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- New ca-blocklist module with the SPKI SHA-256 hashes of the 8 compromised intermediates (each hash covers both the emSign-issued and the Sectigo cross-signed certificate) plus the 2 emSign G3 roots that Mozilla and Chrome distrust. Sectigo AAA and emSign Root CA - G1 are deliberately not blocked.
- Node path: wraps tls.checkServerIdentity at the top of the main entry and walks the issuer chain. Rejects with ERR_TLS_CERT_DISTRUSTED.
- Chromium path: session.setCertificateVerifyProc on the sessions listed below. Rejects with net::ERR_CERT_REVOKED.
*scripts/verify-ca-blocklist.js, run with npx electron scripts/verify-ca-blocklist.js.