Release 0.1.6

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,3 +1,41 @@
+# 0.1.6 - Oct 10, 2025 - "Async Preimage Claims"
+
+## Performance Improvements
+ * `NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking` has been sped up by more
+   than 20x in cases where many entries need to be removed (such as after
+   initial gossip sync, #4080).
+
+## Bug Fixes
+ * Delivery of on-chain resolutions of HTLCs to `ChannelManager` has been made
+   more robust to prevent loss in some exceedingly rare crash cases. This may
+   marginally increase payment resolution event replays on startup (#3984).
+ * Corrected forwarding of new gossip to peers which we are sending an initial
+   gossip sync to (#4107).
+ * A rare race condition may have resulted in outbound BOLT12 payments
+   spuriously failing while processing the `Bolt12Invoice` message (#4078).
+ * If a channel is updated multiple times after a payment is claimed while using
+   async persistence of the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s, and the node then restarts
+   with a stale copy of its `ChannelManager`, the `PaymentClaimed` may have been
+   lost (#3988).
+ * If an async-persisted `ChannelMonitorUpdate` for one part of an MPP claim
+   does not complete before multiple `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s for another channel
+   in the same MPP claim complete, and the node restarts twice, the preimage may
+   be lost and the MPP payment part may not be claimed (#3928).
+
+## Security
+0.1.6 fixes a denial of service vulnerability and a funds-theft vulnerability.
+ * When a channel has been force-closed, we have already claimed some of its
+   HTLCs on-chain, and we later learn a new preimage allowing us to claim
+   further HTLCs on-chain, we could in some cases generate invalid claim
+   transactions leading to loss of funds (#4154).
+ * When a `ChannelMonitor` is created for a channel which is never funded with
+   a real transaction, `ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances` would never be
+   empty. As a result, `ChannelMonitor::check_and_update_full_resolution_status`
+   would never indicate the monitor is prunable, and thus
+   `ChainMonitor::archive_fully_resolved_channel_monitors` would never remove
+   it. This allows a peer which opens channels without funding them to bloat our
+   memory and disk space, eventually leading to denial-of-service (#4081).
+
 # 0.1.5 - Jul 16, 2025 - "Async Path Reduction"
 
 ## Performance Improvements

lightning/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [package]
 name = "lightning"
-version = "0.1.5"
+version = "0.1.6"
 authors = ["Matt Corallo"]
 license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
 repository = "https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/"

lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs

@@ -3118,7 +3118,7 @@ impl<Signer: EcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		// First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
 		macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
 			($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr, $htlcs: expr) => {
-				let (htlc_claim_reqs, _) = self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info($commitment_number, $txid, None, $htlcs, confirmed_spend_height);
+				let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_output_claims_for_preimage(*payment_preimage, $commitment_number, $txid, $htlcs, confirmed_spend_height);
 				let conf_target = self.closure_conf_target();
 				self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height, self.best_block.height, broadcaster, conf_target, fee_estimator, logger);
 			}
@@ -3728,7 +3728,7 @@ impl<Signer: EcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 					(htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
 				), logger);
 			let (htlc_claim_reqs, counterparty_output_info) =
-				self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx), per_commitment_option, Some(height));
+				self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info(commitment_number, commitment_txid, tx, per_commitment_claimable_data, Some(height));
 			to_counterparty_output_info = counterparty_output_info;
 			for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
 				claimable_outpoints.push(req);
@@ -3738,78 +3738,162 @@ impl<Signer: EcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		(claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info)
 	}
 
-	/// Returns the HTLC claim package templates and the counterparty output info
-	fn get_counterparty_output_claim_info(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>, per_commitment_option: Option<&Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>, confirmation_height: Option<u32>)
-	-> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo) {
-		let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
-		let mut to_counterparty_output_info: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = None;
+	fn get_point_for_commitment_number(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Option<PublicKey> {
+		let per_commitment_points = &self.their_cur_per_commitment_points?;
+
+		// If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
+		// per-commitment point
+		if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number {
+			Some(per_commitment_points.1)
+		} else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() {
+			// If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
+			// their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
+			// them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
+			if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
+				Some(*point)
+			} else {
+				None
+			}
+		} else {
+			None
+		}
+	}
 
