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v0.1.0.dev3 (pre-alpha): Basic/Bearer/NTLM rules, narrower KEY=value filter
Warning
Pre-alpha. Interfaces, file formats, the audit record format and defaults will change without
notice or migration. Do not rely on PPE to protect real personal data or secrets yet: the proxy
observes traffic, it does not mask it.
What's new since v0.1.0.dev2
Secret rules v3
-
HTTP authorization credentials. Three new rules, with or without an
Authorization:name before them, each with a value check:- Basic: base64 of a printable
user:password; - Bearer: a 16+ character token with letters and digits;
- NTLM/Negotiate: the NTLMSSP or SPNEGO prefix.
On Samsung CredData these cover 689 of 692 Basic, 289 of 289 Bearer and 108 of 126 NTLM credentials.
- Basic: base64 of a printable
-
A narrower placeholder filter for
KEY=value. v0.1.0.dev2 used Gitleaks' 1,448 stop words, which also dropped real passwords containing ordinary words (44 on Nemotron). A value is now dropped only if it:- contains a placeholder word (
change,example,your, …) or a word naming a kind of credential (token,passw,secret, …); - is a template (
${X},{{x}},<x>); - has three or fewer distinct characters;
- or is unquoted code (
os.environ[,get_token(...)).
- contains a placeholder word (
Measured. CredData, without the one test-vector file that holds 18% of the credentials:
| found | flags that are credentials | |
|---|---|---|
| v0.1.0.dev2 | 0.441 | 0.664 |
| v0.1.0.dev3 | 0.516 | 0.686 |
| Gitleaks 8.30.1 | 0.338 | 0.762 |
| detect-secrets 1.5.0 | 0.370 | 0.342 |
- Nemotron passwords found: 257 (v0.1.0.dev2: 215).
- Known costs:
Password123-style values (2 on Nemotron) and unquoted passwords containing a bracket (2). - Details:
bench/2026-10-17-creddata.md.
Checks at this tag: ruff, strict mypy, 346 passed, 1 skipped, 21 xfailed; ppe verify 10/10; mutation check 52/52.
Not yet
- Generic secrets without a key word or format are still mostly missed (3,013 of the credentials PPE misses on CredData).
- No decoding of base64, hex or percent-encoded text before matching; no masking on traffic (phase 4).
Try it
uv venv --python 3.12 .venv && uv pip install --python .venv/bin/python -e ".[dev]"
.venv/bin/pytest && .venv/bin/ppe verify
echo 'curl -H "Authorization: Basic ZGVwbG95Oms5THcycXpY" https://api.example.test' | .venv/bin/ppe scanv0.1.0.dev2 (pre-alpha): Gitleaks secret rules, CredData benchmark
Warning
Pre-alpha. Interfaces, file formats, the audit record format and defaults will change without
notice or migration. Do not rely on PPE to protect real personal data or secrets yet: the proxy
observes traffic, it does not mask it.
What's new since v0.1.0.dev1
Secret detection
- Gitleaks 8.30.1's rules in Stage 1. The default rule file is vendored unchanged (MIT, credited in NOTICE), pinned by SHA-256, and applied the way Gitleaks applies it: keyword prefilter, secret group, entropy threshold, allow-lists, generic dedupe. 217 rules load; 5 need a file path and are skipped.
- RE2 (
google-re2) is a new required dependency. The rules run with Go regex semantics, unmodified, in linear time on any input. - PPE's own
KEY=valuerule now drops values containing a Gitleaks placeholder word (changeme,example, …).
Measured on real code: Samsung CredData (11,030 files, 15,753 labelled credentials; built with its own script, pinned by manifest hash). Without the one test-vector file that holds 18% of the credentials:
| found | flags that are credentials | |
|---|---|---|
| PPE v0.1.0.dev1 | 0.325 | 0.449 |
| PPE v0.1.0.dev2 | 0.441 | 0.664 |
| Gitleaks 8.30.1 | 0.338 | 0.762 |
| detect-secrets 1.5.0 | 0.370 | 0.342 |
- Nemotron-PII secret recall 0.062 → 0.131; Gretel 0.178 → 0.293.
