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v1.1.0 — Agent & A2A OAuth

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@ianlintner ianlintner released this 21 Sep 13:27
Immutable release. Only release title and notes can be modified.
8fb0bdb

[1.1.0] — 2026-09-21

Phase 7 — Agent & A2A Authorization. AI agents (and agents calling
agents) can now obtain, delegate and chain OAuth tokens. Every capability
below is off by default and only advertised in discovery once its
OAUTH2_* flag is enabled — see docs/agents/README.md
for configuration and worked curl examples, and
docs/oauth2-spec-audit.md §10
for the full chunk tracker.

Added

  • RFC 8693 Token Exchange, fully implemented: actor_token/act/may_act
    delegation, actor-profile act chains (depth-limited via
    OAUTH2_MAX_DELEGATION_DEPTH), audience/resource validation against a new
    protected-resources registry, and RAR (RFC 9396) subset enforcement across
    exchanges.
  • act, cnf, and resource are now persisted on tokens and exposed by
    introspection (POST /oauth/introspect).
  • Protected-resource registry (resources table) with admin CRUD at
    /admin/resources, and per-resource Protected Resource Metadata at
    GET /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/{id} (RFC 9728 §3.1).
  • Trusted-issuer registry (trusted_issuers table) with admin CRUD at
    /admin/trusted-issuers, backing a new
    urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer authorization grant
    (RFC 7523 §2.1) with JIT user provisioning.
  • Identity chaining and Identity Assertion Authorization Grant (ID-JAG)
    support (draft-ietf-oauth-identity-chaining,
    draft-ietf-oauth-identity-assertion-authz-grant): both acceptance (as an
    assertion on the jwt-bearer grant) and issuance (via token exchange with
    requested_token_type=id-jag), gated by OAUTH2_ID_JAG_ENABLED.
  • Transaction Tokens (draft-ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens) with the
    draft-liu-oauth-a2a-profile claims (purp, immutable tctx), gated by
    OAUTH2_TXN_TOKENS_ENABLED and OAUTH2_TRUST_DOMAIN, requiring asymmetric
    client authentication.
  • Transaction Authorization Challenge
    (draft-rosomakho-oauth-txn-challenge): POST /oauth/transaction_authorization,
    a human approval page, and a polling grant
    (urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:transaction-authorization), gated by
    OAUTH2_TAC_ENABLED.
  • Client ID Metadata Document (CIMD) support
    (draft-ietf-oauth-client-id-metadata-document): URL-shaped client_ids
    are resolved (SSRF-guarded, ≤5 KB, HTTPS-only) at /authorize, /oauth/par
    and /oauth/token, gated by OAUTH2_CIMD_ENABLED and capped by
    OAUTH2_CIMD_MAX_CLIENTS.
  • Named-agent consent: requested_actor on /authorize plus actor_token
    at code exchange, so the login page can name the agent acting for the
    user, gated by OAUTH2_AGENT_OBO_ENABLED.
  • Workload identity polish: SAN-based mTLS client auth
    (tls_client_auth_san_uri/_dns), RFC 7591 §2.3 software statements
    attested via trusted issuers, sub_profile classification (user /
    service / ai_agent) on access tokens, and an optional AI-agent
    access-token TTL cap (OAUTH2_AI_AGENT_ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_SECS).
  • DPoP ath claim validation on introspection and a storage-backed DPoP
    jti replay store (dpop_jtis), replacing the in-memory-only replay guard
    for multi-instance deployments.
  • Migrations V23–V31 for all of the above (delegation columns on tokens,
    the resources and trusted_issuers tables, allowed_actors on
    clients, requested_actor on authorization_codes, dpop_jtis,
    transaction_authorizations, workload-identity columns, cimd_managed).

Changed

Everything above is behind a flag. The changes in this section are not —
they apply to every deployment on upgrade.

  • Token endpoint. A JWT client assertion's aud may now be either the
    issuer or the token endpoint URL (RFC 7523 §3 allows both; only the token
    endpoint was accepted before). resource and audience may be repeated,
    and the resulting access token carries a multi-valued aud.
  • Refresh rotation. A refreshed token keeps the act chain of the token
    it replaces, so a delegation survives rotation instead of being silently
    dropped.
  • Introspection responses gained txn, purp and req_wl for
    transaction tokens. act is returned only to an authenticated caller — it
    names the delegating agent, so it is PII on the same footing as sub.
  • Client registration. A software_statement is now always verified,
    whether or not trusted issuers are configured; an unsigned or
    unknown-issuer statement is rejected with invalid_software_statement
    (previously it could be ignored). Self-service dynamic registration strips
    body-supplied allowed_actors, software_id and software_version —
    the last two are accepted only from a verified software statement, and the
    admin endpoint remains exempt. Selecting tls_client_auth_san_uri or
    tls_client_auth_san_dns requires a tls_client_auth_san value. The
    registration response gained three fields (allowed_actors,
    software_id, software_version), and an RFC 7592 update replaces
    tls_client_auth_san rather than merging it.
  • Discovery (/.well-known/openid-configuration and
    /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server) gained mtls_endpoint_aliases
    and the two SAN client-authentication methods, and
    authorization_details_types_supported is now derived from the
    authorization-details types actually registered in the database rather
    than from a static list.
  • Login page now names the client that initiated the authorization
    request (and the agent it asked to act, when requested_actor was used).
    Library API: handlers::login::login_page takes a Session.
  • Library API break (oauth2-actix). handlers::dpop::validate_dpop_proof
    and DpopReplayStore::check_and_insert are now async (the replay store
    may hit the database), and DpopReplayStore's fields are private —
    construct it with new() / with_storage().
  • docs/oauth2-spec-audit.md §1 (Current Implementation Inventory) corrected
    for Token Exchange, the JWT authorization grant, DPoP, mutual-TLS, and RFC
    9728 Protected Resource Metadata — these had shipped in earlier waves but
    §1 had gone stale.

Security

Also always on, and rejections where previous versions accepted the request:

  • Token exchange hardening. A subject_token_type of jwt requires the
    JOSE header to say typ: "at+JWT". A refresh token is never accepted as a
    subject token (except on the ID-JAG path, where the draft calls for it). A
    subject token carrying cnf requires proof of possession — a DPoP proof or
    the matching mTLS certificate — at the exchange. Exchanging a token issued
    to a different client requires that client's allowed_actors to name the
    requesting client. The resulting scope must be a subset of the requesting
    client's own registered scope, not merely of the subject token's.
  • URL-shaped client_ids are rejected with invalid_client unless CIMD
    is enabled, instead of being looked up as an opaque identifier.
  • The transaction-approval form fails closed: only an explicit
    action=approve approves; any other (or absent) value denies.
  • Trusted issuers are an explicit, admin-controlled registry (allowed_audiences,
    subject_mapping, allowed_client_ids, jit_provision); email-based
    subject mapping trusts the issuer to assert accurate local email addresses.
    See docs/agents/README.md#security-considerations.
  • CIMD fetches are SSRF-guarded (loopback, private/link-local/CGNAT ranges
    blocked; HTTPS-only; no redirects; ≤5 KB); materialized clients rows are
    capped by OAUTH2_CIMD_MAX_CLIENTS and never overwrite operator-set fields
    on re-fetch — nor any client that was not itself created from a metadata
    document. Row cleanup is not yet automated — a documented follow-up.
    See docs/agents/README.md#security-considerations.
  • RFC 9470 step-up enforcement for the Transaction Authorization Challenge is
    documented but not yet implemented — a documented follow-up.