+	fn get_counterparty_output_claims_for_preimage(
+		&self, preimage: PaymentPreimage, commitment_number: u64,
+		commitment_txid: Txid,
+		per_commitment_option: Option<&Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
+		confirmation_height: Option<u32>,
+	) -> Vec<PackageTemplate> {
 		let per_commitment_claimable_data = match per_commitment_option {
 			Some(outputs) => outputs,
-			None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
+			None => return Vec::new(),
 		};
-		let per_commitment_points = match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
-			Some(points) => points,
-			None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
+		let per_commitment_point = match self.get_point_for_commitment_number(commitment_number) {
+			Some(point) => point,
+			None => return Vec::new(),
 		};
 
-		let per_commitment_point =
-			// If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
-			// per-commitment point
-			if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number { &per_commitment_points.1 }
-			else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() {
-				// If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
-				// their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
-				// them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
-				if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
-					point
-				} else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); }
-			} else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); };
-
-		if let Some(transaction) = tx {
-			let revocation_pubkey = RevocationKey::from_basepoint(
-				&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,  &self.holder_revocation_basepoint, &per_commitment_point);
-
-			let delayed_key = DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &per_commitment_point);
-
-			let revokeable_p2wsh = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
-				self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
-				&delayed_key).to_p2wsh();
-			for (idx, outp) in transaction.output.iter().enumerate() {
-				if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
-					to_counterparty_output_info =
-						Some((idx.try_into().expect("Can't have > 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
+		let matching_payment_hash = PaymentHash::from(preimage);
+		per_commitment_claimable_data
+			.iter()
+			.filter_map(|(htlc, _)| {
+				if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+					if htlc.offered && htlc.payment_hash == matching_payment_hash {
+						let htlc_data = PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(
+							CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(
+								per_commitment_point,
+								self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
+								self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
+								preimage,
+								htlc.clone(),
+								self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone(),
+								confirmation_height,
+							),
+						);
+						Some(PackageTemplate::build_package(
+							commitment_txid,
+							transaction_output_index,
+							htlc_data,
+							htlc.cltv_expiry,
+						))
+					} else {
+						None
+					}
+				} else {
+					None
 				}
+			})
+			.collect()
+	}
+
+	/// Returns the HTLC claim package templates and the counterparty output info
+	fn get_counterparty_output_claim_info(
+		&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid,
+		tx: &Transaction,
+		per_commitment_claimable_data: &[(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)],
+		confirmation_height: Option<u32>,
+	) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo) {
+		let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
+		let mut to_counterparty_output_info: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = None;
+
+		let per_commitment_point = match self.get_point_for_commitment_number(commitment_number) {
+			Some(point) => point,
+			None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
+		};
+
+		let revocation_pubkey = RevocationKey::from_basepoint(
+			&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
+			&self.holder_revocation_basepoint,
+			&per_commitment_point,
+		);
+		let delayed_key = DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(
+			&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
+			&self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
+			&per_commitment_point,
+		);
+		let revokeable_p2wsh = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(
+			&revocation_pubkey,
+			self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
+			&delayed_key,
+		)
+		.to_p2wsh();
+		for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
+			if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
+				to_counterparty_output_info =
+					Some((idx.try_into().expect("Can't have > 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
 			}
 		}
 
-		for  &(ref htlc, _) in per_commitment_claimable_data.iter() {
+		for &(ref htlc, _) in per_commitment_claimable_data.iter() {
 			if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
-				if let Some(transaction) = tx {
-					if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
-						transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.to_bitcoin_amount() {
-							// per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
-							return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info);
-						}
+				if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len()
+					|| tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value
+						!= htlc.to_bitcoin_amount()
+				{
+					// per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
+					return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info);
 				}
-				let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some((p, _)) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
+				let preimage = if htlc.offered {
+					if let Some((p, _)) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
+						Some(*p)
+					} else {
+						None
+					}
+				} else {
+					None
+				};
 				if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
 					let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered {
 						PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(
-							CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
+							CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(
+								per_commitment_point,
 								self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
 								self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
-								preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone(),
-								confirmation_height))
+								preimage.unwrap(),
+								htlc.clone(),
+								self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone(),
+								confirmation_height,
+							),
+						)
 					} else {
 						PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
-							CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
+							CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(
+								per_commitment_point,
 								self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
 								self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
-								htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone(),
-								confirmation_height))
+								htlc.clone(),
+								self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone(),
+								confirmation_height,
+							),
+						)
 					};
-					let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry);
+					let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
+						commitment_txid,
+						transaction_output_index,
+						counterparty_htlc_outp,
+						htlc.cltv_expiry,
+					);
 					claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
 				}
 			}

