3.0.0

What's Changed

• Make FIDO MDS blob decoding tolerant and align it with MDS v3.1.1 by @vanbukin in #32
• Improve tpm by @vanbukin in #30
• Harden ceremonies, decoding, attestation and FIDO metadata handling against the issues found by a WebAuthn L3 security review by @vanbukin in #33
• Ignore no chain validation errors in the default attestation trust path policy and keep the conformance relaxation in the FIDO Conformance demo by @vanbukin in #34
• Run the unit tests in parallel, each test case with its own fixture instance by @vanbukin in #35
• Serialize Uri-based expected origins in ASCII form and document origin validation, ceremony lifetime and FIDO metadata start-up by @vanbukin in #36
• Report the attStmt members outside the syntax of the packed and TPM formats with a single bounded Warning by @vanbukin in #37
• Reject registration responses with unknown, duplicate or too many transports and report every rejection with a Warning and a metric by @vanbukin in #38
• Count the anomalies and FIDO metadata failures that were only logged by @vanbukin in #39
• Reject the attestation of authenticators that the FIDO metadata doesn't allow to trust, also when it chains up to an embedded root by @vanbukin in #40
• Drop .NET 8 and .NET 9, target .NET 10 only by @vanbukin in #41
• Identify the FIDO U2F authenticator model by the attestation certificate only, not by the unsigned aaguid of the authenticator data by @vanbukin in #43
• Look up FIDO U2F metadata by the key identifier of the certificate, and accept self attestation and no attestation only with an empty trust path by @vanbukin in #42
• Load the FIDO metadata embedded in the application first, retry a failed download every minute and refresh the metadata daily by @vanbukin in #44
• Update libs by @vanbukin in #45
• Limit the size of attestationObject and authenticatorData, and don't use declared CBOR lengths as capacities by @vanbukin in #46
• Remove the android-safetynet attestation statement format by @vanbukin in #47
• Reject a FIDO U2F attestation statement whose authenticator data has a non-zero aaguid by @vanbukin in #48
• Limit the size of clientDataJSON by @vanbukin in #49
• Take the trust anchors of TPM and Android Key attestation from the metadata of the aaguid by @vanbukin in #50
• Move the settings that were overridable methods into WebAuthnOptions by @vanbukin in #51
• Reword a comment of the Android Key verifier tests by @vanbukin in #52
• Accept FIDO metadata blobs only when they are signed by the certificate of mds.fidoalliance.org by @vanbukin in #53
• Dispose the database connection when the storage context can't be created by @vanbukin in #54
• Accept FIDO metadata blobs only when their certificate chain ends at GlobalSign Root R46 by @vanbukin in #55
• Accept Android Key attestation of software keys in the FIDO conformance demo by @vanbukin in #56
• Explain the Android Key setting in the README of the FIDO conformance demo by @vanbukin in #57
• Keep the highest stored signCount and report a signCount that didn't increase by @vanbukin in #58
• Sanitize the unknown fmt, JSON errors and ceremony identifiers before they are logged by @vanbukin in #59
• Reject Android Key attestation statements whose certificates are in Google's revocation status list by @vanbukin in #60
• Remove the default implementations of interface methods by @vanbukin in #61

Full Changelog: 2.1.1...3.0.0