. A
    FortiClient at or past the fix reads REVIEW, not SAFE, and says why: no real FortiClient bundle has been read by
    this check yet, and whether FortiClient can keep running an old version after an update is not known.
  • The tampered Claude Code extension builds 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 (claude-code-extension-2026-10), served from
    Cursor's VS Code Extension Marketplace on 29 Oct 2026 with an SSH backdoor: Cursor's indicators, read from files
    (extension bundles and packages by hash, the attacker's key in authorized_keys, the dropped LaunchAgent and scripts,
    the tunnel key). Uninstalling the extension is not enough, and the fix line says so.
  • macOS behind Apple's latest security release (macos-2026-11): Tahoe below 26.7.1 and Sequoia below 15.8.1 lack
    Apple's fix for CVE-2026-86950, which CISA lists as exploited; Sonoma, which Apple no longer updates, is REVIEW. A
    beta is never SAFE.
  • Visual Studio Code before 1.145.3 (vscode-2026-11): Microsoft's 16 advisories of 10 Nov 2026, three of them code
    execution through MCP servers.
  • Claude Code before 2.1.251 on macOS (claude-code-2026-11, CVE-2026-88968), read from its installs without running
    it; old copies left beside the one that runs are REVIEW.
  • Git before 2.56.1 and its backports (git-2026-11, CVE-2026-111760 and five more); Apple's git 2.54.0 is REVIEW,
    since Apple backports.
  • GPUStack before 2.3.1 (gpustack-2026-11): below 2.2.0, CVE-2026-102895, which CISA lists as exploited; up to
    2.3.1, a critical code execution GPUStack fixed in 2.3.1.
  • Brave, Vivaldi and Microsoft Edge are read by chrome-2026-11 too, and a fixed Extended Stable Chrome no longer
    reads EXPOSED (under "Fixed").

CISA's catalog (version 2026.11.10, read on 11 and 13 Nov 2026) lists neither React's nor FortiClient's CVE (Fortinet's
page says Known Exploited: No; React's advisory says nothing about exploitation), nor the Claude Code, VS Code, git or
tampered-extension issues; those checks print no CISA line and say "fixed in". It lists macOS's three CVEs and
GPUStack's CVE-2026-102895, and those checks print CISA's dates under their titles.

Sources: React's advisory,
the CVE record for CVE-2026-126187,
Next.js's advisory,
Fortinet's advisory FG-IR-26-194,
the CVE record for CVE-2026-121529,
Cursor's notice,
Apple's security releases,
Microsoft's VS Code advisory GHSA-66hq-jw93-462h,
Anthropic's advisory GHSA-5xjx-9qx6-jcrv,
GitHub's post on the git releases,
GPUStack's advisories GHSA-gj9m-f8ph-pmhr
and GHSA-gjf9-3p3r-9h9c,
Chrome's Extended Stable update of 9 Nov,
CISA's catalog. The tests are
test/react-rsc-0.1.18.test.mjs, test/forticlient-0.1.18.test.mjs, test/claude-code-extension-0.1.18.test.mjs,
test/macos-0.1.18.test.mjs, test/vscode-0.1.18.test.mjs, test/claude-code-0.1.18.test.mjs, test/git-0.1.18.test.mjs,
test/gpustack-0.1.18.test.mjs, test/chrome-0.1.18.test.mjs and test/pip-wording-0.1.18.test.mjs. An independent
review of the new checks (13 Nov 2026) found three false-SAFE or false-reassurance paths before release; each is
fixed, says so in its entry below, and has a test.

Added

  • react-rsc-2026-11, and a new kind of check: lockfiles (lib/lockfiles.mjs). Under the folders searched (10
    levels; node_modules and .git are not entered) it reads package-lock.json, npm-shrinkwrap.json, yarn.lock
    (Yarn 1 and Berry) and pnpm-lock.yaml as text. It runs and imports nothing from a project, does not open
    node_modules, and asks no registry. A pinned version in an affected range is EXPOSED; one outside them is SAFE,
    with the lockfile and the version as its receipt. UNKNOWN, never SAFE: a lockfile that can't be read, is not one, is
    cut off, or holds an entry the reader does not understand (the whole file); a canary, experimental or pre-release
    build, which the advisories do not name; Bun's lockfiles (bun.lock, bun.lockb), which are named and not read
    yet; a folder that can't be opened, a link to a folder, and a folder past the depth limit. A lockfile says what an
    install would fetch, not what is in node_modules or running on a server, and the line under the result says so.
  • forticlient-2026-11. Reads /Applications/FortiClient.app/Contents/Info.plist and the same path under
    ~/Applications. 7.4.0 through 7.4.7 is EXPOSED. 7.4.8 or later, the 8.0 line included, is REVIEW, not SAFE (the
    owner, 12 Nov 2026), with the reason on the line: no real FortiClient bundle has been read by this check yet, and
    whether FortiClient can keep running an old version after an update is not known. A REVIEW line does not change the
    exit code, as with a fixed Chrome. The 7.2 line, which Fortinet says was never affected, is SAFE. A version older
    than 7.2 is UNKNOWN, because Fortinet's table names no such line. A version that can't be read (no version
    key, a binary plist, a file that can't be opened) is UNKNOWN. FortiClient for Windows, which the advisory also lists,
    is named under what the check does not cover. No FortiClient was installed on the Mac this was written on: the
    check was tested on an Info.plist written to Apple's format, not on a real bundle.
  • notNamedBelow in a version rule (lib/binaries.mjs): a version on a release line older than any the source
    speaks of is UNKNOWN. Without it such a version read as older than the affected range, SAFE, on the strength of
    a table that never mentioned it.
  • reviewFrom beside reviewWhenFixed on a version file (lib/installs.mjs): only a SAFE at or past that version
    becomes REVIEW, so a version older than the affected range (FortiClient 7.2) is not told it has the fix. Without the
    key, any SAFE does, as before (Chrome, GitLab).
  • --reach, a new mode: what a program started from this terminal could open. For a fixed list of places
    (Messages, Mail, Safari and Notes data and the privacy database on a Mac; Chrome, Chromium, Edge, Brave, Vivaldi and
    Firefox data folders; the login keychain file; ~/.ssh, ~/.npmrc, the GitHub CLI's hosts file, Docker's config,
    AWS, Google Cloud, Azure, Kubernetes, PyPI, Cargo, .netrc and Git's credential store), Wardlatch opens each for
    reading and closes it at once, and prints reachable, blocked, not there, could not tell or not applicable.
    It never reads a byte and never lists a folder: one test runs it against a stand-in for the disk that fails on any
    call but lstat, realpath, open and close, another runs the command under a spy on every read, and both are shown to be
    able to fail. It is not a malware scan and has no signatures. It runs instead of the incident checks, never beside
    them (--reach with --incident, --paths or --no-containers is refused), prints no SAFE, EXPOSED or UNKNOWN
    line, and exits 0 whatever it finds; a reachable and a could not tell are REVIEW lines. "No such file" is not
    taken for "not there" where the system keeps the file in every account, or where a variable the vendor documents
    says the tool keeps it elsewhere; a link that leads outside the home folder is not followed; a FIFO or device is not
    opened. Each place has the vendor page that names it, and each reachable line one fix line with the page it comes
    from, in lib/reach/items.json. Off ...
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wardlatch 0.1.17

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@github-actions github-actions released this 11 Nov 22:18
Immutable release. Only release title and notes can be modified.
v0.1.17
3507ebd

eMudhra revoked eight more CAs on 7 November, for a different reason, and they are now REVIEW lines on a Mac. The
October check reads exactly as it did.