lightning/src/events/mod.rs

@@ -229,11 +229,6 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_legacy!(PaymentPurpose,
 /// Information about an HTLC that is part of a payment that can be claimed.
 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
 pub struct ClaimedHTLC {
-	/// The counterparty of the channel.
-	///
-	/// This value will always be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.2 and
-	/// `Some` otherwise.
-	pub counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
 	/// The `channel_id` of the channel over which the HTLC was received.
 	pub channel_id: ChannelId,
 	/// The `user_channel_id` of the channel over which the HTLC was received. This is the value
@@ -264,7 +259,6 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimedHTLC, {
 	(0, channel_id, required),
 	(1, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, (default_value, 0u64)),
 	(2, user_channel_id, required),
-	(3, counterparty_node_id, option),
 	(4, cltv_expiry, required),
 	(6, value_msat, required),
 });

lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs

@@ -435,7 +435,6 @@ struct ClaimableHTLC {
 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
 	fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
 		events::ClaimedHTLC {
-			counterparty_node_id: val.prev_hop.counterparty_node_id,
 			channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
 			user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
 			cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,

lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs

@@ -3693,3 +3693,85 @@ fn test_lost_timeout_monitor_events() {
 	do_test_lost_timeout_monitor_events(CommitmentType::LocalWithLastHTLC, false);
 	do_test_lost_timeout_monitor_events(CommitmentType::LocalWithLastHTLC, true);
 }
+
+#[test]
+fn test_ladder_preimage_htlc_claims() {
+	// Tests that when we learn of a preimage via a monitor update we only claim HTLCs with the
+	// corresponding payment hash. This test is a reproduction of a scenario that happened in
+	// production where the second HTLC claim also included the first HTLC (even though it was
+	// already claimed) resulting in an invalid claim transaction.
+	let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+	let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+	let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+	let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+	let node_id_0 = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
+	let node_id_1 = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
+
+	let (_, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
+
+	let (payment_preimage1, payment_hash1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
+	let (payment_preimage2, payment_hash2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
+
+	nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &node_id_1, "test".to_string()).unwrap();
+	check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+	check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
+	let reason = ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) };
+	check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, reason, false, &[node_id_1], 1_000_000);
+
+	let commitment_tx = {
+		let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+		assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+		txn.remove(0)
+	};
+	mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
+	mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx);
+
+	check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
+	check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
+	check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, &[node_id_0], 1_000_000);
+
+	nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage1);
+	expect_payment_claimed!(&nodes[1], payment_hash1, 1_000_000);
+	check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
+
+	let (htlc1, htlc_claim_tx1) = {
+		let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+		assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+		let htlc_claim_tx = txn.remove(0);
+		assert_eq!(htlc_claim_tx.input.len(), 1);
+		check_spends!(htlc_claim_tx, commitment_tx);
+		(htlc_claim_tx.input[0].previous_output, htlc_claim_tx)
+	};
+	mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_claim_tx1);
+	mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_claim_tx1);
+
+	connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+	connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+
+	expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage1, None, true, false);
+	check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+
+	nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage2);
+	expect_payment_claimed!(&nodes[1], payment_hash2, 1_000_000);
+	check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
+
+	let (htlc2, htlc_claim_tx2) = {
+		let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+		assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1, "{:?}", txn.iter().map(|tx| tx.compute_txid()).collect::<Vec<_>>());
+		let htlc_claim_tx = txn.remove(0);
+		assert_eq!(htlc_claim_tx.input.len(), 1);
+		check_spends!(htlc_claim_tx, commitment_tx);
+		(htlc_claim_tx.input[0].previous_output, htlc_claim_tx)
+	};
+	assert_ne!(htlc1, htlc2);
+
+	mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_claim_tx2);
+	mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_claim_tx2);
+
+	connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+	connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+
+	expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage2, None, true, false);
+	check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+}