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v1.5.0

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@github-actions github-actions released this 01 Oct 15:06
· 99 commits to main since this release

v1.5.0

Full Sandbox: the execution boundary is now enforced where possible and stated honestly everywhere else. Filesystem tools are confined to the workspace through one hardened path, Git and search helpers run neutralized under the full process lifecycle, and WSL network isolation says exactly what it covers. "Full Sandbox" means complete and documented, not airtight. The limitations below are part of the release.

Changes

  • Filesystem reads, writes, listings, search, and secret scans share one hardened access path: workspace resolution, no-follow opens, descriptor checks (regular file, size cap, single link for writes), bounded context-aware I/O, and fchmod instead of path chmod. FIFOs, sockets, and devices are refused without blocking.
  • Git runs under the full process lifecycle with a minimal environment, -c core.fsmonitor= on every invocation, --no-textconv/--no-ext-diff on all diffs, and per-repository content-filter neutralization (filter drivers are replaced with a pass-through instead of repo binaries).
  • Windows children start suspended and resume only after Job Object assignment, closing the Start to Track race; output lines cap at 256 KiB; Runtime.Close reaps jobs then MCP servers; TUI quit waits bounded; headless runs close on exit. taskkill.exe resolves via System32.
  • Sandbox enforcement is structured data: ff doctor renders facts as info and limits as warnings, names the configured WSL distribution, and runs a safe interop canary (command -v only, no traffic).
  • Permission precedence is pinned by tests: boundary denial outranks every allow, session Deny outranks persisted Allow, sensitive paths escalate even under dual Allows, headless Ask fails closed.
  • MCP stays UNSANDBOXED by decision (warn, never refuse): doctor, both approval prompts, and /mcp list say so from one shared notice.

Fixes

  • WSL network: disabled no longer reads as complete egress denial: approval and doctor qualify it to Linux sockets. Windows .exe interop executes inside the namespace on the host stack (verified with an empty environment) and is refused lexically (curl.exe, explorer.exe, .exe catch-all) plus reported by the canary.
  • Refused file writes no longer truncate before validation; a denied multi-link or special-file write leaves existing content intact.
  • Stale process claims corrected (pre-Track coverage, PATH taskkill); loopback wording qualified; lifecycle tests made hermetic (effect-based setsid proof, backend-independent doctor test, live-backend gating).

Limitations

  • Windows has no O_NOFOLLOW/link-count equivalence; MkdirAll TOCTOU residual; setsid/SIGHUP bypass teardown (use tmux); WSL Linux-side processes may outlive the relay; staged WSL scripts are visible via /mnt; no CPU/memory/PID limits; no Linux/macOS isolation backend. Full list in docs/Sandbox.md.

Full Changelog: v1.4.2...v1.5.0