  • Eight eMudhra RSA CAs revoked on 7 Nov 2026 (rsaRevocation in emudhra-2026-10). They are EM DV/OV/EV TLS CA - G2B/G2C and EM OV CS CA - G2B/G2C, all RSA-4096, revoked with reason cessationOfOperation. eMudhra says their key
    material was handled in a Python process's memory on the ceremony host, so it cannot demonstrate that the keys stayed
    inside the HSM. It also says the keys' integrity remained intact
    (Mozilla bug 2083449, comment 82). That is not the
    October finding, so Wardlatch reports them as REVIEW, never EXPOSED. The six TLS CAs chain through emSign Root TLS CA - G1 to emSign Root CA - G1, one of the five roots Apple's 9 November update removes from
    /etc/ssl/cert.pem. Mozilla and Chrome stop trusting what G1 issues after 16 Nov 2026; a CA file carries no such date.
  • REVIEW lines on a Mac. /etc/ssl/cert.pem gets one when it holds G1 or one of the CAs above, on any macOS
    release, with what to do on that release. So does a copy of it in /etc/ssl (on a release Apple names) that holds
    none of the October roots or keys but holds one of these, such as the Mac fix's own cleaned file: 0.1.16 said nothing
    of it. REVIEW lines don't change the exit code.
  • The note no longer says G1 "changes no result". For emSign Root CA - C1 and emSign ECC Root CA - C3 it says
    what it said.
  • The October code-signing CAs, EM OV CS CA - G3B and G3C, and their two cross-certificates under AAA Certificate Services, are in the record (comment 82, Appendices A and B). 0.1.16 named "two sign code" but carried
    only the six TLS keys. They are matched by fingerprint only, because their certificates aren't in this repository.
    Their lines are REVIEW, because whether a TLS reader trusts a code-signing CA in its CA file was not measured.

Not covered, and said so in the run's last line: certifi, Node.js and Linux bundles are not read for these keys. All of
them still hold emSign Root CA - G1, and no certifi or Node.js release without it exists yet (11 Nov 2026). The Mac
fix still removes only the October roots and keys, not G1.

The certificates are test/support/fixtures/emudhra-2026-11-g2-cas.pem, eMudhra's list is
test/support/fixtures/emudhra-2026-11-bug2083449-c82.tsv (both described in that folder's README), and the tests are
test/emudhra-g2-0.1.17.test.mjs and new cases in test/apple-update-0.1.16.test.mjs and
test/apple-fix-0.1.14.test.mjs.

Verifying this release

The npm package and the source archive carry a Sigstore attestation bound to the workflow run and commit
that built them. There is no key to import.

npm pack wardlatch@0.1.17
gh attestation verify wardlatch-0.1.17.tgz --repo deimos-hq/wardlatch \
  --signer-workflow deimos-hq/wardlatch/.github/workflows/release.yml --source-ref refs/tags/v0.1.17 \
  --deny-self-hosted-runners

See docs/RELEASING.md for the offline check with the attached bundle, and for the signed tag.

wardlatch 0.1.16

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@github-actions github-actions released this 11 Nov 07:20
Immutable release. Only release title and notes can be modified.
v0.1.16
608474c

Two new incidents, CISA's dates under five, and Macs that took Apple's 9 November update now get answers instead of
"could not be tested".

  • Brotli, CVE-2026-111497 (brotli-2026-10). The decoder flaw in Node.js, Bun, Python packages (Brotli, brotlicffi,
    Pillow, opencv-python) and Brotli libraries. CISA lists Google's Brotli as known to be exploited (added 27 Oct 2026,
    due 10 Nov). Wardlatch reads each decoder's own bytes, because version numbers mislead here (Node.js 26.12.1 is fixed
    and reports Brotli 1.2.0). On a Mac it also says what Apple's notes of 9 Nov say of macOS's own copy.
  • Google Chrome, CVE-2026-125350 (chrome-2026-11). Fixed in 157.0.8103.50 (.50 or .51 on Mac and Windows) on
    9 Nov; Google says an exploit exists in the wild, and CISA added it to its catalog on 10 Nov (due 24 Nov). Wardlatch reads the installed version and never starts Chrome.
  • CISA's catalog dates under every incident CISA lists as exploited: SSHole, Brotli, PHP, Plex and Chrome.
  • After Apple's update (macOS 27.2.1, 26.7.3, 15.8.3): 0.1.14 and 0.1.15 read the built-in curl and python3 as
    "could not be tested" on an updated Mac, because those tools now refuse the compromised certificates even when the
    withdrawn roots are put back. That refusal is now counted for what it is, Apple's own block.

Sources: CISA's catalog,
Brotli 1.2.1,
Apple's notes for macOS 27.2.1, 26.7.3
and 15.8.3, Apple's eMudhra page,
Chrome's stable update of 9 Nov.
The two cert.pem files measured on one Mac on 10 Nov 2026, before and after its update to 27.2.1, are described in
test/support/fixtures/README.md (the other measurements quoted here are in our inspection records, not in this
repository); the tests are test/brotli-0.1.16.test.mjs, test/brotli.test.mjs,
test/kev.test.mjs, test/apple-update-0.1.16.test.mjs and test/chrome-0.1.16.test.mjs.

Security

One defect in released code that could read SAFE where something was wrong.

  • A path with .. after a link was cleaned up as text, so Wardlatch read, ran or hashed another file than the one
    your programs use
    (0.1.0 to 0.1.15). Found on 25 Oct 2026 while building the Brotli check (fixed there in
    28a72c2), recorded on 1 Nov as a defect in released code, and shipped only now: past SECURITY.md's 7 days, because
    it was not split out of an unfinished branch. Details under Fixed below.

Added

  • CISA KEV lines. An incident whose CVE is in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog prints one line under
    its title, in CISA's own vendor and product words ("CISA KEV: Google Brotli CVE-2026-111497 is known to be exploited ·
    added 27 Oct 2026 · due date for US federal agencies 10 Nov 2026 · "), and --json carries the rows with their
    links under incidents[].kev. Wardlatch never fetches the catalog: scripts/kev-snapshot.mjs copies the rows from a
    whole read of CISA's feed before a release (it refuses a partial one), and test/kev.test.mjs fails if an incident
    file and that copy disagree in either direction. Catalog 2026.11.10: SSHole, Brotli, PHP (two CVEs), Plex (four) and
    Chrome are listed; GitLab's CVE-2026-110264 is not. A date that is not a real day, or a due date before the date
    added, stops the run.

