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v3.6.0
Summary
3.6.0 asks the same question for actions that have the same effect on GitLab (#1839). An action used to be classified as destructive by its verb, so a call could do what a destructive sibling asks about and go out unasked: group.transfer moves a namespace as project.transfer does, a token rotation ends the previous token as a revocation does, a push rule edit can take away what project.push_rule_delete removes, and a note whose body is /merge merges as merge_request.merge does. Each of those now asks.
- A call asks before it runs when it does one of four things: it deletes something; it cannot be undone, because no call takes it back; it hands a third party something it keeps (a destination GitLab delivers to from then on, a key or a mailbox that lets someone in, or a runner that receives the project's jobs); or it replaces a secret nobody can read back, a credential included. The security guide lists every classified action with its reason, and what each guard asks about and what it leaves alone.
- 41 actions are now destructive on every surface, so every call to one asks:
- A namespace moved:
group.transferandgroup.transfer_project. - A credential replaced: the six
access.token_*_rotateactions,group.service_account_pat_rotate,project.service_account_pat_rotate,runner.controller_token_rotate,runner.reset_token,runner.reset_token_by_token, the threerunner.reset_*_reg_tokenactions andadmin.application_renew_secret. - An object consumed with no way back:
issue.move,project.label_promote,project.archive,group.archive,pipeline.schedule_take_ownership,pipeline.schedule_edit_variableanduser.todo_mark_all_done. - A merge by another route:
merge_train.add. - A destination GitLab delivers to:
project.hook_add,group.hook_add,admin.system_hook_add, the fourproject.integration_set*actions andexternal_status_check.create_project. - Access handed over:
access.deploy_key_add,access.deploy_key_enable,user.add_ssh_key,user.add_ssh_key_for_user,group.ssh_cert_create,user.add_emailanduser.add_email_for_user. - Jobs handed to a runner:
runner.enable_project.
- A namespace moved:
- 43 more actions take a
confirmparameter and ask only for the calls that have the effect, so an ordinary edit goes out as before:project.push_rule_editandgroup.push_rule_edit, when the call turns off a rule that is on, empties or replaces a pattern that is set, or raises or removesmax_file_size.ci_variable.update,ci_variable.group_updateandci_variable.instance_update, when the call sendsvalue.user.modify, when it sendspassword,email,providerorextern_uid.project.hook_edit,group.hook_editandadmin.system_hook_edit, when the URL changes or the call sendstoken,signing_token, or a URL variable or custom header the hook already has, and the fivehook_set_url_variableandhook_set_custom_headeractions when the key already exists.external_status_check.update_projectwithexternal_urlorshared_secret,project.import_from_filewithoverwrite: true,repository.commit_createwithforce: true, andproject.export_schedulewith an upload URL.- 25 of the 26 actions that send a note or a description GitLab reads for quick actions (the note, discussion and draft note writes of issues, merge requests and epics,
mr_review.draft_note_publish_all, and the create and update of issues, merge requests, epics and work items; the 26th,issue.work_item_update, already tookconfirm), when a line begins with one of 16 commands whose effect an action here asks about, such as/merge,/move,/promote,/unassignor/remove_parent./awardand/reactstay unasked, since the same command gives the reaction back at once. - Among those,
issue.update,merge_request.updateandgroup.epic_updatealso ask when the call takes the item out of its epic or parent, or removes every assignee, asissue.work_item_updatealready asked for the lists it clears.
issue.work_item_update, which already asked before clearing its assignee or contact list, asks two new questions: when the call sendsparent_id: 0, which takes the work item out of its parent, and when its description has a line that begins with one of the 16 quick action commands above.- Every guard follows the order destructive actions always had:
GITLAB_MCP_YOLO_MODE(orAUTOPILOT), thenconfirm: true, then an elicitation, then a refusal that quotes the question and asks for the same call again withconfirm: trueonce the user has approved it. A question never shows a secret: a variable's value, a token, a password and an external UID are left out, and a URL is shown by its origin alone. - Every value a question shows (a project, a branch, a path, a key, an email address, the origin of a URL, a line of a text) is written on one line as code, with the scheme of an address written
https[:]//, and without line separators or direction controls, so a value can no longer add a sentence, emphasis or a link to the question it is part of. This covers the pull mirror and work item list questions as well. - The usage of each destructive action says so, and its individual tool description carries
Requires confirmation.; the usage ofissue.update,issue.work_item_updateandgroup.epic_updatesays which calls ask and which ids are refused.
