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v0.1.31

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@github-actions github-actions released this 16 Nov 04:58
· 172 commits to main since this release
3b78e26

⚠️ Isolation suites were not run for this tag

The Cilium packet-level suite and the Kata boot probe did not execute, so
tenant isolation is unverified and the control and guest image digests
were not verified by them. This release continues only because a
workflow_dispatch run set isolation_skip=true (acknowledgement none):
a tag push cannot take this path.

Set SANDBOX_ISOLATION_RUNNER and re-run the release without the skip
input. See docs/release-process.md#isolation-gate.

What's Changed

  • test: pin the reconciler's decision rules with property tests by @ejackson-vp in #198
  • test: check the PodSpec over the wire, not the returned name by @ejackson-vp in #199
  • test: fuzz the create, internal payment and controller-client surfaces by @ejackson-vp in #200
  • test: pin capacity, lifecycle and warm-pool invariants by @ejackson-vp in #201
  • test: boot the real API and controller in process by @ejackson-vp in #202
  • test: count the fuzz targets in the badge by @ejackson-vp in #203
  • fix: answer a rejected body the same way on both API surfaces by @ejackson-vp in #204
  • test: fuzz the internal session routes and the refund worker by @ejackson-vp in #206
  • test: pin the scheduler tick and the pool allocation policy by @ejackson-vp in #207
  • test: give capacity fixtures distinct node ids by @ejackson-vp in #208
  • test: add mutation testing for the three money modules by @ejackson-vp in #209
  • ci: run the packet-level isolation suite per relevant pull request by @ejackson-vp in #205
  • test: measure the Go guest and the fuzz corpora by @ejackson-vp in #210
  • test: kill the security-relevant payment mutants by @ejackson-vp in #211
  • test: drive the SDK transfer loops through a fake guest by @ejackson-vp in #212
  • test: point the blind fuzz targets at guest code, and prune leaked databases by @ejackson-vp in #213
  • fix: refuse an incomplete accepted block instead of throwing, and turn on two gates by @ejackson-vp in #214
  • security: close the launch blockers for a paid public beta by @ejackson-vp in #215
  • docs: add the ordered launch runbook by @ejackson-vp in #216
  • docs(security): rebase the review on the current revision and re-gate by @ejackson-vp in #217
  • feat(deploy): order tenants below the control plane, and remove private deployment references by @ejackson-vp in #218
  • fix(payments): prove the settlement transfer, not just the nonce by @ejackson-vp in #219
  • fix: make the two easy-to-leave-off states visible by @ejackson-vp in #220
  • fix(controller): record settled-but-unentitled debt from the chain by @ejackson-vp in #222
  • docs: operational readiness review, and two alerts that could never fire by @ejackson-vp in #223
  • test: attack the payment path, and fix the settlement record it broke by @ejackson-vp in #225
  • test: produce the Kata isolation evidence the gate was missing by @ejackson-vp in #227
  • test: raise api and sdk coverage, and ratchet the floors by @ejackson-vp in #226

Full Changelog: v0.1.30...v0.1.31

Images

Multi-arch (linux/amd64, linux/arm64), published to GHCR:

  • ghcr.io/ejackson-vp/sandbox-control:v0.1.31
  • ghcr.io/ejackson-vp/sandbox-guest:v0.1.31

These tags were created only after both images passed the Trivy
gate. Each image carries an SBOM and SLSA build provenance as OCI
attestations:

docker buildx imagetools inspect ghcr.io/ejackson-vp/sandbox-control:v0.1.31

Verifying provenance

The *.sigstore.json assets are keyless Sigstore bundles produced by
this workflow, covering exactly the digests above. Verify the image
itself:

gh attestation verify \
  oci://ghcr.io/ejackson-vp/sandbox-control:v0.1.31 \
  --repo ejackson-vp/sandbox

Add --bundle-from-oci to check the attestation stored in the
registry instead of the one on GitHub.

*.intoto.jsonl is the in-toto statement carried inside the bundle,
for SLSA tooling that consumes statements rather than bundles.

The guest image is what runs inside the microVM and must match the
cluster architecture. CVE results for this tag are in the Security
tab (trivy-control, trivy-guest).

Staging images from the build (staging-<run-id>-<sha>) are not
release artifacts; see docs/release-process.md for cleanup.