  • chrome-2026-11. Reads Chrome's Info.plist in /Applications and ~/Applications and dpkg's record of
    google-chrome-stable. Below 157.0.8103.50 is EXPOSED. At or past it is REVIEW, not SAFE: a Chrome left open since
    it updated runs the old version until it restarts, and no file says which version is running. Other Chromium
    browsers, Chrome's other channels and Chrome from snap, Flatpak or an RPM are named under "not covered".

  • macOS's own Brotli. On a Mac the Brotli check gives one row from the macOS version and Apple's notes of 9 Nov
    2026, and says that is all it rests on (Apple's copy is inside the system, not a file Wardlatch reads): SAFE on
    27.2.1, 26.7.3, 15.8.3 or later; EXPOSED, with "update macOS", before them; could not be tested on macOS 14 or older,
    for which Apple names no update. It stands in for no other row: the all-clear for copies on disk is still given.

  • Leftover copies of /etc/ssl/cert.pem. On a release Apple names, each /etc/ssl/cert.pem.* that still holds a
    withdrawn root (by key) is a REVIEW line, the Mac fix's own backup included. Apple says not to restore a backup made
    before the update, and to delete it once you have updated; Wardlatch adds: don't restore it even if a program stops
    connecting after the update. Read, never changed.

  • pip's own CA list (pip/_vendor/certifi/cacert.pem, in the machine's Python folders and in apps' Pythons) is read
    by key: a REVIEW line when it still holds a withdrawn root, saying which pip on which Python it is. pip 24.2 and later
    on Python 3.10 or later ask the system's trust and use this list only with --use-deprecated=legacy-certs (on one
    Mac on 27.2.1, pip 26.1.2 and 26.2.1 given that flag connected to a compromised test host of the emSign family);
    older pips, and any pip on Python 3.9 or older, use it for every download (pip's own index_command.py). Whether
    such a line should be EXPOSED is left open: whether a download is refused depends on that Python's TLS library.

  • certifi inside apps' own Pythons (Blender, Unity's Emscripten Python) is read by key: a REVIEW line when it holds
    a withdrawn root. Those Pythons' plain ssl default reads no list; their bundled certifi and requests accepted
    compromised hosts on one Mac. Whether the apps themselves connect that way was not shown.

  • Read by key. Where a CA file is judged as a file (lib/macos.mjs bundleHolds), each certificate's public key is
    compared with the two withdrawn roots and the seven withdrawn keys, so a relabelled, re-issued or cross-signed copy
    is caught; a block that can't be read keeps the line at "could not be tested", never SAFE.

  • brotli-2026-10: the Brotli decoder flaw (CVE-2026-111497), in Node.js, Bun, Python packages and Brotli
    libraries.
    Built over twelve review rounds (24 Oct to 1 Nov 2026) on a side branch, and landed in 0.1.16. A new kind of check
    (bundled, lib/brotli.mjs) that reads the decoder itself instead of a version number, because the version numbers
    mislead here: Node.js 26.12.1 is fixed and reports Brotli 1.2.0, Homebrew's node uses Homebrew's Brotli, Debian's
    fixed packages keep 1.0.9 and 1.1.0. The fix added an error code, so a fixed decoder's error table holds the string
    _ERROR_FORMAT_BLOCK_SWITCH. Others used that error name as the sign of the fix before this check:
    OrchestratorInc/agent-orchestrator pull request #7107 looked for the string in a library file, and baealex/BLEX pull
    request #580 asked the decoder for it at run time (BrotliDecoderErrorString(-17)), both on 23 October. Wardlatch's is
    the same idea, built into the check: an exact, NUL-delimited match plus a control string every decoder has
    (_ERROR_FORMAT_BLOCK_LENGTH_1), reading bytes only. Trail of Bits' brotli-checker is another tool that finds bundled
    copies; it checks source trees and ELF builds, and Wardlatch points to it.

    • Brotli 1.0 writes the same table without the prefix (1.0.x's BrotliDecoderErrorString has return #NAME;, 1.1.0
      on return #PREFIX #NAME;; both read in google/brotli's own c/dec/decode.c at v1.0.9, v1.0.10 and v1.1.0), so
      Debian 12's libbrotli1 1.0.9 holds BLOCK_LENGTH_1, and 1.0.10, the fix on the 1.0 line, adds BLOCK_SWITCH
      (code -17, right after DISTANCE). Those short words could be in any program, so that form is judged only as a
      whole table (maintainer, 2026-10-25): the names from HUFFMAN_SPACE to DISTANCE in Brotli's order
      around BLOCK_LENGTH_1, each NUL-delimited (up to 16 NULs between two, as a compiler pads strings it aligns),
      either way round (the order decode.h lists them, as clang lays them out, or by code), then BLOCK_SWITCH and
      DICTIONARY_NOT_SET (1.0.10), DICTIONARY_NOT_SET at once (1.0.4 to 1.0.9), or COMPOUND_DICTIONARY and
      DICTIONARY_NOT_SET (1.0.3, the first affected release, whose decode.h lists DISTANCE then
      COMPOUND_DICTIONARY).
    • What proves SAFE: the marker exactly as often as the control, in the file (in each build of a universal Mach-O file,
      with every Brotli library a file with a table also links SAFE too) or in the Brotli library it links (every
      candidate, by its real path, named in the receipt), or a Debian package version its table lists as fixed, for the
      very file that package installed (dpkg's md5sums list names it with the same MD5). In Brotli 1.0's form: every copy
      of BLOCK_LENGTH_1 in a whole table with BLOCK_SWITCH in its place, and BLOCK_SWITCH nowhere else.
    • What is EXPOSED: the control without the marker (or fewer markers than controls), in the file or its library; a
      whole Brotli 1.0 table without BLOCK_SWITCH (a fixed 1.1-form table beside it included), which for a Debian
      library hands over to its package version as the 1.1 form does (Debian 12's own 1.0.9-2+b6 reads EXPOSED by both;
      its security build 1.0.9-2+deb12u1 adds BLOCK_SWITCH in its place and reads SAFE by its table alone); a Debian
      package built from a source version its table lists as without the fix (every rebuild, such as 1.1.0-2+b7, keeps
      its source's version), again for the file that package installed. A bundled copy with no fixed release yet
      (Pillow, opencv-python) is EXPOSED, and its fix line says no release had a fixed Brotli on 10 November and to...
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wardlatch 0.1.15

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@github-actions github-actions released this 10 Nov 19:19
Immutable release. Only release title and notes can be modified.
v0.1.15
d8d0532

The first new incident since 22 October: SSHole, CVE-2026-123158. sshd in OpenSSH before 10.6p2, on Linux with musl
libc and without PAM, accepts a very long password for an account whose password field is * (no password set, as for a
key-only account) when another local account has a $5$ or $6$ hash. Alpine's advisory says 257 to 1024 bytes; the CVE
record says between 256 and 1024 characters. Alpine is such a system. CISA added it to its Known Exploited
Vulnerabilities catalog on 9 Nov 2026, due 12 Nov. Sources:
Alpine's advisory (5 Nov),
the CVE record,
OpenSSH 10.6p2's release notes,
Alpine's secdb for each branch's fixed build, and
CISA's catalog.
This fixes no security defect in Wardlatch, so there is no advisory. test/sshole-0.1.15.test.mjs holds the tests.

