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Smartable Wallet Core v2.0.0
Exported from Smartable Wallet 3.0.0 (build 23).
The recovery phrase's seed and every key derived from it now live in the key
core, a Rust library published here for the first time: once a wallet is
open, the Dart code holds a session with the core, not the phrase. This is
the same move from one implementation to another that a wallet core makes
when it rewrites its key handling in a lower-level language, and it is why
this is a major version. 1.0.0 and 1.0.1 are superseded by 2.0.0. Every
record they wrote — a sealed phrase, a PIN, a device-key record, a split
backup's shares — is read and opened by this version; new work should build
on 2.0.0, and 1.0.x receives no further changes.
Added
- The key core,
native/key_core/: the Rust crate that holds the recovery
phrase's seed and every key derived from it, opens the sealed phrase, and
signs a transaction or a message only after reading it itself; its C
interface (include/key_core.h), its Dart binding overdart:ffi
(dart/), whose build hook compiles the crate offline at the pinned
toolchain, and its tests against published vectors (THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md
names each source). - The split backup in the key core: SLIP-39 split, checked and recombined
there, each share sealed with Argon2id (argon20.5.3) and AES-256-GCM in
the same format the Dart code writes; a restore opens a wallet in the core
from the shares, so the phrase is never text on the way. - A phrase made or typed into the app is sealed in the core
(kc_seal_phrase), and an imported private key is opened there from its
record. - Zcash's transparent keys, addresses and ZIP-244 signatures, held to six
mainnet version 5 transactions and ZIP-320's reference addresses. - CI runs the key core's
cargo test, debug and release.
Changed
- BREAKING:
VaultKeeper.loadSeed,unlockWithPinand
unlockWithDeviceKeyopen the wallet and return nothing; they used to
return the recovery phrase. A caller that shows the words — for a backup —
asksrevealPhrase(password), which reads them from the stored record
behind the password. - BREAKING:
VaultHost.openedandVaultHost.switchedreceive the vault
key, from which the host opens its key-core session, instead of the phrase. - The
lib/core/,test/andnative/files are those of the app's
current source. Among them: the password's PBKDF2 runs off the main
isolate and writes over the typed secret's bytes when done
(crypto_utils.dart); the vault keeper stores a phrase the key core
sealed, for a first wallet and one added beside others, under a vault key
it draws (vault_keeper.dart); the share-sealing parameters
are read in one place, which the key core is handed
(sealed_share.dart). - The GitHub address in the README and the workflows is
github.com/getsmartableapp/core; the repository's home stays
gitlab.com/getsmartable-app/core.
Security
- After an unlock the phrase is no longer kept in the app's memory as text:
the seed is derived and every key used inside the key core, which signs a
transaction or a message only after reading it itself. What remains of a
typed secret is the text the platform's keyboard and text field held. - The password's PBKDF2 runs off the main isolate and overwrites the bytes of
the typed secret when it is done.
Checking this release — see docs/releasing.md:
sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS
gh attestation verify smartable-wallet-core-v2.0.0.tar.gz --repo getsmartableapp/coreSmartable Wallet Core v1.0.1
Superseded by 2.0.0. 2.0.0 moves the recovery phrase's seed and every key derived from it into the Rust key core, and reads every record this version wrote. This version receives no further changes; build on 2.0.0.
Exported from Smartable Wallet 2.2.0 (build 22).
No code changed: every file under lib/, native/ and test/, and
pubspec.lock, is the same as in 1.0.0. This version changes the
documentation only.
Changed
- The repository's home is gitlab.com/getsmartable-app/core: the README's
badges, links and clone address, therepositoryinpubspec.yamland the
address on the banner point there. - While GitHub Actions is not running for this repository, a version is
checked locally before it is published —flutter analyzeand the full test
suite on macOS — and its archive andSHA256SUMSare made with
git archivefrom the tag. This version carries no provenance attestation. - A vulnerability is reported by email only; GitHub's private vulnerability
reporting is not available here. Bug reports and proposed changes also go by
email.
Fixed
- The README and the 1.0.0 entry below said every split-backup share is
sealed under the wallet password. Shares kept on the phone and in cloud
accounts are; a share written on paper is its own words and is not sealed.
Checking this release — see docs/releasing.md:
sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS
gh attestation verify smartable-wallet-core-v1.0.1.tar.gz --repo getsmartableapp/coreSmartable Wallet Core v1.0.0
Superseded by 2.0.0. 2.0.0 moves the recovery phrase's seed and every key derived from it into the Rust key core, and reads every record this version wrote. This version receives no further changes; build on 2.0.0.
Exported from Smartable Wallet 2.2.0 (build 21).
Added
- The code that keeps Smartable Wallet non-custodial on the device, published
for the first time:- one form for every typed secret, Unicode NFC, then PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256
at 600,000 rounds — or, for a split-backup share, Argon2id with 64 MiB
of memory per guess; - encrypted-only secret storage that reports a secret it cannot decrypt
instead of deleting it; - each recovery phrase sealed under a random key of its own, which the
password only wraps, and every way one is opened: the password, the PIN
and biometric unlock; - the rule a password meets before anything is sealed under it: at least
twelve characters, and not mostly a run, a repeat, a year or a common
word; - the platform keys the wallet is sealed under: Android Keystore, StrongBox
first, and the iOS Secure Enclave; - the app PIN: every guess a key-store operation on the phone, then sealed
by a device key that on Android 15 and later works only while the phone is
unlocked; - biometric unlock bound to a key released once per use;
- one lockout for every password and PIN check, measured on the boot clock;
- SLIP-39 split backup, 2-of-3 and 3-of-5, each share sealed under a key
derived from the wallet password; a share written on paper leaves only a
note on the phone, never its words.
- one form for every typed secret, Unicode NFC, then PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256
Checking this release — see docs/releasing.md:
sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS
gh attestation verify smartable-wallet-core-v1.0.0.tar.gz --repo getsmartableapp/core