Repository navigation
Immutable
release. Only release title and notes can be modified.
[1.1.0] — 2026-09-21
Phase 7 — Agent & A2A Authorization. AI agents (and agents calling
agents) can now obtain, delegate and chain OAuth tokens. Every capability
below is off by default and only advertised in discovery once its
OAUTH2_* flag is enabled — see docs/agents/README.md
for configuration and worked curl examples, and
docs/oauth2-spec-audit.md §10
for the full chunk tracker.
Added
- RFC 8693 Token Exchange, fully implemented:
actor_token/act/may_act
delegation, actor-profileactchains (depth-limited via
OAUTH2_MAX_DELEGATION_DEPTH), audience/resource validation against a new
protected-resources registry, and RAR (RFC 9396) subset enforcement across
exchanges. act,cnf, andresourceare now persisted on tokens and exposed by
introspection (POST /oauth/introspect).- Protected-resource registry (
resourcestable) with admin CRUD at
/admin/resources, and per-resource Protected Resource Metadata at
GET /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/{id}(RFC 9728 §3.1). - Trusted-issuer registry (
trusted_issuerstable) with admin CRUD at
/admin/trusted-issuers, backing a new
urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearerauthorization grant
(RFC 7523 §2.1) with JIT user provisioning. - Identity chaining and Identity Assertion Authorization Grant (ID-JAG)
support (draft-ietf-oauth-identity-chaining,
draft-ietf-oauth-identity-assertion-authz-grant): both acceptance (as an
assertion on the jwt-bearer grant) and issuance (via token exchange with
requested_token_type=id-jag), gated byOAUTH2_ID_JAG_ENABLED. - Transaction Tokens (
draft-ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens) with the
draft-liu-oauth-a2a-profile claims (purp, immutabletctx), gated by
OAUTH2_TXN_TOKENS_ENABLEDandOAUTH2_TRUST_DOMAIN, requiring asymmetric
client authentication. - Transaction Authorization Challenge
(draft-rosomakho-oauth-txn-challenge):POST /oauth/transaction_authorization,
a human approval page, and a polling grant
(urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:transaction-authorization), gated by
OAUTH2_TAC_ENABLED. - Client ID Metadata Document (CIMD) support
(draft-ietf-oauth-client-id-metadata-document): URL-shapedclient_ids
are resolved (SSRF-guarded, ≤5 KB, HTTPS-only) at/authorize,/oauth/par
and/oauth/token, gated byOAUTH2_CIMD_ENABLEDand capped by
OAUTH2_CIMD_MAX_CLIENTS. - Named-agent consent:
requested_actoron/authorizeplusactor_token
at code exchange, so the login page can name the agent acting for the
user, gated byOAUTH2_AGENT_OBO_ENABLED. - Workload identity polish: SAN-based mTLS client auth
(tls_client_auth_san_uri/_dns), RFC 7591 §2.3 software statements
attested via trusted issuers,sub_profileclassification (user/
service/ai_agent) on access tokens, and an optional AI-agent
access-token TTL cap (OAUTH2_AI_AGENT_ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_SECS). - DPoP
athclaim validation on introspection and a storage-backed DPoP
jtireplay store (dpop_jtis), replacing the in-memory-only replay guard
for multi-instance deployments. - Migrations V23–V31 for all of the above (delegation columns on
tokens,
theresourcesandtrusted_issuerstables,allowed_actorson
clients,requested_actoronauthorization_codes,dpop_jtis,
transaction_authorizations, workload-identity columns,cimd_managed).
Changed
Everything above is behind a flag. The changes in this section are not —
they apply to every deployment on upgrade.
- Token endpoint. A JWT client assertion's
audmay now be either the
issuer or the token endpoint URL (RFC 7523 §3 allows both; only the token
endpoint was accepted before).resourceandaudiencemay be repeated,
and the resulting access token carries a multi-valuedaud. - Refresh rotation. A refreshed token keeps the
actchain of the token
it replaces, so a delegation survives rotation instead of being silently
dropped. - Introspection responses gained
txn,purpandreq_wlfor
transaction tokens.actis returned only to an authenticated caller — it
names the delegating agent, so it is PII on the same footing assub. - Client registration. A
software_statementis now always verified,
whether or not trusted issuers are configured; an unsigned or
unknown-issuer statement is rejected withinvalid_software_statement
(previously it could be ignored). Self-service dynamic registration strips
body-suppliedallowed_actors,software_idandsoftware_version—
the last two are accepted only from a verified software statement, and the
admin endpoint remains exempt. Selectingtls_client_auth_san_urior
tls_client_auth_san_dnsrequires atls_client_auth_sanvalue. The
registration response gained three fields (allowed_actors,
software_id,software_version), and an RFC 7592 update replaces
tls_client_auth_sanrather than merging it. - Discovery (
/.well-known/openid-configurationand
/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server) gainedmtls_endpoint_aliases
and the two SAN client-authentication methods, and
authorization_details_types_supportedis now derived from the
authorization-details types actually registered in the database rather
than from a static list. - Login page now names the client that initiated the authorization
request (and the agent it asked to act, whenrequested_actorwas used).
Library API:handlers::login::login_pagetakes aSession. - Library API break (
oauth2-actix).handlers::dpop::validate_dpop_proof
andDpopReplayStore::check_and_insertare nowasync(the replay store
may hit the database), andDpopReplayStore's fields are private —
construct it withnew()/with_storage(). docs/oauth2-spec-audit.md§1 (Current Implementation Inventory) corrected
for Token Exchange, the JWT authorization grant, DPoP, mutual-TLS, and RFC
9728 Protected Resource Metadata — these had shipped in earlier waves but
§1 had gone stale.
Security
Also always on, and rejections where previous versions accepted the request:
- Token exchange hardening. A
subject_token_typeofjwtrequires the
JOSE header to saytyp: "at+JWT". A refresh token is never accepted as a
subject token (except on the ID-JAG path, where the draft calls for it). A
subject token carryingcnfrequires proof of possession — a DPoP proof or
the matching mTLS certificate — at the exchange. Exchanging a token issued
to a different client requires that client'sallowed_actorsto name the
requesting client. The resulting scope must be a subset of the requesting
client's own registered scope, not merely of the subject token's. - URL-shaped
client_ids are rejected withinvalid_clientunless CIMD
is enabled, instead of being looked up as an opaque identifier. - The transaction-approval form fails closed: only an explicit
action=approveapproves; any other (or absent) value denies. - Trusted issuers are an explicit, admin-controlled registry (
allowed_audiences,
subject_mapping,allowed_client_ids,jit_provision); email-based
subject mapping trusts the issuer to assert accurate local email addresses.
Seedocs/agents/README.md#security-considerations. - CIMD fetches are SSRF-guarded (loopback, private/link-local/CGNAT ranges
blocked; HTTPS-only; no redirects; ≤5 KB); materializedclientsrows are
capped byOAUTH2_CIMD_MAX_CLIENTSand never overwrite operator-set fields
on re-fetch — nor any client that was not itself created from a metadata
document. Row cleanup is not yet automated — a documented follow-up.
Seedocs/agents/README.md#security-considerations. - RFC 9470 step-up enforcement for the Transaction Authorization Challenge is
documented but not yet implemented — a documented follow-up.