Added

  • sshole-2026-11, Linux only, read-only. It never runs sshd (not even sshd -T) and never connects to a port.
    • musl or not: /etc/alpine-release, or musl's loader /lib/ld-musl-*.so.1. A glibc system is SAFE only when
      every sshd program found names glibc's loader; one that doesn't may be built against musl, and is UNKNOWN.
    • The package: openssh-server, and Alpine's two PAM builds openssh-server-pam and openssh-server-krb5 (both
      built --with-pam, per aports main/openssh/APKBUILD), in
      /lib/apk/db/installed, judged against Alpine's fixed builds (edge 10.6_p2-r0, 3.24 10.3_p1-r2 … 3.16 9.0_p1-r6).
      Alpine backported the fix, so on 3.24 10.3_p1-r2 is fixed though it is below 10.6p2, and 10.3_p1-r1 is not. At or
      above 10.6_p2 a build is fixed anywhere. Below it, only the fix of the branch /etc/alpine-release names counts:
      revision numbers mean nothing across branches (edge built an unfixed 10.0_p1-r11 in September 2025, the very
      version of 3.22's fixed build), so a newer build pinned from another branch is UNKNOWN, and on edge, on 3.15 or
      older, or where the release can't be read, anything below 10.6_p2 is not fixed, except a version that is one of
      Alpine's fixed builds, which can't be told apart there and is UNKNOWN (so is 3.23's fixed build on 3.24). A version
      that can't be read is UNKNOWN. An sshd program apk didn't install, or a link where apk installed one, makes a
      fixed package UNKNOWN. Beside an unfixed one it is named as not read, and since it may read a configuration other than
      /etc/ssh's,
      nothing in /etc/ssh can make the row REVIEW then; only the account reasons can.
    • A fixed package with an older daemon: Alpine says upgrading doesn't restart a running sshd. A running sshd
      (or sshd.pam, sshd.krb5) that started before its program was installed is UNKNOWN with "restart sshd". The
      install time is the file's inode change time, since apk sets each file's modification time from the package. The start
      times come from /proc, and are believed only when this process's own start, read the same way, comes out right.
    • An unfixed package is EXPOSED, unless something Alpine's advisory says the flaw needs was read as missing,
      which makes it REVIEW (still to update): PasswordAuthentication no with no Match block setting it again, a PAM
      build alone with UsePAM yes, no account with * that the flaw can use, or no $-hash. Any setting in
      /etc/conf.d/sshd, a second sshd instance, or a running sshd started with -o or -f on its command line (read
      from /proc/<pid>/cmdline) makes the settings "not read", as does a command line or a process list this can't read,
      or an Include it can't read. A REVIEW line names what wasn't read, as an EXPOSED line does.
      /etc/shadow is read only when this user may (usually root), and only counted: no name, field or hash is printed.
      /etc/passwd is read for accounts with * and no shadow line. Root counts only with PermitRootLogin yes, as
      Alpine says. Accounts from a directory service can't be seen here, so they never make it REVIEW. What couldn't be
      read is named on the line.
    • The fix is Alpine's: apk upgrade -U -a, then restart sshd, or turn password logins off until then (after checking
      that a key login works). Wardlatch doesn't read logs, so it can't say whether anyone got in; it gives Alpine's
      advice on where to look.
    • Not covered: sshd in containers and images.

Verifying this release

The npm package and the source archive carry a Sigstore attestation bound to the workflow run and commit
that built them. There is no key to import.

npm pack wardlatch@0.1.15
gh attestation verify wardlatch-0.1.15.tgz --repo deimos-hq/wardlatch \
  --signer-workflow deimos-hq/wardlatch/.github/workflows/release.yml --source-ref refs/tags/v0.1.15 \
  --deny-self-hosted-runners

See docs/RELEASING.md for the offline check with the attached bundle, and for the signed tag.

wardlatch 0.1.14

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@github-actions github-actions released this 10 Nov 18:24
Immutable release. Only release title and notes can be modified.
v0.1.14
253b08a

Apple shipped its fix for /etc/ssl/cert.pem on 9 November 2026, and from that day Wardlatch's words "no macOS release
has fixed it yet" and "run this again after every update" were wrong. Apple says macOS 27.2.1, 26.7.3 and 15.8.3 remove
the two withdrawn roots from the file, "along with three other eMudhra root CA certificates", and that on these releases
the built-in command-line tools stop accepting the 12 compromised certificates
(Apple, support.apple.com/en-us/149555, as published on 9 Nov 2026). This
release says so. No result changes: SAFE, EXPOSED and UNKNOWN still come from what each tool does with the test hosts,
not from a version number. This fixes no security defect, so there is no advisory. test/apple-fix-0.1.14.test.mjs
holds the tests.

Changed

  • The built-in curl's and python3's fix texts follow the macOS release. On a Mac, Wardlatch reads ProductVersion
    from /System/Library/CoreServices/SystemVersion.plist (a file read; nothing is run for it).
    • On 27.2, 26.7.2, 15.8.2 or any earlier release of those three, or when the version can't be read, an EXPOSED
      /usr/bin/curl or /usr/bin/python3 is told to update macOS, and to use the Mac fix if it can't.
    • On macOS 14 or older, for which Apple names no update, it is told to update to macOS 15 or later if it can, and
      otherwise to use the Mac fix.
    • On 27.2.1, 26.7.3, 15.8.3 or later, where Apple says the roots are gone, it is told how to look at the file, that
      Apple says not to restore a backup made before the update, and how to remove the roots.
    • The python3 text no longer says "see the curl line", which wasn't there when curl read SAFE.
  • A note under the eMudhra rows on a Mac: the macOS version, what Apple says of it, and whether /etc/ssl/cert.pem
    still holds emSign Root CA - G1, emSign Root CA - C1 or emSign ECC Root CA - C3, the three other roots Apple's
    update removes. Apple did not say their keys were compromised, so they are a note and change no result. On a release
    Apple says removes them, a file that still holds them is not what Apple says the update installs, and the note says so.
    A file from which no certificate can be read says that, rather than nothing. --json carries the note as macos:
    { version, appleFix, source, notes }.
  • An UNKNOWN for the built-in curl or python3 on 27.2.1, 26.7.3, 15.8.3 or later says why it may be one. Apple says
    those releases block the 12 certificates in the built-in tools themselves, which could make the test's forced-roots
    control fail too. We haven't measured that on an updated Mac, so the row stays UNKNOWN and says so, and its reason
    no longer says the error was not a block.
  • The words "a macOS update puts Apple's original file back" are now about a Mac that can't update to those
    releases.
    We measured updates to 26.7.2 (27 Oct) and 27.2 (28 Oct) doing it. We haven't measured what an update to
    27.2.1, 26.7.3 or 15.8.3 does to a file already changed by hand, and nothing here says.
  • The Mac fix download has a new digest, for its words only. Its opening comment, the scope lines under every SAFE
    and the message for a damaged file said that no macOS release had fixed the file and that every update undoes the fix.
    They name Apple's releases now, and the Undo line says Apple's own limit on it: don't undo after updating to 27.2.1,
    26.7.3 or 15.8.3. No line of its logic changed, and no verdict or exit code. Its SHA-256 is
    0dae0dc901a23aba216211f4ef6002a6d75b232fe479ef79db463d5c1dc9b98c; a copy with SHA-256 893f53cb... needn't be replaced.
  • The Mac fix's test suite could fail on a run that was fine. test/fix-macos.check.sh piped the output into
    grep -q, and under pipefail grep stopping at its first match can kill the writer, so a case read "printed no line"
    while it had printed two. Seen once in four runs under load; the old form failed 7 times in 300 on a 5,000-line output.
    It reads a here-string now.

