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modprobe gives invalid argument #6
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Can you please paste the dmesg output? |
Hi, here comes dmesg: thank you |
previos installed tbs drivers where the issue. thank you very much for your work, i will drop you a beer |
Good to know that it worked! |
When parsing lines from objdump a line containing source code starting with a numeric label is mistaken for a line of disassembly starting with a memory address. Current validation fails to recognise that the "memory address" is out of range and calculates an invalid offset which later causes this segfault: Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x0000000000457315 in disasm__calc_percent (notes=0xc98970, evidx=0, offset=143705, end=2127526177, path=0x7fffffffbf50) at util/annotate.c:631 631 hits += h->addr[offset++]; (gdb) bt #0 0x0000000000457315 in disasm__calc_percent (notes=0xc98970, evidx=0, offset=143705, end=2127526177, path=0x7fffffffbf50) at util/annotate.c:631 #1 0x00000000004d65e3 in annotate_browser__calc_percent (browser=0x7fffffffd130, evsel=0xa01da0) at ui/browsers/annotate.c:364 #2 0x00000000004d7433 in annotate_browser__run (browser=0x7fffffffd130, evsel=0xa01da0, hbt=0x0) at ui/browsers/annotate.c:672 #3 0x00000000004d80c9 in symbol__tui_annotate (sym=0xc989a0, map=0xa02660, evsel=0xa01da0, hbt=0x0) at ui/browsers/annotate.c:962 #4 0x00000000004d7aa0 in hist_entry__tui_annotate (he=0xdf73f0, evsel=0xa01da0, hbt=0x0) at ui/browsers/annotate.c:823 #5 0x00000000004dd648 in perf_evsel__hists_browse (evsel=0xa01da0, nr_events=1, helpline= 0x58b768 "For a higher level overview, try: perf report --sort comm,dso", ev_name=0xa02cd0 "cycles", left_exits=false, hbt= 0x0, min_pcnt=0, env=0xa011e0) at ui/browsers/hists.c:1659 #6 0x00000000004de372 in perf_evlist__tui_browse_hists (evlist=0xa01520, help= 0x58b768 "For a higher level overview, try: perf report --sort comm,dso", hbt=0x0, min_pcnt=0, env=0xa011e0) at ui/browsers/hists.c:1950 #7 0x000000000042cf6b in __cmd_report (rep=0x7fffffffd6c0) at builtin-report.c:581 #8 0x000000000042e25d in cmd_report (argc=0, argv=0x7fffffffe4b0, prefix=0x0) at builtin-report.c:965 #9 0x000000000041a0e1 in run_builtin (p=0x801548, argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe4b0) at perf.c:319 #10 0x000000000041a319 in handle_internal_command (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe4b0) at perf.c:376 #11 0x000000000041a465 in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffe38c, argv=0x7fffffffe380) at perf.c:420 #12 0x000000000041a707 in main (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe4b0) at perf.c:521 After the fix is applied the symbol can be annotated showing the problematic line "1: rep" copy_user_generic_string /usr/lib/debug/lib/modules/3.9.10-100.fc17.x86_64/vmlinux */ ENTRY(copy_user_generic_string) CFI_STARTPROC ASM_STAC andl %edx,%edx and %edx,%edx jz 4f je 37 cmpl $8,%edx cmp $0x8,%edx jb 2f /* less than 8 bytes, go to byte copy loop */ jb 33 ALIGN_DESTINATION mov %edi,%ecx and $0x7,%ecx je 28 sub $0x8,%ecx neg %ecx sub %ecx,%edx 1a: mov (%rsi),%al mov %al,(%rdi) inc %rsi inc %rdi dec %ecx jne 1a movl %edx,%ecx 28: mov %edx,%ecx shrl $3,%ecx shr $0x3,%ecx andl $7,%edx and $0x7,%edx 1: rep 100.00 rep movsq %ds:(%rsi),%es:(%rdi) movsq 2: movl %edx,%ecx 33: mov %edx,%ecx 3: rep rep movsb %ds:(%rsi),%es:(%rdi) movsb 4: xorl %eax,%eax 37: xor %eax,%eax data32 xchg %ax,%ax ASM_CLAC ret retq Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1379009721-27667-1-git-send-email-adrian.hunter@intel.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Bug 60815 - Interface hangs in mwifiex_usb https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60815 [ 2.883807] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000048 [ 2.883813] IP: [<ffffffff815a65e0>] pfifo_fast_enqueue+0x90/0x90 [ 2.883834] CPU: 1 PID: 3220 Comm: kworker/u8:90 Not tainted 3.11.1-monotone-l0 #6 [ 2.883834] Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Surface with Windows 8 Pro/Surface with Windows 8 Pro, BIOS 1.03.0450 03/29/2013 On Surface Pro, suspend to ram gives a NULL pointer dereference in pfifo_fast_enqueue(). The stack trace reveals that the offending call is clearing carrier in mwifiex_usb suspend handler. Since commit 1499d9f "mwifiex: don't drop carrier flag over suspend" has removed the carrier flag handling over suspend/resume in SDIO and PCIe drivers, I'm removing it in USB driver too. This also fixes the bug for Surface Pro. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.5+ Tested-by: Dmitry Khromov <icechrome@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Bing Zhao <bzhao@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
commit d16933b "i2c: s3c2410: Move location of clk_prepare_enable() call in probe function" refactored clk_enable and clk_disable calls yet neglected to remove the clk_disable_unprepare call in the module's remove(). It helps remove warnings on an arndale during unbind: echo 12c90000.i2c > /sys/bus/platform/devices/12c90000.i2c/driver/unbind ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2548 at drivers/clk/clk.c:842 clk_disable+0x18/0x24() Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 2548 Comm: bash Not tainted 3.11.0-next-20130916-00003-gf4bddbc #6 [<c0014d48>] (unwind_backtrace+0x0/0xf8) from [<c00117d0>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [<c00117d0>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) from [<c0361be8>] (dump_stack+0x6c/0xac) [<c0361be8>] (dump_stack+0x6c/0xac) from [<c001d864>] (warn_slowpath_common+0x64/0x88) [<c001d864>] (warn_slowpath_common+0x64/0x88) from [<c001d8a4>] (warn_slowpath_null+0x1c/0x24) [<c001d8a4>] (warn_slowpath_null+0x1c/0x24) from [<c02c4a64>] (clk_disable+0x18/0x24) [<c02c4a64>] (clk_disable+0x18/0x24) from [<c028d0b0>] (s3c24xx_i2c_remove+0x28/0x70) [<c028d0b0>] (s3c24xx_i2c_remove+0x28/0x70) from [<c0217a10>] (platform_drv_remove+0x18/0x1c) [<c0217a10>] (platform_drv_remove+0x18/0x1c) from [<c0216358>] (__device_release_driver+0x58/0xb4) [<c0216358>] (__device_release_driver+0x58/0xb4) from [<c02163d0>] (device_release_driver+0x1c/0x28) [<c02163d0>] (device_release_driver+0x1c/0x28) from [<c02153c0>] (unbind_store+0x58/0x90) [<c02153c0>] (unbind_store+0x58/0x90) from [<c0214c90>] (drv_attr_store+0x20/0x2c) [<c0214c90>] (drv_attr_store+0x20/0x2c) from [<c01032c0>] (sysfs_write_file+0x168/0x198) [<c01032c0>] (sysfs_write_file+0x168/0x198) from [<c00ae1c0>] (vfs_write+0xb0/0x194) [<c00ae1c0>] (vfs_write+0xb0/0x194) from [<c00ae594>] (SyS_write+0x3c/0x70) [<c00ae594>] (SyS_write+0x3c/0x70) from [<c000e3e0>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x30) ---[ end trace 4c9f9403066f57a6 ]--- ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2548 at drivers/clk/clk.c:751 clk_unprepare+0x14/0x1c() Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 2548 Comm: bash Tainted: G W 3.11.0-next-20130916-00003-gf4bddbc #6 [<c0014d48>] (unwind_backtrace+0x0/0xf8) from [<c00117d0>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [<c00117d0>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) from [<c0361be8>] (dump_stack+0x6c/0xac) [<c0361be8>] (dump_stack+0x6c/0xac) from [<c001d864>] (warn_slowpath_common+0x64/0x88) [<c001d864>] (warn_slowpath_common+0x64/0x88) from [<c001d8a4>] (warn_slowpath_null+0x1c/0x24) [<c001d8a4>] (warn_slowpath_null+0x1c/0x24) from [<c02c5834>] (clk_unprepare+0x14/0x1c) [<c02c5834>] (clk_unprepare+0x14/0x1c) from [<c028d0b8>] (s3c24xx_i2c_remove+0x30/0x70) [<c028d0b8>] (s3c24xx_i2c_remove+0x30/0x70) from [<c0217a10>] (platform_drv_remove+0x18/0x1c) [<c0217a10>] (platform_drv_remove+0x18/0x1c) from [<c0216358>] (__device_release_driver+0x58/0xb4) [<c0216358>] (__device_release_driver+0x58/0xb4) from [<c02163d0>] (device_release_driver+0x1c/0x28) [<c02163d0>] (device_release_driver+0x1c/0x28) from [<c02153c0>] (unbind_store+0x58/0x90) [<c02153c0>] (unbind_store+0x58/0x90) from [<c0214c90>] (drv_attr_store+0x20/0x2c) [<c0214c90>] (drv_attr_store+0x20/0x2c) from [<c01032c0>] (sysfs_write_file+0x168/0x198) [<c01032c0>] (sysfs_write_file+0x168/0x198) from [<c00ae1c0>] (vfs_write+0xb0/0x194) [<c00ae1c0>] (vfs_write+0xb0/0x194) from [<c00ae594>] (SyS_write+0x3c/0x70) [<c00ae594>] (SyS_write+0x3c/0x70) from [<c000e3e0>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x30) ---[ end trace 4c9f9403066f57a7 ]--- Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de>
As the new x86 CPU bootup printout format code maintainer, I am taking immediate action to improve and clean (and thus indulge my OCD) the reporting of the cores when coming up online. Fix padding to a right-hand alignment, cleanup code and bind reporting width to the max number of supported CPUs on the system, like this: [ 0.074509] smpboot: Booting Node 0, Processors: #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 OK [ 0.644008] smpboot: Booting Node 1, Processors: #8 #9 #10 #11 #12 #13 #14 #15 OK [ 1.245006] smpboot: Booting Node 2, Processors: #16 #17 #18 #19 #20 #21 #22 #23 OK [ 1.864005] smpboot: Booting Node 3, Processors: #24 #25 #26 #27 #28 #29 #30 #31 OK [ 2.489005] smpboot: Booting Node 4, Processors: #32 #33 #34 #35 #36 #37 #38 #39 OK [ 3.093005] smpboot: Booting Node 5, Processors: #40 #41 #42 #43 #44 #45 #46 #47 OK [ 3.698005] smpboot: Booting Node 6, Processors: #48 #49 #50 #51 #52 #53 #54 #55 OK [ 4.304005] smpboot: Booting Node 7, Processors: #56 #57 #58 #59 #60 #61 #62 #63 OK [ 4.961413] Brought up 64 CPUs and this: [ 0.072367] smpboot: Booting Node 0, Processors: #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 OK [ 0.686329] Brought up 8 CPUs Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Libin <huawei.libin@huawei.com> Cc: wangyijing@huawei.com Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com Cc: guohanjun@huawei.com Cc: paul.gortmaker@windriver.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130927143554.GF4422@pd.tnic Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Michael Semon reported that xfs/299 generated this lockdep warning: ============================================= [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] 3.12.0-rc2+ #2 Not tainted --------------------------------------------- touch/21072 is trying to acquire lock: (&xfs_dquot_other_class){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64 but task is already holding lock: (&xfs_dquot_other_class){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&xfs_dquot_other_class); lock(&xfs_dquot_other_class); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 7 locks held by touch/21072: #0: (sb_writers#10){++++.+}, at: [<c11185b6>] mnt_want_write+0x1e/0x3e #1: (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#4){+.+.+.}, at: [<c11078ee>] do_last+0x245/0xe40 #2: (sb_internal#2){++++.+}, at: [<c122c9e0>] xfs_trans_alloc+0x1f/0x35 #3: (&(&ip->i_lock)->mr_lock/1){+.+...}, at: [<c126cd1b>] xfs_ilock+0x100/0x1f1 #4: (&(&ip->i_lock)->mr_lock){++++-.}, at: [<c126cf52>] xfs_ilock_nowait+0x105/0x22f #5: (&dqp->q_qlock){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64 #6: (&xfs_dquot_other_class){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64 The lockdep annotation for dquot lock nesting only understands locking for user and "other" dquots, not user, group and quota dquots. Fix the annotations to match the locking heirarchy we now have. Reported-by: Michael L. Semon <mlsemon35@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
Turn it into (for example): [ 0.073380] x86: Booting SMP configuration: [ 0.074005] .... node #0, CPUs: #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 [ 0.603005] .... node #1, CPUs: #8 #9 #10 #11 #12 #13 #14 #15 [ 1.200005] .... node #2, CPUs: #16 #17 #18 #19 #20 #21 #22 #23 [ 1.796005] .... node #3, CPUs: #24 #25 #26 #27 #28 #29 #30 #31 [ 2.393005] .... node #4, CPUs: #32 #33 #34 #35 #36 #37 #38 #39 [ 2.996005] .... node #5, CPUs: #40 #41 #42 #43 #44 #45 #46 #47 [ 3.600005] .... node #6, CPUs: #48 #49 #50 #51 #52 #53 #54 #55 [ 4.202005] .... node #7, CPUs: #56 #57 #58 #59 #60 #61 #62 #63 [ 4.811005] .... node #8, CPUs: #64 #65 #66 #67 #68 #69 #70 #71 [ 5.421006] .... node #9, CPUs: #72 #73 #74 #75 #76 #77 #78 #79 [ 6.032005] .... node #10, CPUs: #80 #81 #82 #83 #84 #85 #86 #87 [ 6.648006] .... node #11, CPUs: #88 #89 #90 #91 #92 #93 #94 #95 [ 7.262005] .... node #12, CPUs: #96 #97 #98 #99 #100 #101 #102 #103 [ 7.865005] .... node #13, CPUs: #104 #105 #106 #107 #108 #109 #110 #111 [ 8.466005] .... node #14, CPUs: #112 #113 #114 #115 #116 #117 #118 #119 [ 9.073006] .... node #15, CPUs: #120 #121 #122 #123 #124 #125 #126 #127 [ 9.679901] x86: Booted up 16 nodes, 128 CPUs and drop useless elements. Change num_digits() to hpa's division-avoiding, cell-phone-typed version which he went at great lengths and pains to submit on a Saturday evening. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: huawei.libin@huawei.com Cc: wangyijing@huawei.com Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com Cc: guohanjun@huawei.com Cc: paul.gortmaker@windriver.com Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130930095624.GB16383@pd.tnic Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Michael Semon reported that xfs/299 generated this lockdep warning: ============================================= [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] 3.12.0-rc2+ #2 Not tainted --------------------------------------------- touch/21072 is trying to acquire lock: (&xfs_dquot_other_class){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64 but task is already holding lock: (&xfs_dquot_other_class){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&xfs_dquot_other_class); lock(&xfs_dquot_other_class); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 7 locks held by touch/21072: #0: (sb_writers#10){++++.+}, at: [<c11185b6>] mnt_want_write+0x1e/0x3e #1: (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#4){+.+.+.}, at: [<c11078ee>] do_last+0x245/0xe40 #2: (sb_internal#2){++++.+}, at: [<c122c9e0>] xfs_trans_alloc+0x1f/0x35 #3: (&(&ip->i_lock)->mr_lock/1){+.+...}, at: [<c126cd1b>] xfs_ilock+0x100/0x1f1 #4: (&(&ip->i_lock)->mr_lock){++++-.}, at: [<c126cf52>] xfs_ilock_nowait+0x105/0x22f #5: (&dqp->q_qlock){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64 #6: (&xfs_dquot_other_class){+.+...}, at: [<c12902fb>] xfs_trans_dqlockedjoin+0x57/0x64 The lockdep annotation for dquot lock nesting only understands locking for user and "other" dquots, not user, group and quota dquots. Fix the annotations to match the locking heirarchy we now have. Reported-by: Michael L. Semon <mlsemon35@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com> (cherry picked from commit f112a04)
