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v0.1.0

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@github-actions github-actions released this 19 Oct 12:36
· 48 commits to main since this release
v0.1.0
e0fa5c3

The first release, and it watches without touching. Install it, run it in
audit mode for a few days, and read what it would have done. Nothing on
the host is stopped, moved or rewritten yet; that starts in v0.2.0.

Added

  • eBPF probes for every committed exec, fork and exit, successful ptrace
    attaches, memfd_create and outbound TCP connects. The exec probe reports
    the file the kernel actually ran, so a script in /tmp shows up as the
    script, not as /bin/sh, and a memfd or tmpfs binary is flagged however
    it was reached.
  • A risk score for every process that halves after 30 seconds of quiet.
    Running from a temp directory adds 25, creating a memfd 20, running one
    65, attaching to a system daemon 45, and a burst of outbound connects 40.
    Repeats of the same kind don't stack. Cross 50 and you get a
    would_throttle incident; cross 80 and it's would_quarantine.
  • Incidents that follow the attack, not the PID. Once one process crosses
    the line, its children join the same incident, and the incident is
    judged on everything they did between them.
  • Allowlists that can't be satisfied by a name. dnf, gdb, nmap, runc and
    friends are forgiven only when the binary is owned by an installed
    package, matches the package's SHA-256, and is the same inode the kernel
    executed. A process loaded with LD_PRELOAD, LD_AUDIT or
    LD_LIBRARY_PATH, or one that has been ptrace-attached, gets no
    forgiveness at all.
  • Incidents on disk under /var/lib/aegis-v2/incidents, written
    atomically, with a timeline of each decision and every process involved.
  • Telemetry to journald, a JSON-lines file and OTLP logs over http or
    https with auth headers. A slow collector costs you records, never
    detection.
  • aegisctl status, preflight and incidents list | show | timeline,
    all with --json. Text pulled from an incident is escaped before it
    reaches your terminal.
  • RPMs for x86_64 and aarch64: a hardened systemd unit with five
    capabilities, and an SELinux module that confines aegisd to its own
    aegisd_t domain. It runs in enforcing mode with no denials across the
    end-to-end suite. OTLP needs setsebool -P aegisd_can_network_connect 1.
  • cargo xtask e2e, which installs the RPMs on a disposable test host and
    runs twelve attack and everyday-admin scenarios, including a container
    start and an ssh login that must stay quiet.
  • CI on every pull request, a licence and advisory audit, and a tag-driven
    release that builds both architectures and publishes checksums.
  • A README and a full set of docs, including a threat model that says
    plainly what v0.1.0 can and can't see.

Known limits

  • Audit mode only. mode = "enforce" is refused at startup.
  • The injection checks are best effort: a library can scrub its own
    environment, and a tracer that attaches before exec isn't seen. Capture
    in the kernel is planned for v0.2.0.
  • UDP, and scans spread one connection per process, aren't detected.
  • Binaries on btrfs subvolumes, overlay roots and inside containers stay
    unverified, so their allowlist entries don't apply.

The threat model has the full list.