Verifying this release

The npm package and the source archive carry a Sigstore attestation bound to the workflow run and commit
that built them. There is no key to import.

npm pack wardlatch@0.1.14
gh attestation verify wardlatch-0.1.14.tgz --repo deimos-hq/wardlatch \
  --signer-workflow deimos-hq/wardlatch/.github/workflows/release.yml --source-ref refs/tags/v0.1.14 \
  --deny-self-hosted-runners

See docs/RELEASING.md for the offline check with the attached bundle, and for the signed tag.

wardlatch 0.1.13

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@github-actions github-actions released this 03 Nov 03:25
Immutable release. Only release title and notes can be modified.
v0.1.13
f576aa8

We found every defect under Security below ourselves, on 2 November 2026, while checking the advisories for 0.1.11 and
0.1.12. Each could read SAFE where something was wrong. If 0.1.12 or earlier said SAFE, run this version. The advisory is
GHSA-2q92-ggx3-wq82. test/seat11.test.mjs holds the tests; L1 runs on Linux only.

Security

  • A project file one level past the header walk was not read. A folder past a walk's limit that holds only files
    makes no row, so a .mcp.json in a project with no .git, five levels below a folder searched, read SAFE. The
    walk reads the project files one level past its limit now.

  • The quick look stopped at a link. ~/app/proj as a link to a project with a stealer in its .venv read SAFE,
    reachable or locked. The quick look now goes through a link that leads to a folder, as deep as it goes into a folder.
    A locked target is UNKNOWN. On a Mac, EPERM there is named under the result as ~/.Trash is, because ~/OneDrive as a
    link to a folder macOS protects would otherwise end every run in exit 2. A link past a locked folder can't be told
    from a link to a file, and the quick look still reports only one named like a venv.

  • A venv whose own name isn't valid UTF-8 had no row at the quick look's last level, on Linux. It is UNKNOWN now.

Changed

  • The Mac fix download has a new digest, for its words only. Its comments and three of its messages said that a site
    loading "through this file" showed what the file trusts. The Mac's curl also falls back to Apple's trust (seat 16,
    measured 2 Nov 2026), so they say what was measured now, and the message for a test site still trusted after the fix
    names that third cause. No line of its logic changed, and no verdict or exit code. A copy with SHA-256 c8bba160... needn't be
    replaced.

Verifying this release

The npm package and the source archive carry a Sigstore attestation bound to the workflow run and commit
that built them. There is no key to import.

npm pack wardlatch@0.1.13
gh attestation verify wardlatch-0.1.13.tgz --repo deimos-hq/wardlatch \
  --signer-workflow deimos-hq/wardlatch/.github/workflows/release.yml --source-ref refs/tags/v0.1.13 \
  --deny-self-hosted-runners

See docs/RELEASING.md for the offline check with the attached bundle, and for the signed tag.

wardlatch 0.1.12

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@github-actions github-actions released this 02 Nov 23:15
Immutable release. Only release title and notes can be modified.
v0.1.12
2f03b46

We found every defect under Security below ourselves, on 2 November 2026, in a second read of 0.1.11 made after it
shipped, three reviews of this release's drafts, and a differential against 0.1.11 over about 250,000 generated cases. Each could read SAFE where something was wrong. If 0.1.11 or
earlier said SAFE, run this version. The Mac fix download doesn't change. The advisories SECURITY.md promises for these
defects, and for those in 0.1.11, are not open yet. test/seat6.test.mjs to test/seat10.test.mjs hold the tests. Two of seat 6's, I4-H2 and R11, pass on 0.1.11: they pin fixes already made. There is no test for the Linux
link name.

Security

  • Apple's own Python folders were never searched. /Library/Python/3.x/site-packages, where sudo pip3 installs, and
    the site folders of the Command Line Tools and Xcode are the ones /usr/bin/python3 names, and none was on the list.
    A stealer in one read SAFE, exit 0.

  • A link to a folder the run couldn't reach was dropped with no row. All four walks asked whether a link led to a
    folder, and a locked target is neither a folder nor gone. A venv, repository or WordPress site behind one read SAFE,
    exit 0, while the same link reachable read UNKNOWN. On Linux a link with a name that isn't valid UTF-8 fell in the same
    hole. Below the folders searched it is UNKNOWN now, and so is a link to a file behind a locked folder, which the run
    can't tell from one. In the quick look round the home folder only a link named like a venv is reported.

  • The quick look missed a venv it could not enter. ~/app/.venv as a link to a locked target, or a folder of mode
    0644, read SAFE. It is UNKNOWN now, and so is any folder of that mode there, whatever its name.

  • 0.1.11 put a name back in charge of a verdict. Its quick look left out .Trash, Photo Booth Library and
    *.photoslibrary by name at any depth, so a locked ~/Documents/clients.photoslibrary holding a stealer read SAFE and
    the same folder called work read UNKNOWN. Now only ~/.Trash, and Photo Booth Library and any *.photoslibrary in
    ~/Pictures, are left out, and only on EPERM, which macOS gives there and a sandbox or security tool can give too.
    When they are refused they are not searched, and the line under the result names them, says how many items at their
    top level went unsearched, and says how to search them: Full Disk Access, or emptying the Trash. macOS answers for a folder's own metadata
    while refusing its contents, so a refused folder holding nothing is proven empty and isn't mentioned. That works on APFS;
    on another disk the count is left out.

  • The temp-folder fix in 0.1.11 stopped short. With /private/var/folders, or the level below it, refused, the run
    read SAFE, exit 0, with T gone from what it looked at. Those levels are UNKNOWN now, as is the per-user folder through
    T's row, except zz, which holds only system users. Inside a sandbox that refuses them this can read UNKNOWN where nothing is wrong: it is a place not looked at.

  • A sitecustomize.py changed by one byte read SAFE. The published file was EXPOSED and anything else had no row,
    by an option that silenced the line. It is a REVIEW line now, and the option is gone. A file of that name inside a
    site-packages turns that check's SAFE into REVIEW, exit 0. Homebrew's own is one folder up and isn't read. A
    sitecustomize/ package, or either compiled with no source, which Python runs the same way, is a REVIEW line too. The
    owner's decision, 2 Nov 2026.