Andrey reported the following report: ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address ffff8800359c99f3 ffff8800359c99f3 is located 0 bytes to the right of 243-byte region [ffff8800359c9900, ffff8800359c99f3) Accessed by thread T13003: #0 ffffffff810dd2da (asan_report_error+0x32a/0x440) #1 ffffffff810dc6b0 (asan_check_region+0x30/0x40) #2 ffffffff810dd4d3 (__tsan_write1+0x13/0x20) #3 ffffffff811cd19e (ftrace_regex_release+0x1be/0x260) #4 ffffffff812a1065 (__fput+0x155/0x360) #5 ffffffff812a12de (____fput+0x1e/0x30) #6 ffffffff8111708d (task_work_run+0x10d/0x140) #7 ffffffff810ea043 (do_exit+0x433/0x11f0) #8 ffffffff810eaee4 (do_group_exit+0x84/0x130) #9 ffffffff810eafb1 (SyS_exit_group+0x21/0x30) #10 ffffffff81928782 (system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b) Allocated by thread T5167: #0 ffffffff810dc778 (asan_slab_alloc+0x48/0xc0) #1 ffffffff8128337c (__kmalloc+0xbc/0x500) #2 ffffffff811d9d54 (trace_parser_get_init+0x34/0x90) #3 ffffffff811cd7b3 (ftrace_regex_open+0x83/0x2e0) #4 ffffffff811cda7d (ftrace_filter_open+0x2d/0x40) #5 ffffffff8129b4ff (do_dentry_open+0x32f/0x430) #6 ffffffff8129b668 (finish_open+0x68/0xa0) #7 ffffffff812b66ac (do_last+0xb8c/0x1710) #8 ffffffff812b7350 (path_openat+0x120/0xb50) #9 ffffffff812b8884 (do_filp_open+0x54/0xb0) #10 ffffffff8129d36c (do_sys_open+0x1ac/0x2c0) #11 ffffffff8129d4b7 (SyS_open+0x37/0x50) #12 ffffffff81928782 (system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b) Shadow bytes around the buggy address: ffff8800359c9700: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd ffff8800359c9780: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9800: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9880: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>ffff8800359c9980: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[03]fb ffff8800359c9a00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9a80: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9b00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8800359c9b80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8800359c9c00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap redzone: fa Heap kmalloc redzone: fb Freed heap region: fd Shadow gap: fe The out-of-bounds access happens on 'parser->buffer[parser->idx] = 0;' Although the crash happened in ftrace_regex_open() the real bug occurred in trace_get_user() where there's an incrementation to parser->idx without a check against the size. The way it is triggered is if userspace sends in 128 characters (EVENT_BUF_SIZE + 1), the loop that reads the last character stores it and then breaks out because there is no more characters. Then the last character is read to determine what to do next, and the index is incremented without checking size. Then the caller of trace_get_user() usually nulls out the last character with a zero, but since the index is equal to the size, it writes a nul character after the allocated space, which can corrupt memory. Luckily, only root user has write access to this file. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20131009222323.04fd1a0d@gandalf.local.home Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
This work contains a lightweight BPF-based traffic classifier that can serve as a flexible alternative to ematch-based tree classification, i.e. now that BPF filter engine can also be JITed in the kernel. Naturally, tc actions and policies are supported as well with cls_bpf. Multiple BPF programs/filter can be attached for a class, or they can just as well be written within a single BPF program, that's really up to the user how he wishes to run/optimize the code, e.g. also for inversion of verdicts etc. The notion of a BPF program's return/exit codes is being kept as follows: 0: No match -1: Select classid given in "tc filter ..." command else: flowid, overwrite the default one As a minimal usage example with iproute2, we use a 3 band prio root qdisc on a router with sfq each as leave, and assign ssh and icmp bpf-based filters to band 1, http traffic to band 2 and the rest to band 3. For the first two bands we load the bytecode from a file, in the 2nd we load it inline as an example: echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_enable tc qdisc del dev em1 root tc qdisc add dev em1 root handle 1: prio bands 3 priomap 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 tc qdisc add dev em1 parent 1:1 sfq perturb 16 tc qdisc add dev em1 parent 1:2 sfq perturb 16 tc qdisc add dev em1 parent 1:3 sfq perturb 16 tc filter add dev em1 parent 1: bpf run bytecode-file /etc/tc/ssh.bpf flowid 1:1 tc filter add dev em1 parent 1: bpf run bytecode-file /etc/tc/icmp.bpf flowid 1:1 tc filter add dev em1 parent 1: bpf run bytecode-file /etc/tc/http.bpf flowid 1:2 tc filter add dev em1 parent 1: bpf run bytecode "`bpfc -f tc -i misc.ops`" flowid 1:3 BPF programs can be easily created and passed to tc, either as inline 'bytecode' or 'bytecode-file'. There are a couple of front-ends that can compile opcodes, for example: 1) People familiar with tcpdump-like filters: tcpdump -iem1 -ddd port 22 | tr '\n' ',' > /etc/tc/ssh.bpf 2) People that want to low-level program their filters or use BPF extensions that lack support by libpcap's compiler: bpfc -f tc -i ssh.ops > /etc/tc/ssh.bpf ssh.ops example code: ldh [12] jne #0x800, drop ldb [23] jneq #6, drop ldh [20] jset #0x1fff, drop ldxb 4 * ([14] & 0xf) ldh [%x + 14] jeq #0x16, pass ldh [%x + 16] jne #0x16, drop pass: ret #-1 drop: ret #0 It was chosen to load bytecode into tc, since the reverse operation, tc filter list dev em1, is then able to show the exact commands again. Possible follow-up work could also include a small expression compiler for iproute2. Tested with the help of bmon. This idea came up during the Netfilter Workshop 2013 in Copenhagen. Also thanks to feedback from Eric Dumazet! Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
…ux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 boot changes from Ingo Molnar: "Two changes that prettify and compactify the SMP bootup output from: smpboot: Booting Node 0, Processors #1 #2 #3 OK smpboot: Booting Node 1, Processors #4 #5 #6 #7 OK smpboot: Booting Node 2, Processors #8 #9 #10 #11 OK smpboot: Booting Node 3, Processors #12 #13 #14 #15 OK Brought up 16 CPUs to something like: x86: Booting SMP configuration: .... node #0, CPUs: #1 #2 #3 .... node #1, CPUs: #4 #5 #6 #7 .... node #2, CPUs: #8 #9 #10 #11 .... node #3, CPUs: #12 #13 #14 #15 x86: Booted up 4 nodes, 16 CPUs" * 'x86-boot-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/boot: Further compress CPUs bootup message x86: Improve the printout of the SMP bootup CPU table
…culation Currently mx53 (CortexA8) running at 1GHz reports: Calibrating delay loop... 663.55 BogoMIPS (lpj=3317760) Tom Evans verified that alignments of 0x0 and 0x8 run the two instructions of __loop_delay in one clock cycle (1 clock/loop), while alignments of 0x4 and 0xc take 3 clocks to run the loop twice. (1.5 clock/loop) The original object code looks like this: 00000010 <__loop_const_udelay>: 10: e3e01000 mvn r1, #0 14: e51f201c ldr r2, [pc, #-28] ; 0 <__loop_udelay-0x8> 18: e5922000 ldr r2, [r2] 1c: e0800921 add r0, r0, r1, lsr #18 20: e1a00720 lsr r0, r0, #14 24: e0822b21 add r2, r2, r1, lsr #22 28: e1a02522 lsr r2, r2, #10 2c: e0000092 mul r0, r2, r0 30: e0800d21 add r0, r0, r1, lsr #26 34: e1b00320 lsrs r0, r0, #6 38: 01a0f00e moveq pc, lr 0000003c <__loop_delay>: 3c: e2500001 subs r0, r0, #1 40: 8afffffe bhi 3c <__loop_delay> 44: e1a0f00e mov pc, lr After adding the 'align 3' directive to __loop_delay (align to 8 bytes): 00000010 <__loop_const_udelay>: 10: e3e01000 mvn r1, #0 14: e51f201c ldr r2, [pc, #-28] ; 0 <__loop_udelay-0x8> 18: e5922000 ldr r2, [r2] 1c: e0800921 add r0, r0, r1, lsr #18 20: e1a00720 lsr r0, r0, #14 24: e0822b21 add r2, r2, r1, lsr #22 28: e1a02522 lsr r2, r2, #10 2c: e0000092 mul r0, r2, r0 30: e0800d21 add r0, r0, r1, lsr #26 34: e1b00320 lsrs r0, r0, #6 38: 01a0f00e moveq pc, lr 3c: e320f000 nop {0} 00000040 <__loop_delay>: 40: e2500001 subs r0, r0, #1 44: 8afffffe bhi 40 <__loop_delay> 48: e1a0f00e mov pc, lr 4c: e320f000 nop {0} , which now reports: Calibrating delay loop... 996.14 BogoMIPS (lpj=4980736) Some more test results: On mx31 (ARM1136) running at 532 MHz, before the patch: Calibrating delay loop... 351.43 BogoMIPS (lpj=1757184) On mx31 (ARM1136) running at 532 MHz after the patch: Calibrating delay loop... 528.79 BogoMIPS (lpj=2643968) Also tested on mx6 (CortexA9) and on mx27 (ARM926), which shows the same BogoMIPS value before and after this patch. Reported-by: Tom Evans <tom_usenet@optusnet.com.au> Suggested-by: Tom Evans <tom_usenet@optusnet.com.au> Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@freescale.com> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Hayes Wang says: ==================== support new chip Remove the trailing "/* CRC */" for patch #3. Change the return value type of rtl_ops_init() from int to boolean for patch #4. Replace VENDOR_ID_SAMSUNG with SAMSUNG_VENDOR_ID for patch #6. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
When we pull a received packet from a link's 'deferred packets' queue for processing, its 'next' pointer is not cleared, and still refers to the next packet in that queue, if any. This is incorrect, but caused no harm before commit 40ba3cd ("tipc: message reassembly using fragment chain") was introduced. After that commit, it may sometimes lead to the following oops: general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC Modules linked in: tipc CPU: 4 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/4 Tainted: G W 3.13.0-rc2+ #6 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2007 task: ffff880017af4880 ti: ffff880017aee000 task.ti: ffff880017aee000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81710694>] [<ffffffff81710694>] skb_try_coalesce+0x44/0x3d0 RSP: 0018:ffff880016603a78 EFLAGS: 00010212 RAX: 6b6b6b6bd6d6d6d6 RBX: ffff880013106ac0 RCX: ffff880016603ad0 RDX: ffff880016603ad7 RSI: ffff88001223ed00 RDI: ffff880013106ac0 RBP: ffff880016603ab8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88001223ed00 R13: ffff880016603ad0 R14: 000000000000058c R15: ffff880012297650 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880016600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 000000000805b000 CR3: 0000000011f5d000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Stack: ffff880016603a88 ffffffff810a38ed ffff880016603aa8 ffff88001223ed00 0000000000000001 ffff880012297648 ffff880016603b68 ffff880012297650 ffff880016603b08 ffffffffa0006c51 ffff880016603b08 00ffffffa00005fc Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff810a38ed>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [<ffffffffa0006c51>] tipc_link_recv_fragment+0xd1/0x1b0 [tipc] [<ffffffffa0007214>] tipc_recv_msg+0x4e4/0x920 [tipc] [<ffffffffa00016f0>] ? tipc_l2_rcv_msg+0x40/0x250 [tipc] [<ffffffffa000177c>] tipc_l2_rcv_msg+0xcc/0x250 [tipc] [<ffffffffa00016f0>] ? tipc_l2_rcv_msg+0x40/0x250 [tipc] [<ffffffff8171e65b>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x80b/0xd00 [<ffffffff8171df94>] ? __netif_receive_skb_core+0x144/0xd00 [<ffffffff8171eb76>] __netif_receive_skb+0x26/0x70 [<ffffffff8171ed6d>] netif_receive_skb+0x2d/0x200 [<ffffffff8171fe70>] napi_gro_receive+0xb0/0x130 [<ffffffff815647c2>] e1000_clean_rx_irq+0x2c2/0x530 [<ffffffff81565986>] e1000_clean+0x266/0x9c0 [<ffffffff81985f7b>] ? notifier_call_chain+0x2b/0x160 [<ffffffff8171f971>] net_rx_action+0x141/0x310 [<ffffffff81051c1b>] __do_softirq+0xeb/0x480 [<ffffffff819817bb>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2b/0x40 [<ffffffff810b8c42>] ? handle_fasteoi_irq+0x72/0x100 [<ffffffff81052346>] irq_exit+0x96/0xc0 [<ffffffff8198cbc3>] do_IRQ+0x63/0xe0 [<ffffffff81981def>] common_interrupt+0x6f/0x6f <EOI> This happens when the last fragment of a message has passed through the the receiving link's 'deferred packets' queue, and at least one other packet was added to that queue while it was there. After the fragment chain with the complete message has been successfully delivered to the receiving socket, it is released. Since 'next' pointer of the last fragment in the released chain now is non-NULL, we get the crash shown above. We fix this by clearing the 'next' pointer of all received packets, including those being pulled from the 'deferred' queue, before they undergo any further processing. Fixes: 40ba3cd ("tipc: message reassembly using fragment chain") Signed-off-by: Erik Hugne <erik.hugne@ericsson.com> Reported-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch should resolve the following bug. ========================================================= [ INFO: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected ] 3.13.0-rc5.f2fs+ #6 Not tainted --------------------------------------------------------- kswapd0/41 just changed the state of lock: (&sbi->gc_mutex){+.+.-.}, at: [<ffffffffa030503e>] f2fs_balance_fs+0xae/0xd0 [f2fs] but this lock took another, RECLAIM_FS-READ-unsafe lock in the past: (&sbi->cp_rwsem){++++.?} and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them. other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &sbi->gc_mutex --> &sbi->cp_mutex --> &sbi->cp_rwsem Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&sbi->cp_rwsem); local_irq_disable(); lock(&sbi->gc_mutex); lock(&sbi->cp_mutex); <Interrupt> lock(&sbi->gc_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** This bug is due to the f2fs_balance_fs call in f2fs_write_data_page. If f2fs_write_data_page is triggered by wbc->for_reclaim via kswapd, it should not call f2fs_balance_fs which tries to get a mutex grabbed by original syscall flow. Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk.kim@samsung.com>
This patch tries to fix this crash: #5 [ffff88003c1cd690] do_invalid_op at ffffffff810166d5 #6 [ffff88003c1cd730] invalid_op at ffffffff8159b2de [exception RIP: ocfs2_direct_IO_get_blocks+359] RIP: ffffffffa05dfa27 RSP: ffff88003c1cd7e8 RFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88003c1cdaa8 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: ffff880027a95000 RDI: ffff88003c79b540 RBP: ffff88003c1cd858 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: ffffffff815f6ba0 R10: 00000000000001c9 R11: 00000000000001c9 R12: ffff88002d271500 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000001000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffff88003c1cd860] do_direct_IO at ffffffff811cd31b #8 [ffff88003c1cd950] direct_IO_iovec at ffffffff811cde9c #9 [ffff88003c1cd9b0] do_blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff811ce764 #10 [ffff88003c1cdb80] __blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff811ce7cc #11 [ffff88003c1cdbb0] ocfs2_direct_IO at ffffffffa05df756 [ocfs2] #12 [ffff88003c1cdbe0] generic_file_direct_write_iter at ffffffff8112f935 #13 [ffff88003c1cdc40] ocfs2_file_write_iter at ffffffffa0600ccc [ocfs2] #14 [ffff88003c1cdd50] do_aio_write at ffffffff8119126c #15 [ffff88003c1cddc0] aio_rw_vect_retry at ffffffff811d9bb4 #16 [ffff88003c1cddf0] aio_run_iocb at ffffffff811db880 #17 [ffff88003c1cde30] io_submit_one at ffffffff811dc238 #18 [ffff88003c1cde80] do_io_submit at ffffffff811dc437 #19 [ffff88003c1cdf70] sys_io_submit at ffffffff811dc530 #20 [ffff88003c1cdf80] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff8159a159 It crashes at BUG_ON(create && (ext_flags & OCFS2_EXT_REFCOUNTED)); in ocfs2_direct_IO_get_blocks. ocfs2_direct_IO_get_blocks is expecting the OCFS2_EXT_REFCOUNTED be removed in ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_write() if it was there. But no cluster lock is taken during the time before (or inside) ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_write() and after ocfs2_direct_IO_get_blocks(). It can happen in this case: Node A(which crashes) Node B ------------------------ --------------------------- ocfs2_file_aio_write ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_write ocfs2_inode_lock ... ocfs2_inode_unlock #no refcount found .... ocfs2_reflink ocfs2_inode_lock ... ocfs2_inode_unlock #now, refcount flag set on extent ... flush change to disk ocfs2_direct_IO_get_blocks ocfs2_get_clusters #extent map miss #buffer_head miss read extents from disk found refcount flag on extent crash.. Fix: Take rw_lock in ocfs2_reflink path Signed-off-by: Wengang Wang <wen.gang.wang@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch wires up the new syscall sys_bpf() on powerpc. Passes the tests in samples/bpf: #0 add+sub+mul OK #1 unreachable OK #2 unreachable2 OK #3 out of range jump OK #4 out of range jump2 OK #5 test1 ld_imm64 OK #6 test2 ld_imm64 OK #7 test3 ld_imm64 OK #8 test4 ld_imm64 OK #9 test5 ld_imm64 OK #10 no bpf_exit OK #11 loop (back-edge) OK #12 loop2 (back-edge) OK #13 conditional loop OK #14 read uninitialized register OK #15 read invalid register OK #16 program doesn't init R0 before exit OK #17 stack out of bounds OK #18 invalid call insn1 OK #19 invalid call insn2 OK #20 invalid function call OK #21 uninitialized stack1 OK #22 uninitialized stack2 OK #23 check valid spill/fill OK #24 check corrupted spill/fill OK #25 invalid src register in STX OK #26 invalid dst register in STX OK #27 invalid dst register in ST OK #28 invalid src register in LDX OK #29 invalid dst register in LDX OK #30 junk insn OK #31 junk insn2 OK #32 junk insn3 OK #33 junk insn4 OK #34 junk insn5 OK #35 misaligned read from stack OK #36 invalid map_fd for function call OK #37 don't check return value before access OK #38 access memory with incorrect alignment OK #39 sometimes access memory with incorrect alignment OK #40 jump test 1 OK #41 jump test 2 OK #42 jump test 3 OK #43 jump test 4 OK Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com> [mpe: test using samples/bpf] Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
