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v0.15.1
Fixed
- MCP002's
exfiltratalternative was a bare substring match with no
directive context, unlike every other phrase in the injection regex
(all of which require an actual command shape: "ignore previous
instructions", "do not tell the user", "before X read Y"). This meant
any comment or docstring merely discussing exfiltration, a normal
security term, not an injected instruction, false-positived at MEDIUM
severity. Found while dogfooding mcpscan against secops-toolkit-mcp,
whoseassess_shell_commandmodule comment ("well-documented
destructive/exfiltration shapes") tripped it. Narrowed to two directive
shapes that still catch real injected instructions: an imperative adverb
before the verb (silently/quietly/secretly/covertly exfiltrate), or the
verb followed by an object and a destination (exfiltrate the contents to <host>). 3 new regression tests confirm the false positive is gone
and both real-attack shapes still fire. 130 tests passing (was 127).
Full diff: v0.15.0...v0.15.1