  • WordPress leftovers read SAFE. <site>/content/plugins beside a stock site is checked now, as backup/plugins was,
    and so is a folder under any parent that holds a listed plugin (wp-content/upgrade, backup/old). A folder holding a
    listed plugin's main file is that plugin, whatever it is called (rank-math-pro, a pasted version number, a change of
    case), in the live plugins folder too, where it had only an "added" REVIEW line. A folder with the plugin's name in it,
    set off by anything but a letter or digit (plugin copy, plugin 2, old-plugin), and without the main file, has its
    indicator searched and is a REVIEW line. So is a folder of the exact name in a parent with no plugins in its name; it
    was not looked at before. A link at a copy's name counts. --paths naming a copy, a link to the plugin, or a folder holding
    its main file, is checked as the exact name is.

  • Private keys in forms LibreSSL loads read SAFE. Lengths that aren't minimal, however long; a constructed OCTET STRING;
    high-tag forms (3f 10, 3f 80 10, 1f 02), for the outer element and the ones inside; a version other than a single
    byte 0 or 1, however written; a short key with no NUL byte. These go through one reader now, which normalises the tag and
    the length, and they are found, or UNKNOWN where they can't be read. A file that merely begins 0., such as a VERSION of
    0.1.0, read UNKNOWN, exit 2, and no longer does.

  • Header forms read SAFE. In TOML, --header or http_headers in an inline table, a dotted key split by a quote, a
    quoted key holding =, a ] or a quoted word in a comment, multi-line strings and escapes: a small tokenizer now reads
    the file beside the line reader, and a row from either counts, so a file a strict parser gives up on loses nothing. Text
    inside a multi-line string can therefore be a REVIEW line. A file with a multi-line string never closed and no header the
    line reader can see is UNKNOWN, as broken JSON is. In git config, a
    value continued by a backslash on a file's last line with no line end, quotes inside a value (ada"@"example.org), and a
    CR or U+2028 inside one. A FIFO at .mcp.json in a project with no .git. A project file in a repository's subfolder is
    still not read, in this release or earlier.

Fixed

  • A PKCS #1 public key in DER read UNKNOWN, exit 2, for an ordinary public key. It stays quiet now, on its whole shape: two
    INTEGERs, a modulus and a small exponent.
  • A --paths folder that is a plugin's now checks its parent once, however many were named. The sitecustomize advice no
    longer lands on a Docker image's row, where it told a healthy machine to rotate every secret. Both were in drafts only.
  • test/round6.test.mjs failed in place of skipping inside a sandbox.
  • test/fix-macos.check.sh said it is safe on your own Mac, and on a Mac with a network it contacts the advisory's test
    host. Its header says so now, and how to keep it offline.
  • SECURITY.md said this repository is ahead of the download. It stopped being true on 2 Nov 2026.

Verifying this release

The npm package and the source archive carry a Sigstore attestation bound to the workflow run and commit
that built them. There is no key to import.

npm pack wardlatch@0.1.12
gh attestation verify wardlatch-0.1.12.tgz --repo deimos-hq/wardlatch \
  --signer-workflow deimos-hq/wardlatch/.github/workflows/release.yml --source-ref refs/tags/v0.1.12 \
  --deny-self-hosted-runners

See docs/RELEASING.md for the offline check with the attached bundle, and for the signed tag.

wardlatch 0.1.11

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@github-actions github-actions released this 02 Nov 13:44
Immutable release. Only release title and notes can be modified.
v0.1.11
50c741c

We found every defect under Security below ourselves, in reviews of our own work from 29 October to 2 November 2026,
and each entry ends with the day it was found and the day it was fixed (dates in US Pacific time, as the commits record
them). The fixes to the command ship in this package. The Mac fix download changes only when the site serves the new
script and its digest together (SECURITY.md, step 4), so a copy downloaded before then has none of its fixes. The
advisories SECURITY.md promises for these defects are not open yet.

Security

  • Folders Wardlatch could not open were passed over in four more places, and each read SAFE. All four are in 0.1.10
    too. A folder name that isn't valid UTF-8 read as not there, on Linux, and everything under it was skipped, in every
    walker. A folder the quick look round the home folder could not open was skipped with no row, so a stealer in
    ~/Documents read SAFE, exit 0, on a terminal without access to it; it is UNKNOWN now, except .Trash and the two
    Photos libraries, which macOS keeps to itself on every Mac. A settings file the system refused with EPERM was counted
    as not used, when the person's own tools may read it; it is UNKNOWN now. This user's own per-user temp folder that
    could not be listed was dropped; it is UNKNOWN now. And a PATH folder that can be entered but not listed hid
    php8.1; for a rule with several names it is UNKNOWN now. test/round6.test.mjs. Found and fixed 2 Nov 2026.

  • Fourteen more places a real finding read SAFE, found and fixed 2 Nov 2026. The git config parser now reads a section
    and key on one line, a value continued with a backslash, and a ; inside quotes. A TOML args array is read as a JSON
    one is. A compromised WordPress copy beside a core, under a folder like plugins.bak, in a folder named for its
    version, or at Version: 3.0.123.0 is matched; a single-file plugin added in the window is a REVIEW line. A dangling
    image with a known-bad digest is EXPOSED, and an engine whose list can't be read is UNKNOWN. A LiteLLM tag the rule's
    text names, with an unlisted digest, is a REVIEW line. A bare repository, a pip --target folder, and .mcp.json in a
    project with no .git are read. A failing program's warning is no longer taken for its version, a venv with only
    bin/python3 is probed, and a FIFO in place of a certifi bundle is UNKNOWN. test/seat5.test.mjs.

  • A failed control could hide the only EXPOSED the Mac fix can print (never released). Round 5 took the date off
    curl's 0 and left the 0 inside the control's if, so when the ordinary website failed for any reason (a DNS block, a
    firewall, a timeout, an inspecting proxy) the test site was not read, and a Mac whose curl verified the advisory's
    chain read SAFE, exit 0. 0.1.10 reads the test site first and never had this. The test site is now read before the
    control on both paths, the 0 is EXPOSED whatever the control says, and the control gates the 60 alone, as the
    script's comments already claimed. test/fix-macos.check.sh gains the case, with the 60 as its control. Found and
    fixed 2 Nov 2026 by the four-seat panel.

  • A committed private key written with non-minimal DER lengths was skipped with no row. derKind() reads the common
    encodings and LibreSSL reads more; a key rewritten with a five-byte length, or a two-byte version number, was neither
    found nor counted as unread, so the repository read SAFE, exit 0. A file that begins as a DER element and is not
    read as one is now UNKNOWN, on the working tree and on git's copy of a deleted file, whatever it is called.
    test/round6.test.mjs. Found and fixed 2 Nov 2026 by the four-seat panel.

  • The containers' date gate failed open. A missing or unreadable canaryNotAfter meant "not expired", so containers
    were probed past the real expiry and every refusal read SAFE. Latent: today's value parses. It now closes, and
    test/round6.test.mjs pins it. Found and fixed 2 Nov 2026 by the four-seat panel.

  • A --paths folder that isn't there said nothing on the checks that don't search it, and exited 0. The README
    promised an UNKNOWN line. It is one now, on every check. A folder that is there and plays no part is named under the
    all-clear as not searched, and in pathsNotSearched with --json, never in the receipt (AUDIT-11). Found 29 Oct
    2026, fixed 2 Nov 2026.

