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@github-actions github-actions released this 15 Oct 08:05

Security: the daemon, database restores and the panel's tools are each held to their own privileges, and one app can no longer read another's files, logs or secrets.

What's New

  • The Ferrum daemon now listens on a Unix socket, /run/ferrum/ferrum.sock, instead of a local TCP port. nginx and the ferrum command use it automatically; nothing changes in how you reach the panel.
  • A person can be removed from Settings → People. Their passkeys, sessions and enrollment links go with them.
  • ferrum.toml packages must name existing Ubuntu packages; a deploy that lists one that does not exist is refused before anything is installed.
  • Custom nginx directives are checked before nginx sees them: directives that write files, load code or change TLS are refused, and root and alias must stay inside the app's release. Directives already saved keep working and are checked the next time they are saved.

Bug Fixes

  • Any program on the server could take over the daemon's local port while Ferrum restarted and receive the panel's sessions and tokens from nginx. The daemon now answers on a socket only root can create, and app processes can bind only their own port.
  • An application could be given the panel's own hostname as a domain and take over the panel's traffic and certificate. The panel's hostname is refused.
  • Loading a plain-SQL dump, or restoring a database snapshot during a rollback, ran as the PostgreSQL superuser, so a crafted dump or a compromised app's schema could take over the whole cluster. Restores now connect as the database's own role.
  • Enabling the firewall on an Oracle Cloud server removed Oracle's own outbound rules, which keep the boot volume's iSCSI endpoint root-only. Those rules are carried into ufw and kept.
  • Custom nginx directives, from the panel's Nginx tab or the MCP tool, could point nginx's root process at any file on the server. Directives that touch files or load code are refused; root and alias stay inside the app's directory.
  • An API token with write access could invite a new person, re-enroll one, or mint more tokens, and so keep access after it was revoked. Those actions now need a signed-in session.
  • The GitHub installation token was briefly readable by other users on the server while a repository was cloned. It never touches the disk now.
  • Every application could read every other application's source and build output, and its nginx request logs. Release directories and log files are now closed to other users.
  • Passing --token on the command line showed the token to every user on the server. The flag is gone; set FERRUM_TOKEN instead.
  • Log lines containing terminal escape sequences were printed as-is by the ferrum command. They are stripped.
  • A crafted link to Settings could show arbitrary text as a GitHub error. The panel shows only its own sentences.
  • A build or command that left processes behind could block deleting the application. They are stopped when the run ends and before the application is removed.
  • A start, build, install, migrate or one-off command containing control characters other than newline and tab is refused.
  • Toolchain archives are extracted without following links out of their directory and without setuid bits.

Update

From the panel: Settings → Updates → Update now, or ferrum update on the server. A fresh install:

curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/irixsoft/ferrum/main/install.sh | sudo sh

Verify

Every release ships ferrum-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl, ferrum-aarch64-unknown-linux-musl, SHA256SUMS, SHA256SUMS.sig and ferrum-pub.pem. The installer and the updater check them; by hand:

openssl pkeyutl -verify -pubin -inkey ferrum-pub.pem -rawin -in SHA256SUMS -sigfile SHA256SUMS.sig
sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS --ignore-missing