Breaking changes
A client that automates these actions meets the following (#1839):
- The 41 actions above carry
destructiveHint: trueand aconfirmparameter on the individual surface, and the meta-toolgitlab_merge_traincarriesdestructiveHint: true. A call withoutconfirm: truefrom a client that cannot elicit is refused with the text that asks to send it again withconfirm=true. - The 43 actions above take a
confirmparameter, and a call that has the effect is refused until it is sent withconfirm: true, or asks through elicitation. issue.work_item_updatewithparent_id: 0, or with a description that carries a guarded quick action, asks underparent_removalorquick_action_effect, and from a client that cannot elicit is refused until it is sent withconfirm: true. Removing a work item's parent went out unasked before.- On a
2026-07-28session the new questions arrive under eleven new elicitation keys:push_rule_relax,variable_value_replace,user_access_replace,hook_delivery_change,status_check_delivery_change,project_export_upload,project_import_overwrite,commit_force,quick_action_effect,parent_removalandassignees_clear. - Question texts change: values are shown between backticks (
project `42`where it saidproject 42, an origin as`https[:]//host/...`, a branch regex in backticks rather than quotes), the pull mirror and work item list questions included. Their keys,project_pull_mirror_overwriteandwork_item_clear_lists, do not change. A webhook edit that stays on the same host is described as changing the path or the query. - Refused before any request:
issue.work_item_updatewith an id of 0 or below inassignee_idsorcrm_contact_ids, andgroup.epic_updatewith one inassignee_ids, which GitLab read as emptying the list. The refusal saysassignee_ids must hold the IDs of the objects to set, or be [] to remove every one, got 0(or the same forcrm_contact_ids). - One more read on some calls, made only when neither
confirm: truenor YOLO mode is set: anissue.update,merge_request.updateorgroup.epic_updatethat removes every assignee reads the item first, a hook edit or hook key set that sends a URL or a key reads the hook, and a push rule edit that could relax a rule reads the rules. A fine-grained token needs the matching read permission for it (Webhook: Read, Push Rule: Read, Work Item: Read or Merge Request: Read); without it the read fails and the call asks. The fine-grained permissions reference says which calls.
Upgrading
- A client or script that calls one of the 41 destructive actions, or makes a guarded call to one of the 43 or to
issue.work_item_update(parent_id: 0, or a guarded quick action in the description), without a person to answer sendsconfirm: trueonce the call is approved, or runs withGITLAB_MCP_YOLO_MODE=truewhere nothing should ask, as before. - A hook or script that matches a question by its text matches the new text, or the elicitation key, which is stable.
- Empty an assignee or contact list on
issue.work_item_updateorgroup.epic_updatewith[], not with an id of 0. - A fine-grained token used for hook edits, push rule edits or updates that remove every assignee holds the read permission the call reads with, or such a call asks every time.
Read-only and safe mode are unchanged, since every action affected was already a write.
Security
- Fixes GHSA-v9r2-48m8-49fm (high, CVSS 7.1, CWE-184, CWE-356): token rotations, runner token resets, group transfers and the other actions listed below ran without the confirmation that actions with the same effect ask for. Every release up to 3.5.0 is affected, and 3.6.0 is the fixed release. Reported by @mappygrid and @cooliscool, thank you both.
- Before this release, a call could do what a destructive action asks about without asking: transfer a group, rotate or reset a token or a runner credential, relax a push rule, replace a CI/CD variable's value or a user's password or email, point a webhook, an integration or a status check at a new destination, add a deploy key, an SSH key or an email address, enable a runner for a project, take a work item out of its parent, or merge, move or unlink an item through a quick action in a note or a description. Each of those now asks for confirmation through elicitation or
confirm: true, on every surface (#1839). - A value shown in a confirmation question could carry line breaks, Markdown or direction controls that changed how the question read; such values are now shown on one line, as code, with those characters removed, and a URL by its origin alone (#1839).
- Dependencies: none changed since 3.5.0.
Changelog
🐛 Bug Fixes
- c17422a: fix(catalog): ask the same question for actions that have the same effect (#1839) (@jmrplens)
🚧 Maintenance
- adb55e2: chore(release): move VERSION to 3.6.0, with its release notes (#1840) (@jmrplens)
- 641eda2: chore: update manifests for v3.5.0 (@jmrplens)
Full changelog: v3.5.0...v3.6.0
Verify the assets
All binaries, and the OpenVEX document gitlab-mcp-server.openvex.json, are listed in checksums.txt, signed keylessly with cosign:
cosign verify-blob \
--bundle checksums.txt.sigstore.json \
--certificate-identity "https://github.com/jmrplens/gitlab-mcp-server/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/v3.6.0" \
--certificate-oidc-issuer "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com" \
checksums.txt
sha256sum --check --ignore-missing checksums.txtEvery file in checksums.txt and every Claude Desktop bundle also carries SLSA build provenance, attached as gitlab-mcp-server.intoto.jsonl. Verify a file against it, without signing in to GitHub:
gh attestation verify gitlab-mcp-server-linux-amd64 \
--bundle gitlab-mcp-server.intoto.jsonl \
--repo jmrplens/gitlab-mcp-server \
--cert-identity "https://github.com/jmrplens/gitlab-mcp-server/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/v3.6.0"