  • A NUL byte hid a withdrawn root from the Mac fix, and not from the tools the fix is about. macOS's
    /bin/bash 3.2 read cuts a line at its first NUL byte and drops the rest of it, and so does awk
    (measured: printf 'ab\0cd\n' comes back from read as ab, length 2). LibreSSL does not: it reads the file
    with BIO_gets in 253-byte pieces and cuts each piece at its first NUL, so on a line longer than 253 bytes it
    reads every piece after the first. So one certificate block could carry base64 that curl, git, ruby, perl
    and openssl decode as AAA Certificate Services or emSign ECC Root CA - G3 while the fix, reading the same
    block line by line, saw an innocent throwaway certificate — and said SAFE, exit 0, "no longer holds the two
    roots. Nothing changed", with the root still verifying through that file before and after. No earlier check caught
    it: the -----BEGIN marker still only ever started a line, so the round-3 gate matched nothing; the counts agreed;
    and every certificate the fix did read had a fingerprint and a key, so the completeness gate passed too. A
    line-length check cannot stand in for it, because awk measures the line it already cut: on such a file
    awk 'length($0)>252' reports no line at all. roots() now counts the NUL bytes on bytes, with tr, before it
    reads a line, and any at all makes the run UNKNOWN, exit 2, with nothing changed and a line saying why. Every path
    that reads the file for withdrawn roots goes through roots() — the snapshot, the backup, the re-reads from the
    file itself, the cleaned file and built() — so one test covers them all. The same refusal makes true a sentence
    that was not: strip() rewrote the file with awk, so every line holding a NUL byte came out cut short, while
    the header said it "removes only each withdrawn root's own lines … and nothing else in the file" (measured: Apple's
    file plus # admin note: keep\0 this whole line was rewritten with that line cut, under a SAFE that named only the
    roots). Apple's own file holds no NUL byte and no line over 231 bytes, so this costs it nothing.
    test/fix-macos.check.sh gains three cases: a block built so that LibreSSL reads the withdrawn root and a line
    reader does not, for each root, each shown first to be read that way by LibreSSL and to verify the root through the
    file (otherwise the case would measure nothing); a NUL byte outside any block, in a file that still holds both
    roots, so it is about a run that did rewrite the file; and the control that a file with no NUL byte is still
    fixed, without which a change that refused everything would pass. Found 31 Oct 2026, fixed 1 Nov 2026 (73038cb).

  • A compromised eMudhra intermediate, or emSign Root TLS CA - G3, left in the bundle read SAFE. The incident is
    a compromise of eight CA keys, six of them TLS, in 12 certificates. Removing the two withdrawn roots clears the
    compromised intermediates only for a reader that insists on a chain ending at a self-signed root in the file.
    /usr/bin/curl 8.7.1 does not: like curl since 7.68 on OpenSSL-style backends it takes every CA certificate in a
    --cacert file as a trust anchor, and Apple's git goes through the same libcurl, as does the built-in perl. So
    a cert.pem holding one of those intermediates kept trusting everything it had issued after both roots were gone,
    and the fix — which looked only for the two roots — said SAFE, exit 0, nothing changed. emSign Root TLS CA - G3,
    which issued six of the 12, is worse again: besides the cross-signed certificate the advisory's hosts serve, it
    exists as a self-signed certificate, which is a full trust anchor for every reader, python3 and the openssl
    CLI included, with no partial chain needed. Measured on the branch as it stood: all 14 of those certificates read
    SAFE, exit 0, unchanged, each still readable out of the file by LibreSSL afterwards; and the advisory's ov-g3c
    leaf verified through the cleaned bundle plus its intermediate under openssl verify -partial_chain, and failed
    through the cleaned bundle alone. The fix now carries seven more keys and removes any certificate holding one, by
    key, in the same way and with the same machinery as the roots' keys: the six compromised TLS intermediate keys
    (which cover all 12 certificates, because each intermediate was issued twice, under emSign Root TLS CA - G3 and
    under AAA Certificate Services) and emSign Root TLS CA - G3's own key, which covers both of its certificates at
    once. A bundle too small to rebuild that holds one of them is UNKNOWN with the key named, not "nothing to remove".
    lib/incidents/emudhra-2026-10.json carries the seven as withdrawnKeys, apart from distrustedRoots, which
    drives the probes' forced-roots control and has one PEM file and one canary group per entry. Each key value was
    derived from its certificates three times — LibreSSL 3.3.6, OpenSSL 4.0.3 and node's own crypto — and refused if
    it came out as the SHA-256 of no input (e3b0c442…). test/fix-macos.check.sh gains one case per certificate, 14
    of them, each with LibreSSL as the oracle that the key was in the file before the run and gone after it, counted by
    the SHA-256 of the SubjectPublicKeyInfo rather than by a name; plus the control that a bundle holding none of them
    is left alone, and the small-bundle case. test/incidents.test.mjs gains the data's own checks, including that
    none of the seven is in the macOS bundle Apple ships —...

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wardlatch 0.1.10

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@github-actions github-actions released this 27 Oct 13:09
Immutable release. Only release title and notes can be modified.
v0.1.10

Security

  • The Mac fix (fix/fix-macos.sh) could say SAFE for a file that still trusted the leaked eMudhra keys. It found
    the two roots by their === …/CN= name lines. Some copies of /etc/ssl/cert.pem (on some managed Macs) have no
    name lines, so it found neither root and removed nothing. If the advisory's test site then answered, it printed
    EXPOSED (exit 1) and changed nothing; if the site didn't answer, it printed "SAFE … no longer holds the two roots"
    (exit 0) for a file that still trusted the keys. It now finds the two roots by their SHA-256 fingerprints, removes
    them whether or not the file has name lines (on Apple's file, byte for byte the advisory's removal, as before), and
    refuses a file with a certificate it can't read (UNKNOWN, exit 2, nothing changed). It also refuses a file holding
    blocks curl trusts but the fix doesn't read (BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE, BEGIN X509 CERTIFICATE): an emSign root
    appended in that form would otherwise have read SAFE with the test site unreachable. It works on a snapshot of the
    file and won't replace it if it changed meanwhile, it refuses a file it can't read, and its re-test ignores
    ~/.curlrc (curl -q). test/fix-macos.check.sh gains the cases, counts the roots by fingerprint, and checks
    that each run prints nothing on stderr and leaves no temporary files; the new cases fail on the old script. The
    download on www.deimoscore.com changes with it (SHA-256 50e1e41d…21b1). The advisory's own one-line command has
    the same blind spot: on a file with no name lines it removes nothing.
  • The Mac fix now says that a macOS update puts Apple's original file back (macOS 26.7.2 did, on 27 Oct 2026), so it
    should be run again after every update; its last line says npx wardlatch@latest, and it names the tools the file
    covers (the built-in curl, git, python3, openssl, perl and ruby) and that Apple's pip3 has its own copy.

