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v3.6.1 — where a payload can land
The last tagged release was v3.0.1. Nine versions have landed since, and they have one through-line: a payload cannot be proven in a place the tool cannot put it. 3.0.0 settled what a verdict means; this run of releases is about reach.
New injection-point kinds
--auto-params learned four surfaces it could not address before:
XML and SOAP bodies — element text, attribute values and CDATA sections, addressed by byte offset and spliced rather than re-serialised, so a whitespace-significant envelope survives. A signed envelope is reported as unreachable instead of being rewritten. Previously an envelope fell through to the form branch and yielded one point named after its prolog, which could confirm nothing.
Multipart filenames — the filename="…" parameter in the part header, quoted-string escaped, with the upload’s content left alone. A newline is never placed there: in a part header it forges a new part, which no notice afterwards can undo.
JSON booleans and nulls, the last scalars excluded, plus index addressing for repeated query and form keys — a=1&a=2 is two points now. Addressing by name alone rewrote the first occurrence for every candidate, so the later ones were counted as covered and probed nowhere.
Encoded blobs — the fields inside a base64 or base64url JSON document, or a JWT, named carrier>field (state>role, tok>sub), across query values, form values, JSON string leaves and cookie or header values. One layer deep, at most 64 fields. A JWT’s signature is invalid by construction: an application that accepts the rewritten token is not verifying it, which is the finding, and one that rejects it reports blocked rather than a clean negative.
A sink no probe could reach
reflected gained the Shellshock shape (() { :;}; echo; echo; echo …, CVE-2014-6271). Headers had been enumerated for years with Shellshock given as the reason, and no probe could confirm that sink: every other shape breaks out of a command the application built, and here there is no such command — the server copies the header into the environment and bash parses it on the way in.
It is the env rung of the sink-shape ladder, so --sink-shape env asks for it alone: 17 requests across a full sweep where the default sends 1094.
Scope stated rather than implied: this is CVE-2014-6271 and not the shapes that survive its patch (6277, 6278) or the parser-state shape (7169), and a cookie crumb cannot carry it, because HTTP_COOKIE is the whole header and an enumerated crumb keeps its name.
The pre-flight plan stopped disagreeing with the traffic
Two fixes to the one output an operator is told to read instead of inferring the run from the traffic:
A run narrowed to nothing (--sink-shape sq --sink-env windows) printed the plan of a full sweep while sending zero probes. An empty rung selection was read as “no selection given”.
The new empty-ladder line predicted NOTHING WAS TESTED for the whole run, when only four of the nine methods ride the ladder — so a mixed run sent probes under a plan that said it would send none.
Bench coverage
The suite goes from 10 cases to 13, and boolean is no longer the only method without one: MongoDB $where through mongo-express, reaching evaluation-sink, with a class-attribution control that moves the payload to a position Mongo compares literally instead of evaluating. time becomes the subject of a case rather than only the control half of two others, and -p all gets a case where the sink must be found rather than named.
What is measured: those three cases were each run individually (29.9s, 4m32s, 21m21s) and python tests/bench/runner.py --all was last green at 3.0.1, 10/10 in 55m48s. The coverage ledger says which, per row.