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v0.1.0
Pre-release
Pre-release
The first release, and it watches without touching. Install it, run it in
audit mode for a few days, and read what it would have done. Nothing on
the host is stopped, moved or rewritten yet; that starts in v0.2.0.
Added
- eBPF probes for every committed exec, fork and exit, successful ptrace
attaches, memfd_create and outbound TCP connects. The exec probe reports
the file the kernel actually ran, so a script in/tmpshows up as the
script, not as/bin/sh, and a memfd or tmpfs binary is flagged however
it was reached. - A risk score for every process that halves after 30 seconds of quiet.
Running from a temp directory adds 25, creating a memfd 20, running one
65, attaching to a system daemon 45, and a burst of outbound connects 40.
Repeats of the same kind don't stack. Cross 50 and you get a
would_throttleincident; cross 80 and it'swould_quarantine. - Incidents that follow the attack, not the PID. Once one process crosses
the line, its children join the same incident, and the incident is
judged on everything they did between them. - Allowlists that can't be satisfied by a name. dnf, gdb, nmap, runc and
friends are forgiven only when the binary is owned by an installed
package, matches the package's SHA-256, and is the same inode the kernel
executed. A process loaded withLD_PRELOAD,LD_AUDITor
LD_LIBRARY_PATH, or one that has been ptrace-attached, gets no
forgiveness at all. - Incidents on disk under
/var/lib/aegis-v2/incidents, written
atomically, with a timeline of each decision and every process involved. - Telemetry to journald, a JSON-lines file and OTLP logs over http or
https with auth headers. A slow collector costs you records, never
detection. aegisctl status,preflightandincidents list | show | timeline,
all with--json. Text pulled from an incident is escaped before it
reaches your terminal.- RPMs for x86_64 and aarch64: a hardened systemd unit with five
capabilities, and an SELinux module that confines aegisd to its own
aegisd_tdomain. It runs in enforcing mode with no denials across the
end-to-end suite. OTLP needssetsebool -P aegisd_can_network_connect 1. cargo xtask e2e, which installs the RPMs on a disposable test host and
runs twelve attack and everyday-admin scenarios, including a container
start and an ssh login that must stay quiet.- CI on every pull request, a licence and advisory audit, and a tag-driven
release that builds both architectures and publishes checksums. - A README and a full set of docs, including a threat model that says
plainly what v0.1.0 can and can't see.
Known limits
- Audit mode only.
mode = "enforce"is refused at startup. - The injection checks are best effort: a library can scrub its own
environment, and a tracer that attaches before exec isn't seen. Capture
in the kernel is planned for v0.2.0. - UDP, and scans spread one connection per process, aren't detected.
- Binaries on btrfs subvolumes, overlay roots and inside containers stay
unverified, so their allowlist entries don't apply.
The threat model has the full list.