This reverts commit aa11bbf. This commit was causing connection issues and is not needed if IWL_MVM_RS_RSSI_BASED_INIT_RATE is set to false by default. Regardless of the issues mentioned above, this patch added the following WARNING: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3946 at drivers/net/wireless/iwlwifi/mvm/tx.c:190 iwl_mvm_set_tx_params+0x60a/0x6f0 [iwlmvm]() Got an HT rate for a non data frame 0x8 CPU: 0 PID: 3946 Comm: wpa_supplicant Tainted: G O 3.17.0+ #6 Hardware name: LENOVO 20ANCTO1WW/20ANCTO1WW, BIOS GLET71WW (2.25 ) 07/02/2014 0000000000000009 ffffffff814fa911 ffff8804288db8f8 ffffffff81064f52 0000000000001808 ffff8804288db948 ffff88040add8660 ffff8804291b5600 0000000000000000 ffffffff81064fb7 ffffffffa07b73d0 0000000000000020 Call Trace: [<ffffffff814fa911>] ? dump_stack+0x41/0x51 [<ffffffff81064f52>] ? warn_slowpath_common+0x72/0x90 [<ffffffff81064fb7>] ? warn_slowpath_fmt+0x47/0x50 [<ffffffffa07a39ea>] ? iwl_mvm_set_tx_params+0x60a/0x6f0 [iwlmvm] [<ffffffffa07a3cf8>] ? iwl_mvm_tx_skb+0x48/0x3c0 [iwlmvm] [<ffffffffa079cb9b>] ? iwl_mvm_mac_tx+0x7b/0x180 [iwlmvm] [<ffffffffa0746ce9>] ? __ieee80211_tx+0x2b9/0x3c0 [mac80211] [<ffffffffa07492f3>] ? ieee80211_tx+0xb3/0x100 [mac80211] [<ffffffffa0749c49>] ? ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x459/0xca0 [mac80211] [<ffffffff814116e7>] ? dev_hard_start_xmit+0x337/0x5f0 [<ffffffff81430d46>] ? sch_direct_xmit+0x96/0x1f0 [<ffffffff81411ba3>] ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x203/0x4f0 [<ffffffff8142f670>] ? ether_setup+0x70/0x70 [<ffffffff814e96a1>] ? packet_sendmsg+0xf81/0x1110 [<ffffffff8140625c>] ? skb_free_datagram+0xc/0x40 [<ffffffff813f7538>] ? sock_sendmsg+0x88/0xc0 [<ffffffff813f7274>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x14/0x60 [<ffffffff811c47c2>] ? __inode_wait_for_writeback+0x62/0xb0 [<ffffffff813f7a91>] ? SYSC_sendto+0xf1/0x180 [<ffffffff813f88f9>] ? __sys_recvmsg+0x39/0x70 [<ffffffff8150066d>] ? system_call_fastpath+0x1a/0x1f ---[ end trace cc19a150d311fc63 ]--- which was reported here: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85691 CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [3.13+] Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Firmware-assisted dump (fadump) kernel code is not endian safe. The below patch fixes this issue. Tested this patch with upstream kernel. Below output shows crash tool successfully opening LE fadump vmcore. # crash vmlinux vmcore GNU gdb (GDB) 7.6 This GDB was configured as "powerpc64le-unknown-linux-gnu"... KERNEL: vmlinux DUMPFILE: vmcore CPUS: 16 DATE: Wed Dec 31 19:00:00 1969 UPTIME: 00:03:28 LOAD AVERAGE: 0.46, 0.86, 0.41 TASKS: 268 NODENAME: linux-dhr2 RELEASE: 3.17.0-rc5-7-default VERSION: #6 SMP Tue Sep 30 01:06:34 EDT 2014 MACHINE: ppc64le (4116 Mhz) MEMORY: 40 GB PANIC: "Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]" (check log for details) PID: 6223 COMMAND: "bash" TASK: c0000009661b2500 [THREAD_INFO: c000000967ac0000] CPU: 2 STATE: TASK_RUNNING (PANIC) Signed-off-by: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.vnet.ibm.com> [mpe: Make the comment in pSeries_lpar_hptab_clear() clearer] Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
David reported that perf can segfault when adding an uprobe event like this: $ perf probe -x /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so -a 'malloc size=%di' (gdb) bt #0 parse_eh_frame_hdr (hdr=0x0, hdr_size=2596, hdr_vaddr=71788, ehdr=0x7fffffffd390, eh_frame_vaddr= 0x7fffffffd378, table_entries=0x8808d8, table_encoding=0x8808e0 "") at dwarf_getcfi_elf.c:79 #1 0x000000385f81615a in getcfi_scn_eh_frame (hdr_vaddr=71788, hdr_scn=0x8839b0, shdr=0x7fffffffd2f0, scn=<optimized out>, ehdr=0x7fffffffd390, elf=0x882b30) at dwarf_getcfi_elf.c:231 #2 getcfi_shdr (ehdr=0x7fffffffd390, elf=0x882b30) at dwarf_getcfi_elf.c:283 #3 dwarf_getcfi_elf (elf=0x882b30) at dwarf_getcfi_elf.c:309 #4 0x00000000004d5bac in debuginfo__find_probes (pf=0x7fffffffd4f0, dbg=Unhandled dwarf expression opcode 0xfa) at util/probe-finder.c:993 #5 0x00000000004d634a in debuginfo__find_trace_events (dbg=0x880840, pev=<optimized out>, tevs=0x880f88, max_tevs=<optimized out>) at util/probe-finder.c:1200 #6 0x00000000004aed6b in try_to_find_probe_trace_events (target=0x881b20 "/lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so", max_tevs=128, tevs=0x880f88, pev=0x859b30) at util/probe-event.c:482 #7 convert_to_probe_trace_events (target=0x881b20 "/lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so", max_tevs=128, tevs=0x880f88, pev=0x859b30) at util/probe-event.c:2356 #8 add_perf_probe_events (pevs=<optimized out>, npevs=1, max_tevs=128, target=0x881b20 "/lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so", force_add=false) at util/probe-event.c:2391 #9 0x000000000044014f in __cmd_probe (argc=<optimized out>, argv=0x7fffffffe2f0, prefix=Unhandled dwarf expression opcode 0xfa) at at builtin-probe.c:488 #10 0x0000000000440313 in cmd_probe (argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffe2f0, prefix=<optimized out>) at builtin-probe.c:506 #11 0x000000000041d133 in run_builtin (p=0x805680, argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffe2f0) at perf.c:341 #12 0x000000000041c8b2 in handle_internal_command (argv=<optimized out>, argc=<optimized out>) at perf.c:400 #13 run_argv (argv=<optimized out>, argcp=<optimized out>) at perf.c:444 #14 main (argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffe2f0) at perf.c:559 And I found a related commit (5704c8c4fa71 "getcfi_scn_eh_frame: Don't crash and burn when .eh_frame bits aren't there.") in elfutils that can lead to a unexpected crash like this. To safely use the function, it needs to check the .eh_frame section is a PROGBITS type. Reported-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Tested-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Cc: Mark Wielaard <mjw@redhat.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141230090533.GH6081@sejong Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
It is possible for ata_sff_flush_pio_task() to set ap->hsm_task_state to HSM_ST_IDLE in between the time __ata_sff_port_intr() checks for HSM_ST_IDLE and before it calls ata_sff_hsm_move() causing ata_sff_hsm_move() to BUG(). This problem is hard to reproduce making this patch hard to verify, but this fix will prevent the race. I have not been able to reproduce the problem, but here is a crash dump from a 2.6.32 kernel. On examining the ata port's state, its hsm_task_state field has a value of HSM_ST_IDLE: crash> struct ata_port.hsm_task_state ffff881c1121c000 hsm_task_state = 0 Normally, this should not be possible as ata_sff_hsm_move() was called from ata_sff_host_intr(), which checks hsm_task_state and won't call ata_sff_hsm_move() if it has a HSM_ST_IDLE value. PID: 11053 TASK: ffff8816e846cae0 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "sshd" #0 [ffff88008ba03960] machine_kexec at ffffffff81038f3b #1 [ffff88008ba039c0] crash_kexec at ffffffff810c5d92 #2 [ffff88008ba03a90] oops_end at ffffffff8152b510 #3 [ffff88008ba03ac0] die at ffffffff81010e0b #4 [ffff88008ba03af0] do_trap at ffffffff8152ad74 #5 [ffff88008ba03b50] do_invalid_op at ffffffff8100cf95 #6 [ffff88008ba03bf0] invalid_op at ffffffff8100bf9b [exception RIP: ata_sff_hsm_move+317] RIP: ffffffff813a77ad RSP: ffff88008ba03ca0 RFLAGS: 00010097 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff881c1121dc60 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff881c1121dd10 RSI: ffff881c1121dc60 RDI: ffff881c1121c000 RBP: ffff88008ba03d00 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 000000000000002e R10: 000000000001003f R11: 000000000000009b R12: ffff881c1121c000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000050 R15: ffff881c1121dd78 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffff88008ba03d08] ata_sff_host_intr at ffffffff813a7fbd #8 [ffff88008ba03d38] ata_sff_interrupt at ffffffff813a821e #9 [ffff88008ba03d78] handle_IRQ_event at ffffffff810e6ec0 --- <IRQ stack> --- [exception RIP: pipe_poll+48] RIP: ffffffff81192780 RSP: ffff880f26d459b8 RFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff880f26d459c8 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff881a0539fa80 RBP: ffffffff8100bb8e R8: ffff8803b23324a0 R9: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff880f26d45dd0 R11: 0000000000000008 R12: ffffffff8109b646 R13: ffff880f26d45948 R14: 0000000000000246 R15: 0000000000000246 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff10 CS: 0010 SS: 0018 RIP: 00007f26017435c3 RSP: 00007fffe020c420 RFLAGS: 00000206 RAX: 0000000000000017 RBX: ffffffff8100b072 RCX: 00007fffe020c45c RDX: 00007f2604a3f120 RSI: 00007f2604a3f140 RDI: 000000000000000d RBP: 0000000000000000 R8: 00007fffe020e570 R9: 0101010101010101 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fffe020e5f0 R13: 00007fffe020e5f4 R14: 00007f26045f373c R15: 00007fffe020e5e0 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000017 CS: 0033 SS: 002b Somewhere between the ata_sff_hsm_move() check and the ata_sff_host_intr() check, the value changed. On examining the other cpus to see what else was running, another cpu was running the error handler routines: PID: 326 TASK: ffff881c11014aa0 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "scsi_eh_1" #0 [ffff88008ba27e90] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff8102fee6 #1 [ffff88008ba27ea0] notifier_call_chain at ffffffff8152d515 #2 [ffff88008ba27ee0] atomic_notifier_call_chain at ffffffff8152d57a #3 [ffff88008ba27ef0] notify_die at ffffffff810a154e #4 [ffff88008ba27f20] do_nmi at ffffffff8152b1db #5 [ffff88008ba27f50] nmi at ffffffff8152aaa0 [exception RIP: _spin_lock_irqsave+47] RIP: ffffffff8152a1ff RSP: ffff881c11a73aa0 RFLAGS: 00000006 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff881c1121deb8 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000246 RSI: 0000000000000020 RDI: ffff881c122612d8 RBP: ffff881c11a73aa0 R8: ffff881c17083800 R9: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff881c1121c000 R13: 000000000000001f R14: ffff881c1121dd50 R15: ffff881c1121dc60 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0000 --- <NMI exception stack> --- #6 [ffff881c11a73aa0] _spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff8152a1ff #7 [ffff881c11a73aa8] ata_exec_internal_sg at ffffffff81396fb5 #8 [ffff881c11a73b58] ata_exec_internal at ffffffff81397109 #9 [ffff881c11a73bd8] atapi_eh_request_sense at ffffffff813a34eb Before it tried to acquire a spinlock, ata_exec_internal_sg() called ata_sff_flush_pio_task(). This function will set ap->hsm_task_state to HSM_ST_IDLE, and has no locking around setting this value. ata_sff_flush_pio_task() can then race with the interrupt handler and potentially set HSM_ST_IDLE at a fatal moment, which will trigger a kernel BUG. v2: Fixup comment in ata_sff_flush_pio_task() tj: Further updated comment. Use ap->lock instead of shost lock and use the [un]lock_irq variant instead of the irqsave/restore one. Signed-off-by: David Milburn <dmilburn@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Perf top raise a warning if a kernel sample is collected but kernel map is restricted. The warning message needs to dereference al.map->dso... However, previous perf_event__preprocess_sample() doesn't always guarantee al.map != NULL, for example, when kernel map is restricted. This patch validates al.map before dereferencing, avoid the segfault. Before this patch: $ cat /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict 1 $ perf top -p 120183 perf: Segmentation fault -------- backtrace -------- /path/to/perf[0x509868] /lib64/libc.so.6(+0x3545f)[0x7f9a1540045f] /path/to/perf[0x448820] /path/to/perf(cmd_top+0xe3c)[0x44a5dc] /path/to/perf[0x4766a2] /path/to/perf(main+0x5f5)[0x42e545] /lib64/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xf4)[0x7f9a153ecbd4] /path/to/perf[0x42e674] And gdb call trace: Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. perf_event__process_sample (machine=0xa44030, sample=0x7fffffffa4c0, evsel=0xa43b00, event=0x7ffff41c3000, tool=0x7fffffffa8a0) at builtin-top.c:736 736 !RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&al.map->dso->symbols[MAP__FUNCTION]) ? (gdb) bt #0 perf_event__process_sample (machine=0xa44030, sample=0x7fffffffa4c0, evsel=0xa43b00, event=0x7ffff41c3000, tool=0x7fffffffa8a0) at builtin-top.c:736 #1 perf_top__mmap_read_idx (top=top@entry=0x7fffffffa8a0, idx=idx@entry=0) at builtin-top.c:855 #2 0x000000000044a5dd in perf_top__mmap_read (top=0x7fffffffa8a0) at builtin-top.c:872 #3 __cmd_top (top=0x7fffffffa8a0) at builtin-top.c:997 #4 cmd_top (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>, prefix=<optimized out>) at builtin-top.c:1267 #5 0x00000000004766a3 in run_builtin (p=p@entry=0x8a6ce8 <commands+264>, argc=argc@entry=3, argv=argv@entry=0x7fffffffdf70) at perf.c:371 #6 0x000000000042e546 in handle_internal_command (argv=0x7fffffffdf70, argc=3) at perf.c:430 #7 run_argv (argv=0x7fffffffdcf0, argcp=0x7fffffffdcfc) at perf.c:474 #8 main (argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffdf70) at perf.c:589 (gdb) Signed-off-by: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1429946703-80807-1-git-send-email-wangnan0@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Calling btrfs_qgroup_reserve_meta_prealloc from btrfs_delayed_inode_reserve_metadata can result in flushing delalloc while holding a transaction and delayed node locks. This is deadlock prone. In the past multiple commits: * ae5e070 ("btrfs: qgroup: don't try to wait flushing if we're already holding a transaction") * 6f23277 ("btrfs: qgroup: don't commit transaction when we already hold the handle") Tried to solve various aspects of this but this was always a whack-a-mole game. Unfortunately those 2 fixes don't solve a deadlock scenario involving btrfs_delayed_node::mutex. Namely, one thread can call btrfs_dirty_inode as a result of reading a file and modifying its atime: PID: 6963 TASK: ffff8c7f3f94c000 CPU: 2 COMMAND: "test" #0 __schedule at ffffffffa529e07d ljalves#1 schedule at ffffffffa529e4ff ljalves#2 schedule_timeout at ffffffffa52a1bdd ljalves#3 wait_for_completion at ffffffffa529eeea <-- sleeps with delayed node mutex held ljalves#4 start_delalloc_inodes at ffffffffc0380db5 ljalves#5 btrfs_start_delalloc_snapshot at ffffffffc0393836 ljalves#6 try_flush_qgroup at ffffffffc03f04b2 ljalves#7 __btrfs_qgroup_reserve_meta at ffffffffc03f5bb6 <-- tries to reserve space and starts delalloc inodes. ljalves#8 btrfs_delayed_update_inode at ffffffffc03e31aa <-- acquires delayed node mutex ljalves#9 btrfs_update_inode at ffffffffc0385ba8 ljalves#10 btrfs_dirty_inode at ffffffffc038627b <-- TRANSACTIION OPENED ljalves#11 touch_atime at ffffffffa4cf0000 ljalves#12 generic_file_read_iter at ffffffffa4c1f123 ljalves#13 new_sync_read at ffffffffa4ccdc8a ljalves#14 vfs_read at ffffffffa4cd0849 ljalves#15 ksys_read at ffffffffa4cd0bd1 ljalves#16 do_syscall_64 at ffffffffa4a052eb ljalves#17 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffffa540008c This will cause an asynchronous work to flush the delalloc inodes to happen which can try to acquire the same delayed_node mutex: PID: 455 TASK: ffff8c8085fa4000 CPU: 5 COMMAND: "kworker/u16:30" #0 __schedule at ffffffffa529e07d ljalves#1 schedule at ffffffffa529e4ff ljalves#2 schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffa529e80a ljalves#3 __mutex_lock at ffffffffa529fdcb <-- goes to sleep, never wakes up. ljalves#4 btrfs_delayed_update_inode at ffffffffc03e3143 <-- tries to acquire the mutex ljalves#5 btrfs_update_inode at ffffffffc0385ba8 <-- this is the same inode that pid 6963 is holding ljalves#6 cow_file_range_inline.constprop.78 at ffffffffc0386be7 ljalves#7 cow_file_range at ffffffffc03879c1 ljalves#8 btrfs_run_delalloc_range at ffffffffc038894c ljalves#9 writepage_delalloc at ffffffffc03a3c8f ljalves#10 __extent_writepage at ffffffffc03a4c01 ljalves#11 extent_write_cache_pages at ffffffffc03a500b ljalves#12 extent_writepages at ffffffffc03a6de2 ljalves#13 do_writepages at ffffffffa4c277eb ljalves#14 __filemap_fdatawrite_range at ffffffffa4c1e5bb ljalves#15 btrfs_run_delalloc_work at ffffffffc0380987 <-- starts running delayed nodes ljalves#16 normal_work_helper at ffffffffc03b706c ljalves#17 process_one_work at ffffffffa4aba4e4 ljalves#18 worker_thread at ffffffffa4aba6fd ljalves#19 kthread at ffffffffa4ac0a3d ljalves#20 ret_from_fork at ffffffffa54001ff To fully address those cases the complete fix is to never issue any flushing while holding the transaction or the delayed node lock. This patch achieves it by calling qgroup_reserve_meta directly which will either succeed without flushing or will fail and return -EDQUOT. In the latter case that return value is going to be propagated to btrfs_dirty_inode which will fallback to start a new transaction. That's fine as the majority of time we expect the inode will have BTRFS_DELAYED_NODE_INODE_DIRTY flag set which will result in directly copying the in-memory state. Fixes: c53e965 ("btrfs: qgroup: try to flush qgroup space when we get -EDQUOT") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