Fixed

  • The workflow review read SAFE without having read every workflow in the window, in two ways (0.1.0 to 0.1.9).
    Both came from giving git the window's start with git log --since.
    • The start was a bare date. The github-actions-2026-10 incident gave the window's start as 2026-09-01, passed
      to git as it was, and git reads a bare date as that day at the current time of day, in the zone git runs in: up
      to 0.1.8 the zone of the TZ Wardlatch was started with (the machine's when TZ was unset), which git got with
      the rest of the caller's environment, and in 0.1.9, which gives git no TZ, the machine's. So the window began on
      1 Sep at the hour the check ran: a workflow committed on 31 Aug, or on 1 Sep before that hour, was not read, and
      with nothing else found the review said "no workflow files added since 2026-09-01", SAFE, exit code 0. The sources
      say to check from 31 Aug (The Hacker News and StepSecurity, with no time zone), and GitGuardian reports a commit
      through the same compromised account at 00:30 UTC on 30 Aug. No test had a commit near the start of the window.
    • git stopped reading at a back-dated commit. Given --since, git stops following a line of history at the first
      commit dated before the start (its walk drops that commit before queueing its parents; only --since-as-filter,
      git 2.37 and later, doesn't). Whoever makes a commit sets its date, so one commit dated before the window, on top
      of a branch, hid every workflow added beneath it, however those were dated: on 0.1.9's code with git 2.54, a
      workflow committed on 10 Oct with a commit dated 1 Jan 2025 on top read SAFE, exit code 0; one beneath a
      back-dated commit with another workflow above it was left out; and a workflow on a side branch behind a
      back-dated commit, merged inside the window and the branch deleted, read SAFE. 0.1.9's known limits named this
      only for a later commit made on a machine with a wrong clock.
    • Also found while fixing this, each checked on 0.1.9's code with git 2.54. A commit whose committer date git can't
      read, on top of a workflow, did the same as a back-dated one (git takes it as 1970): SAFE. A workflow added on a
      side branch and removed again before the merge, all inside the window, read SAFE: given a path, git log follows
      only the parent a merge's files match and passed the side branch by. In a shallow clone cut inside the window, a
      workflow added and removed again below the cut was never seen (SAFE), and a workflow still there at the cut was
      listed as added by the cut commit, at that commit's date. Not a miss in 0.1.9: a replace ref (refs/replace/)
      couldn't put another commit in place of a workflow's commit (GIT_NO_REPLACE_OBJECTS=1, since 0.1.7; the commit
      the ref points to is read as one more commit), and a .git/info/grafts file wasn't read
      (GIT_GRAFT_FILE=/dev/null, in 0.1.9); both still hold.
    • The window now starts at 30 Aug 2026 00:00 UTC ("since": "2026-08-30T00:00:00Z", with its sources in
      sinceSource). The review takes only an explicit UTC instant (YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SSZ); anything else is
      UNKNOWN, never SAFE.
    • git gets no date at all. git log --all --format='%H %ct' lists every commit any branch, tag or other ref leads
      to, with its committer time in seconds since 1970, and the review keeps those on or after the start by comparing
      whole numbers in its own code. Then git log --no-walk=unsorted --stdin lists the workflow files that exactly
      those commits added: no walk, so no side branch is passed by, and only those commits are compared with their
      parents (a treeless partial clone with nothing in the window needs no tree, and reads SAFE as before).
      A committer time git prints that isn't a plain whole number (git prints none for a date it can't read) makes the
      repository UNKNOWN, never a commit left out. --since-as-filter would have kept the date in git, but needs git
      2.37, and Ubuntu 22.04 ships 2.34.1: every repository there would have read UNKNOWN.
    • A shallow repository is UNKNOWN, wherever its history is cut: "its history is cut (a shallow repository; the
      newest cut is commit …, dated 10 Oct 2026 12:00 UTC), so workflows added below the cut can't be seen: run git
      fetch --unshallow, then run again". Shallow means git rev-parse --is-shallow-repository says true, or the
      shallow file git reads (git rev-parse --git-path shallow) is there and not empty; one Wardlatch can't read is
      UNKNOWN too. A cut commit's date is no sign that the window is all there, because whoever makes a commit sets its
      date: an earlier cut of this fix read a history cut before the start as whole, so a --depth 1 clone of a tip
      dated 2025, over a workflow committed on 5 Sep 2026, read SAFE, exit code 0, with the workflow file in the clone's
      own tree. A shallow file can also be written into a full repository, and git then reads nothing below the commits
      it names.
    • The SAFE line names the instant and the date it compares: "no workflow files added in commits dated on or after
      30 Aug 2026 00:00 UTC (committer date) in N local repositories". The date a review line shows is the commit's
      committer date in UTC, the date of the time the review compares: a commit made at 30 Aug 2026 00:00 UTC from
      UTC-7, where it was still 29 Aug, shows 2026-08-30. Up to 0.1.9 the line showed the author date, and an earlier cut
      of this fix the committer date in the commit's own zone.
    • The WordPress check's addedSince was already an explicit UTC instant; a test now holds the start of every
      incident's window to one.
    • A file added more than once was listed at one commit (0.1.0 to 0.1.9, and this fix up to 3cff5c5). The review
      kept one line per workflow file, at the earliest commit in the window that added it. A file added, deleted and
      added again with other contents was listed once, at the first commit: Alice adds .github/workflows/ci.yml on
      5 Sep and deletes it the next day, Mallory adds ci.yml again on 8 Oct, and the review showed only "added …
      2026-09-05 Alice". It now lists every commit in the window that added each workflow file, one REVIEW line (and one
      --json row, with the same file and commit fields) per file and commit, newest first: "added 4123d9f
      2026-10-08 Mallory", then "added 3fc2679 2026-09-05 Alice". With nothing added in the window, the SAFE line is
      unchanged.
    • Still not covered: a workflow whose own commit is dated before 30 Aug 2026 isn't listed, because whoever makes a
      commit sets its date (ASSURANCE_CASE.md, section 4). And a change to a workflow file that already existed isn't
      listed; the check lists added files, as the campaign added them: a commit that only changes a workflow committed
      before the window reads SAFE.
    • What to do: if 0.1.0 to 0.1.9 said SAFE for github-actions-2026-10, run a release with this fix again, or
      paste this line at the top folder of each repository, in a POSIX shell such as bash or zsh (it doesn't run as
      pasted in PowerShell or cmd). It has no date in it (given one, git stops reading a branch at the first commit
      dated before it) and reads what the review reads, in one command:
      TZ=UTC GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH=1 GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=none git --no-pager --work-tree=. --no-replace-objects -c core.commitGraph=false -c advice.graftFileDeprecated=true log --all --full-history --root --no-renames --diff-merges=combined --diff-filter=A --name-only --no-show-signature --date=iso-strict-local --format='%h %ct %cd %an' -- .github/workflows
      It lists every workflow file that any commit of any branch, tag or other ref added, each under its commit's hash,
      committer time in seconds since 1970 (%ct), committer date in UTC (for convenience only) and author, whatever
      the date; a file added, deleted and added again is listed under each commit that added it, as the review lists
      it. **Review every line ...
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