- Cost: the placeholder filter drops 44 real Nemotron passwords that contain dictionary words.
- Details:
bench/2026-10-17-creddata.md.
Also
- Earlier external benchmarks (Nemotron-PII, Gretel finance, Presidio baseline), with detector fixes found on them: IPv4 at a sentence end, IBAN followed by a word, non-ASCII e-mail, IPv6 inside a word.
- The 2026-10-16 product review's "now" fixes.
Checks at this tag: ruff, strict mypy, 319 passed, 1 skipped, 22 xfailed; ppe verify 10/10; mutation check 47/47.
Not yet
- Generic secrets without a key word or format are still mostly missed (3,810 of the credentials PPE misses on CredData).
- No decoding of base64, hex or percent-encoded text before matching.
- No masking on traffic (phase 4), span models or arbiter.
Try it
uv venv --python 3.12 .venv && uv pip install --python .venv/bin/python -e ".[dev]"
.venv/bin/pytest && .venv/bin/ppe verify
echo 'export API_KEY="Zq8vT2mX9pL4wR7nK3bY"' | .venv/bin/ppe scanv0.1.0.dev1 (pre-alpha): shadow-mode proxy
Warning
Pre-alpha. Interfaces, file formats, the audit record format and defaults will change without
notice or migration. Do not rely on PPE to protect real personal data or secrets yet: the proxy in
this release observes traffic, it does not mask it.
First tagged snapshot of Prompt Privacy Enhancement: a testable privacy harness for LLM traffic.
What's in it
Phase 1 core
- Stage 0 shadow text (folds full-width digits, zero-width and bidi characters) and Stage 1 rules:
12 secret rules, NRIC/FIN (incl. M-series), cards, IBAN, email, phone, IPv4/IPv6, operator dictionary. - Surrogate swap and restore with format transfer, stable per conversation, unlinkable across
conversations. - Fully sealed 2-of-2 audit log: hybrid ML-KEM-768 + X25519 HPKE, padded records, hash chain.
- Synthetic labelled corpus, benchmark,
ppe scan | mask | corpus | bench | explain | verify | audit.
Since phase 1
- Stage 1 detection is now linear in input size: 0.80 / 1.70 / 5.1 ms/KB at 10 / 100 / 400 KB
became 0.68 / 0.70 / 0.76 ms/KB, with byte-identical output. ppe serve(phase 2a), a shadow-mode proxy for the Anthropic Messages API on aiohttp:- loopback only; forwards requests and responses unchanged (bodies byte for byte, SSE as it
arrives) - records sealed
observeevents with keyed per-identifier digests, deduplicated per conversation - observation never delays or fails traffic
- refuses to start with aiohttp's pure-Python HTTP parser
- loopback only; forwards requests and responses unchanged (bodies byte for byte, SSE as it
- Adversarial test pass:
- 27 ambiguous or malformed requests are refused with 400 and nothing is forwarded
- accepted requests are re-framed cleanly
- also covered: disconnects, stalls, size limits, concurrency, duplicate headers
- 300-case mutation fuzz
- Design: ADR-0005 amendment (measured span-model latency), ADR-0013 (restricted zone and sticky
labels, draft), MAS AI risk management guidelines mapped to controls.
Checks at this tag: ruff, strict mypy, 130 tests, ppe verify 10/10.
Not yet
ppe servehas not been validated with a real client against a real provider.- Reply-flow observation, OpenAI wire formats, exposure ledger, sensor API.
- Masking on traffic (phase 4), span models, arbiter, signed checkpoints, retention/shredding,
break-glass broker.
Try it
uv venv --python 3.12 .venv && uv pip install --python .venv/bin/python -e ".[dev]"
.venv/bin/pytest && .venv/bin/ppe verify
.venv/bin/ppe audit keygen --dev-token && .venv/bin/ppe serve # 127.0.0.1:8787 -> api.anthropic.com