When removing the driver module w/o bringing an interface up before the error below occurs. Reason seems to be that cancel_work_sync() is called in t3_sge_stop() for a queue that hasn't been initialized yet. [10085.941785] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [10085.941799] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5850 at kernel/workqueue.c:3074 __flush_work+0x3ff/0x480 [10085.941819] Modules linked in: vfat snd_hda_codec_hdmi fat snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic ledtrig_audio led_class ee1004 iTCO_ wdt intel_tcc_cooling x86_pkg_temp_thermal coretemp aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core r 8169 snd_pcm realtek mdio_devres snd_timer snd i2c_i801 i2c_smbus libphy i915 i2c_algo_bit cxgb3(-) intel_gtt ttm mdio drm_kms_helper mei_me s yscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt mei fb_sys_fops acpi_pad sch_fq_codel crypto_user drm efivarfs ext4 mbcache jbd2 crc32c_intel [10085.941944] CPU: 1 PID: 5850 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 5.14.0-rc7-next-20210826+ ljalves#6 [10085.941974] Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product Name/PRIME H310I-PLUS, BIOS 2603 10/21/2019 [10085.941992] RIP: 0010:__flush_work+0x3ff/0x480 [10085.942003] Code: c0 74 6b 65 ff 0d d1 bd 78 75 e8 bc 2f 06 00 48 c7 c6 68 b1 88 8a 48 c7 c7 e0 5f b4 8b 45 31 ff e8 e6 66 04 00 e9 4b fe ff ff <0f> 0b 45 31 ff e9 41 fe ff ff e8 72 c1 79 00 85 c0 74 87 80 3d 22 [10085.942036] RSP: 0018:ffffa1744383fc08 EFLAGS: 00010246 [10085.942048] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000923 [10085.942062] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff91c901710a88 [10085.942076] RBP: ffffa1744383fce8 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001 [10085.942090] R10: 00000000000000c2 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff91c901710a88 [10085.942104] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff91c909a96100 R15: 0000000000000001 [10085.942118] FS: 00007fe417837740(0000) GS:ffff91c969d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [10085.942134] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [10085.942146] CR2: 000055a8d567ecd8 CR3: 0000000121690003 CR4: 00000000003706e0 [10085.942160] Call Trace: [10085.942166] ? __lock_acquire+0x3af/0x22e0 [10085.942177] ? cancel_work_sync+0xb/0x10 [10085.942187] __cancel_work_timer+0x128/0x1b0 [10085.942197] ? __pm_runtime_resume+0x5b/0x90 [10085.942208] cancel_work_sync+0xb/0x10 [10085.942217] t3_sge_stop+0x2f/0x50 [cxgb3] [10085.942234] remove_one+0x26/0x190 [cxgb3] [10085.942248] pci_device_remove+0x39/0xa0 [10085.942258] __device_release_driver+0x15e/0x240 [10085.942269] driver_detach+0xd9/0x120 [10085.942278] bus_remove_driver+0x53/0xd0 [10085.942288] driver_unregister+0x2c/0x50 [10085.942298] pci_unregister_driver+0x31/0x90 [10085.942307] cxgb3_cleanup_module+0x10/0x18c [cxgb3] [10085.942324] __do_sys_delete_module+0x191/0x250 [10085.942336] ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x21/0x60 [10085.942347] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x2a/0xe0 [10085.942357] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x13/0x20 [10085.942368] do_syscall_64+0x40/0x90 [10085.942377] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [10085.942389] RIP: 0033:0x7fe41796323b Fixes: 5e0b892 ("net:cxgb3: replace tasklets with works") Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
If CONFIG_BLK_DEV_LOOP && CONFIG_MTD (at least; there might be other combinations), lockdep complains circular locking dependency at __loop_clr_fd(), for major_names_lock serves as a locking dependency aggregating hub across multiple block modules. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.14.0+ #757 Tainted: G E ------------------------------------------------------ systemd-udevd/7568 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88800f334d48 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 but task is already holding lock: ffff888014a7d4a0 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x4d/0x400 [loop] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> ljalves#6 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_killable_nested+0x17/0x20 lo_open+0x23/0x50 [loop] blkdev_get_by_dev+0x199/0x540 blkdev_open+0x58/0x90 do_dentry_open+0x144/0x3a0 path_openat+0xa57/0xda0 do_filp_open+0x9f/0x140 do_sys_openat2+0x71/0x150 __x64_sys_openat+0x78/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> ljalves#5 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x20 bd_register_pending_holders+0x20/0x100 device_add_disk+0x1ae/0x390 loop_add+0x29c/0x2d0 [loop] blk_request_module+0x5a/0xb0 blkdev_get_no_open+0x27/0xa0 blkdev_get_by_dev+0x5f/0x540 blkdev_open+0x58/0x90 do_dentry_open+0x144/0x3a0 path_openat+0xa57/0xda0 do_filp_open+0x9f/0x140 do_sys_openat2+0x71/0x150 __x64_sys_openat+0x78/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> ljalves#4 (major_names_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x20 blkdev_show+0x19/0x80 devinfo_show+0x52/0x60 seq_read_iter+0x2d5/0x3e0 proc_reg_read_iter+0x41/0x80 vfs_read+0x2ac/0x330 ksys_read+0x6b/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> ljalves#3 (&p->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x20 seq_read_iter+0x37/0x3e0 generic_file_splice_read+0xf3/0x170 splice_direct_to_actor+0x14e/0x350 do_splice_direct+0x84/0xd0 do_sendfile+0x263/0x430 __se_sys_sendfile64+0x96/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> ljalves#2 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 lo_write_bvec+0x96/0x280 [loop] loop_process_work+0xa68/0xc10 [loop] process_one_work+0x293/0x480 worker_thread+0x23d/0x4b0 kthread+0x163/0x180 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> ljalves#1 ((work_completion)(&lo->rootcg_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 process_one_work+0x280/0x480 worker_thread+0x23d/0x4b0 kthread+0x163/0x180 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #0 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}: validate_chain+0x1f0d/0x33e0 __lock_acquire+0x92d/0x1030 lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 flush_workqueue+0x8c/0x560 drain_workqueue+0x80/0x140 destroy_workqueue+0x47/0x4f0 __loop_clr_fd+0xb4/0x400 [loop] blkdev_put+0x14a/0x1d0 blkdev_close+0x1c/0x20 __fput+0xfd/0x220 task_work_run+0x69/0xc0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1ce/0x1f0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (wq_completion)loop0 --> &disk->open_mutex --> &lo->lo_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&lo->lo_mutex); lock(&disk->open_mutex); lock(&lo->lo_mutex); lock((wq_completion)loop0); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by systemd-udevd/7568: #0: ffff888012554128 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: blkdev_put+0x4c/0x1d0 ljalves#1: ffff888014a7d4a0 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x4d/0x400 [loop] stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 7568 Comm: systemd-udevd Tainted: G E 5.14.0+ #757 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 02/27/2020 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x79/0xbf print_circular_bug+0x5d6/0x5e0 ? stack_trace_save+0x42/0x60 ? save_trace+0x3d/0x2d0 check_noncircular+0x10b/0x120 validate_chain+0x1f0d/0x33e0 ? __lock_acquire+0x953/0x1030 ? __lock_acquire+0x953/0x1030 __lock_acquire+0x92d/0x1030 ? flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 ? flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 flush_workqueue+0x8c/0x560 ? flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 ? sched_clock_cpu+0xe/0x1a0 ? drain_workqueue+0x41/0x140 drain_workqueue+0x80/0x140 destroy_workqueue+0x47/0x4f0 ? blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait+0xac/0xd0 __loop_clr_fd+0xb4/0x400 [loop] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x35/0x230 blkdev_put+0x14a/0x1d0 blkdev_close+0x1c/0x20 __fput+0xfd/0x220 task_work_run+0x69/0xc0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1ce/0x1f0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f0fd4c661f7 Code: 00 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 41 c3 48 83 ec 18 89 7c 24 0c e8 13 fc ff ff RSP: 002b:00007ffd1c9e9fd8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007f0fd46be6c8 RCX: 00007f0fd4c661f7 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 0000000000000006 R08: 000055fff1eaf400 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f0fd46be6c8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000002f08 R15: 00007ffd1c9ea050 Commit 1c500ad ("loop: reduce the loop_ctl_mutex scope") is for breaking "loop_ctl_mutex => &lo->lo_mutex" dependency chain. But enabling a different block module results in forming circular locking dependency due to shared major_names_lock mutex. The simplest fix is to call probe function without holding major_names_lock [1], but Christoph Hellwig does not like such idea. Therefore, instead of holding major_names_lock in blkdev_show(), introduce a different lock for blkdev_show() in order to break "sb_writers#$N => &p->lock => major_names_lock" dependency chain. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b2af8a5b-3c1b-204e-7f56-bea0b15848d6@i-love.sakura.ne.jp [1] Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/18a02da2-0bf3-550e-b071-2b4ab13c49f0@i-love.sakura.ne.jp Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
It's later supposed to be either a correct address or NULL. Without the initialization, it may contain an undefined value which results in the following segmentation fault: # perf top --sort comm -g --ignore-callees=do_idle terminates with: #0 0x00007ffff56b7685 in __strlen_avx2 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 ljalves#1 0x00007ffff55e3802 in strdup () from /lib64/libc.so.6 ljalves#2 0x00005555558cb139 in hist_entry__init (callchain_size=<optimized out>, sample_self=true, template=0x7fffde7fb110, he=0x7fffd801c250) at util/hist.c:489 ljalves#3 hist_entry__new (template=template@entry=0x7fffde7fb110, sample_self=sample_self@entry=true) at util/hist.c:564 ljalves#4 0x00005555558cb4ba in hists__findnew_entry (hists=hists@entry=0x5555561d9e38, entry=entry@entry=0x7fffde7fb110, al=al@entry=0x7fffde7fb420, sample_self=sample_self@entry=true) at util/hist.c:657 ljalves#5 0x00005555558cba1b in __hists__add_entry (hists=hists@entry=0x5555561d9e38, al=0x7fffde7fb420, sym_parent=<optimized out>, bi=bi@entry=0x0, mi=mi@entry=0x0, sample=sample@entry=0x7fffde7fb4b0, sample_self=true, ops=0x0, block_info=0x0) at util/hist.c:288 ljalves#6 0x00005555558cbb70 in hists__add_entry (sample_self=true, sample=0x7fffde7fb4b0, mi=0x0, bi=0x0, sym_parent=<optimized out>, al=<optimized out>, hists=0x5555561d9e38) at util/hist.c:1056 ljalves#7 iter_add_single_cumulative_entry (iter=0x7fffde7fb460, al=<optimized out>) at util/hist.c:1056 ljalves#8 0x00005555558cc8a4 in hist_entry_iter__add (iter=iter@entry=0x7fffde7fb460, al=al@entry=0x7fffde7fb420, max_stack_depth=<optimized out>, arg=arg@entry=0x7fffffff7db0) at util/hist.c:1231 ljalves#9 0x00005555557cdc9a in perf_event__process_sample (machine=<optimized out>, sample=0x7fffde7fb4b0, evsel=<optimized out>, event=<optimized out>, tool=0x7fffffff7db0) at builtin-top.c:842 ljalves#10 deliver_event (qe=<optimized out>, qevent=<optimized out>) at builtin-top.c:1202 ljalves#11 0x00005555558a9318 in do_flush (show_progress=false, oe=0x7fffffff80e0) at util/ordered-events.c:244 ljalves#12 __ordered_events__flush (oe=oe@entry=0x7fffffff80e0, how=how@entry=OE_FLUSH__TOP, timestamp=timestamp@entry=0) at util/ordered-events.c:323 ljalves#13 0x00005555558a9789 in __ordered_events__flush (timestamp=<optimized out>, how=<optimized out>, oe=<optimized out>) at util/ordered-events.c:339 ljalves#14 ordered_events__flush (how=OE_FLUSH__TOP, oe=0x7fffffff80e0) at util/ordered-events.c:341 ljalves#15 ordered_events__flush (oe=oe@entry=0x7fffffff80e0, how=how@entry=OE_FLUSH__TOP) at util/ordered-events.c:339 ljalves#16 0x00005555557cd631 in process_thread (arg=0x7fffffff7db0) at builtin-top.c:1114 ljalves#17 0x00007ffff7bb817a in start_thread () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0 ljalves#18 0x00007ffff5656dc3 in clone () from /lib64/libc.so.6 If you look at the frame ljalves#2, the code is: 488 if (he->srcline) { 489 he->srcline = strdup(he->srcline); 490 if (he->srcline == NULL) 491 goto err_rawdata; 492 } If he->srcline is not NULL (it is not NULL if it is uninitialized rubbish), it gets strdupped and strdupping a rubbish random string causes the problem. Also, if you look at the commit 1fb7d06, it adds the srcline property into the struct, but not initializing it everywhere needed. Committer notes: Now I see, when using --ignore-callees=do_idle we end up here at line 2189 in add_callchain_ip(): 2181 if (al.sym != NULL) { 2182 if (perf_hpp_list.parent && !*parent && 2183 symbol__match_regex(al.sym, &parent_regex)) 2184 *parent = al.sym; 2185 else if (have_ignore_callees && root_al && 2186 symbol__match_regex(al.sym, &ignore_callees_regex)) { 2187 /* Treat this symbol as the root, 2188 forgetting its callees. */ 2189 *root_al = al; 2190 callchain_cursor_reset(cursor); 2191 } 2192 } And the al that doesn't have the ->srcline field initialized will be copied to the root_al, so then, back to: 1211 int hist_entry_iter__add(struct hist_entry_iter *iter, struct addr_location *al, 1212 int max_stack_depth, void *arg) 1213 { 1214 int err, err2; 1215 struct map *alm = NULL; 1216 1217 if (al) 1218 alm = map__get(al->map); 1219 1220 err = sample__resolve_callchain(iter->sample, &callchain_cursor, &iter->parent, 1221 iter->evsel, al, max_stack_depth); 1222 if (err) { 1223 map__put(alm); 1224 return err; 1225 } 1226 1227 err = iter->ops->prepare_entry(iter, al); 1228 if (err) 1229 goto out; 1230 1231 err = iter->ops->add_single_entry(iter, al); 1232 if (err) 1233 goto out; 1234 That al at line 1221 is what hist_entry_iter__add() (called from sample__resolve_callchain()) saw as 'root_al', and then: iter->ops->add_single_entry(iter, al); will go on with al->srcline with a bogus value, I'll add the above sequence to the cset and apply, thanks! Signed-off-by: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com> CC: Milian Wolff <milian.wolff@kdab.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Fixes: 1fb7d06 ("perf report Use srcline from callchain for hist entries") Link: https //lore.kernel.org/r/20210719145332.29747-1-mpetlan@redhat.com Reported-by: Juri Lelli <jlelli@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
FD uses xyarray__entry that may return NULL if an index is out of bounds. If NULL is returned then a segv happens as FD unconditionally dereferences the pointer. This was happening in a case of with perf iostat as shown below. The fix is to make FD an "int*" rather than an int and handle the NULL case as either invalid input or a closed fd. $ sudo gdb --args perf stat --iostat list ... Breakpoint 1, perf_evsel__alloc_fd (evsel=0x5555560951a0, ncpus=1, nthreads=1) at evsel.c:50 50 { (gdb) bt #0 perf_evsel__alloc_fd (evsel=0x5555560951a0, ncpus=1, nthreads=1) at evsel.c:50 ljalves#1 0x000055555585c188 in evsel__open_cpu (evsel=0x5555560951a0, cpus=0x555556093410, threads=0x555556086fb0, start_cpu=0, end_cpu=1) at util/evsel.c:1792 ljalves#2 0x000055555585cfb2 in evsel__open (evsel=0x5555560951a0, cpus=0x0, threads=0x555556086fb0) at util/evsel.c:2045 ljalves#3 0x000055555585d0db in evsel__open_per_thread (evsel=0x5555560951a0, threads=0x555556086fb0) at util/evsel.c:2065 ljalves#4 0x00005555558ece64 in create_perf_stat_counter (evsel=0x5555560951a0, config=0x555555c34700 <stat_config>, target=0x555555c2f1c0 <target>, cpu=0) at util/stat.c:590 ljalves#5 0x000055555578e927 in __run_perf_stat (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe4a0, run_idx=0) at builtin-stat.c:833 ljalves#6 0x000055555578f3c6 in run_perf_stat (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe4a0, run_idx=0) at builtin-stat.c:1048 ljalves#7 0x0000555555792ee5 in cmd_stat (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe4a0) at builtin-stat.c:2534 ljalves#8 0x0000555555835ed3 in run_builtin (p=0x555555c3f540 <commands+288>, argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe4a0) at perf.c:313 ljalves#9 0x0000555555836154 in handle_internal_command (argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe4a0) at perf.c:365 ljalves#10 0x000055555583629f in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffe2ec, argv=0x7fffffffe2e0) at perf.c:409 ljalves#11 0x0000555555836692 in main (argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe4a0) at perf.c:539 ... (gdb) c Continuing. Error: The sys_perf_event_open() syscall returned with 22 (Invalid argument) for event (uncore_iio_0/event=0x83,umask=0x04,ch_mask=0xF,fc_mask=0x07/). /bin/dmesg | grep -i perf may provide additional information. Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x00005555559b03ea in perf_evsel__close_fd_cpu (evsel=0x5555560951a0, cpu=1) at evsel.c:166 166 if (FD(evsel, cpu, thread) >= 0) v3. fixes a bug in perf_evsel__run_ioctl where the sense of a branch was backward. Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210918054440.2350466-1-irogers@google.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
To clear a user buffer we cannot simply use memset, we have to use clear_user(). With a virtio-mem device that registers a vmcore_cb and has some logically unplugged memory inside an added Linux memory block, I can easily trigger a BUG by copying the vmcore via "cp": systemd[1]: Starting Kdump Vmcore Save Service... kdump[420]: Kdump is using the default log level(3). kdump[453]: saving to /sysroot/var/crash/127.0.0.1-2021-11-11-14:59:22/ kdump[458]: saving vmcore-dmesg.txt to /sysroot/var/crash/127.0.0.1-2021-11-11-14:59:22/ kdump[465]: saving vmcore-dmesg.txt complete kdump[467]: saving vmcore BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00007f2374e01000 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0003) - permissions violation PGD 7a523067 P4D 7a523067 PUD 7a528067 PMD 7a525067 PTE 800000007048f867 Oops: 0003 [ljalves#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 468 Comm: cp Not tainted 5.15.0+ ljalves#6 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.14.0-27-g64f37cc530f1-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:read_from_oldmem.part.0.cold+0x1d/0x86 Code: ff ff ff e8 05 ff fe ff e9 b9 e9 7f ff 48 89 de 48 c7 c7 38 3b 60 82 e8 f1 fe fe ff 83 fd 08 72 3c 49 8d 7d 08 4c 89 e9 89 e8 <49> c7 45 00 00 00 00 00 49 c7 44 05 f8 00 00 00 00 48 83 e7 f81 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000073be08 EFLAGS: 00010212 RAX: 0000000000001000 RBX: 00000000002fd000 RCX: 00007f2374e01000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00000000ffffdfff RDI: 00007f2374e01008 RBP: 0000000000001000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc9000073bc50 R10: ffffc9000073bc48 R11: ffffffff829461a8 R12: 000000000000f000 R13: 00007f2374e01000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88807bd421e8 FS: 00007f2374e12140(0000) GS:ffff88807f000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f2374e01000 CR3: 000000007a4aa000 CR4: 0000000000350eb0 Call Trace: read_vmcore+0x236/0x2c0 proc_reg_read+0x55/0xa0 vfs_read+0x95/0x190 ksys_read+0x4f/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Some x86-64 CPUs have a CPU feature called "Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP)", which is used to detect wrong access from the kernel to user buffers like this: SMAP triggers a permissions violation on wrong access. In the x86-64 variant of clear_user(), SMAP is properly handled via clac()+stac(). To fix, properly use clear_user() when we're dealing with a user buffer. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211112092750.6921-1-david@redhat.com Fixes: 997c136 ("fs/proc/vmcore.c: add hook to read_from_oldmem() to check for non-ram pages") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Change the cifs filesystem to take account of the changes to fscache's indexing rewrite and reenable caching in cifs. The following changes have been made: (1) The fscache_netfs struct is no more, and there's no need to register the filesystem as a whole. (2) The session cookie is now an fscache_volume cookie, allocated with fscache_acquire_volume(). That takes three parameters: a string representing the "volume" in the index, a string naming the cache to use (or NULL) and a u64 that conveys coherency metadata for the volume. For cifs, I've made it render the volume name string as: "cifs,<ipaddress>,<sharename>" where the sharename has '/' characters replaced with ';'. This probably needs rethinking a bit as the total name could exceed the maximum filename component length. Further, the coherency data is currently just set to 0. It needs something else doing with it - I wonder if it would suffice simply to sum the resource_id, vol_create_time and vol_serial_number or maybe hash them. (3) The fscache_cookie_def is no more and needed information is passed directly to fscache_acquire_cookie(). The cache no longer calls back into the filesystem, but rather metadata changes are indicated at other times. fscache_acquire_cookie() is passed the same keying and coherency information as before. (4) The functions to set/reset cookies are removed and fscache_use_cookie() and fscache_unuse_cookie() are used instead. fscache_use_cookie() is passed a flag to indicate if the cookie is opened for writing. fscache_unuse_cookie() is passed updates for the metadata if we changed it (ie. if the file was opened for writing). These are called when the file is opened or closed. (5) cifs_setattr_*() are made to call fscache_resize() to change the size of the cache object. (6) The functions to read and write data are stubbed out pending a conversion to use netfslib. Changes ======= ver ljalves#8: - Abstract cache invalidation into a helper function. - Fix some checkpatch warnings[3]. ver ljalves#7: - Removed the accidentally added-back call to get the super cookie in cifs_root_iget(). - Fixed the right call to cifs_fscache_get_super_cookie() to take account of the "-o fsc" mount flag. ver ljalves#6: - Moved the change of gfpflags_allow_blocking() to current_is_kswapd() for cifs here. - Fixed one of the error paths in cifs_atomic_open() to jump around the call to use the cookie. - Fixed an additional successful return in the middle of cifs_open() to use the cookie on the way out. - Only get a volume cookie (and thus inode cookies) when "-o fsc" is supplied to mount. ver ljalves#5: - Fixed a couple of bits of cookie handling[2]: - The cookie should be released in cifs_evict_inode(), not cifsFileInfo_put_final(). The cookie needs to persist beyond file closure so that writepages will be able to write to it. - fscache_use_cookie() needs to be called in cifs_atomic_open() as it is for cifs_open(). ver ljalves#4: - Fixed the use of sizeof with memset. - tcon->vol_create_time is __le64 so doesn't need cpu_to_le64(). ver ljalves#3: - Canonicalise the cifs coherency data to make the cache portable. - Set volume coherency data. ver ljalves#2: - Use gfpflags_allow_blocking() rather than using flag directly. - Upgraded to -rc4 to allow for upstream changes[1]. - fscache_acquire_volume() now returns errors. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> cc: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> cc: Shyam Prasad N <nspmangalore@gmail.com> cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-cachefs@redhat.com Link: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=23b55d673d7527b093cd97b7c217c82e70cd1af0 [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3419813.1641592362@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ [2] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAH2r5muTanw9pJqzAHd01d9A8keeChkzGsCEH6=0rHutVLAF-A@mail.gmail.com/ [3] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163819671009.215744.11230627184193298714.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163906982979.143852.10672081929614953210.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163967187187.1823006.247415138444991444.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/164021579335.640689.2681324337038770579.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v4 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3462849.1641593783@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v5 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1318953.1642024578@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v6 Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Patch series "mm: COW fixes part 1: fix the COW security issue for THP and swap", v3. This series attempts to optimize and streamline the COW logic for ordinary anon pages and THP anon pages, fixing two remaining instances of CVE-2020-29374 in do_swap_page() and do_huge_pmd_wp_page(): information can leak from a parent process to a child process via anonymous pages shared during fork(). This issue, including other related COW issues, has been summarized in [2]: "1. Observing Memory Modifications of Private Pages From A Child Process Long story short: process-private memory might not be as private as you think once you fork(): successive modifications of private memory regions in the parent process can still be observed by the child process, for example, by smart use of vmsplice()+munmap(). The core problem is that pinning pages readable in a child process, such as done via the vmsplice system call, can result in a child process observing memory modifications done in the parent process the child is not supposed to observe. [1] contains an excellent summary and [2] contains further details. This issue was assigned CVE-2020-29374 [9]. For this to trigger, it's required to use a fork() without subsequent exec(), for example, as used under Android zygote. Without further details about an application that forks less-privileged child processes, one cannot really say what's actually affected and what's not -- see the details section the end of this mail for a short sshd/openssh analysis. While commit 1783985 ("gup: document and work around "COW can break either way" issue") fixed this issue and resulted in other problems (e.g., ptrace on pmem), commit 09854ba ("mm: do_wp_page() simplification") re-introduced part of the problem unfortunately. The original reproducer can be modified quite easily to use THP [3] and make the issue appear again on upstream kernels. I modified it to use hugetlb [4] and it triggers as well. The problem is certainly less severe with hugetlb than with THP; it merely highlights that we still have plenty of open holes we should be closing/fixing. Regarding vmsplice(), the only known workaround is to disallow the vmsplice() system call ... or disable THP and hugetlb. But who knows what else is affected (RDMA? O_DIRECT?) to achieve the same goal -- in the end, it's a more generic issue" This security issue was first reported by Jann Horn on 27 May 2020 and it currently affects anonymous pages during swapin, anonymous THP and hugetlb. This series tackles anonymous pages during swapin and anonymous THP: - do_swap_page() for handling COW on PTEs during swapin directly - do_huge_pmd_wp_page() for handling COW on PMD-mapped THP during write faults With this series, we'll apply the same COW logic we have in do_wp_page() to all swappable anon pages: don't reuse (map writable) the page in case there are additional references (page_count() != 1). All users of reuse_swap_page() are remove, and consequently reuse_swap_page() is removed. In general, we're struggling with the following COW-related issues: (1) "missed COW": we miss to copy on write and reuse the page (map it writable) although we must copy because there are pending references from another process to this page. The result is a security issue. (2) "wrong COW": we copy on write although we wouldn't have to and shouldn't: if there are valid GUP references, they will become out of sync with the pages mapped into the page table. We fail to detect that such a page can be reused safely, especially if never more than a single process mapped the page. The result is an intra process memory corruption. (3) "unnecessary COW": we copy on write although we wouldn't have to: performance degradation and temporary increases swap+memory consumption can be the result. While this series fixes (1) for swappable anon pages, it tries to reduce reported cases of (3) first as good and easy as possible to limit the impact when streamlining. The individual patches try to describe in which cases we will run into (3). This series certainly makes (2) worse for THP, because a THP will now get PTE-mapped on write faults if there are additional references, even if there was only ever a single process involved: once PTE-mapped, we'll copy each and every subpage and won't reuse any subpage as long as the underlying compound page wasn't split. I'm working on an approach to fix (2) and improve (3): PageAnonExclusive to mark anon pages that are exclusive to a single process, allow GUP pins only on such exclusive pages, and allow turning exclusive pages shared (clearing PageAnonExclusive) only if there are no GUP pins. Anon pages with PageAnonExclusive set never have to be copied during write faults, but eventually during fork() if they cannot be turned shared. The improved reuse logic in this series will essentially also be the logic to reset PageAnonExclusive. This work will certainly take a while, but I'm planning on sharing details before having code fully ready. ljalves#1-ljalves#5 can be applied independently of the rest. ljalves#6-ljalves#9 are mostly only cleanups related to reuse_swap_page(). Notes: * For now, I'll leave hugetlb code untouched: "unnecessary COW" might easily break existing setups because hugetlb pages are a scarce resource and we could just end up having to crash the application when we run out of hugetlb pages. We have to be very careful and the security aspect with hugetlb is most certainly less relevant than for unprivileged anon pages. * Instead of lru_add_drain() we might actually just drain the lru_add list or even just remove the single page of interest from the lru_add list. This would require a new helper function, and could be added if the conditional lru_add_drain() turn out to be a problem. * I extended the test case already included in [1] to also test for the newly found do_swap_page() case. I'll send that out separately once/if this part was merged. [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211217113049.23850-1-david@redhat.com [2] https://lore.kernel.org/r/3ae33b08-d9ef-f846-56fb-645e3b9b4c66@redhat.com This patch (of 9): Liang Zhang reported [1] that the current COW logic in do_wp_page() is sub-optimal when it comes to swap+read fault+write fault of anonymous pages that have a single user, visible via a performance degradation in the redis benchmark. Something similar was previously reported [2] by Nadav with a simple reproducer. After we put an anon page into the swapcache and unmapped it from a single process, that process might read that page again and refault it read-only. If that process then writes to that page, the process is actually the exclusive user of the page, however, the COW logic in do_co_page() won't be able to reuse it due to the additional reference from the swapcache. Let's optimize for pages that have been added to the swapcache but only have an exclusive user. Try removing the swapcache reference if there is hope that we're the exclusive user. We will fail removing the swapcache reference in two scenarios: (1) There are additional swap entries referencing the page: copying instead of reusing is the right thing to do. (2) The page is under writeback: theoretically we might be able to reuse in some cases, however, we cannot remove the additional reference and will have to copy. Note that we'll only try removing the page from the swapcache when it's highly likely that we'll be the exclusive owner after removing the page from the swapache. As we're about to map that page writable and redirty it, that should not affect reclaim but is rather the right thing to do. Further, we might have additional references from the LRU pagevecs, which will force us to copy instead of being able to reuse. We'll try handling such references for some scenarios next. Concurrent writeback cannot be handled easily and we'll always have to copy. While at it, remove the superfluous page_mapcount() check: it's implicitly covered by the page_count() for ordinary anon pages. [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220113140318.11117-1-zhangliang5@huawei.com [2] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/0480D692-D9B2-429A-9A88-9BBA1331AC3A@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220131162940.210846-2-david@redhat.com Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reported-by: Liang Zhang <zhangliang5@huawei.com> Reported-by: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: Don Dutile <ddutile@redhat.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
As guest_irq is coming from KVM_IRQFD API call, it may trigger crash in svm_update_pi_irte() due to out-of-bounds: crash> bt PID: 22218 TASK: ffff951a6ad74980 CPU: 73 COMMAND: "vcpu8" #0 [ffffb1ba6707fa40] machine_kexec at ffffffff8565b397 ljalves#1 [ffffb1ba6707fa90] __crash_kexec at ffffffff85788a6d ljalves#2 [ffffb1ba6707fb58] crash_kexec at ffffffff8578995d ljalves#3 [ffffb1ba6707fb70] oops_end at ffffffff85623c0d ljalves#4 [ffffb1ba6707fb90] no_context at ffffffff856692c9 ljalves#5 [ffffb1ba6707fbf8] exc_page_fault at ffffffff85f95b51 ljalves#6 [ffffb1ba6707fc50] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff86000ace [exception RIP: svm_update_pi_irte+227] RIP: ffffffffc0761b53 RSP: ffffb1ba6707fd08 RFLAGS: 00010086 RAX: ffffb1ba6707fd78 RBX: ffffb1ba66d91000 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 00003c803f63f1c0 RSI: 000000000000019a RDI: ffffb1ba66db2ab8 RBP: 000000000000019a R8: 0000000000000040 R9: ffff94ca41b82200 R10: ffffffffffffffcf R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffffffffffffffcf R15: 000000000000005f ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 ljalves#7 [ffffb1ba6707fdb8] kvm_irq_routing_update at ffffffffc09f19a1 [kvm] ljalves#8 [ffffb1ba6707fde0] kvm_set_irq_routing at ffffffffc09f2133 [kvm] ljalves#9 [ffffb1ba6707fe18] kvm_vm_ioctl at ffffffffc09ef544 [kvm] RIP: 00007f143c36488b RSP: 00007f143a4e04b8 RFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f05780041d0 RCX: 00007f143c36488b RDX: 00007f05780041d0 RSI: 000000004008ae6a RDI: 0000000000000020 RBP: 00000000000004e8 R8: 0000000000000008 R9: 00007f05780041e0 R10: 00007f0578004560 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000004e0 R13: 000000000000001a R14: 00007f1424001c60 R15: 00007f0578003bc0 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 CS: 0033 SS: 002b Vmx have been fix this in commit 3a8b067 (KVM: VMX: Do not BUG() on out-of-bounds guest IRQ), so we can just copy source from that to fix this. Co-developed-by: Yi Liu <liu.yi24@zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: Yi Liu <liu.yi24@zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: Yi Wang <wang.yi59@zte.com.cn> Message-Id: <20220309113025.44469-1-wang.yi59@zte.com.cn> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Current DP driver implementation has adding safe mode done at dp_hpd_plug_handle() which is expected to be executed under event thread context. However there is possible circular locking happen (see blow stack trace) after edp driver call dp_hpd_plug_handle() from dp_bridge_enable() which is executed under drm_thread context. After review all possibilities methods and as discussed on https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/483155/, supporting EDID compliance tests in the driver is quite hacky. As seen with other vendor drivers, supporting these will be much easier with IGT. Hence removing all the related fail safe code for it so that no possibility of circular lock will happen. Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org> ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.15.35-lockdep ljalves#6 Tainted: G W ------------------------------------------------------ frecon/429 is trying to acquire lock: ffffff808dc3c4e8 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dp_panel_add_fail_safe_mode+0x4c/0xa0 but task is already holding lock: ffffff808dc441e0 (&kms->commit_lock[i]){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_crtcs+0xb4/0x124 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> ljalves#3 (&kms->commit_lock[i]){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock_common+0x174/0x1a64 mutex_lock_nested+0x98/0xac lock_crtcs+0xb4/0x124 msm_atomic_commit_tail+0x330/0x748 commit_tail+0x19c/0x278 drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x1dc/0x1f0 drm_atomic_commit+0xc0/0xd8 drm_atomic_helper_set_config+0xb4/0x134 drm_mode_setcrtc+0x688/0x1248 drm_ioctl_kernel+0x1e4/0x338 drm_ioctl+0x3a4/0x684 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x118/0x154 invoke_syscall+0x78/0x224 el0_svc_common+0x178/0x200 do_el0_svc+0x94/0x13c el0_svc+0x5c/0xec el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8 -> ljalves#2 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock_common+0x174/0x1a64 ww_mutex_lock+0xb8/0x278 modeset_lock+0x304/0x4ac drm_modeset_lock+0x4c/0x7c drmm_mode_config_init+0x4a8/0xc50 msm_drm_init+0x274/0xac0 msm_drm_bind+0x20/0x2c try_to_bring_up_master+0x3dc/0x470 __component_add+0x18c/0x3c0 component_add+0x1c/0x28 dp_display_probe+0x954/0xa98 platform_probe+0x124/0x15c really_probe+0x1b0/0x5f8 __driver_probe_device+0x174/0x20c driver_probe_device+0x70/0x134 __device_attach_driver+0x130/0x1d0 bus_for_each_drv+0xfc/0x14c __device_attach+0x1bc/0x2bc device_initial_probe+0x1c/0x28 bus_probe_device+0x94/0x178 deferred_probe_work_func+0x1a4/0x1f0 process_one_work+0x5d4/0x9dc worker_thread+0x898/0xccc kthread+0x2d4/0x3d4 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 -> ljalves#1 (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}: ww_acquire_init+0x1c4/0x2c8 drm_modeset_acquire_init+0x44/0xc8 drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes+0xb0/0x12dc drm_mode_getconnector+0x5dc/0xfe8 drm_ioctl_kernel+0x1e4/0x338 drm_ioctl+0x3a4/0x684 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x118/0x154 invoke_syscall+0x78/0x224 el0_svc_common+0x178/0x200 do_el0_svc+0x94/0x13c el0_svc+0x5c/0xec el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8 -> #0 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x2650/0x672c lock_acquire+0x1b4/0x4ac __mutex_lock_common+0x174/0x1a64 mutex_lock_nested+0x98/0xac dp_panel_add_fail_safe_mode+0x4c/0xa0 dp_hpd_plug_handle+0x1f0/0x280 dp_bridge_enable+0x94/0x2b8 drm_atomic_bridge_chain_enable+0x11c/0x168 drm_atomic_helper_commit_modeset_enables+0x500/0x740 msm_atomic_commit_tail+0x3e4/0x748 commit_tail+0x19c/0x278 drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x1dc/0x1f0 drm_atomic_commit+0xc0/0xd8 drm_atomic_helper_set_config+0xb4/0x134 drm_mode_setcrtc+0x688/0x1248 drm_ioctl_kernel+0x1e4/0x338 drm_ioctl+0x3a4/0x684 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x118/0x154 invoke_syscall+0x78/0x224 el0_svc_common+0x178/0x200 do_el0_svc+0x94/0x13c el0_svc+0x5c/0xec el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8 Changes in v2: -- re text commit title -- remove all fail safe mode Changes in v3: -- remove dp_panel_add_fail_safe_mode() from dp_panel.h -- add Fixes Changes in v5: -- to=dianders@chromium.org Changes in v6: -- fix Fixes commit ID Fixes: 8b2c181 ("drm/msm/dp: add fail safe mode outside of event_mutex context") Reported-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kuogee Hsieh <quic_khsieh@quicinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1651007534-31842-1-git-send-email-quic_khsieh@quicinc.com Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org>
While handling PCI errors (AER flow) driver tries to disable NAPI [napi_disable()] after NAPI is deleted [__netif_napi_del()] which causes unexpected system hang/crash. System message log shows the following: ======================================= [ 3222.537510] EEH: Detected PCI bus error on PHB#384-PE#800000 [ 3222.537511] EEH: This PCI device has failed 2 times in the last hour and will be permanently disabled after 5 failures. [ 3222.537512] EEH: Notify device drivers to shutdown [ 3222.537513] EEH: Beginning: 'error_detected(IO frozen)' [ 3222.537514] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): Invoking bnx2x->error_detected(IO frozen) [ 3222.537516] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_error_detected:14236(eth14)]IO error detected [ 3222.537650] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): bnx2x driver reports: 'need reset' [ 3222.537651] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.1): Invoking bnx2x->error_detected(IO frozen) [ 3222.537651] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_error_detected:14236(eth13)]IO error detected [ 3222.537729] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.1): bnx2x driver reports: 'need reset' [ 3222.537729] EEH: Finished:'error_detected(IO frozen)' with aggregate recovery state:'need reset' [ 3222.537890] EEH: Collect temporary log [ 3222.583481] EEH: of node=0384:80:00.0 [ 3222.583519] EEH: PCI device/vendor: 168e14e4 [ 3222.583557] EEH: PCI cmd/status register: 00100140 [ 3222.583557] EEH: PCI-E capabilities and status follow: [ 3222.583744] EEH: PCI-E 00: 00020010 012c8da2 00095d5e 00455c82 [ 3222.583892] EEH: PCI-E 10: 10820000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.583893] EEH: PCI-E 20: 00000000 [ 3222.583893] EEH: PCI-E AER capability register set follows: [ 3222.584079] EEH: PCI-E AER 00: 13c10001 00000000 00000000 00062030 [ 3222.584230] EEH: PCI-E AER 10: 00002000 000031c0 000001e0 00000000 [ 3222.584378] EEH: PCI-E AER 20: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584416] EEH: PCI-E AER 30: 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584416] EEH: of node=0384:80:00.1 [ 3222.584454] EEH: PCI device/vendor: 168e14e4 [ 3222.584491] EEH: PCI cmd/status register: 00100140 [ 3222.584492] EEH: PCI-E capabilities and status follow: [ 3222.584677] EEH: PCI-E 00: 00020010 012c8da2 00095d5e 00455c82 [ 3222.584825] EEH: PCI-E 10: 10820000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584826] EEH: PCI-E 20: 00000000 [ 3222.584826] EEH: PCI-E AER capability register set follows: [ 3222.585011] EEH: PCI-E AER 00: 13c10001 00000000 00000000 00062030 [ 3222.585160] EEH: PCI-E AER 10: 00002000 000031c0 000001e0 00000000 [ 3222.585309] EEH: PCI-E AER 20: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.585347] EEH: PCI-E AER 30: 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.586872] RTAS: event: 5, Type: Platform Error (224), Severity: 2 [ 3222.586873] EEH: Reset without hotplug activity [ 3224.762767] EEH: Beginning: 'slot_reset' [ 3224.762770] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): Invoking bnx2x->slot_reset() [ 3224.762771] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14271(eth14)]IO slot reset initializing... [ 3224.762887] bnx2x 0384:80:00.0: enabling device (0140 -> 0142) [ 3224.768157] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14287(eth14)]IO slot reset --> driver unload Uninterruptible tasks ===================== crash> ps | grep UN 213 2 11 c000000004c89e00 UN 0.0 0 0 [eehd] 215 2 0 c000000004c80000 UN 0.0 0 0 [kworker/0:2] 2196 1 28 c000000004504f00 UN 0.1 15936 11136 wickedd 4287 1 9 c00000020d076800 UN 0.0 4032 3008 agetty 4289 1 20 c00000020d056680 UN 0.0 7232 3840 agetty 32423 2 26 c00000020038c580 UN 0.0 0 0 [kworker/26:3] 32871 4241 27 c0000002609ddd00 UN 0.1 18624 11648 sshd 32920 10130 16 c00000027284a100 UN 0.1 48512 12608 sendmail 33092 32987 0 c000000205218b00 UN 0.1 48512 12608 sendmail 33154 4567 16 c000000260e51780 UN 0.1 48832 12864 pickup 33209 4241 36 c000000270cb6500 UN 0.1 18624 11712 sshd 33473 33283 0 c000000205211480 UN 0.1 48512 12672 sendmail 33531 4241 37 c00000023c902780 UN 0.1 18624 11648 sshd EEH handler hung while bnx2x sleeping and holding RTNL lock =========================================================== crash> bt 213 PID: 213 TASK: c000000004c89e00 CPU: 11 COMMAND: "eehd" #0 [c000000004d477e0] __schedule at c000000000c70808 ljalves#1 [c000000004d478b0] schedule at c000000000c70ee0 ljalves#2 [c000000004d478e0] schedule_timeout at c000000000c76dec ljalves#3 [c000000004d479c0] msleep at c0000000002120cc ljalves#4 [c000000004d479f0] napi_disable at c000000000a06448 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ljalves#5 [c000000004d47a30] bnx2x_netif_stop at c0080000018dba94 [bnx2x] ljalves#6 [c000000004d47a60] bnx2x_io_slot_reset at c0080000018a551c [bnx2x] ljalves#7 [c000000004d47b20] eeh_report_reset at c00000000004c9bc ljalves#8 [c000000004d47b90] eeh_pe_report at c00000000004d1a8 ljalves#9 [c000000004d47c40] eeh_handle_normal_event at c00000000004da64 And the sleeping source code ============================ crash> dis -ls c000000000a06448 FILE: ../net/core/dev.c LINE: 6702 6697 { 6698 might_sleep(); 6699 set_bit(NAPI_STATE_DISABLE, &n->state); 6700 6701 while (test_and_set_bit(NAPI_STATE_SCHED, &n->state)) * 6702 msleep(1); 6703 while (test_and_set_bit(NAPI_STATE_NPSVC, &n->state)) 6704 msleep(1); 6705 6706 hrtimer_cancel(&n->timer); 6707 6708 clear_bit(NAPI_STATE_DISABLE, &n->state); 6709 } EEH calls into bnx2x twice based on the system log above, first through bnx2x_io_error_detected() and then bnx2x_io_slot_reset(), and executes the following call chains: bnx2x_io_error_detected() +-> bnx2x_eeh_nic_unload() +-> bnx2x_del_all_napi() +-> __netif_napi_del() bnx2x_io_slot_reset() +-> bnx2x_netif_stop() +-> bnx2x_napi_disable() +->napi_disable() Fix this by correcting the sequence of NAPI APIs usage, that is delete the NAPI after disabling it. Fixes: 7fa6f34 ("bnx2x: AER revised") Reported-by: David Christensen <drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Tested-by: David Christensen <drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Manish Chopra <manishc@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: Ariel Elior <aelior@marvell.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220426153913.6966-1-manishc@marvell.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Recent commit that modified fib route event handler to handle events according to their priority introduced use-after-free[0] in mp->mfi pointer usage. The pointer now is not just cached in order to be compared to following fib_info instances, but is also dereferenced to obtain fib_priority. However, since mlx5 lag code doesn't hold the reference to fin_info during whole mp->mfi lifetime, it could be used after fib_info instance has already been freed be kernel infrastructure code. Don't ever dereference mp->mfi pointer. Refactor it to be 'const void*' type and cache fib_info priority in dedicated integer. Group fib_info-related data into dedicated 'fib' structure that will be further extended by following patches in the series. [0]: [ 203.588029] ================================================================== [ 203.590161] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mlx5_lag_fib_update+0xabd/0xd60 [mlx5_core] [ 203.592386] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888144df2050 by task kworker/u20:4/138 [ 203.594766] CPU: 3 PID: 138 Comm: kworker/u20:4 Tainted: G B 5.17.0-rc7+ ljalves#6 [ 203.596751] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 203.598813] Workqueue: mlx5_lag_mp mlx5_lag_fib_update [mlx5_core] [ 203.600053] Call Trace: [ 203.600608] <TASK> [ 203.601110] dump_stack_lvl+0x48/0x5e [ 203.601860] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x160 [ 203.602950] ? mlx5_lag_fib_update+0xabd/0xd60 [mlx5_core] [ 203.604073] ? mlx5_lag_fib_update+0xabd/0xd60 [mlx5_core] [ 203.605177] kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf [ 203.605969] ? mlx5_lag_fib_update+0xabd/0xd60 [mlx5_core] [ 203.607102] mlx5_lag_fib_update+0xabd/0xd60 [mlx5_core] [ 203.608199] ? mlx5_lag_init_fib_work+0x1c0/0x1c0 [mlx5_core] [ 203.609382] ? read_word_at_a_time+0xe/0x20 [ 203.610463] ? strscpy+0xa0/0x2a0 [ 203.611463] process_one_work+0x722/0x1270 [ 203.612344] worker_thread+0x540/0x11e0 [ 203.613136] ? rescuer_thread+0xd50/0xd50 [ 203.613949] kthread+0x26e/0x300 [ 203.614627] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 [ 203.615542] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 203.616273] </TASK> [ 203.617174] Allocated by task 3746: [ 203.617874] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 [ 203.618644] __kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0 [ 203.619394] fib_create_info+0xb41/0x3c50 [ 203.620213] fib_table_insert+0x190/0x1ff0 [ 203.621020] fib_magic.isra.0+0x246/0x2e0 [ 203.621803] fib_add_ifaddr+0x19f/0x670 [ 203.622563] fib_inetaddr_event+0x13f/0x270 [ 203.623377] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0xd4/0x130 [ 203.624355] __inet_insert_ifa+0x641/0xb20 [ 203.625185] inet_rtm_newaddr+0xc3d/0x16a0 [ 203.626009] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x309/0x880 [ 203.626826] netlink_rcv_skb+0x11d/0x340 [ 203.627626] netlink_unicast+0x4cc/0x790 [ 203.628430] netlink_sendmsg+0x762/0xc00 [ 203.629230] sock_sendmsg+0xb2/0xe0 [ 203.629955] ____sys_sendmsg+0x58a/0x770 [ 203.630756] ___sys_sendmsg+0xd8/0x160 [ 203.631523] __sys_sendmsg+0xb7/0x140 [ 203.632294] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 [ 203.633045] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 203.634427] Freed by task 0: [ 203.635063] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 [ 203.635844] kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 [ 203.636618] kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30 [ 203.637450] __kasan_slab_free+0xfc/0x140 [ 203.638271] kfree+0x94/0x3b0 [ 203.638903] rcu_core+0x5e4/0x1990 [ 203.639640] __do_softirq+0x1ba/0x5d3 [ 203.640828] Last potentially related work creation: [ 203.641785] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 [ 203.642571] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0x9f/0xb0 [ 203.643478] call_rcu+0x88/0x9c0 [ 203.644178] fib_release_info+0x539/0x750 [ 203.644997] fib_table_delete+0x659/0xb80 [ 203.645809] fib_magic.isra.0+0x1a3/0x2e0 [ 203.646617] fib_del_ifaddr+0x93f/0x1300 [ 203.647415] fib_inetaddr_event+0x9f/0x270 [ 203.648251] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0xd4/0x130 [ 203.649225] __inet_del_ifa+0x474/0xc10 [ 203.650016] devinet_ioctl+0x781/0x17f0 [ 203.650788] inet_ioctl+0x1ad/0x290 [ 203.651533] sock_do_ioctl+0xce/0x1c0 [ 203.652315] sock_ioctl+0x27b/0x4f0 [ 203.653058] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x124/0x190 [ 203.653850] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 [ 203.654608] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 203.666952] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888144df2000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256 [ 203.669250] The buggy address is located 80 bytes inside of 256-byte region [ffff888144df2000, ffff888144df2100) [ 203.671332] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 203.672273] page:00000000bf6c9314 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x144df0 [ 203.674009] head:00000000bf6c9314 order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 [ 203.675422] flags: 0x2ffff800010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1ffff) [ 203.676819] raw: 002ffff800010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffff888100042b40 [ 203.678384] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 203.679928] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 203.681455] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 203.682421] ffff888144df1f00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 203.683863] ffff888144df1f80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 203.685310] >ffff888144df2000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 203.686701] ^ [ 203.687820] ffff888144df2080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 203.689226] ffff888144df2100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 203.690620] ================================================================== Fixes: ad11c4f ("net/mlx5e: Lag, Only handle events from highest priority multipath entry") Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Maor Dickman <maord@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
Do not allow to write timestamps on RX rings if PF is being configured. When PF is being configured RX rings can be freed or rebuilt. If at the same time timestamps are updated, the kernel will crash by dereferencing null RX ring pointer. PID: 1449 TASK: ff187d28ed658040 CPU: 34 COMMAND: "ice-ptp-0000:51" #0 [ff1966a94a713bb0] machine_kexec at ffffffff9d05a0be ljalves#1 [ff1966a94a713c08] __crash_kexec at ffffffff9d192e9d ljalves#2 [ff1966a94a713cd0] crash_kexec at ffffffff9d1941bd ljalves#3 [ff1966a94a713ce8] oops_end at ffffffff9d01bd54 ljalves#4 [ff1966a94a713d08] no_context at ffffffff9d06bda4 ljalves#5 [ff1966a94a713d60] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff9d06c10c ljalves#6 [ff1966a94a713da8] do_page_fault at ffffffff9d06cae4 ljalves#7 [ff1966a94a713de0] page_fault at ffffffff9da0107e [exception RIP: ice_ptp_update_cached_phctime+91] RIP: ffffffffc076db8b RSP: ff1966a94a713e98 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 16e3db9c6b7ccae4 RBX: ff187d269dd3c180 RCX: ff187d269cd4d018 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ff187d269cfcc644 R8: ff187d339b9641b0 R9: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff187d269cfcc648 R13: ffffffff9f128784 R14: ffffffff9d101b70 R15: ff187d269cfcc640 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 ljalves#8 [ff1966a94a713ea0] ice_ptp_periodic_work at ffffffffc076dbef [ice] ljalves#9 [ff1966a94a713ee0] kthread_worker_fn at ffffffff9d101c1b ljalves#10 [ff1966a94a713f10] kthread at ffffffff9d101b4d ljalves#11 [ff1966a94a713f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff9da0023f Fixes: 77a7811 ("ice: enable receive hardware timestamping") Signed-off-by: Arkadiusz Kubalewski <arkadiusz.kubalewski@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> Tested-by: Dave Cain <dcain@redhat.com> Tested-by: Gurucharan <gurucharanx.g@intel.com> (A Contingent worker at Intel) Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
In Google internal bug 265639009 we've received an (as yet) unreproducible crash report from an aarch64 GKI 5.10.149-android13 running device. AFAICT the source code is at: https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/common/+/refs/tags/ASB-2022-12-05_13-5.10 The call stack is: ncm_close() -> ncm_notify() -> ncm_do_notify() with the crash at: ncm_do_notify+0x98/0x270 Code: 79000d0b b9000a6c f940012a f9400269 (b9405d4b) Which I believe disassembles to (I don't know ARM assembly, but it looks sane enough to me...): // halfword (16-bit) store presumably to event->wLength (at offset 6 of struct usb_cdc_notification) 0B 0D 00 79 strh w11, [x8, ljalves#6] // word (32-bit) store presumably to req->Length (at offset 8 of struct usb_request) 6C 0A 00 B9 str w12, [x19, ljalves#8] // x10 (NULL) was read here from offset 0 of valid pointer x9 // IMHO we're reading 'cdev->gadget' and getting NULL // gadget is indeed at offset 0 of struct usb_composite_dev 2A 01 40 F9 ldr x10, [x9] // loading req->buf pointer, which is at offset 0 of struct usb_request 69 02 40 F9 ldr x9, [x19] // x10 is null, crash, appears to be attempt to read cdev->gadget->max_speed 4B 5D 40 B9 ldr w11, [x10, #0x5c] which seems to line up with ncm_do_notify() case NCM_NOTIFY_SPEED code fragment: event->wLength = cpu_to_le16(8); req->length = NCM_STATUS_BYTECOUNT; /* SPEED_CHANGE data is up/down speeds in bits/sec */ data = req->buf + sizeof *event; data[0] = cpu_to_le32(ncm_bitrate(cdev->gadget)); My analysis of registers and NULL ptr deref crash offset (Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 000000000000005c) heavily suggests that the crash is due to 'cdev->gadget' being NULL when executing: data[0] = cpu_to_le32(ncm_bitrate(cdev->gadget)); which calls: ncm_bitrate(NULL) which then calls: gadget_is_superspeed(NULL) which reads ((struct usb_gadget *)NULL)->max_speed and hits a panic. AFAICT, if I'm counting right, the offset of max_speed is indeed 0x5C. (remember there's a GKI KABI reservation of 16 bytes in struct work_struct) It's not at all clear to me how this is all supposed to work... but returning 0 seems much better than panic-ing... Cc: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org> Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com> Cc: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com> Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230117131839.1138208-1-maze@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
During EEH error injection testing, a deadlock was encountered in the tg3 driver when tg3_io_error_detected() was attempting to cancel outstanding reset tasks: crash> foreach UN bt ... PID: 159 TASK: c0000000067c6000 CPU: 8 COMMAND: "eehd" ... ljalves#5 [c00000000681f990] __cancel_work_timer at c00000000019fd18 ljalves#6 [c00000000681fa30] tg3_io_error_detected at c00800000295f098 [tg3] ljalves#7 [c00000000681faf0] eeh_report_error at c00000000004e25c ... PID: 290 TASK: c000000036e5f800 CPU: 6 COMMAND: "kworker/6:1" ... ljalves#4 [c00000003721fbc0] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8 ljalves#5 [c00000003721fbe0] tg3_reset_task at c008000002969358 [tg3] ljalves#6 [c00000003721fc60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4 ... PID: 296 TASK: c000000037a65800 CPU: 21 COMMAND: "kworker/21:1" ... ljalves#4 [c000000037247bc0] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8 ljalves#5 [c000000037247be0] tg3_reset_task at c008000002969358 [tg3] ljalves#6 [c000000037247c60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4 ... PID: 655 TASK: c000000036f49000 CPU: 16 COMMAND: "kworker/16:2" ...:1 ljalves#4 [c0000000373ebbc0] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8 ljalves#5 [c0000000373ebbe0] tg3_reset_task at c008000002969358 [tg3] ljalves#6 [c0000000373ebc60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4 ... Code inspection shows that both tg3_io_error_detected() and tg3_reset_task() attempt to acquire the RTNL lock at the beginning of their code blocks. If tg3_reset_task() should happen to execute between the times when tg3_io_error_deteced() acquires the RTNL lock and tg3_reset_task_cancel() is called, a deadlock will occur. Moving tg3_reset_task_cancel() call earlier within the code block, prior to acquiring RTNL, prevents this from happening, but also exposes another deadlock issue where tg3_reset_task() may execute AFTER tg3_io_error_detected() has executed: crash> foreach UN bt PID: 159 TASK: c0000000067d2000 CPU: 9 COMMAND: "eehd" ... ljalves#4 [c000000006867a60] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8 ljalves#5 [c000000006867a80] tg3_io_slot_reset at c0080000026c2ea8 [tg3] ljalves#6 [c000000006867b00] eeh_report_reset at c00000000004de88 ... PID: 363 TASK: c000000037564000 CPU: 6 COMMAND: "kworker/6:1" ... ljalves#3 [c000000036c1bb70] msleep at c000000000259e6c ljalves#4 [c000000036c1bba0] napi_disable at c000000000c6b848 ljalves#5 [c000000036c1bbe0] tg3_reset_task at c0080000026d942c [tg3] ljalves#6 [c000000036c1bc60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4 ... This issue can be avoided by aborting tg3_reset_task() if EEH error recovery is already in progress. Fixes: db84bf4 ("tg3: tg3_reset_task() needs to use rtnl_lock to synchronize") Signed-off-by: David Christensen <drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Pavan Chebbi <pavan.chebbi@broadcom.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230124185339.225806-1-drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
code path: ocfs2_ioctl_move_extents ocfs2_move_extents ocfs2_defrag_extent __ocfs2_move_extent + ocfs2_journal_access_di + ocfs2_split_extent //sub-paths call jbd2_journal_restart + ocfs2_journal_dirty //crash by jbs2 ASSERT crash stacks: PID: 11297 TASK: ffff974a676dcd00 CPU: 67 COMMAND: "defragfs.ocfs2" #0 [ffffb25d8dad3900] machine_kexec at ffffffff8386fe01 ljalves#1 [ffffb25d8dad3958] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8395959d ljalves#2 [ffffb25d8dad3a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff8395a45d ljalves#3 [ffffb25d8dad3a38] oops_end at ffffffff83836d3f ljalves#4 [ffffb25d8dad3a58] do_trap at ffffffff83833205 ljalves#5 [ffffb25d8dad3aa0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff83833aa6 ljalves#6 [ffffb25d8dad3ac0] invalid_op at ffffffff84200d18 [exception RIP: jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata+0x2ba] RIP: ffffffffc09ca54a RSP: ffffb25d8dad3b70 RFLAGS: 00010207 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9706eedc5248 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff97337029ea28 RDI: ffff9706eedc5250 RBP: ffff9703c3520200 R8: 000000000f46b0b2 R9: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000001000000fe R12: ffff97337029ea28 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9703de59bf60 R15: ffff9706eedc5250 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 ljalves#7 [ffffb25d8dad3ba8] ocfs2_journal_dirty at ffffffffc137fb95 [ocfs2] ljalves#8 [ffffb25d8dad3be8] __ocfs2_move_extent at ffffffffc139a950 [ocfs2] ljalves#9 [ffffb25d8dad3c80] ocfs2_defrag_extent at ffffffffc139b2d2 [ocfs2] Analysis This bug has the same root cause of 'commit 7f27ec9 ("ocfs2: call ocfs2_journal_access_di() before ocfs2_journal_dirty() in ocfs2_write_end_nolock()")'. For this bug, jbd2_journal_restart() is called by ocfs2_split_extent() during defragmenting. How to fix For ocfs2_split_extent() can handle journal operations totally by itself. Caller doesn't need to call journal access/dirty pair, and caller only needs to call journal start/stop pair. The fix method is to remove journal access/dirty from __ocfs2_move_extent(). The discussion for this patch: https://oss.oracle.com/pipermail/ocfs2-devel/2023-February/000647.html Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230217003717.32469-1-heming.zhao@suse.com Signed-off-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Sai Krishna says: ==================== octeontx2: Miscellaneous fixes This patchset includes following fixes. Patch ljalves#1 Fix for the race condition while updating APR table Patch ljalves#2 Fix end bit position in NPC scan config Patch ljalves#3 Fix depth of CAM, MEM table entries Patch ljalves#4 Fix in increase the size of DMAC filter flows Patch ljalves#5 Fix driver crash resulting from invalid interface type information retrieved from firmware Patch ljalves#6 Fix incorrect mask used while installing filters involving fragmented packets Patch ljalves#7 Fixes for NPC field hash extract w.r.t IPV6 hash reduction, IPV6 filed hash configuration. Patch ljalves#8 Fix for NPC hardware parser configuration destination address hash, IPV6 endianness issues. Patch ljalves#9 Fix for skipping mbox initialization for PFs disabled by firmware. Patch ljalves#10 Fix disabling packet I/O in case of mailbox timeout. Patch ljalves#11 Fix detaching LF resources in case of VF probe fail. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
In the function ieee80211_tx_dequeue() there is a particular locking sequence: begin: spin_lock(&local->queue_stop_reason_lock); q_stopped = local->queue_stop_reasons[q]; spin_unlock(&local->queue_stop_reason_lock); However small the chance (increased by ftracetest), an asynchronous interrupt can occur in between of spin_lock() and spin_unlock(), and the interrupt routine will attempt to lock the same &local->queue_stop_reason_lock again. This will cause a costly reset of the CPU and the wifi device or an altogether hang in the single CPU and single core scenario. The only remaining spin_lock(&local->queue_stop_reason_lock) that did not disable interrupts was patched, which should prevent any deadlocks on the same CPU/core and the same wifi device. This is the probable trace of the deadlock: kernel: ================================ kernel: WARNING: inconsistent lock state kernel: 6.3.0-rc6-mt-20230401-00001-gf86822a1170f ljalves#4 Tainted: G W kernel: -------------------------------- kernel: inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage. kernel: kworker/5:0/25656 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes: kernel: ffff9d6190779478 (&local->queue_stop_reason_lock){+.?.}-{2:2}, at: return_to_handler+0x0/0x40 kernel: {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at: kernel: lock_acquire+0xc7/0x2d0 kernel: _raw_spin_lock+0x36/0x50 kernel: ieee80211_tx_dequeue+0xb4/0x1330 [mac80211] kernel: iwl_mvm_mac_itxq_xmit+0xae/0x210 [iwlmvm] kernel: iwl_mvm_mac_wake_tx_queue+0x2d/0xd0 [iwlmvm] kernel: ieee80211_queue_skb+0x450/0x730 [mac80211] kernel: __ieee80211_xmit_fast.constprop.66+0x834/0xa50 [mac80211] kernel: __ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x217/0x530 [mac80211] kernel: ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x60/0x580 [mac80211] kernel: dev_hard_start_xmit+0xb5/0x260 kernel: __dev_queue_xmit+0xdbe/0x1200 kernel: neigh_resolve_output+0x166/0x260 kernel: ip_finish_output2+0x216/0xb80 kernel: __ip_finish_output+0x2a4/0x4d0 kernel: ip_finish_output+0x2d/0xd0 kernel: ip_output+0x82/0x2b0 kernel: ip_local_out+0xec/0x110 kernel: igmpv3_sendpack+0x5c/0x90 kernel: igmp_ifc_timer_expire+0x26e/0x4e0 kernel: call_timer_fn+0xa5/0x230 kernel: run_timer_softirq+0x27f/0x550 kernel: __do_softirq+0xb4/0x3a4 kernel: irq_exit_rcu+0x9b/0xc0 kernel: sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x80/0xa0 kernel: asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1f/0x30 kernel: _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3f/0x70 kernel: free_to_partial_list+0x3d6/0x590 kernel: __slab_free+0x1b7/0x310 kernel: kmem_cache_free+0x52d/0x550 kernel: putname+0x5d/0x70 kernel: do_sys_openat2+0x1d7/0x310 kernel: do_sys_open+0x51/0x80 kernel: __x64_sys_openat+0x24/0x30 kernel: do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90 kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc kernel: irq event stamp: 5120729 kernel: hardirqs last enabled at (5120729): [<ffffffff9d149936>] trace_graph_return+0xd6/0x120 kernel: hardirqs last disabled at (5120728): [<ffffffff9d149950>] trace_graph_return+0xf0/0x120 kernel: softirqs last enabled at (5069900): [<ffffffff9cf65b60>] return_to_handler+0x0/0x40 kernel: softirqs last disabled at (5067555): [<ffffffff9cf65b60>] return_to_handler+0x0/0x40 kernel: other info that might help us debug this: kernel: Possible unsafe locking scenario: kernel: CPU0 kernel: ---- kernel: lock(&local->queue_stop_reason_lock); kernel: <Interrupt> kernel: lock(&local->queue_stop_reason_lock); kernel: *** DEADLOCK *** kernel: 8 locks held by kworker/5:0/25656: kernel: #0: ffff9d618009d138 ((wq_completion)events_freezable){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1ca/0x530 kernel: ljalves#1: ffffb1ef4637fe68 ((work_completion)(&local->restart_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1ce/0x530 kernel: ljalves#2: ffffffff9f166548 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: return_to_handler+0x0/0x40 kernel: ljalves#3: ffff9d6190778728 (&rdev->wiphy.mtx){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: return_to_handler+0x0/0x40 kernel: ljalves#4: ffff9d619077b480 (&mvm->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: return_to_handler+0x0/0x40 kernel: ljalves#5: ffff9d61907bacd8 (&trans_pcie->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: return_to_handler+0x0/0x40 kernel: ljalves#6: ffffffff9ef9cda0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: iwl_mvm_queue_state_change+0x59/0x3a0 [iwlmvm] kernel: ljalves#7: ffffffff9ef9cda0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: iwl_mvm_mac_itxq_xmit+0x42/0x210 [iwlmvm] kernel: stack backtrace: kernel: CPU: 5 PID: 25656 Comm: kworker/5:0 Tainted: G W 6.3.0-rc6-mt-20230401-00001-gf86822a1170f ljalves#4 kernel: Hardware name: LENOVO 82H8/LNVNB161216, BIOS GGCN51WW 11/16/2022 kernel: Workqueue: events_freezable ieee80211_restart_work [mac80211] kernel: Call Trace: kernel: <TASK> kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: dump_stack_lvl+0x5f/0xa0 kernel: dump_stack+0x14/0x20 kernel: print_usage_bug.part.46+0x208/0x2a0 kernel: mark_lock.part.47+0x605/0x630 kernel: ? sched_clock+0xd/0x20 kernel: ? trace_clock_local+0x14/0x30 kernel: ? __rb_reserve_next+0x5f/0x490 kernel: ? _raw_spin_lock+0x1b/0x50 kernel: __lock_acquire+0x464/0x1990 kernel: ? mark_held_locks+0x4e/0x80 kernel: lock_acquire+0xc7/0x2d0 kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: ? ftrace_return_to_handler+0x8b/0x100 kernel: ? preempt_count_add+0x4/0x70 kernel: _raw_spin_lock+0x36/0x50 kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: ieee80211_tx_dequeue+0xb4/0x1330 [mac80211] kernel: ? prepare_ftrace_return+0xc5/0x190 kernel: ? ftrace_graph_func+0x16/0x20 kernel: ? 0xffffffffc02ab0b1 kernel: ? lock_acquire+0xc7/0x2d0 kernel: ? iwl_mvm_mac_itxq_xmit+0x42/0x210 [iwlmvm] kernel: ? ieee80211_tx_dequeue+0x9/0x1330 [mac80211] kernel: ? __rcu_read_lock+0x4/0x40 kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: iwl_mvm_mac_itxq_xmit+0xae/0x210 [iwlmvm] kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: iwl_mvm_queue_state_change+0x311/0x3a0 [iwlmvm] kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: iwl_mvm_wake_sw_queue+0x17/0x20 [iwlmvm] kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: iwl_txq_gen2_unmap+0x1c9/0x1f0 [iwlwifi] kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: iwl_txq_gen2_free+0x55/0x130 [iwlwifi] kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: iwl_txq_gen2_tx_free+0x63/0x80 [iwlwifi] kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: _iwl_trans_pcie_gen2_stop_device+0x3f3/0x5b0 [iwlwifi] kernel: ? _iwl_trans_pcie_gen2_stop_device+0x9/0x5b0 [iwlwifi] kernel: ? mutex_lock_nested+0x4/0x30 kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: iwl_trans_pcie_gen2_stop_device+0x5f/0x90 [iwlwifi] kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: iwl_mvm_stop_device+0x78/0xd0 [iwlmvm] kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: __iwl_mvm_mac_start+0x114/0x210 [iwlmvm] kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: iwl_mvm_mac_start+0x76/0x150 [iwlmvm] kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: drv_start+0x79/0x180 [mac80211] kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: ieee80211_reconfig+0x1523/0x1ce0 [mac80211] kernel: ? synchronize_net+0x4/0x50 kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: ieee80211_restart_work+0x108/0x170 [mac80211] kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: process_one_work+0x250/0x530 kernel: ? ftrace_regs_caller_end+0x66/0x66 kernel: worker_thread+0x48/0x3a0 kernel: ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kernel: kthread+0x10f/0x140 kernel: ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 kernel: ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50 kernel: </TASK> Fixes: 4444bc2 ("wifi: mac80211: Proper mark iTXQs for resumption") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/1f58a0d1-d2b9-d851-73c3-93fcc607501c@alu.unizg.hr/ Reported-by: Mirsad Goran Todorovac <mirsad.todorovac@alu.unizg.hr> Cc: Gregory Greenman <gregory.greenman@intel.com> Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/cdc80531-f25f-6f9d-b15f-25e16130b53a@alu.unizg.hr/ Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> Signed-off-by: Mirsad Goran Todorovac <mirsad.todorovac@alu.unizg.hr> Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: tag, or it goes automatically? Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230425164005.25272-1-mirsad.todorovac@alu.unizg.hr Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
The cited commit adds a compeletion to remove dependency on rtnl lock. But it causes a deadlock for multiple encapsulations: crash> bt ffff8aece8a64000 PID: 1514557 TASK: ffff8aece8a64000 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "tc" #0 [ffffa6d14183f368] __schedule at ffffffffb8ba7f45 ljalves#1 [ffffa6d14183f3f8] schedule at ffffffffb8ba8418 ljalves#2 [ffffa6d14183f418] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffb8ba8898 ljalves#3 [ffffa6d14183f428] __mutex_lock at ffffffffb8baa7f8 ljalves#4 [ffffa6d14183f4d0] mutex_lock_nested at ffffffffb8baabeb ljalves#5 [ffffa6d14183f4e0] mlx5e_attach_encap at ffffffffc0f48c17 [mlx5_core] ljalves#6 [ffffa6d14183f628] mlx5e_tc_add_fdb_flow at ffffffffc0f39680 [mlx5_core] ljalves#7 [ffffa6d14183f688] __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow at ffffffffc0f3b636 [mlx5_core] ljalves#8 [ffffa6d14183f6f0] mlx5e_tc_add_flow at ffffffffc0f3bcdf [mlx5_core] ljalves#9 [ffffa6d14183f728] mlx5e_configure_flower at ffffffffc0f3c1d1 [mlx5_core] ljalves#10 [ffffa6d14183f790] mlx5e_rep_setup_tc_cls_flower at ffffffffc0f3d529 [mlx5_core] ljalves#11 [ffffa6d14183f7a0] mlx5e_rep_setup_tc_cb at ffffffffc0f3d714 [mlx5_core] ljalves#12 [ffffa6d14183f7b0] tc_setup_cb_add at ffffffffb8931bb8 ljalves#13 [ffffa6d14183f810] fl_hw_replace_filter at ffffffffc0dae901 [cls_flower] ljalves#14 [ffffa6d14183f8d8] fl_change at ffffffffc0db5c57 [cls_flower] ljalves#15 [ffffa6d14183f970] tc_new_tfilter at ffffffffb8936047 ljalves#16 [ffffa6d14183fac8] rtnetlink_rcv_msg at ffffffffb88c7c31 ljalves#17 [ffffa6d14183fb50] netlink_rcv_skb at ffffffffb8942853 ljalves#18 [ffffa6d14183fbc0] rtnetlink_rcv at ffffffffb88c1835 ljalves#19 [ffffa6d14183fbd0] netlink_unicast at ffffffffb8941f27 ljalves#20 [ffffa6d14183fc18] netlink_sendmsg at ffffffffb8942245 ljalves#21 [ffffa6d14183fc98] sock_sendmsg at ffffffffb887d482 ljalves#22 [ffffa6d14183fcb8] ____sys_sendmsg at ffffffffb887d81a ljalves#23 [ffffa6d14183fd38] ___sys_sendmsg at ffffffffb88806e2 ljalves#24 [ffffa6d14183fe90] __sys_sendmsg at ffffffffb88807a2 ljalves#25 [ffffa6d14183ff28] __x64_sys_sendmsg at ffffffffb888080f ljalves#26 [ffffa6d14183ff38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffffb8b9b6a8 ljalves#27 [ffffa6d14183ff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffffb8c0007c crash> bt 0xffff8aeb07544000 PID: 1110766 TASK: ffff8aeb07544000 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "kworker/u20:9" #0 [ffffa6d14e6b7bd8] __schedule at ffffffffb8ba7f45 ljalves#1 [ffffa6d14e6b7c68] schedule at ffffffffb8ba8418 ljalves#2 [ffffa6d14e6b7c88] schedule_timeout at ffffffffb8baef88 ljalves#3 [ffffa6d14e6b7d10] wait_for_completion at ffffffffb8ba968b ljalves#4 [ffffa6d14e6b7d60] mlx5e_take_all_encap_flows at ffffffffc0f47ec4 [mlx5_core] ljalves#5 [ffffa6d14e6b7da0] mlx5e_rep_update_flows at ffffffffc0f3e734 [mlx5_core] ljalves#6 [ffffa6d14e6b7df8] mlx5e_rep_neigh_update at ffffffffc0f400bb [mlx5_core] ljalves#7 [ffffa6d14e6b7e50] process_one_work at ffffffffb80acc9c ljalves#8 [ffffa6d14e6b7ed0] worker_thread at ffffffffb80ad012 ljalves#9 [ffffa6d14e6b7f10] kthread at ffffffffb80b615d ljalves#10 [ffffa6d14e6b7f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffffb8001b2f After the first encap is attached, flow will be added to encap entry's flows list. If neigh update is running at this time, the following encaps of the flow can't hold the encap_tbl_lock and sleep. If neigh update thread is waiting for that flow's init_done, deadlock happens. Fix it by holding lock outside of the for loop. If neigh update is running, prevent encap flows from offloading. Since the lock is held outside of the for loop, concurrent creation of encap entries is not allowed. So remove unnecessary wait_for_completion call for res_ready. Fixes: 95435ad ("net/mlx5e: Only access fully initialized flows in neigh update") Signed-off-by: Chris Mi <cmi@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Roi Dayan <roid@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
after compiling and rebooting, there is no new card in tvheadend, so i tried moprobe my selfe and get this errors:
WARNING: Error inserting v4l2_common (/lib/modules/3.5.0-39-generic/kernel/drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-common.ko): Invalid argument
WARNING: Error inserting cx2341x (/lib/modules/3.5.0-39-generic/kernel/drivers/media/common/cx2341x.ko): Invalid argument
WARNING: Error inserting snd_page_alloc (/lib/modules/3.5.0-39-generic/kernel/sound/core/snd-page-alloc.ko): Invalid argument
WARNING: Error inserting snd_timer (/lib/modules/3.5.0-39-generic/kernel/sound/core/snd-timer.ko): Invalid argument
WARNING: Error inserting snd_pcm (/lib/modules/3.5.0-39-generic/kernel/sound/core/snd-pcm.ko): Invalid argument
WARNING: Error inserting altera_stapl (/lib/modules/3.5.0-39-generic/kernel/drivers/misc/altera-stapl/altera-stapl.ko): Invalid argument
WARNING: Error inserting videobuf_dma_sg (/lib/modules/3.5.0-39-generic/kernel/drivers/media/v4l2-core/videobuf-dma-sg.ko): Invalid argument
WARNING: Error inserting rc_core (/lib/modules/3.5.0-39-generic/kernel/drivers/media/rc/rc-core.ko): Invalid argument
FATAL: Error inserting cx23885 (/lib/modules/3.5.0-39-generic/kernel/drivers/media/pci/cx23885/cx23885.ko): Invalid argument
what should i do?
thank you and best regards
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